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Abstract
In this dissertation I analyze Sir Arthur Eddington's statistical theory as developed in the 
first six chapters of his posthumously published Fundamental Theory. In particular I 
look at the mathematical structure, philosophical implications, and relevancy to modern 
physics. This analysis is the only one of Fundamental Theory that compares it to modern 
quantum field theory and is the most comprehensive look at his statistical theory in four 
decades. Several major insights have been made in this analysis including the fact that he 
was able to derive Pauli’s Exclusion Principle in part from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle. In addition the most profound general conclusion of this research is that 
Fundamental Theory is, in fact, an early quantum field theory, something that has never 
before been suggested. Contrary to the majority of historical reports and some comments 
by his contemporaries, this analysis shows that Eddington’s later work is neither mystical 
nor was it that far from mainstream when it was published. My research reveals 
numerous profoundly deep ideas that were ahead of their time when Fundamental Theory 
was developed, but that have significant applicability at present. As such this analysis 
presents several important questions to be considered by modern philosophers of science, 
physicists, mathematicians, and historians. In addition it sheds new light on Eddington as 
a scientist and mathematician, in part indicating that his marginalization has been largely 
unwarranted.
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Preface
Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity is perhaps the most significant development 
in the history of modern cosmology. It turned the entire field of cosmology into a 
quantitative science. In it, Einstein described gravity as being a consequence of the 
geometry of the universe. Though this precise point is still unsettled, it is undeniable that 
dimensionality plays a role in modem physics and in gravity itself. Following quickly on 
the heels of Einstein’s discovery, physicists attempted to link gravity to the only other 
fundamental force of nature known at that time: electromagnetism. Both Hermann Weyl 
(1885-1955) in 1918 and Arthur Stanley Eddington (1888-1944) in 1921 developed field 
theories that in essence were early attempts at unification employing the new concept of 
the géométrisation of physics. Also in 1921 the German theoretical physicist Theodor 
Kaluza (1885-1954) attempted this by extending Einstein’s field equations to five 
dimensions (Kaluza 1921). Essentially he postulated a five dimensional Riemannian 
space by adding to the four known dimensions a fifth one where particles always 
followed closed paths. Both electromagnetism and relativity were contained within this 
grand scheme but it did not contain any of the relatively young quantum theory leaving 
most physicists to realize it bore no resemblance to reality. The Swedish theoretical 
physicist Oskar Klein (1894-1977) added the quantum aspect to Kaluza’s theory in 1926 
(Klein 1926) and similar subsequent theories have been loosely grouped into the category 
of Kaluza-Klein Theories. In Klein’s theory the fifth dimension was unobservable 
whereas Kaluza’s was macroscopic in size. This unobservable dimension’s physical 
reality was akin to a quantity that was conjugate to the electrical charge. In this way 
Klein also sought to explain Planck’s quantum of action. The lack of sufficient 
mechanisms for testing such an idea and finding a practical application for the theory 
kept Kaluza-Klein theories largely out of the mainstream until their revival in the 1970s. 
This did not stop many scientists from studying unification, however. Einstein 
essentially devoted the final thirty years of his life to it while Eddington devoted the last 
fifteen.
Unification today is widely regarded as the Holy Grail of physics. Physicists have 
successfully unified the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces with special relativity 
under the guise of quantum field theory, but any definitive link to gravity or general 
relativity remains elusive. String theory is currently the mainstream theory of choice for 
this but remains unproven. Unifying gravity and quantum theory then must be at the 
heart of this quest, and theories of quantum gravity have been at the forefront of research 
in physics for nearly forty years. But attempts at such a unification actually date to at 
least 1928, when Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac (1902-1984) derived his relativistic equation 
for the electron (Dirac 1928a and 1928b). Eddington, disappointed that Dirac’s equation 
did not appear in tensor form,^ sought to reformulate Dirac’s work in 1929-1930 to put 
quantum theory into the language of relativity, i.e. tensor calculus (Eddington 1929).
This led to the development of several theories of cosmology in the 1930s developed 
primarily by Eddington, Dirac, and Edward Arthur Milne (1896-1950). Several 
unification theories that did not directly address cosmological questions were also 
developed at this time.
Eddington’s work rested on the premise that quantum mechanics and relativity 
could be united under a common framework both in the formalism and the philosophy.
He began by analyzing uncertainty and became convinced that its introduction into 
physics heralded such a monumental change that every physicist needed to consider its 
philosophical implications in their work. He clearly opposed the Einstein-Podolsky- 
Rosen (EPR) interpretation saying that any scientist who accepted the idea of hidden 
variables as an explanation of indeterminacy “wants shaking up and waking” (Eddington 
1935b, p. 84). He saw this fundamental indeterminacy as the foundation on which to 
build a unified theory of physics.
Though his work on uncertainty is clearly debatable in its validity it actually 
foreshadowed some later developments in physics, including the need for a quantum- 
mechanical standard of length. This led him to the next major component of his work: an 
analysis of The Pauli Exclusion Principle. He develops exclusion into a richer 
framework that serves, in combination with uncertainty, as the basis of later versions of
' Charles Galton Darwin (1887-1962) was the first to note that Dirac’s equation was not in tensor form; see 
C.G. Darwin, “The Wave Equation of the Electron,” Proceedings o f  the Royal Society [A] 118 (1928), 654- 
680.
his complete theory, which held that physical events depend solely on dimensionless 
ratios. Later, this idea was taken up by Dirac in proposing his Large Numbers 
Hypothesis (Diiac 1937).
Eddington’s work hinted at some of the underlying principles of modern theories 
including some aspects of grand unified theories (GUTs) and string theory. In fact, as 
this monograph discusses, Fundamental Theory, as it was posthumously titled, is a very 
early attempt at quantum field theory that quite remarkably predicts future advances in 
that field. It’s greatest relevance to modem science is in its unique interpretation of the 
foundational aspects of modern physics and its philosophical implications for the 
underlying structure of the physical world. In fact Eddington’s work has seen somewhat 
of a renaissance in recent years and has been studied in greater detail by a growing list of 
scholars.
I first discovered this aspect of Eddington’s work when reading a brief account of 
his cosmology in Helge Kragh’s Quantum Generations. I had known of Eddington from 
my work in astronomy for his many mainstream accomplishments, but this brief 
encounter with his unorthodox worldview turned my research from work on general 
problems in cosmology to addressing truly foundational problems in modem physics.
The results of my initial foray into his work on uncertainty, that reveal a deep 
distrust of standard measurement techniques and a worldview incorporating uncertainty 
into the very fabric of space-time, led naturally to his extension of the Exclusion 
Principle. One of the many amazing insights that continued to fuel my work was the fact 
that Eddington modifies the interpretation of this fundamental principle and extracts 
results from the new interpretation that point to a deeper philosophical meaning behind 
exclusion. This presented me with several fundamental questions about the nature of 
exclusion: could it be more than a relatively straightforward quantum phenomenon; could 
it reside in that fundamental area inhabited by the conservation laws, the forces of nature, 
and the uncertainty principle, and, if it does, what does this mean for modern physics?
My conclusions in this endeavour have led to several extended pieces of research in 
fundamental physics that, in itself, emphasizes the surprising relevance of his work 
despite its chequered past.
Examining these questions is not only important for a complete understanding of 
exclusion and Eddington’s unorthodox worldview, but they are also at the heart of the 
relationship between science and philosophy. When analyzed in full compliment with his 
work on uncertainty', the whole of his thinking begins to unravel itself. To say that 
Eddington went from being one of the subjects of my dissertation to being the only 
subject of my dissertation does not do proper justice to his influence on me. Delving into 
the deep questions of uncertainty and exclusion, particularly in the context of unification 
and the nature of the universe itself, his work has led me into many new uncharted areas 
and has helped to focus my general research interests onto more fundamental and 
foundational questions. But aside from my personal interest in the subject, Eddington’s 
philosophical and even some of his mathematical work is often overlooked by modern 
scholars. Bohm, Fred Hoyle (1915 - 2001), and Hermann Bondi (b. 1919) are well- 
known despite their controversial theories making up a lai'ge portion of their body of 
work, while Eddington, whose diverse work included the first observational verification 
of general relativity and the neaiiy single-handed creation of the field of stellar stiucture, 
tends to be overlooked and even marginalized.^ It was this historical treatment that 
contributed to my focus solely on Eddington.
My research concentrated primarily on what comprises the first six chapters of 
Fundamental Theory and is often referred to as his statistical theory. These six chapters 
focus their efforts on reinterpreting and applying Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and 
Pauli’s Exclusion Principle. They form the philosophical and interpretive basis of his 
entire program of research. I analyzed each in detail both philosophically and 
mathematically in search of any morsel of truth or potential application to modern 
physics. The formalism of the latter chapters cannot be understood without the 
contextual basis the early material provides. A direct result of his statistical theory was 
the derivation of many of the known constants in the universe (hence the derisive label of 
numerology) and I analyzed these in detail as well. Putting all of this together I 
examined the impact on unification, particularly from a modern quantum field theoretic
 ^One slightly elderly physicist who devotes much of his time to the histoiy o f physics these days, remarked 
to me at a conference once that when he thought of Eddington he always thought o f numerology. Helge 
Kragh, a noted historian of modem physics devotes nearly all of his discussion on Eddington in Quantum 
Generations: A Histoiy o f  Physics in the 20' '^ Century (Kragh 1999) to Eddington’s cosmology and very 
little to his more mainstream, and arguably more influential, works on relativity and stellar stmcture.
sense, attempting to determine if Eddington could have been on the right track with 
anything. The portions that do have relevance to the foundations of modern physics I 
then examined in depth. I have three published papers (Durham 2004, 2003a,and 2003b) 
on the subject but, other than the most recent, they bear little resendblance to what follows 
since my work has matured and evolved over the years as my understanding of physics 
itself has done the same. A robust and lengthy treatment of Eddington’s statistical theory 
from Fundamental Theory comprises the nine chapters of this text.
One final note I wish to make is that, despite its title, Clive Kilmister’s 1994 book 
Eddington’s Search for a Fundamental Theory: A Key to the Universe is devoted more 
fully to an analysis of Eddington’s 1936 book Relativity Theory o f Protons and Electrons 
that laid the groundwork for Fundamental Theory published a decade later. Much was 
changed in the theory in the final eight years of Eddington’s life and the two years 
between then and publication. Kilmister and B.G.J. Tupper did analyze the statistical 
components of Fundamental Theory in the early 1960s (Kilmister and Tupper 1963) but 
more from the perspective of their own research that built upon Eddington’s. It was also 
prior to many of the major advances in quantum field theory. As such, my work is the 
only comprehensive study of the statistical portions of Eddington’s Fundamental Theory 
that puts it into historical perspective and the only study that compares it to quantum field  
theory rather than quantum mechanics and relativistic cosmology.
I wish to thank numerous people in helping me to complete this work. In addition 
to eveiyone to whom this text is dedicated, I wish to thank my doctoral advisors at St. 
Andrews, Prof. Edmund Robertson, ERSE, and Dr. John O’Connor. During a recent 
session on advising for new faculty members at Saint Anselm College where I now teach, 
participants were asked about their best and worst advising experiences as students. I 
was the only one whose best experience was with their doctorate. Edmund and John have 
gone well beyond what I expected of them and made this experience a truly pleasurable 
one. I also wish to thank Simmons College in Boston for employing me as a full-time 
instructor for the vast majority of my time as a doctoral student. In addition to providing 
my family and I with much-needed financial resources Simmons provided excellent 
facilities for building my research and developing my pedagogical style. As such, thanks 
must also go to Saint Anselm College in New Hampshire, where I now reside as a tenure-
track faculty member. Saint A’s has offered me a wonderful place to ply my 
interdisciplinaiy trade as a philosopher and historian of physics while also providing me 
with a fantastic group of students with whom I can discuss physics at length.
Thanks are also in order for Roger Stuewer for careful editing of one of the papers 
that formed part of this treatise, a process in which I learned a great deal; Kate Price for 
organizing the most stimulating conference of my professional career, one that actually 
had a greater impact on my work than anything else; John Amson, one of the founders of 
the Alternative Natural Philosophy Association (ANPA) with Clive Kilmister and a 
former Saint Andrews (the other Saint A ’s!) professor, for encouraging my interest in 
Eddington and welcoming me into his wonderful home on the coast of Scotland to pick 
his brain for an afternoon; Meg Weston Smith, the daughter of E.A. Milne, who has 
generously provided me with her friendship and hospitality not to mention a treasure- 
trove of information relating to her father and his relationship with Eddington (Milne’s 
kinematic relativity will be a future project for me); and Alan Boufford for teaching me 
the organizational skills I needed to finish this.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the numerous libraries and archives I accessed 
along the way including the libraries (including archives and other resources) of the 
University of St. Andrews, Simmons College, Saint Anselm College, MIT, the Royal 
Society of London, the Royal Astronomical Society, and the American Philosophical 
Society. I also wish to thank the Kennebunk Free Library in Kennebunk, Maine, for a 
quiet place to work. I have four generations of libraiians in my family and librarians are 
often unsung heroes.
Ian T. Durham 
October 2004 
Kennebunk, Maine
II
Eddington^s Life and Worldview
No study of Eddington’s work is complete without a brief description of his life and his 
worldview since these were vital in shaping his research. In particular I will examine 
aspects of his life that are directly relevant to the development of Fundamental Theory 
and the ideas behind it. A full account of his life can be found in several texts including 
the standard biography of him done by his former student A.V. Douglas in 1956.
Eddington’s Life in a Nutshell
Eddington was bom 28 December, 1882, in Kendal, Westmoreland, England. He was the 
second child and only son of Arthur Henry Eddington, who was the headmaster of the 
Stinmongate School, the Quaker (Society of Friends) school where the chemist John 
Dalton (1766-1844) once taught (Douglas 1956, p. 103). Eddington was a very 
intelligent child with a curious intellect and an aptitude for numbers: he attempted to 
count the words in tlie Bible and mastered the 24 x 24 multiplication table before he 
could read (Douglas 1956, p. 2 and Plummer 1948). He obtained a three-inch telescope a 
bit later thus launching his lifelong study of the heavens (Smart 1945 and Plummer 
1948). His schooling began at the Brynmelyn School in Weston-super-Mare (1893- 
1898), where his family had moved shortly after the untimely death of his father in 1884 
from typhoid. He then attended Owens College, Manchester (1898-1902), managing to 
circumvent the mles that prohibited those under the age of 16 from attending. His 
professors at Owens included mathematician Horace Lamb (1849-1934) (see Figure 1.) 
and physicist Arthur Schuster (1851-1934). In 1902 he received his B.S. from Owens 
and then moved to Trinity College, Cambridge, on a scholarship, where he studied under 
E.T. Whittaker (1873-1956), the person who later compilQd Fundamental Theory, A.N. 
Wliitehead (1861-1947), and E.W. Barnes (1874-1953), all mathematicians. In 1905 in 
addition to receiving his M.A., he spent a term working in the Cavendish Laboratory, 
then under the direction of J.J. Thomson (1856-1940), where he very nearly made
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Figure 1. Horace Lamb’s headstone in 
Ascension burial ground (formerly St. 
Giles’ cemetery) in Cambridge, just a 
few hundred feet from Eddington’s 
(photo by author).
a career for himself in physics. In 1907, 
he was awarded the Smith’s Prize and 
elected as a Fellow of Trinity College 
(see Figure 2.). In January of 1906, he 
was appointed as Chief Assistant at the 
Royal Observatory, Greenwich, to 
succeed Sir Frank Dyson (1868-1939) 
who moved to Edinburgh to take up the 
post of Astronomer Royal for Scotland. 
Once there he began working on a 
research project that had actually started 
in 1900, studying photographic plates of 
the minor planet Eros.
Eddington completed the project determining an accurate value for solar parallax. Much 
of his early work at the Observatory has been overlooked but Smith gives a nice detailed 
account of much of this in his recent paper (Smith 2004). Once again, in 1909, he was 
tempted by physics but turned down Schuster’s offer of a position at Manchester because, 
as he explained in a letter to Schuster, he preferred the observational work associated 
with astronomy (Eddington to Schuster 1909). He returned to physics later in his career 
but in the next chapter and beyond 1 contend that his philosophical outlook was primarily
Figure 2. Neville’s Court, Trinity College, Cambridge, 
2004 (photo by author).
1 1
shaped, albeit indirectly and perhaps subconsciously, by his astronomical work.
In 1913 Eddington succeeded Sir George Darwin (1845-1912), son of evolutionist
Charles Darwin (1809-1882), as the Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental
Philosophy at Cambridge. The following year he also succeeded Sir Robert Ball (1840-
1913) (see Figure 3.) as Director of the
University Observatory and was elected
a Fellow of the Royal Society. As
Director of the Observatory he was
given the right to live in the east wing of
the Observatory’s main building. He
moved in on Lady Day, 1914, with his
sister Winifred (1878-1954) and his
mother Sarah Ann (d. 1924). He had
previously been elected to the Royal
Astronomical Society in 1906 (he was
u .1 * • nominated by Whittaker) and served asFigure 3. Sir Robert Ball s headstone is at the
top (his son’s is the lower stone). This is also in its Secretary from 1912 to 1917, as its
Ascension burial ground less than twenty feet
from Eddington’s (photo by author) President from 1921 to 1923,
i
 ^ A
fwm-
and as its Foreign Secretary from 1933 until his death. He received the Society’s Gold 
Medal, its highest honour for achievement in astronomy and geophysics (2 are awarded 
each year) in 1924. In the same year the Astronomical Society of the Pacific awarded 
him its Bruce Medal. The Royal Society (of London) awarded him its Royal Medal in 
1928, a medal originally chartered by King George IV. Shortly thereafter, in 1930, he 
was knighted. His knighthood status was that of Knight Bachelor as he never married. 
1938 was once again a pivotal year that saw him made President of the International 
Astronomical Union and the recipient of yet another of Britain’s highest honours, the 
Order of Merit.
12
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The Meticulous Man
By 1917 he was fully absorbed in operations at the Observatory, though the ongoing war 
on the continent continued to knock on his door (see below). During this time he 
completed the Cambridge Zone Catalogue of Observations using telescopes housed in the 
Observatory. He was well-known within the astronomy community but he was about to 
achieve a fame and notoriety that, while not universal like Einstein’s, makes him one of 
the pivotal figures in twentieth century science. In 1919, in part due to an attempt at 
deferment from active military duty, he organized and participated in an observation of a 
total solar eclipse (in fact, two observations) in an effort to determine if Einstein’s 
relatively newly minted theory of general relativity was accurate. The resulting report 
(Eddington 1919) is legendary -  it gave scientists as well as the general public physical 
evidence that overturned long-held concepts of space and time. Eddington followed this 
up by publishing in 1923 Mathematical Theory o f Relativity described by Einstein as the 
“finest presentation of the subject in any language” (as quoted in Douglas 1956). His 
major contribution to astrophysics. The Internal Constitution o f the Stars, that 
summarized his pioneering work on stellar structure, appeared in 1926. This was 
followed two years later by his first book aimed at a non-technical audience: The Nature 
o f the Physical World based on the Gifford Lectures he had given at the University of 
Edinburgh. He subsequently published four more non-technical books, the impact of 
which has been recently discussed by Whitworth (Whitworth 2004). His attention to 
detail is noteworthy. His lifelong interest in cycling was well-known (see Figure 4.)
Figure 4. Eddington’s Cycling Log at the Wren Library, 
Trinity College, Cambridge (photo by author).
13
and gives an excellent example of this in the form of his meticulous cycling logs. His 
meticulous nature was not confined to the taking of data: he was a master at language, in 
English as well as the classics.^ He was well versed in literature and wrote poems for his 
own amusement that were considered quite good by those lucky enough to steal a 
glimpse of them. He was a fan of P.O. Wodehouse (1881-1975) and mathematician 
Charles Dodgson (1832-1898) who was better known by his penname Lewis Carroll. 
Eddington often made up grammatically correct sentences in Carroll’s style that made no 
sense. Subramanyan Chandrasekhar (1910-1995) gives an example directly told to him 
by Eddington: “To stand by the hedge and sound like a turnip” (Chandrasekhar 1983). 
The fact that this sentence is both ridiculous and grammatically correct might serve for 
many as an excellent metaphor for Fundamental Theory, which is largely internally 
consistent but appears ridiculous to some upon examination (I will show it is not nearly 
as ridiculous as it may first appear).
Dodgon’s influence on Eddington extends beyond the literary and into the realm 
of mathematics. He had a penchant for writing mathematical puzzles and his most 
famous, the Zoo Puzzle, which still circulates among puzzle enthusiasts, was written in 
the style and used the characters of Lewis Carroll (see Appendix A for a detailed 
description and solution). Some of Eddington’s own more light-hearted literary fare was 
actually published, for example:
There once was a brainy baboon,
Wlio always breathed down a bassoon.
For he said, "It appears 
That in billions of years 
I shall certainly hit on a tune (Eddington 1935b).
Harold Spencer Jones (1890-1960) and Edmund T. Whittaker (1873-1956) recalled his 
“retentive memory for the apposite quotation” and his fondness for Shakespeare, having 
been a member of The Elizabethans, a small private society devoted to The Bard at
 ^Though he was a consummate mathematician, he did say “If I sometimes employ pure mathematics, it is 
only as a drudge; my devotion is fixed on the physical thought which lies behind the mathematics” 
(Eddington 1939, p. 74).
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Greenwich (Spencer Jones and Whittaker 1945). He was addicted to solving crossword 
puzzles in The Times and the New Statesman and Nation and rarely took more than five 
minutes per puzzle (Chandrasekhar 1983). His linguistic skill is well represented in the 
five popular books on science and philosophy that he had written.
But in addition to being a gifted writer, Eddington was a careful and concise 
mathematician, as I will explore in greater detail in the coming chapters. In truth, though 
Eddington’s work was primarily in astronomy and physics, he was an applied 
mathematician. Evidence of his application of complex mathematics to even seemingly 
mundane astronomical problems appears fairly early in his work. For example, in an 
article that appeared in Monthly Notices o f the Royal Astronomical Society in 1910, he 
attempted to fit three-dimensional paraboloids to fuzzy two-dimensional photographs 
(Eddington 1910). The attention to detail required of such a task is immense and is only 
one example of his ability to focus intently on certain subjects, sometimes to the 
exclusion of others. His meticulous nature is even apparent in his handwriting, which is 
extremely neat and compact, and in his arguments, which attempt to be wholly logical, 
though passion and zeal do creep in (see Larmor discussion below).
Meticulous yet Much Maligned
Despite his faith in mathematics, Eddington always searched for physical justifications 
for his work, despite its deductive nature. Moreover, his philosophy of science was far 
from unusual at the time, although in his later years his contemporaries often viewed his 
views unfavourably. His work was - and still is - regarded as heterodoxical, both 
philosophically and scientifically (Kragh 1999). His harshest critic in Britain was the 
astrophysicist and philosopher Herbert Dingle, who referred to the theories of Eddington, 
Milne, Dirac, and others as the “pseudoscience of invertebrate cosmythology” (as quoted 
in Kragh 1999). Eddington’s mathematics, however, were faiily standard and always 
rigorous. Thus, the charge of heterodoxy can only be applied to his physics. But his was 
hardly the only physical theory before or since that was regained as heterodoxical. As I 
have mentioned several times, Dirac’s Large Numbers Hypothesis (LNH) was just such a
15
theory and even Dirac’s theory of electron-holes, which is still used to teach elementary 
quantum mechanics, is fairly heterodoxical to a quantum field theorist.
In fact to Eddington’s credit he employed a number of methods that are in use 
today, including Clifford algebras. A httle-known fact is that he introduced chirality to 
particle physics. He also is sometimes credited with an independent discovery of 
Majorana spinors (Chandrasekhar 1983), which are often described (somewhat 
incorrectly) as the square roots of vectors since the vector representation appears in the 
tensor product of two copies of the spinor representation. A Majorana spinor is actually 
the real representation of a non-complexified Clifford algebra (while a Dirac spinor is the 
fundamental representation of a complexified Clifford algebra). Ettore Majorana (1906- 
1938) is credited with their invention (Majorana 1937). Despite appearing in 1937, the 
substance of this paper was rumoured to have been written in 1932/33 but confined to a 
desk drawer until 1937 (Recami 1999). Its appearance came about a year before 
Majorana disappeared under suspicious circumstances on a boat ride from Naples to 
Palermo. Two letters left behind hint that suicide may have been contemplated, though 
kidnapping was also speculated as a possibility as was an intentional disappearance since 
he was working for the fascist regime in Italy to develop an atomic weapon (Wikipedia: 
The Free Encyclopaedia).'^ In any regard, his premature presumed death could have led 
to his receiving primary credit for the discovery as a recognition of his achievement of 
sorts, particularly considering that Eddington’s professional reputation was beginning to 
suffer in the late 1930s as his work on cosmology consumed the majority of his life. 
Eddington’s contribution could also have easily been overlooked thanks to his liberal use 
of novel notation, derivations, and nomenclature (something that can make reading 
Eddington’s technical works difficult).
In other ways Eddington was ahead of his time -  and is seldom recognized for it. 
He recognized the need for a quantum-mechanical standard of length nearly fifty years 
before one was adopted, and he advocated the inseparability of an object and its
Enrico Fermi said of Majorana; '"There are many categories o f scientists, people o f second and third rank, 
who do their best, but do not go very far. There are also people o f first class, who make great discoveries, 
fundamental fo r  the development o f science. But then there are the geniuses, like Galilei and Newton. Well, 
Ettore Majorana was one o f them... ” (Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopaedia).
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environment (not to be confused with the inseparability of the object and its observer), a 
philosophical stance that appears in some versions of quantum field theory. His idea of 
linking quantum mechanics and relativity through coordinates compares well with 
modem links through topology. Quite apart from his work on cosmology, however, he 
almost single-handedly founded the field of stellar structure (c.f. Chandrasekhar 1983). 
About those critics who laughed at Eddington, Einstein^ once said: “Why should they 
laugh? They have never done what he has done!” (Douglas 1956, p. 146).
Figure 5. Einstein and Eddington in the Cambridge 
Observatory garden in 1930 (photo by Winifred Eddington, 
courtesy Institute of Astronomy, Cambridge).
Formation of the Eddington Worldview
Not even the best science occurs in a vacuum. After all, scientists are humans and 
subject to real human emotions, thoughts, influences, and the like. Therefore it would be 
remiss of me not to spend a bit of time discussing a few key influences in Eddington’s 
career, specifically those that helped shape Fundamental Theory. Since his spirituality 
was such an integral part of his life it is important to consider the influences in this area 
as well since his spirituality and science are intertwined. Matthew Stanley recently 
completed a PhD dissertation at Harvard University entitled Practical Mystic: Religion 
and Science in the Life ofA.S. Eddington (Stanley 2004b). His work discusses many of 
these points in much greater detail and I refer readers to that work if they are particularly 
interested in Eddington’s spiritual side.
 ^Einstein visited Eddington in Cambridge in 1930, the year Eddington was knighted. He is rumoured to 
have played violin for Eddington, his sister, and his mother at some point during this visit (see Figure 5.).
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Before venturing into the realm of religion and mysticism, more worldly 
influences will be discussed. Two of the more prominent influences on Eddington were 
his association with Sir Ralph Fowler (who eventually became Lord Rutherford’s son-in- 
law) and his upbringing in the late Victorian age. These influences are, in fact, shared by 
Milne and Diiac (Durham 2003a). Fowler influenced Eddington both directly and 
indirectly though he was seven years Eddington’s junior. In particular the two 
collaborated on research in super dense matter primarily as it relates to white dwarf stars, 
though they never published a joint paper.® As I show in the final few chapters of this 
text this work on super-dense matter was one of the key points in the development of 
Fundamental Theory, particularly the statistical aspects. Fowler’s scientific contribution 
here was a general solution to Emden’s equation of state, something Eddington had found 
a specific solution to. It was Fowler who introduced Dirac to quantum mechanics (and to 
Werner Heisenberg) and it was Dirac’s paper describing the relativistic theory of the 
election that helped launch Eddington’s work on Fundamental Theory (see Ch. 4).
Fowler was also a Fellow of Trinity College at the same time as Eddington and the two 
had frequent contact, though Eddington’s work was primarily at the Cambridge 
Observatory while Fowler’s was at the Cavendish Laboratory. Fowler’s general 
influence on Cambridge physics is remarkable -  during the period 1922-1939 he 
supervised sixty-four students for an average of eleven at any one time. Fifteen of these 
became Fellows of the Royal Society and another three became Nobel Laureates. Far 
from being impossible to locate due to his tremendous commitments, most of his students 
found themselves in a close relationship with him.
Like Eddington, Milne, and Dirac, Fowler was also raised in the late Victorian 
age. Two aspects of Victorianism had a direct influence on Eddington’s work. The first 
was the strict social system that had religion at its forefront. The second was a mystical 
fascination with the unknown (Durham 2003a). Focusing on the latter, the late Victorian 
age was particularly relevant to an understanding of Eddington’s formative years. H.G. 
Wells (1866 -  1946), who was one of the original science fiction literaries and who began 
writing in the 1890s, pointed out that the major change during the Victorian age was the
® In fact, of Eddington’s 265 published papers, 93 of which appeared before the famous eclipse paper, a 
mere 9 list co-authors.
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shift in worldview from mystically religious to more cosmic in nature (Frayter 1997) 
incorporating new views of time, space, and evolution. Time and space began their new 
lives starting in 1854 with Bernhard Riemann’s (1826 -  1866) publication of non- 
Euclidean geometry and development of hypersurfaces (Eddington was the type who 
might have noticed that Wells was born the same yeai* Riemann died). To explain his 
hypersurfaces he created fictional creatures called flatlanders who could only live in two 
dimensions but who could experience a third dimension as a force or feeling. The 
concept was introduced to England in 1884 by Dr. Edwin Abbott Abbott (1838 -  1926), a 
religious scholar, in his novel Flatland in which flatlanders were one of many 
dimensionally limited species. The novel was hierarchical in that it displayed the caste­
like social system of Victorian England.
The new evolutionary (as well as aspects of the cosmic) views of the Victorian 
age began appearing in a series of purely sectaiian works on science known collectively 
as the Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness o f God as Manifested 
in the Creation. They were published after the death and at the bequest of the 8^ Earl of 
Bridgewater in 1829. Paul Frayter describes Wells’ The Island o f Dr. Moreau as an anti- 
Bridgewater Treatise where the beneficent God was replaced by a vivisectionist (Frayter 
1997). The year 1869 saw the publication of Frances Gabon’s (1822 -  1911) Hereditary 
Genius in which he first formulated the idea of eugenics or the improvement of the 
human species through selected parenthood. Wells was also inspired by Gabon’s work to 
write the dark and alien First Men in the Moon. Gabon was a cousin of Charles Darwin 
(1809 ~ 1882) and was dbectly influenced by his evolutionary work. Darwin’s son 
Horace (1851 -  1928; who is yet another famous scientist buried in the same cemetery as 
Eddington -  see Appendix B), founder of the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company, 
worked closely with Fowler, in particular, and Dai'win’s grandson Charles Gabon Darwin 
(1887 -  1962) was the first person to notice (publicly) that Dirac’s relativistic theory of 
the election was not in tensor format, a key point of influence in Eddington’s early 
musings on Fundamental Theory. Indeed one could quite possibly write an entire treatise 
on the varying influences of the entire Darwin/Gabon clan from 1850 to 1950, but what is 
important here is the dramatic display of fanciful thinking, much of which was directly or 
indirectly inspired by the religious fervour of the time as well as the desbe to reconcile
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the new discoveries in science and mathematics with the concept of a deity. In essence 
there was a sense that religious and scientific “seeking” were two parts of the same 
whole. This is a concept that was nearly dogmatised in turn-of-the-century Quaker 
reformism, something that impacted Eddington’s life directly.
His family being devout Quakers, Eddington was exposed to Quakerism and its 
embodiment of a philosophy of peace (specifically pacifism) and inner harmony, not 
unlike some Eastern philosophies, early in life. Stanley (Stanley 2004a) says that in 
keeping the lines of communication with Germany open in difficult times “for him, 
Einstein and relativity were his contribution as a Quaker to world peace.” Reportedly, 
several of Einstein’s papers on relativity were smuggled to Eddington via the Dutch 
astronomer Willem de Sitter (1872 -  1934). As Eddington lived during two world wars it 
is not unexpected that it became a source of tension for him at times. For instance, 
during the first World War of 1914-1918, conscientious objectors were placed in camps. 
Due to their pacifistic creed Quakers usually became conscientious objectors, and 
Eddington had friends who were sent to pick potatoes in agricultural camps 
(Chandrasekhar 1983). Most (though not all) authors attribute his success in receiving a 
deferment to Dyson. The actual circumstances, though involving Dyson to some extent, 
also involved mathematical physicist Joseph Larmor (1857-1942) who attempted to 
utilize contacts at the British Home Office to have Eddington deferred on the grounds 
that it was not in the national interest to have a distinguished scientist in the Army.^ 
Eddington was perfectly willing to go to jail to avoid serving (Stanley 2004a). Whether 
he was in jail, in a camp picking potatoes, or in the field fighting, the scientific 
establishment in Britain did not want one of their pre-eminent young members doing 
anything but serious science. Eddington’s pacifist convictions proved too great for him 
to ignore and he was compelled to add a postscript to Larmor’s letter to the Home Office, 
saying that if  he was denied an exemption on the grounds of his usefulness to British 
science, he would claim conscientious-objector status. “Larmor and others were very 
much piqued” (Chandrasekhar 1983). Eddington’s action thus led to a short, heated 
exchange of letters with Larmor, who insinuated that conscientious objectors held pro-
 ^ Physicist Henry G. J. Moseley (1887-1915) had been killed at Gallipoli, as Larmor reminded the Home 
Office. Moseley had worked with C.G. Darwin and Ernest Rutherford in Manchester and had used X-ray 
spectra to study atomic structure, which laid the groundwork for ordering the elements in the periodic table.
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German views (c.f. Eddington 1916a). Eddington never begrudged Larmor a thing, 
however, and the two became friends in later years (c.f. Eddington 1932).
A similar pattern was repeated with Milne, one of his strongest professional 
antagonists, yet one of his closest personal friends. For example, when Eddington 
reviewed one of Milne’s books, he wrote to Milne, saying: “I realise that the review can 
scarcely be pleasing to you; but I hope you will recognise that it might have been worse if 
(holding the opinion I do) I had let myself go without regard to our friendship”
(Eddington 1935a). In this way Eddington was able to separate the person from the 
opinion, something most of us find supremely difficult. This ability to divide people 
from their opinions is seemingly at odds with Quakerism’s unifying principles. However, 
it is not really a division but simply the ability to look past the opinion and see the person 
beyond. As A. Ruth Fiy describes in A Quaker Adventure there is in Quakerism a “belief 
in the potentiality of the divine in all men -  the Inner Light, as we call it, which is in 
every man, no matter how hidden or darkened it may be” (Fry 1926).
It is the unifying aspect in Quakerism that promoted values that provided 
Eddington with a unifying approach to the world around him and the people in it. In this 
way it was impossible for Eddington to completely separate science and religion. Quaker 
reformers at the turn of the century promoted the idea that the “scientific spirit could, and 
should, be combined with a religious outlook.” (Stanley 2004a). Similarly J. Rendal 
Harris, a Cambridge palaeographer and Quaker reformer said in 1896, “This theory of the 
detachment of science and religion from one another never has been a working theoiy of 
the universe; the two areas must overlap and blend, or we are lost” {Report 1896). In 
fact, Eddington found at least one overt way in which science and religion agreed: “The 
scientist and the religious teacher may well be content to agree that the value of any 
hypothesis extends just so far as it is verified by actual experience” (Eddington 1925a, 
222). It was on this piece of overt agreement that his scientific worldview took shape. 
Despite the purely deductive nature of his later works his reliance on matching theory to 
experiment (experience) remained a central theme in his search for a fundamental theory.
Experience was one of the primary values promoted by modern Quakerism. The 
so-called “third way” of the Quaker renaissance maintained that religion should sprout 
from tlie individual experience of what was called the “Inward Light” and not from
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dogma (Stanley 2004a). He maintained that, in fact, that science is unable to 
quantitatively measure every aspect of human experience, specifically consciousness, yet 
it is just as real as the portions of human experience science can measure (similar ideas 
are explored by Bohm -  see Bohm 1980 -  and these similarities are discussed in Ch. 3). 
As Stanley puts it, “The proof of science was in empirical measurement; the proof of 
religion was in empirical experience” (Stanley 2004a, p. 49). Thus, scientifically, not 
everything is certain since science can’t measure everything. Once again, the Quaker 
outlook provides guidance: “one should not try to find complete certainty because this 
leads to stagnation and a refusal to accept new ideas” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50). As a 
scientific principle and working philosophy, Eddington found this view embodied in 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle that served as one of the foundations for his attempt 
to apply his unifying worldview to modem physics. This, along with the Pauli Exclusion 
Principle, formed the backbone of his theory. Essentially he reinterpreted the uncertainty 
and exclusion principles on relativistic grounds and utilized the combination as the 
foundation on which to build a self-consistent theory of quantum mechanics that was 
fully compatible with relativity -  basically a theory of quantum gravity though, as I will 
show, it turned out to be more like quantum field theory and his motivation had its roots 
in his work on stellar structure and stellar motion. In order to better understand what he 
did it is necessaiy first to exam his work philosophically as well as examine the history of 
modern physics leading up to the development of Fundamental Theory, including the 
contributions he personally made. But first, a philosophical examination of his work is in 
order.
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Ill
A Philosophical Analysis of Eddington^ s Work
Eddington’s philosophy actually manifests itself both explicitly and implicitly, and 
differently in each respect. Explicitly he quickly adopted the concept of uncertainty, as 
embodied in Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, as a cornerstone of his work. Implicitly 
he worked from the notion that a truly comprehensive theory of the universe would need 
to be derivable purely from first principles. In essence he felt deductive reasoning was 
the only path that would lead to a truly objective description of the world. His 
philosophy is most fully developed in the Philosophy o f Physical Science, an expanded 
version of the Tainer lectures he delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge in the spring of 
1938, and in The Nature o f the Physical World, an expanded version of the Gifford 
lectures he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1927 as well as portions of New 
Pathways in Science, an expanded version of the Messenger lectures delivered at Cornell 
University in 1934. However the substance of these books implicitly announces its 
presence in all his major works since it is the substance that comprises his working 
philosophy. I shall look specifically at a few key points from these treatises before 
analyzing Eddington’s work from my own philosophical viewpoint. Along the way I will 
occasionally contrast these. I also continue to discuss Eddington’s philosophy throughout 
this monograph as I discuss specific details of Fundamental Theory.
The New Quantum Theory
In the Nature o f the Physical World Eddington was riding the crest of the new quantum 
theory mostly developed in the 1920s with so many important breakthroughs being made 
in 1926, the year he delivered the Gifford lectures that would later become Nature.
Indeed he writes that he was preparing these lectures a mere twelve months following 
Heisenberg’s groundbreaking paper on uncertainty.
The seeds sown early in his career by statistics are evident throughout. He says 
we “must not think about space and time in connection with an individual quantum; and
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the extension of a quantum in space has no real meaning” (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 
201). This is because it is rather an ensemble of quanta gathered to form a “quorum” that 
produce statistical properties that ultimately give rise to observable quantities. Note that 
though he is talking about photons in this case (he is discussing one of his favourite 
subjects; the star Sirius) he uses the term “quanta” which we would just as likely apply to 
any particle, unfortunately sometimes including particles of extended size. This perhaps 
unintentional slip should be checked and quanta should be applied only to elementary 
particles that theoretically have no size (e.g. electrons). In this sense it is meaningless to 
speak of the extension of a quantum in space though one should note that Eddington was 
speaking about a specific example (Sirius) that was not well understood at the time.
Nonetheless he is clearly speaking in statistical terms. In such terms considerably 
less certainty is given to specific claims or observations -  even whole models: “One must 
not expect too much from a model...” (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 205). Similarly he 
expresses scepticism of the predictions made by the relatively new Bose-Einstein 
statistics in relation to wave theory saying “at least that seems to be the physical 
interpretation of the highly abstract mathematics of their theory” (Eddington 1927 [1958], 
p. 203). Though it seems odd that abstract mathematics would turn him off in light of his 
own mathematical ramblings in Fundamental Theory, his scepticism is in line with his 
general expressions of uncertainty.
He also finds in these new developments limitations on the measurements to be 
made in science. Ironically he suggests that there might be a limit to the application of 
numerical results to portions of scientific theory, specifically citing Dirac. Of course 
Eddington later perceived the numerical predictions of his theory to be one of its great 
triumphs. But in 1927 he was searching for a deeper interpretation of the new quantum 
theory regardless of its source. In Dirac’s work of 1926 and early 1927 he found what 
Eddington termed a “non-arithmetical” calculus for the governing laws of the universe 
providing a purely symbolic beginning to the new quantum theory where the symbolism 
was unrelated to specific arithmetical operations.
To be clear there is a difference here between the numerical results Eddington is 
speaking of and the numerical results he later predicted in his theory. The latter were
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derived directly from the theory while the former were directly measured. Eddington 
found the latter expressed in Dirac’s work. In summary,
The fascinating point is that as the development proceeds 
actual numbers are exuded  from the symbols. Thus 
although p  and q individually have no arithmetical 
interpretation, the combination qp -  pq  has the arithmetical 
interpretation expressed by the formula ... [qp -  p q  -  
ih l2 jt\. By furnishing numbers, thought itself non- 
numerical, such a theory can well be the basis for the 
measure-numbers studied in exact science. The measure- 
numbers, which are all that we glean from a physical 
survey of the world, cannot be the whole world; they may 
not even be so much of it as to constitute a self-governing 
unit (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 210).
The symbolic interpretation was no less physical. In fact it is here that we see 
Eddington’s continuing use of an aether-like quantity of which I will discuss more in 
coming chapters. At this point Eddington refers to it as a sub-aether and describes quanta 
as oscillations in this sub-aether. But he asks the very pointed question, what exactly is 
oscillating? He makes it clear that it is not the sub-aether itself, rather it is something in 
the sub-aether denoted y/. He gives it the classical interpretation of a probability that 
provides a distribution function describing the probable location of the corresponding 
quanta. The physical interpretation is then couched firmly in statistical considerations.
But Eddington’s interest should not be construed as support. In general he 
disapproved of wave theory, calling Schrodinger’s work “a dodge -  and a very good 
dodge too.
The fact is that the almost universal applicability of this 
wave-mechanics spoils all chance of our taking it seriously 
as a physical theoiy. A delightful illustration of this occurs
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incidentally in the work of Dirac. In one of the problems 
... it is found that solutions only exit for a series of special 
values of the frequency... In Dirac’s problem the series 
turns out to be the series of integers... [w]e are not likely to 
be persuaded that the true explanation of why we count in 
integers is afforded by a system of waves (Eddington 1927 
[1958], pp. 219-220).
Subsequent to these developments and following his delivery of the Gifford 
lectures, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle arrived on the scene, in time for its inclusion 
in The Nature o f the Physical World. Immediately Eddington placed this principle on par 
with the principle of relativity. In fact there is a clear link here between the two 
principles. Since relativity demonstrates that distances must be defined by certain 
operations of measurement rather than in reference to the space between points, there 
appeared to be no limit to the accuracy of measurements. Similar operations can be 
performed for momentum. In particular a derivative of position can provide an 
instantaneous velocity. Mathematically there is no limit to the accuracy of numerical 
results but it is not clear that this is true physically. As physicists delved deeper into 
atoms the accuracy of measurements began to come into question. The uncertainty 
principle provided the limit to this accuracy. In essence indeterminacy, as Eddington 
called it, puts a lower limit on relativity.
More fundamentally indeterminacy is epistemological reminding us that the 
universe is observed from within and we cannot profess to know it in a truly objective 
light. As such it is difficult to say what a complete scientific description of the world 
would look like. It cannot include items that are not causally connected with our 
experience yet should not be limited to our immediate observations that are clearly 
incomplete. As Eddington describes,
The description should include nothing that is unobservable 
but a great deal that is actually unobserved. Virtually we 
postulate an infinite army of watchers and measurers.
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From moment to moment they survey everything that can 
be measured by methods which we ourselves might 
conceivably employ. Everything they measure goes down 
as part of the complete description of the scientific world 
(Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 226).
Such was the state of Eddington’s thoughts as the new quantum theory began to reveal 
itself as the ‘roaring twenties’ neaied their end. We find his belief rooted in the idea that 
the quantum action is the only way we can interact with the outside world and 
“knowledge of it can reach our minds.
A quantum action may be the means of revealing to us 
some fact about Nature, but simultaneously a fresh 
unknown is implanted in the womb of Time. An addition 
to knowledge is won at the expense of an addition to 
ignorance. It is hard to empty the well of Truth with a 
leaky bucket (Eddington 1927 [1958], p. 229).
A New Epistemology
We find Eddington little more than a decade later questioning the very veracity of 
knowledge itself: “I have said that I do not regard the term ‘knowledge’ as implying 
assurance of truth” (Eddington 1938 [1958], p. 2). Still recognizing the impossibility of 
making truly objective observations but faced with the undeniable interference of the 
observer, Eddington advocates for a ‘selective subjectivism.’ This is rooted in the 
introduction of epistemological analysis to modern physics. In fact the epistemologist, as 
it were, is responsible for observing the observers. This is not fai’ from the truth of 
today’s physics where philosophers of physics provide the cheque and balance for the 
physicists. As quantum information, Bose-Einstein condensates, and other formerly 
fringe aspects of physics find contemplation of practical applicability this cheque is
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becoming increasingly important and we find the lines between physicist and philosopher 
blurring.
Eddington refers to selective subjectivism as providing a priori knowledge of the 
universe while empirical science provides a posteriori knowledge of the universe (see the 
discussion of a priori probability below). His justification is that a priori knowledge in 
some cases has later been reconciled with a posteriori knowledge. This philosophy 
embodies the entire purpose behind his pursuit of a fundamental theory: the ability to 
derive data from first principles that otherwise has only been known through 
experimentation. Experimentation clearly plays an important role and should not be 
abandoned but selective subjectivism provides the a priori cheque on the a posteriori 
data. The latter requires careful consideration: it often does not directly provide the 
desired observable data but rather provides ancillary or even undesired data that leads, by 
process of elimination, to the desired result. In Eddington’s terms the desired result is 
then referred to as an ‘unobservable.’ But an unobservable is not proven as such purely 
by observation (or lack thereof). There must additionally be some logical flaw 
discovered through the scrutiny of the very definition of the unobservable. This would 
constitute a priori knowledge.
Selective subjectivism finds its application in the epistemological transition from 
classical to quantum systems. When classical methods are applied to microscopic 
transitions equations are derived that link positions, momenta, etc. at one instant to 
positions, momenta, etc. at another instant. When quantum methods are applied in the 
same situation the equations link knowledge of positions, momenta, etc. at one instant to 
knowledge of positions, momenta, etc. at another instant. The knowledge in the latter 
case is necessarily inexact. Ironically the latter, though seemingly less exact, provides a 
more correct (I hesitate to use the word ‘accurate’) description of the phenomena. This is 
due in part to the mathematical symbolism and the associated methodology used in the 
description. Probabilistic methods actually provide an exact specification of just how 
inexact our knowledge is. As such, though we may be limited in how much knowledge 
we may have about a given transition, we nonetheless can specify exactly how limited we 
aie. This is a powerful example of selective subjectivism: a priori knowledge supplies 
specific limitations on a posteriori knowledge. Wave mechanics witnesses the
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application of these ideas to unobservables: the best observation, though unable to 
provide a precise quantity, will narrow the range of possible values.
Epistemology then tells us that in the quantum world our knowledge is limited to 
probabilities. In the relativistic world our knowledge is limited to relations. The 
combination of these two form the foundation of Fundamental Theory as the bulk of this 
treatise will show.
Probability and Uncertainty: Classical versus Quantum
Traditionally statistics takes different foims in classical and quantum situations. If we 
imagine the roll of a pair of dice -  label them A and B -  classical statistics tells us that 
there are two possible ways of rolling a three and a two on a single roll: A could produce 
a three while B  produces a two or A could produce the two while B produces the three. 
Quantum statistics, however, tells us that there is only a single way a three and a two can 
come up on a single roll because it does not recognize the difference between the two 
dice. Probability and uncertainty then have different interpretations in classical and 
quantum situations. Eddington, as I will show, tends to blur this distinction a bit 
particularly in his application of uncertainty to measurement.
One problem with probability is that it is often viewed as the “antithesis of fact” 
as Eddington puts it when, in fact, it can be a far more accurate predictor of events than 
other methods. Eddington expands the interpretation of quantum theory from simply the 
observation of probabilities to the “synthesis of knowledge which constitutes theoretical 
physics is connected with observation by an irreversible relation of the formal type 
familiar to us in the concept of probability” (Eddington 1938 [1958], p. 92). What does 
Eddington mean by irreversibility in this case? He gives the following example: imagine 
two bags, A and B. A contains two white balls and one red ball while B contains two red 
balls and one white. If we randomly draw a white ball from a bag the chances are 2 to 1 
we will have drawn the ball from bag A. Now let’s say we’re actually handed this bag 
which we’re told has a 2 to 1 chance of being A. What will be the result of drawing a 
ball? If the entfre process was reversible we would have to draw a white ball since if we 
drew a red ball the chances would be 2 to 1 that the bag was B even though we were just
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told it was more likely to be A. Now obviously in real life we could easily pick a red ball 
by random chance, ruling out reversibility. In fact, in reality, given the knowledge that 
the bag is likely A, the chances are 5 to 4 the ball we draw will be white. Probability is 
thus an irreversible process and, of course, lies at the heart of thermodynamics that is 
often, more appropriately, called statistical mechanics. To clarify, in modem physics 
rather than determining whether or not an observation is true, we determine whether its 
degree of probability matches what we expect from it. That nature of this process is 
irreversible at its core. However, experimentally, we often test an apparatus by 
submitting observations with probabilities so high they are almost certain. In such cases 
macroscopic events can appear reversible but the meaning is simply that the sheer 
numbers involved in the process wash out the scatter. For instance, let's consider the act 
of removing a book from a bookshelf. Clearly this act is reversible in its most basic sense 
(you can put the book back). But is everything about the book and the shelf unchanged 
when you return it? If you perform this act literally thousands of times, eventually the 
book and perhaps the shelf will begin to exhibit some wear and tear. This is because the 
underlying microscopic effects are irreversible and not absolutely everything remains the 
same when you put the book back. This relates directly to the concept of multiplicity that 
is discussed in greater depth in chapter six. Of immediate importance is the fact that the 
multiplicity is directly related to probability: probabilities are ratios of multiplicities.
Now, in general probability in physics is used in a strictly statistical manner, that 
is to say it is defined to be a frequency in a certain class of events (thus we see directly 
that multiplicity must relate to the number of events in some way). In order to be used in 
an actual scientific statement it must be used in this manner. However, in its more 
colloquial form it still may be used to qualify the statement as a whole. As such it really 
has two meanings in physics. Somewhat similarly uncertainty can have two meanings.
In modern physics the meaning is determined by the uncertainty principle while 
classically it is a statistical quantity related to the inaccuracy of a measurement. This is 
an important distinction that is blurred by Eddington in several places in Fundamental 
Theory as I will show. It is a statistical quantity in both instances, but is applied in 
different ways. Classically we usually think of the uncertainty in measurement as being a 
result of the inability to make repeated measurements to 100% accuracy (ultimately this
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goes back to the reversibility concept I just described). In many cases this is inherently 
understood since measurements may be idealized depending on the degree of accuracy 
that is desired. So, for instance, when a doctor measures a person’s weight during an 
annual physical he or she does not usually care about changes of a pound (or even a few 
pounds for most full-grown adults) since body weights fluctuate on a daily cycle 
depending on such factors as water retention, food consumed, etc. As such these 
measurements are often idealized in the sense that the person is usually fully clothed each 
time but rarely wears exactly the same outfit year after year. In this instance there is a 
natural uncertainty in the measmement of plus or minus a few pounds. This is a 
statistical and classical interpretation of uncertainty that has no overt relation to the 
uncertainty principle.
Quantum mechanically uncertainty also takes on a statistical meaning and in both 
cases uncertainty is a limiting factor. However, in quantum mechanics uncertainty is a 
result of the fact that it is principally impossible to make simultaneously exact 
measurements of certain conjugate variables. In essence there is a Gaussian spread to the 
measurement of each variable. Without opening a Pandora’s Box, I should say there aie 
really two ways of understanding this. In one sense if one is not measuring something 
that requires a specific unit a single measurement could, theoretically, be ‘exact.’ For 
example in a standard two slit (or even one slit) experiment a single particle will land on 
a definite spot on the screen (though asking which slit it passed thiough is another 
question entirely). However, repeated measurements will show the locations of the 
aggregate of particles on the screen is a distribution (i.e. they don’t always land in the 
same spot). This distribution is usually Gaussian and represents the fact that repeating 
the measurements won’t always guarantee the same results. But what about the location 
of any single particle among the aggregate? If the screen is graph paper, how accurately 
can we assign coordinate locations to a single particle? This is another problem entirely. 
W e’re no longer speaking about the statistical distribution of an aggregate of events but 
rather the accuracy of the measurement of a single event. The measurement depends on 
several points including the accuracy of the measuring device, the possible interference 
of the observer in the entire process (i.e. did the act of making the measurement change 
the outcome fi'om what it would have been if the measurement had not been made), and
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the potential spread in the measured object itself (i.e. is it extended in space and, if so, by 
just how much?).
Eddington considers all of these applications of uncertainty including the classical 
method and often blurs the distinction between them. To be clear, including both 
classical and quantum conceptions, there are really two broad interpretations of 
uncertainty that have subtle variations within themselves: the uncertainty related to the 
aggregate behaviour of a number of particles or events, and the uncertainty related to the 
measurement of a single particle or event. It is vital to keep these concepts clear in one’s 
mind while reading the description of Eddington’s work in order to understand just how 
he blurs the distinctions.
Explicit Probability
Probability was so ingrained in Eddington’s worldview it even appears in his more 
fanciful writing including the light-hearted limerick quoted on page 14: the bassoon- 
playing baboon is banking on the laws of probability to assure him that he will eventually 
“hit on a tune.” Eddington’s exposure to probability and statistics as a means for carrying 
out the scientific method came early when he began work at the Royal Observatory in 
Greenwich. One of Eddington’s first assignments at the Royal Observatory was to 
investigate possible sources of error in a Cookson Floating Zenith-Telescope on loan 
from the Cambridge Observatory. As Smith says “Such investigations were fully in line 
with one of Greenwich’s central goals over its long history: the improvement of the 
accuracy of observations.. (Smith 2004, p. 23).
One of Eddington’s major influences in these earlier years was the work of the 
Dutch astronomer J.C. (Jacob Cornelius) Kapteyn (1851 -  1922). One of Kapteyn’s chief 
goals was to chart the distribution and motions of the stars in our galaxy (other galaxies 
were, of course, unknown until nearly a decade after Kapteyn’s death). Kapteyn argued 
that the motions of the stars are not actually random as many astronomers believed. In 
1906, not long after he arrived at Greenwich, Eddington took to testing Kapteyn’s theory. 
His method involved no new observations. In fact it was a purely statistical endeavour as
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was Kapteyn’s^ . In Kapteyn’s own words from a letter to George Ellery Hale (1868 -  
1938): “My studies have made me more and more of a statistician and for statistics we 
must have great masses of data, of course.” (Kapteyn to Hale 1915). But, Kapteyn was 
clearly convinced that this work had nothing to do with logical or proper reasoning. In 
other letters he exchanged with Hale he “warned against putting deduction ahead of 
induction as a means of making progress in stellar studies.” (Smith 2004).
Eddington’s view of the role played by data and statistics was completely 
different. As Stanley has stated in reference to Eddington’s Quakerism “one should not 
try to find complete certainty because this leads to stagnation and a refusal to accept new 
ideas.” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50). Eddington’s outlook embodied this view. For instance, 
the germination of his ideas on how to construct a unified theory are stated in his first 
book, Stellar Movements and the Structure o f the Universe: “There can be no harm in 
building hypotheses, and weaving explanations which seem best fitted to our present 
partial knowledge. These are not idle speculations if they help us, even temporarily, to 
grasp the relations of scattered facts, and to organise our knowledge.” (Eddington 1914, 
p. v). In the context of this quote. Fundamental Theory could have been seen by 
Eddington as nothing more than a continual work-in-progress that provided new insights 
every few years in the form of some published paper and it begs the question: if he had 
lived longer, would he had ever attempted to publish the entire manuscript himself -  or if 
he did, would he have published a completely altered version years later? Many striking 
changes can be seen in the vaiious manuscripts leading up to the final version (see Slater 
1957 for a detailed analysis of these manuscripts).
The statistical work he was performing with the large data sets also was at least 
one reason he began thinking about the structure of the universe as a whole. As he stated 
in his obituaiy of Karl Schwarzschild (1873 -  1916), the “task of determining accurate 
data for a large number of stars inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems 
of the structure of the stellar universe” (Eddington 1916b). He was speaking of 
Schwarzschild (and in the next sentence draws a comparison to Kapteyn), but the idea is 
clearly his own. His mention of ‘structure’ here presages his ‘subjective structuralism’ 
which is related to the ‘selective subjectivism’ I discussed above and was what French
Kapteyn was at the poorly funded University of Groningen and actually did not even have a telescope!
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has referred to as “a metaphysics for the quantum age.” (French 2004, p .l 17). French 
also finds a link in Eddington’s ideas between uncertainty as manifested in the 
‘unevenness’ of gravity (matter) and the structuralism that was the building block of 
Fundamental Theory: “By matter as the putative cause of irregularities in the field, ... 
this construction is seen as eliminating substance from our ontology in favour of 
relational structures.” (French 2003, p. 228). Here I disagree with French. As it will 
become apparent as I dissemble and reconstruct Fundamental Theory the unevenness was 
present in a more fundamental combination of both the gravitational and electromagnetic 
fields and thus is more than just matter.
But the extension of probabilistic methods to gravity did not come until 
Eddington led the famous eclipse expeditions in 1919 in an effort to prove Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity correct. Here, Eddington’s observations as well as those 
made by the companion team, required statistical analysis and an understanding that the 
results could only be accurate to a certain point (as long as that point was enough to 
essentially prove -  or at the very least, show how probable it was -  that Einstein was 
right). This is a classic inductive argument where the conclusions to be supported are 
probable or probably true (Copi 1986, p. 404 and see next section). The expedition report 
was, in fact, one of the last articles he published dealing directly with a specific 
observation or statistical data set. However, he often referenced actual data even in 
Fundamental Theoiy, for as Batten says, “he did not turn his back on observation, but he 
did maintain that understanding came only when there was a theory to explain the 
observations.” (Batten 2004, p. 169). Essentially, he went from believing observation 
should prove theory to be correct, to believing that theory should prove observation to be 
correct.
Inductive reasoning was therefore an integral part of his early work simply 
because it is the method by which all experimental science is carried out and Eddington’s 
observations and statistical research were nothing more than experimental science. Thus 
it seems that inductive reasoning and statistical methods of analysis go hand-in-hand. 
Probability is a direct outgrowth of statistics and is a fundamental part of experimental 
science. However, in the non-aggregate form of probability discussed above there is a 
history of deductivism including Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle which arose from
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critical thinking and not experiment. Though Eddington’s work appears to turn more 
toward deductivism in his later career I will, in fact, show that experimental results 
played a large role in shaping his subsequent ideas largely due to the uncertainty principle 
which is probabilistic in nature.
But what exactly is it that we mean when we say probability! I have discussed 
probability in depth in relation to statistics but have assumed some familiarity on the part 
of the reader. It is often useful to return to the most basic definitions and even the history 
of a concept when attempting to fully understand its application in a given situation. 
Probability is usually thought to have begun with a series of letters exchanged between 
Blaise Pascal (1623 -  1662) and Pierre de Feimat (1608 -  1665) in which they aigued 
about the proper way to divide the stakes in an interrupted game of chance. Still another 
possibility is that it began with Pascal’s advice to seventeenth-century gambler Chevalier 
de Mere on how to wager in a game of dice. There also exists a study published in 1662 
by Captain John Graunt (1620 -  1674) where he discusses the mortality records 
maintained in London since 1592 (Copi 1986). Copi suggests that the result of this 
“mixed ancestry” gives probability two different interpretations. The first, often referred 
to as the a priori view regards probability in its classical sense as measuring the degree of 
rational belief (recall my discussion of a priori and a posteriori knowledge above). In 
practice this simply means being able to predict the likelihood of various outcomes of an 
event given that these outcomes are limited in number. The alternative view to this 
regards probability as simply a measure of relative frequency of outcomes. The latter is 
often associated with statistical investigations and is thus the sense in which Eddington 
was first acquainted with it professionally. But Eddington recognized that one of the 
many goals of science is not simply to describe the world but also to be able to make 
reliable predictions of outcomes of events. Thus, when combined with a belief in 
deductive reasoning, which is essentially just “rational belief’ as Copi puts it, he switches 
to the a priori interpretation. The importance of this point cannot be understated as it 
allowed him to maintain probability as the basis of his work while moving to a 
deductivist approach which is sometimes seen as incompatible with the concept of 
probability. In fact it may not be incompatible with the a priori interpretation since in the 
a priori interpretation one can deduce exact likelihoods based on specific limitations in
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the antecedent conditions which themselves could theoretically be derived from first 
principles. This is precisely what Eddington did.
This switch by Eddington begs the question of whether or not it was a conscious 
decision on his part. He certainly was aware of the history of probability theory. In New 
Pathways in Science he refers numerous times to Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827), 
who was clearly a deductivist since his work in mathematics, including probability 
theory, was based on logical reasoning. But, once again, probability theory is often 
associated with inductive pursuits which are often quite apart from logical reasoning 
(though not necessarily logic itself). Laplace, though a Frenchman, is actually tied up in 
the history of probability theory in Britain. He was at the centre of a heated debate in 
Britain in the 1820s when an attempt was made to introduce the teaching of probability 
theory into the curriculum of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford. At the time both 
were still sectarian (in contrast to the secular University of London). In particular, 
several religiously fervent dons at Cambridge, including'William Whewell (1794-1866), 
argued against the introduction of probability theory to the curriculum on the grounds 
that it sought to answer questions better left to the Divine. Specifically the opposition 
singled out the teachings of Continental deductivists such as Laplace, Jean D’Alambert 
(1717-1783), Alexis Claude Clairault (1713-1765), Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813), 
and Leonhard Euler (1707-1783). Whewell favoured inductive science, and being 
experimental in nature was thus supposedly more supportive of religious beliefs; 
deductive science was apparently too mechanistic. Joan Richards has noted that “a 
religion that rested on evidence attested to by personal experience and conviction had no 
standing in probabilistic discourse” (Richards 1997). But isn’t the act of taking a 
measurement or making an observation simply another form of personal experience? So 
in one sense, religion’s standing in probabilistic discourse is a matter of interpretation 
but, as I ’ve shown, so is the very definition of probability. Whewell’s support of 
inductive science would suggest a recognition on his part of the inherently statistical 
nature of measurement, but, on the other hand, the truly difficult nature of measurement 
theory was not well understood in Whewell’s day. Before the Uncertainty Principle and 
the true nature of quantum mechanics were discovered, perfectly exact measurements 
were thought to be possible (there is still debate regarding hidden variables -  despite
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Bell’s Theorem, spatiotemporal non-locality has been observed in experiments). So 
Whewell’s understanding of inductive science was built around the notion that it was in 
fact an exact science in every sense of the word. In that sense he could have potentially 
been persuaded to accept the a priori interpretation of probability on the grounds that the 
antecedent conditions could be known exactly (perhaps even from Divine guidance) and 
the outcomes were specifically constrained.
Eddington was much the same way in his seemingly inconsistent application of 
probability within the bounds of deductive science. In fact it could be said that they held 
the same view -  probability was really the realm of deductive science and not inductive 
science and this view could be interpreted as arising from the fact that they recognized, 
primarily, the a priori definition of probability.
Eddington, however, clearly had knowledge of the “relative frequency” definition 
since he utilized these techniques in his work as an observational astronomer. Since he 
was a consummate mathematician, early on he was driven by a desire to formulate exact 
mathematical descriptions of astronomical observations not recognizing the inherent 
inexactitude in the observations themselves. For example he attempted to fit three- 
dimensional paraboloids to the envelopes of Comet Morehouse from fuzzy, two- 
dimensional photographic plates, finding considerable room for error (Eddington 1910). 
Similaiiy, in the eclipse expedition it turned out that only one of the numerous 
observations was good enough to support Einstein’s theory, and only within a statistically 
valid error range (Eddington 1919). So, while applying the “relative frequency” form of 
probability through inductive science he was left with too wide a margin of error, so to 
speak. Note that the Comet Morehouse example is a relative frequency definition only if 
one considers the aggregate behaviour of the photons on the photographic plate. 
Otherwise it is a measurement problem analogous to the accurate assignment of specific 
coordinates to a single photon on a detection screen, i.e. the statistical distribution of all 
of the photons on the photographic plates is not overall Gaussian since, if it were, the 
photograph wouldn’t look like a comet. In this sense, Eddington was more interested in 
the coordinate positions of all of the photons in order that he might find  a mathematical 
distribution or form to match the photograph.
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In any case, the introduction of the Uncertainty Principle gave Eddington the 
philosophical foundation for maintaining probability as a mathematical basis for 
understanding the universe, reinforcing the impossibility of exactitude that he had been 
observing in his analyses. But, by movmg to deductive reasoning and the a priori 
interpretation of probability, he was able to put deducible limitations on any antecedent 
conditions thus leading to well-defined probable outcomes and limiting the randomness a 
bit. This is again better understood in the context of Batten’s quote (see page 34). The 
change in his scientific approach was perhaps not as dramatic as some historians (this one 
included) may have previously thought. It was simply Eddington following his own rule 
of not being too dogmatic (see Eddington’s quote on page 33) and adjusting existing 
methods accordingly.
By constraining the antecedent conditions he was free to extend Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle, which he just recognized as a natural limit placed on mathematical 
probability, from microscopic (quantum) to macroscopic phenomena (see chapter three 
for a description of the causal nature of this principle). This is an important point: 
Eddington’s view of the uncertainty principle was not necessarily one of a purely 
quantum phenomenon but rather simply as a limiting case of our usual classical inability 
to take repeatedly accurate measurements. This is where Eddington blurs the distinctions 
between all of the various interpretations of uncertainty and probability. The quantum 
case was, to him, simply a limit of the classical case and the individual measurement 
problem (e.g. the location of a single photon on a screen) is really a result of aggregate 
behaviour since devising a coordinate system in the first place requires at least one other 
object for comparison.
In any case, as Batten has said, he did not forget about observation. Being the 
primary way in which we interact with the universe any complete theory needs to 
incorporate it. The root of our interaction with the universe is essentially through the 
process of measurement and so he developed deductive methods that worked within the 
pai ameters of a priori probability to define standards of measurement like the meter.
Eddington thus seemingly made the dramatic switch from inductive to deductive 
science, yet a careful examination of the approach he used clearly shows that he really 
was simply changing the way in which he dealt with probability. Probability and
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statistics had been the mathematical foundation of his analyses from the very beginning. 
In an interesting and quiiky little twist on all this, Whewell’s inductivism incorporated 
what he called “fundamental ideas” (could Whittaker have gotten the title of 
Fundamental Theory from Whewell?) that were supported by observation but were found 
by “thinking properly.” Perhaps Whewell was closer to an acceptance of probability than 
he himself realized.
Implicit Reasoning
Eddington was very explicit about his use of probability and the concept of uncertainty as 
I have shown. He was less explicit about his movement to deductive reasoning later in 
his career that I have just shown corresponds to a change in his use of probability. The 
deductivist nature of Eddington’s later works is no secret and plenty of writers have 
discussed or analyzed this aspect of his method (for example see Kmgh 1999). But the 
details of his incorporation of deductivism is much more subtle and really more implicit 
in its application, particularly in Fundamental Theory. I have already discussed inductive 
reasoning from a probabilistic standpoint, but a precise definition will be of greater use in 
understanding deductive reasoning. The definitions of inductive and deductive reasoning 
as given in Warriner’s English Grammar and Composition are straightforward enough 
definitions to give an initial flavour of their similaiities and differences (Warriner 1986).
Inductive reasoning starts from a set of observations and draws a generalization 
from them. Deductive reasoning stalls with a generalization and draws conclusions from 
it. As I have shown probability can be interpreted as being either, though in early 
Victorian science it was thought to be more deductive in nature since its conclusions were 
derived from mathematical first principles and did not rely on experimental evidence (this 
is really a priori probability and not “relative frequency” probability). Experimental 
science, by contrast, has usually been described as a form of inductive reasoning (see for 
example Richards 1997 and Copi 1986). Eddington found that inductivism did not 
produce the most accurate answers (within the bounds of probability theory) as he felt 
were possible and so he turned to deductivism. But deductivism entails a definite
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problem, particularly in relation to science. As Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote in 
his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy:
Since all terms that are defined are defined by means of 
other terms, it is clear that human knowledge must always 
be content to accept some terms as intelligible without 
definition, in order to have a starting-point for definition. It 
is not clear that there must be terms which are incapable of 
definition: it is possible that, however far back we go in 
defining, we always might go further still (Russell 1919, 
pp. 3-4).
If everything is deducible from first principles, where did the first principles come from? 
Could they ultimately be derived themselves? But, if so, from what? Eddington 
approached the problem from a different tack: what caused uncertainty? His answer: 
uncertainty arose because there was never a suitably defined starting point in 
measurement. So uncertainty’s very existence was due to the inability to suitably 
produce purely objective first principles in any deductive argument. So it really solved 
two problems for him: it required him to use probability theory in the context of 
deductive reasoning and explained the problem of finding truly objective first principles 
in any such argument.
Here Eddington’s deductivism also finds a parallel in another passage in Russell 
where he notes that Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) “first succeeded in Togicising’ 
mathematics, i.e. in reducing to logic the arithmetical notions which his predecessors had 
shown to be sufficient for mathematics” (Russell 1919, p. 7). Eddington attempted to do 
the same for physics by reducing it to a logical set of arithmetical notions that had been 
shown to be sufficient for physics (or by reducing physics to mathematics in those cases 
where mathematics can be applied in physics). Frege was bothered by statements of 
identity, such as ‘a  = b' which led him to develop a new theory of semantics (Copi 1986). 
Statements such as 'a = o’ hold a priori and are analytic in nature (Copi 1986). But 
statements such as ‘o = 6 ’ could be true or false depending on knowledge not contained
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within the statement itself and thus cannot hold a priori. Eddington was similarly 
bothered by physical problems of identity, in particular the identities of indistinguishable 
particles (a topic still at the forefront of the fundamentals of modern physics and one I 
discuss in depth in several future chapters). Eddington went a step further, though, 
holding that in some physical senses even ‘o = o ’ could not hold a priori but required 
prior knowledge. I will discuss the details of this in depth when discussing his tieatment 
of the exclusion principle, but the origin of his thinking in that regard clearly came out of 
his attempt to ‘logicise’ physics.
Any attempt to logicise physics then must deal with definitions and Eddington 
dealt not only with definitions of objects but also with definitions of measurements. 
Deductivism, however, did emerge in other ways early on in his work. In 1916, for 
example, he began attempting to answer the age-old question: what exactly are stars and 
what makes them shine? As Stanley has pointed out his approach was deductive: “start 
from completely valid premises and the conclusion is certain to be true, but without total 
certainty in one’s premises, one has nothing” (Stanley 2004a, p. 50). He was still focused 
on inductive science at that time and combined this deductive approach with the 
inductive method of gathering data on stellar masses and brightnesses and combining it 
with mathematical analyses to examine the various patterns that emerged. Stanley, 
however, gets at the heart of why the inductive method ultimately proved unsatisfactory 
in Eddington’s mind: it runs the risk of being disproved by new evidence or observations 
(Stanley 2004a, p. 51). Eddington’s deductivism was supposed to be as objective a 
process as humanly possible and ultimately impervious to disproval. The irony in all this 
is that Eddington viewed Subramanyan Chandiasekhar’s (1910 -  1995) work on white 
dwarf stars as being ‘mindlessly deductive’ (Stanley 2004a, p. 53).
But, Eddington’s method, though deductive, was ultimately designed to be 
practical while simultaneously above speculation. In this his observational background 
clearly played a role. Chandrasekhai' was a pure theorist. Eddington was both a theorist 
and an observationalist. Relativity was a key player in all of this since he was both the 
first person to really disseminate Einstein’s theory in the English language as well as the 
first person to produce experimental evidence supporting it. But relativity plays a very 
important role in any attempt at a purely objective analysis of the universe. This is
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because relativity implies that there is no universally preferred reference frame. A strong 
interpretation of this concept would imply the impossibility of objectivity since 
objectivity would either imply a single, preferred reference frame or the same view from 
every reference frame.
Structuralism
Just how does Eddington, then, walk this fine line between truth and progress? Defining 
a purely objective point of view forces one to consider exactly how the universe is 
structured. Thomas A. Moore in his outstanding six-part textbook Six Ideas That Shaped 
Physics essentially reduces physics to two things: particles and their interactions (Moore 
2003a). In the Standard Model, however, the four fundamental interactions (gravity, 
electromagnetism, strong nuclear, weak nuclear) are really represented by more particles, 
the carrier particles of each interaction -  i.e. the particles that mediate the interaction by 
delivering information from one particle to another. So, ultimately, the universe is 
nothing but particles. But what are particles? Are they simply packets of energy? What 
gives them motion? Their direction ultimately depends on how (or if) they interact with 
their neighbours, but what produces them to begin with and ultimately serves as the seed 
of motion? Eddington has referred to them as simply being conceptual carriers of a set of 
variables (he used the term ‘variâtes’ -  Eddington 1946, p. 30). Everything basically 
reduces to mathematics, then. Structure in Eddington’s mind, in relativistic language, 
consisted of events with intervals linking the events. Point events would be relata while 
the intervals would be the relations or, in Moore’s interpretation, the relata would be 
particles and the relations would be the interactions, which are simply carrier particles.
As French points out, the only problem with this is a classic ‘chicken and egg’ issue: 
which came first? This is particularly troubling if the relations are simply more relata 
and, as I will show in chapter six, indistinguishable from the original relata according to 
Eddington. But as French says,
... we can think of both the relata and the relations as
equally derivative in the sense that both can be
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conceptually ‘pulled out’ of the package as a whole (French 
2003, p. 232).
Thus Eddington took the universe and its constituents to be an indivisible whole. In his 
own words, “The relations unite the relata; the relata are the meeting point of the 
relations. The one is unthinkable apart from the other.” (Eddington 1928, pp. 230-231).
The variâtes Eddington was talking about include such things as mass, charge, 
and spin. Einstein showed that in a relativistic sense mass is really just energy. 
Eddington, as I will show in subsequent chapters, attempted to apply the same relativistic 
reasoning to show that charge and spin were also frame-dependant quantities and show 
that all particles were indistinguishable (e.g. a proton is indistinguishable from an 
electron) since they were just packets of energy. The wholeness of the universe would 
then just be energy. There are subtle arguments about the nature of indistinguishability 
that will be worked out in greater depth as we study their applications.
Another view might be to interpret everything more fundamentally as momentum 
(or rather four-momentum which is a relativistic unification of energy and momentum). 
Moore has said that mass is simply a measure of how a particle reacts to changes in 
momentum (Moore 2003a). In some sense charge and spin could be related in a similar 
manner since, ultimately, mass’ response to momentum is only through certain 
fundamental interactions. Any electromagnetic interaction (which technically includes 
all macroscopic contact interactions) ultimately is mass-independent (see Coulomb’s and 
the Lorenz Force Laws) but is dependent on chaige. So ultimately, momentum 
conservation at this level in such an interaction depends on charge and not mass, even 
though macroscopically it appears to depend on mass (even in the four-momentum case). 
A similar argument can be made for spin, paiticularly in the context of angular 
momentum, though this is a more complicated situation. In one sense this is true since 
the quantum field theoretic interpretation of charge is that it is a measure of how the W 
and Z bosons propagate and so a relation to momentum is natural, though that is a bit of a 
simplistic interpretation. As for spin, any relation to momentum may well get at the root 
of the exclusion principle as I will discuss in the closing chapters.
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In a modern sense, much of this could be attributed to the field concept and, 
indeed, the field concept has been highly successful in predicting the results of particle 
physics experiments. But fields, or in the twenty-first century perhaps strings, are not as 
dogmatic a construct as is sometimes viewed. As French says “we have good reason to 
expect our current favoured ontology -  quantum fields, strings, whatever -  to ... come to 
be replaced” (French 2004, p. 120). Despite those who search for a theory of everything, 
French’s statement is not wholly unbelievable. The simple act of relative motion actually 
creates macroscopic phenomena such as magnetism that do not exist apart from the 
relative motion (or, perhaps more correctly, they reduce to a more familiar form without 
relative motion). The elegance of reducing everything via fairly simple relativistic 
arguments to momentum, which is essentially just motion, then is perhaps, by virtue of 
Ockham’s Razor, a better solution than the complexities of modern theories.^^° Even 
Hemi Poincaré (1854 -  1912) in 1905 in Science and Hypothesis indicates that 
knowledge of motion is ultimately at the root of many ‘non-mechanical’ problems:
only the something, which we then called motion, we now 
call electric current. But these are merely the names of the 
images we substituted for the real objects which Nature 
will hide for ever from our eyes. The true relations 
between these real objects are the only reality we can 
attain. (Poincaré 1905, p. 162).
Eddington was thus sceptical of man-made units since for the most part they were so 
arbitrary. In fact, Eddington viewed the fragmentation of the universe as being 
manifested in the multitude of units present in science. I will discuss the details of 
measurement in several later chapters, but for now I want to focus on how this leads to a 
philosophical bypass, so-to-speak.
 ^Since field theories often make use of Lagrangians, action integral, and propagators one could argue that 
field theories already have reduced everything to relative motion.
To debunk conspiracy theories it is often useful to make use o f a variation on this known as Hanlon’s 
Razor: “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.” (see 
http ://catb.org/~esr/j argon/html/H/Hanlons-Razor.html).
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Eddington saw a way around this by using a system of natural units and 
investigating unitless ratios which is essentially investigating the large-scale structure of 
space-time by comparing different aspects of the whole. This idea actually has some 
merit, though philosophically speaking its merit may rest on an interpretation of the 
nature of mathematics and numbers. But, ignoring that quagmire for a moment, it is 
well-known that in Euclidean geometry, which recent experiments have proven is the 
overall geometiy of the universe as a whole (de Bernardis, et. al. 2000), the ratio of the 
circumference of a circle to its diameter is always the number tc. This apparently 
observed ‘truth’ is the source of the natural measure of an angle: the radian. Technically, 
in fact, a radian is, of course, not a real unit at all. We just treat it as one in order to better 
keep track of what we’re doing. The idea is that whenever a circle is wholly traversed 
circumferentially the change in the angle is always a set multiple of Jt -  or, in fact, a 
unitless ratio of the arc length to the radius. So, again, it is just a comparison of different 
aspects of the whole circle. Eddington’s technique, then, is a direct application of 
relativity by making all objectively describable entities in the universe simply relations 
between different aspects of the whole. As I quoted earlier, French says of Eddington’s 
position, “By matter as the putative cause of irregularities in the field, ... this 
construction is seen as eliminating substance from our ontology in favour of relational 
structures.” (French 2003, p. 228) -  basically structure was formed from a relativistic 
worldview. The technique of employing relational structures is extended in the creation 
of his concept of comparison particles that will be discussed at length in the latter half of 
this text. The philosophical quandary Eddington gets into, though, is how to compare or 
relate seemingly indistinguishable particles, especially if relativity itself seems to indicate 
all particles are indistinguishable from each other (see chapter six).
Again, this brings up the ugly possibility of having to analyze the nature of 
mathematics and numbers. Primarily it begs the question of whether or not mathematics 
and number exist apart from our mental construct of it (if a tree falls in a forest and no 
one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?). Eddington’s implied view is this: 
mathematics is inherent and not constructed. The symbols we use for representation are 
our translation of mathematics, which is simply the language of nature. But the 
underlying tiuths mathematics provides are existent apart from the language we use to
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interpret them. How, then, is mathematics applied to the description or observation of a 
particle, especially if the observation is direct and not deduced from some experimental 
apparatus? Eddington, as I stated previously, described particles as merely conceptual 
carriers of a set of variâtes. French puts this in more general terms by saying that group 
theory “enters as a way of expressing the relationships between relations and the 
important point is that whatever the nature of the entities, the use of group theory allows 
us to abstract away the ‘pattern’ or structure of relations between them” (French 2003, p. 
239). In some sense, based on Cassirer’s conception (see above), French says that this 
reduces an object to “nothing more than a node in the structure” (French 2004, p. 123). 
Cassirer has argued that quantum mechanics really had nothing to do with indeterminacy 
(and the related limitations on measurement) but really with how we conceived of 
objects. As I mentioned previously Eddington considered particles to simply be carriers 
of sets of variâtes. This is what he termed ‘Principle of the Blank Sheet:’
The Principle of the Blank Sheet requires that at the start 
we should recognise no intrinsic distribution between the 
particles which we contemplate, in order that we may trace 
to their very source the origin of those distinctions which 
we recognise in practical observation. The fundamental 
dynamics is the dynamics of indistinguishable particles; the 
dynamics of distinguishable particles is a practical 
application to be used when we do not wish to analyze the 
phenomena so deeply (Eddington 1936,287).
As I will demonstrate in my technical analysis the method he employs to accomplish this 
is to treat particles as merely fluctuations in a uniform background. Through purely 
relativistic reasoning utilizing the framework of space-time, he shows that all particles 
(regardless of type) are indistinguishable from all other particles, which is the physical 
‘blank sheet’ he started building everything else with. The advantage of this is that the 
manifestation of physical properties like mass, charge, and spin and thus the observed 
differences in particles could be introduced as a consequence of frame of reference or
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derived from the blank sheet, rather than assumed as initial conditions. He essentially 
treats distinguishability as a mere practical convenience for certain problems but not as a 
requirement. Mathematically, this translates as the “part [being a structural concept] is a 
symbol having no properties except as a constituent of the group-structure of a set of 
parts” (Eddington 1939, p. 145). The details go well beyond the initial analysis presented 
here, but, of relevance is the employment of group theory.
In a veiy modern sense, the group theoretic approach has led to many advances in 
quantum field theory. As A. Zee describes in his recent textbook Quantum Field Theory: 
In A Nutshell, the physics contained in a simple field theory can be interpreted as a source 
in some region of space-time “that sends out a ‘disturbance in the field,’ which is later 
absorbed by a sink” in some other region of space-time where the disturbance is referred 
to by experimentalists as a particle of some given mass, m (Zee 2003, p. 24).
Eddington’s ‘Principle of the Blank Sheet’ and his idea that particles are simply 
fluctuations in the background, look very modern, then, when set against Zee’s 
description of standard quantum field theory: all of existence, as represented by particles 
(including force carrier particles), can be simply reduced to fluctuations in a uniform 
background or field. To be more specific, Eddington’s particles, which ar e nothing more 
than carriers of sets of variables, are mathematical entities set in matrix or tensor form. 
Transformations including rotations, translations (spatial and temporal), and permutations 
ar e achieved in many cases in Fundamental Theory thr ough the application of group 
theory. The same is true in quantum field theory where the introduction of group theory 
actually helped lead to profound discoveries. In Eddington’s case group theory was used 
most liberally in Relativity Theory o f Electrons and Protons but, particularly in the first 
six chapters of Fundamental Theory, not as much. Perhaps some of this stems from the 
debate he had with Braithwaite regarding his use of group theory in the former as well as 
in the Philosophy o f Physical Science (see Eddington 1936 and 1940). In any case, group 
theory is not a major component of the statistical portion of Fundamental Theory. It 
saves its grand entrance here until his discussion of E-number theory near the end.
Deducing the Structure
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There are two problems here in both perceiving the structure of the universe as well as 
deducing it from first principles. The two problems are intertwined and it is difficult to 
say which is the causal result of the other. The logical problem with Eddington’s 
reasoning here is that in assuming that uncertainty permeates absolutely everything, then 
if all of structure -  and not only its mathematical description -  is deducible from first 
principles, how can one deduce a definite conclusion from an indefinite starting point? 
Related to the logical problem then is the epistemological problem of our ability to even 
gain objective knowledge about the universe. If we cannot separate the observer 
(ourselves) from the observed, is it possible to deduce any truth?
Russell has said: “In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the 
existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences” (Russell 1952 as quoted in 
Feinberg 1986, p. 193). Russell’s idea is that the difficulty arises if we perceive 
everything as sense-data -  data that is relayed to our brain through our five senses -  
which, in effect, is all data. But is all data merely a set of sense-data? Do things exist 
apart from our senses -  i.e. do they exist while not being observed? Eddington side­
stepped this by flat-out rejecting the atomistic view of sensation by saying that a single 
sensation really doesn’t provide any useful information about the world at all and by 
requiring a group-theoretic structure that applied to both the universe and the mind. This 
addresses the Mind-Body Problem and was a point Russell actually made in 1919 in his 
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and again in following up his statement above 
by saying that although the inability to prove the existence of anything other than 
ourselves and our experiences “is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatsoever 
to suppose that it is true” (Russell 1952). Technically in one sense, particularly in his 
eaiiier work, he was referring to cardinality. This poses a problem since it reduces nearly 
everything to number and set theory. As the mathematician M.H.A. Newman (1897 -  
1984) pointed out, this structuralist ‘ontology,’ as it were, admits that '"nothing can be 
known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except 
(‘theoretically’) the number of constituting objects” (Newman 1928, p. 144). This meant 
that knowing only the structure of the universe was useless information. Notably 
Eddington did derive the number of particles in the universe, i.e. the “number of 
constituting objects” in the structure and Fundamental Theory is built on purely
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mathematical analyses of an aggregate of particles. So in some sense ‘number’ is 
fundamental here. But the problem is that Eddington derived this number from  the 
structure and not the other way around which is: a.) why his application is wholly 
different from Russell’s since for Russell the number was the structure, and b.) why 
Newman’s criticism still fits and leaves open the question of the truth of any observation 
(except, perhaps in Newman’s view, the number of constituent objects in some structure 
unless the nature of pure number is called into question -  yet another quagmire).
Eddington recognized that the separability of obseiwer and observed is the major 
problem with inductivism since inductive science relies on observed data. But he does 
not seem to realize that this is a problem for deductivism as well, missing the point that 
the mental constructions of a theory are built on pre-existing sense-data already stored in 
the brain: with absolutely no knowledge of any aspect of our universe whatsoever 
(ignoring, for a moment, any multiple-universe theories), its structure -  even its mere 
existence -  could not be derived. This is the essence of Newman’s argument. Eddington 
appeared on the verge of this realization as early as 1920: “the distinction of substance 
and emptiness is the mind’s own contribution, depending on the kind of pattern it is 
interested in recognising” (Eddington 1920, p. 420). Eveiything Eddington does employ 
given factual knowledge not just about the universe but also about mathematics, physics, 
astronomy, etc. all of which are parts o/the universe and known through sense-data (see 
the discussion on .stabilization in chapter six).
This all falls under the larger question of certainty. Can we really be certain of 
anything, including end points and boundary conditions? The uncertainty principle itself 
seems to imply we can’t and Eddington even extended this principle to include 
uncertainty in the actual reference frame of observation (see chapter five). And yet 
Eddington reaches definite conclusions in his work. How can he reach definite 
conclusions beginning with an indefinite starting point? Even his introduction of the 
‘Blank Sheet’ is not necessarily logically consistent with this idea since, even though 
physical differences (and thus initial conditions) of paiticles are derivable from the 
‘Sheet,’ the sheet itself, according to Eddington, contains some uncertainty. It would be 
more logically consistent to say that, rather than assuming that particles take on very 
well-defined properties that clearly separ ate them into various groups, they have the
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probability of taking on any property whatsoever (e.g. there exists the small but finite 
probability that a fundamental particle with a mass of 1 kg could come into being). This 
appears to be inconsistent with observation, however it is worth keeping this in mind 
when we encounter Eddington’s use of multiplicity since multiphcity is simply a ratio of 
probabilities.
In the context of group theory and the underlying mathematics, French points out 
(interpreting R.B. Braithwaite) how this manifests itself:
It is only by specifying the group relation, or mode of 
combination, that we actually have a group to begin with.
But such a specification introduces a non-structural element 
into our structuralism, because we have to have some 
ground -  which clearly cannot be structural itself -  for 
selecting one combination over another (French 2004, p.
129).
In extending this to relations between groups (for instance, let us say all electrons are one 
group and all protons are a second group), the groups become the relata and the relevant 
transformations (rotations, permutations, etc.) become the relations that, by Eddington’s 
own admission, cannot be considered apart from one another. The relations between the 
groups (for instance the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron), then, are 
essentially non-structural content since they are supplied by the mathematician or 
physicist, according to Braithwaite (French 2004 and 2003).
Eddington may have recognized part of this limitation since he responded directly 
to Braithwaite’s criticism by pointing out that group theory is simply used in physics as a 
tool for expressing the relationships between various relations (which, in the Standard 
Model, might be viewed simply as more relata) thereby bringing out the underlying 
structure or pattern -  perhaps a bit like a litmus test or hidden ink (Eddington 1940). In 
fact Eddington referred to the group structure as simply the “pattern of interweaving” or 
the “inten*elatedness of relations” and insisted that pure structure is only attainable by 
considering these (Eddington 1939). French points out that the error in Braithwaite’s
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argument is the separation of the relations from the group elements that are the original 
relata. Eddington’s point was that one could not have one without the other. This is in 
fact true in the modern sense if the relations are simply other particles, which 
immediately puts them into the same category as the group elements themselves that are 
particles (or particle properties). Once again Braithwaite is trapped by fragmentation by 
assuming that content produces the structure while Eddington takes the reverse tack and 
assumes structure actually produces content. Any supposed non-structural components 
are really just caused by the mind being led astray. Such non-structural components 
could include initial conditions such as values for mass, charge, and spin. But this 
argument does not properly provide a mathematically consistent way to deduce these 
values within the context of uncertainty and Eddington himself could not find a proper 
way to do this.
As such he introduced the concept of stabilization by assuming or taking for 
granted certain quantities (like the mass and charge of the electron), but, again, where do 
these values come from? How can one assume these quantities have any particular 
values? The values are merely sense-data again or averages of sense-data and he is back 
to inductivism that he was attempting to shun. In fact the circular nature of all of this can 
be demonstrated when considering the masses of sub-atomic particles, for example, 
which are often found through experiments that include the uncertainty principle in their 
analysis. Eddington’s half-hearted attempt at getting around this is noted in New 
Pathways in Science: “we have been concerned to show that probability is always relative 
to knowledge (actual or presumed) and that there is no a priori probability of things in a 
metaphysical sense, i.e. a probability relative to complete ignorance” (Eddington 1935b, 
p. 133). He basically attempted to put a limit on probability by making it relative but was 
unable to do so in a logically consistent way despite the fact that uncertainty is consistent 
with special relativity (see chapter three). This, then, is the biggest flaw in Eddington’s 
philosophical reasoning: his assumption that a proper theory of quantum gravity could be 
deduced from logical reasoning alone if the theory itself implied that there could be no 
definite or certain starting point for logical reasoning.
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IV
The Roaring Twenties: Dawn of the New Quantum Theory
As if deducing the structure wasn’t difficult enough, Eddington firmly latched onto the 
uncertainty principle, a foundation of the ‘new’ quantum theory, as a defining philosophy 
making deduction even more difficult as I have just shown. On the surface this appears 
to be a contradiction -  how can certain results be derived from uncertain first principles? 
A detailed look at uncertainty and Eddington’s mathematical treatment of it (see chapter 
five) is necessary to fully understand his reasoning and to ultimately determine if that 
reasoning is valid. In analyzing uncertainty and Eddington’s interpretation of it, we must 
do what Eddington did and shed any preconceived notions we might have regarding the , 
implications of uncertainty or even the principle itself. In particular, as I will show, it 
will be most helpful to shed the preconception that uncertainty is what ultimately leads to 
the particulate nature of matter. But other preconceived notions surrounding uncertainty 
are also a hindrance in some instances particularly when we begin to deal with it in 
relation to structuralism. I will discuss these as they arise, though some of them can be 
dispensed with simply by looking at the historical development of the principle itself. In 
addition it is necessary to then extend this to include a historical analysis of the exclusion 
principle, which is intimately intertwined with uncertainty. Related, again, to both is the 
history of the development of wave and matrix mechanics, of which I will have 
something to say.
The Origins of Uncertainty
There are countless histories of the development of Werner Heisenberg’s (1901 -  1976) 
Uncertainty Principle from single articles to entire texts. For a basic historical treatment 
Helge Kragh’s Quantum Generations: A History o f Physics in the Twentieth Century 
shows its relation to the rest of modern physics. Max Jammer’s comprehensive text The 
Conceptual Development o f Quantum Mechanics contains a more technical account, 
pai'ticularly in relation to the Copenhagen Interpretation. However, a radical reanalysis
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of the history of the Copenhagen Interpretation that profoundly alters the view of the 
context within which many of the original points were made, was recently put forth by 
Mara Beller and bears close scrutiny (Beller 1999). Another classic critical analysis of 
Bohr’s work is The Philosophy o f Niels Bohr: The Framework o f Complementarity by H. 
Folse. In addition Walter Moore’s Schrddinger: Life and Thought provides a new 
perspective on the impact of Schrddinger’s wave mechanics on the development of 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.
The roots of the mathematical aspect of uncertainty -  the uncertainty relations 
themselves -  date to the mid 1920s and ultimately Max Born’s (1882 -  1970) 
probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. The germination of the general concept 
of uncertainty in physics has its roots in philosophy. Jammer has argued that Heisenberg 
was influenced early on by philosophy 
having first come into contact with 
atomic theory through Plato and was 
later influenced by the writings of 
Immanuel Kant (1724 -  1804) and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -  1951) (see 
Figure 6 .). But, perhaps even more 
p h ilo so p h ically  in flu en tia l, was 
Einstein’s concept of an observable 
relativistic time that brought with it the 
very important rejection of the absolute 
simultaneity of events as indefinable 
(Jammer 1966). This first put the 
emphasis on the concept of observable 
quantities in relation to quantum 
mechanics. Heisenberg even confided
Figure 6. Wittgenstein’s headstone -  yet another 
person appearing in this narrative buried less 
than fifty feet from Eddington. Note the 
reference to ‘W ittgenstein’s Ladder’. More 
curious were the hundreds of pennies (difficult to 
see in the photo) near the ladder end of the 
headstone. No one in Cambridge (nor any 
visiting philosophers I ran into) had any 
explanation for this (photo by author).this latter point to Einstein in 1926 
saying “the idea of observable quantities was actually taken from his [Einstein’s] 
relativity” {Archive 1963 as quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 198). Jammer’s points can be 
contrasted with the views of Beller, who maintains the germination of Heisenberg’s ideas
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grew out of dialogues he had with certain scientists including Bohr, Schrddinger, Pauli, 
Dirac, and Jordan (Beller 1999, pp. 65-102), and with Moore, who points to debates 
about causality and determinism in the early 1920s as appearing to “foreshadow the much 
more cogent attack on causality derived from quantum mechanics by Werner Heisenberg 
in his indeterminacy principle of 1927” (Moore 1989, p. 154). These debates included 
the likes of Schrddinger, Franz Exner, and Georg Hamel.
Heisenberg also employed Niels Bohr’s (1885 -  1962) Correspondence Principle 
in a unique way. This principle’s versatility alone implied a non-rigid formulation of 
quantum theory. But Heisenberg used it to formulate a new mathematical approach to be 
used in a new theory of mechanics. The idea was to make correspondence a root 
foundation of the new theory so that the mathematics could be built upon that. In 1925 
Heisenberg set about developing a solution for an anharmonic oscillator that was built 
around correspondence and utilized the notion of observable quantities. The resulting 
paper was sent to Wolfgang Pauli (1900 -  1958) whose encouraging comments prompted 
Heisenberg to give the paper to Bom in July of 1925. The unique solution included the 
use of matrices and complex numbers, though the matrix multiplication he used was not 
immediately obvious to Bom. Matrices had been rarely used by physicists prior to this 
point (what physicist could imagine living without them now?) with minor exceptions 
including Born’s own work on the lattice theory of crystals. In 1924, just prior to 
Heisenberg’s paper, Richard Courant (1888 -  1972), armed with the lecture notes of 
David Hilbert (1862 -  1943), published the remarkable volume Methods o f  Mathematical 
Physics which just happened to contain exactly those parts of algebra and analysis that 
would later sei*ve as the basis for quantum mechanics. As Jammer notes: “it seems 
almost uncanny how mathematics ... prepared itself for its future service to quantum 
mechanics” (Jammer 1966, p. 207).
Born took on the task, then, of putting Heisenberg’s new matrix mechanics in a 
more logically consistent framework. Originally his assistant in this endeavour was to be 
Pauli, but ironically, Pauli, whom shall cross our path again later in this chapter, turned 
down Bom’s offer. In a particularly providential scenario. Born was on a train to 
Hanover discussing his work with a colleague from Gottingen. He mentioned the 
problems he was having with the matrix calculations and was overheard by the twenty-
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three year-old Pascual Jordan (1902 -  1980) who just happened to be sitting in the same 
compaitment. Jordan and Born did not know one another, but upon arrival at Hanover 
Jordan introduced himself to Bom being certain to point out his experience with matrix 
algebra and offered his assistance. By September of 1925 Born and Jordan submitted 
their paper (Born and Jordan 1925) for publication. It was the first rigorous development 
and formulation of the new matrix mechanics.
The Commutation Relation and Born’s Matrix Mechanics
This paper utilized classical Hamiltonian methods combined with matrix mechanics in 
the manner now standard in both classical as well as quantum,mechanics (see Goldstein 
1980) to show that finding the extrema of the trace of the Lagrangian
L = p q -H (p q )
leads to the canonical equations:
q = OH / Op p = OH / Oq.
Rather than using only q as Heisenberg did. Born and Jordan used both q and p  as 
independent matrices to write for the first time what is now known as the commutation 
relation in quantum mechanics:
p q -q p  = * - (4.1)iK i)
where 1 is the unit matiix. Their derivation was based on the correspondence principle 
thus planting the seed of uncertainty through the non-rigid, versatile nature of the 
principle (see above).
In November a sequel to this paper appeared with Heisenberg as a co-author with 
Born and Jordan and it was in this famous paper that a logically consistent method for 
solving quantum mechanical problems was developed (Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan 
1925). The commutation relation itself led to several important results including Dirac’s 
discovery that it led directly to Bohr’s relation that connected the frequencies of atomic 
vibrations with the differences in atomic energy levels. Thus it paved the way for a more 
complete understanding of atomic radiation. In an interesting twist that is only a tiny
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morsel of the vast amount of evidence supporting the idea that Dirac was a genius, he 
developed the same theory without using or even knowing about matrices -  and he was 
only twenty-three (Kragh 1999).
De Broglie, Schrddinger, and the Dawn of Wave Mechanics
Simultaneous to this was the development of the wave model of light and matter. The 
wave-particle debate for light dates to the seventeenth century and the works of Isaac 
Newton (1642 -  1727), who was a proponent of the particle nature of light, and 
Christiaan Huygens (1629 -  1695) who was a proponent of the wave nature of light. The 
breakthrough in this debate was Louis de Broglie’s (1892 -  1987) discovery of the wave 
nature of matter in his doctoral thesis research in 1923 (his thesis was presented in 1924 
(de Broglie 1924) but several papers had already been published on the subject). The key 
result of de Broglie’s work was what is known as the ‘de Broglie relationship’ linking the 
effective wavelength of the wavefunction of a beam of quantum particles with their 
corresponding classical momentum: X = h i p  wherep  is the momentum. This led 
several physicists to develop a new theory of wave mechanics where the kinematics of 
particles could be described by treating them as waves rather than particles. De Broglie’s 
work laid the foundation for Erwin Schrddinger (1887 -  1961) to derive what is now 
popularly known as the Schrddinger time-independent wave equation, nearly at precisely 
the same time as Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan were first developing matrix mechanics. 
The h'ony, of course, is that Born was really wrapped up in the development of both 
theories since his probabilistic interpretation of the wave equation was a foundation piece 
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (see Beller 1999). In any case, Schrddinger began 
with the standard Hamiltonian equation for energy:
a s 'H = E
and replaced the separable function S by K \og\^\
 ^ Kdy/'^H
V y  y¥
= E
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In simple cases involving only \f/ and its first derivatives this can be easily written as a 
quadi'atic equation. As Jammer explains:
Schrddinger then replaced the quantum conditions by the 
following postulate: y/hsLS to be a real, single-valued, twice 
continuously differentiable function for which the integral 
of the just-mentioned quadratic form over the whole 
configuration space {q space) is an extremum. The Euler- 
Lagrange equation, corresponding to this variational 
integral, is the wave equation (Jammer 1966, p. 259).
Schrddinger applied this to a hydrogen atom with the potential energy —e^ / r to produce 
the following familiar form of the wave equation:
y/ = 0. (4.2)
Schrddinger then applied his new theoiy to a linear harmonic oscillator, a rigid rotator 
with both fixed and free axes, and a vibrational rotator that was equivalent to a diatomic 
molecule (see his general result below which, when combined with the de Broglie 
relation, matches the Born-Heisenberg-Jordan result precisely). Schrddinger’s results 
were thus in complete agreement with Heisenberg’s matrix mechanical results (Jammer 
1966).
The importance of the this entire process cannot be understated both in its 
relevance to Eddington’s formulation of his theory and its standing in the history of 
modern physics. To underscore this fact I will now present a somewhat simpler 
derivation of the wave equation. This will also serve to demonstrate the pivotal nature of 
the de Broglie relation in the development of modern quantum mechanics.
A Simple Derivation of the Time-Independent Schrddinger Equation
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The primary application of the Schrddinger equations is to find the energy eigenfunctions 
in the Hamiltonian equation for energy. Prior to the 1920s Newtonian mechanics was the 
only method used to study non-relativistic particles. Since Newtonian mechanics is still 
applicable in many situations it must be recoverable from any subsequently broader 
theory such as relativity (in fact it is not entirely recoverable from quantum mechanics, a 
point that still haunts physicists and philosophers). But let’s at least attempt to compare a 
Newtonian particle with a quantum particle and see what happens.
Assume we have some classical particle with some energy E  moving in a straight 
line in some direction such that as it moves it slows down. Thus the potential energy of 
whatever interaction is causing it to slow down is increasing while the kinetic energy of 
the particle itself is decreasing. Basically the particle transfers its kinetic energy to the 
potential energy of the interaction that, by the Standard Model, is itself a particle -  
essential one could interpret this as the carrier particle gaining some kinetic energy that 
manifests itself to an observer as potential energy. The original particle’s kinetic energy 
is given as E  = E -  F (x ) . If the particle is nonrelativistic, its kinetic energy is:
2  2m 2m
where p  is the particle’s momentum (Moore 2003b, p. 176). The particle’s momentum is
then p  = yi2mK . Obviously this implies that as the kinetic energy decreases, so does the 
momentum. This is where the previously mentioned de Broglie relationship becomes 
useful since it includes the classical momentum: X = h f  p .  The implication here is that if 
the particle’s classical momentum is decreasing its wavelength should be getting longer.
The problem here, of course, is that the wavelength is now not a constant -  it is 
changing in time. But initially, we’re only interested in handling the timQ-independent 
wave equation so we would like to ‘freeze’ the particle at a specific point (ignoring, for a 
moment, the problem of uncertainty here). This allows us to define something Moore 
refers to as the ‘local wavelength.’ Through simple calculus applied to a simple sine- 
wave with a changing wavelength, Moore shows that this is:
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where (Efld£' locate the extrema of/(x) (Moore 2003b, p. 179). Thus we now have a 
means of calculating the wavelength of some function at some p o i n t e v e n  if the 
wavelength is also dependent on % since the function and its second derivative can be 
evaluated at any %-position (simply find the second derivative and plug an x-value into 
this and the original function!).
Once again ignoring problems with uncertainty for a moment, we now have a way 
of finding the wavelength of some decelerating particle at a given position and by the de 
Broglie relation we know that this is related to the particle’s classical momentum. 
Mathematically this involves combining equation (4.3) with the de Broglie relation 
beginning with:
— ~ X  or — = p  = y/2mK . 
p  A
We can isolate the kinetic energy on the right side by squaring both sides and dividing by 
2 m:
1
2 m A
The inverse of the squaie of the local wavelength we determined was:
1 _ V g / dx^
Substituting this into the previous equation and recognizing that h = h l2 K  we find the 
time-independent Schrddinger equation:
ALi^-[E-V{x)]x)f,(x) = 02m dx
which is simply a slightly rearranged version of Schrddinger’s original equation:
y/ = 0 .2 m~K ' - S 'V ' y
Note that in Schrddinger’s form he has simply given the potential energy the value 
-e^  / r . In fact Schrddinger himself deduced a more general form using the de Broglie 
relations:
%K^m
hAyr + —^  (E -  U )^  = 0 . (4.4)
59
The beauty in this derivation is that it demonstrates the link between classically 
measurable quantities such as momentum and energy, and the more typically quantum 
quantity of wavelength. It is quite simply found by combining ordinary calculus, 
classical energy conservation, and the de Broglie relation. It is clear from this just how 
pivotal a discovery the de Broglie relation was.
The Time-Dependent Schrddinger Equation
Schrddinger, of course, recognized that the energy eigenvalue E  varies from position to 
position as the particle decelerates (or accelerates). In a time-dependent wave equation, 
then, it would be most useful to find some way to eliminate E. The wavefunction in four 
dimensions is defined as 'F = xi/(x,y,z,t) • Schrddinger was able to eliminate E  by setting
Y = y/(^)exp[2 m (E / h)t] which is simply the full equation combining the real and
imaginary parts of a sinusoidal wave travelling in time (one-dimension relativistically
speaking) with kq = 0 and co = 2 m — . Substituting this into his more general form of theh
ûmQ-independent wave equation he produced the Schrddinger time-dependent wave 
equation:
* A4' + t/4 ' = - L ^ -  (4.5)m 2m  dt
I will leave it in the form presented here since some of the combinations of constants 
present in this form became integral parts of Eddington’s work.
Once again, the simplicity of the derivation is beautiful. Simple pre-calculus level 
mathematics describing sinusoidal curves combined with the already fairly simple time- 
independent wave equation produced one of the bedrock equations of modern physics. 
Often the complexity of the broader subject overshadows the simplicity of the basic 
assumptions and derivations.
A New Interpretation of the Wave Function
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Let me return for a moment to 1926 and Schrddinger’s attempt to interpret his own work. 
He ascribed to y/ electromagnetic physical attributes and defined xj/y/  ^ as something he 
called the ‘weight function’ of this charge distribution. This is a term borrowed much 
later by Eddington and adapted to somewhat different purposes (see equation 8.7). But it 
is worth remembering this particular interpretation of this term. Schiddinger used it to 
draw a relationship between microscopic phenomena and macroscopic phenomena 
showing that the macroscopic behaviour of a linear harmonic oscillator can be described 
using microscopic wave packets. Unfortunately this led to several erroneous results on 
his part. His first flaw was assuming that the wave packets did not spread out in space.
In addition he incorrectly proposed that y/was a cause of some radiation phenomena. 
Ultimately, everything hinged on the question of how a paiticle could remain stable in 
wave dispersion phenomena if it was simply a bunch of waves. A new interpretation of 
the wave function was needed to bridge the gap between matrix and wave mechanics.
It was Born who picked up the yoke on this task as I mentioned briefly above. He 
was studying quantum mechanical scattering processes, specifically those between free 
particles and atoms. He was actually employing Schrddinger’s wave mechanics in this 
work, rather than his own matrix mechanics. Given an electron with an energy of 
E ~ h f  1 that approaches an atom whose unperturbed eigenfunctions are yA° {q) , he 
assigned it the following eigenfunction: y/^»g(g,z) = y/°(^)sin(2 ;rz / X) (assuming it was 
approaching from some positive direction, z). He then assigned a potential energy to the 
interaction between the two particles and applied perturbation theoiy to obtain the 
following expression for a scattered wave a great distance from the centre of scattering:
( ^ , y , =  Z  j j d co \(/J ^ \a ,/?,7 ) s i n {ax + Py + y z + S)y/l{q) w heredcois an
element of solid angle in the direction of the unit vector with the components a, jS, and 7. 
This expression also contains the wave function that determines the differential or 
scattering cross-section for this direction. Born said that if this equation allowed for the 
particle interpretation of matter then there is only one possibility here. Originally Born 
said this possibility was . After reading galley proofs of his paper he changed this
to which measures the probability that the electron is scattered in the direction
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defined in the scattering expression (Jammer 1966). To emphasize the significance of 
this result in the history of quantum mechanics here are Bom’s own words: “The motion 
of particles conforms to the laws of probability, but the probability itself is propagated in 
accordance with the law of causality” (Born 1926, p. 804). Probability had found its 
home deep in the heart of quantum theory, though still imbued with the spirit of causality 
(thereby minimizing the heart palpitations of strict causal proponents such as Einstein). 
Born’s result restricted classical, macroscopic phenomena to a limiting case of the new 
interpretation giving fundamental forces new meaning while still allowing them to 
predict results, as they had done successfully for centuries, consistent with the classical 
framework.
This, of course, was something Eddington wholeheartedly adopted as the core of 
his philosophy. In fact, the root of his ability to be both a strident relativist and a 
proponent of uncertainty is found right there in Bom’s statement. The preservation of 
causality satisfied his relativistic (classical) sensibilities, but the use of probability 
brought in a mathematical tool he could employ to deal with the problems that arose in 
measurement theory (see chapter five).
There is still a bit of related history that could be told here including the use of 
matrix mechanics to develop the transformation theory. The importance of the 
development of transformation theory by Jordan and, from a different point of view by 
Dirac and Fritz London (1900 -  1954), is that it generalized Bom’s interpretation and 
brought all the previous formalisms of quantum mechanics together in a single 
formulation (Jammer 1966). Both Jordan and Dirac’s formalism utilized the idea of 
probability amplitudes and suggested that the correspondence principle might be 
irrelevant as a foundational principle in quantum mechanics to be replaced instead by 
statistical considerations. The full story of this stage in the development of quantum 
mechanics also includes, then, the story of the work of the mathematician David Hilbert 
(1862 -  1943) who, again in 1926 and continuing into 1927, together with his assistants 
Lothar Wolfgang Nordheim (1899 -  1985) and John (Johann, Janos, or Jancsi) von 
Neumann (1903 -  1957), elaborated in a purely mathematical way on the transformation
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work of Jordan and introduced the mathematical concept of Hilbert spaces to quantum 
mechanics."
Subsequent to his work with Hilbert and Nordheim on transformation theory, von 
Neumann tackled the as-yet unsolved problem of fully merging matrix mechanics and 
wave mechanics. The major epistemological problem was that matrix theory consisted of 
a space of discrete variables while wave mechanics consisted of a space of continuous 
valuables. Von Neumann contended that unifying the two theories required transforming 
a differential operator into an integral operator using ‘improper’ functions such as Dirac’s 
5-function that in 1927 was considered mathematically illegitimate (it still is if it is 
considered an ordinary function). As such, von Neumann rejected the idea of unifying 
these two spaces and developed a completely new mathematical framework for quantum 
mechanics between 1927 and 1929, based on Hilbert’s work on linear integral equations. 
Von Neumann’s formalism is pai'ticularly suitable to nonrelativistic mechanics and its 
offshoots including relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. In 
developing it he contended that the set of all sequences in the discrete space of matrix 
theoiy, called the sequence space where the sum of all the probability amplitudes is equal 
to one, is essentially identical to the set of all summable and square-integrable complex­
valued functions in the continuous space of wave mechanics. Essentially he took 
advantage of the fact that integrals are simply summations. The discrete space is Hilbert 
space. He first presented these ideas in May of 1927. His formalism, though new, 
simply recognized the meeting point of matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. He did 
not propose any new physical or epistemological assumptions (beyond those proposed by 
Dirac and Jordan in their transformation theories). This is laigely since the uncertainty 
relations had only just been proposed in March and hadn’t played any role in his early 
work. But they would have a profound impact on the later expansion of his theory and on 
his work in measurement, the latter a point he shared with Eddington.
The Birth of the Uncertainty Relations
"  For a brief description of Hilbert spaces see Liboff 1998, pp. 101-106. For a more thorough description 
see van Fraassen 1991, pp. 144-146 and Introduction to Hilbert Space and the Theory o f  Spectral 
Multiplicity by Paul R. Halmos (1957).
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The introduction of probabilistic methods to quantum mechanics brought in the now 
familiar idea of expectation values -  rather than knowing quantities with certainty, the 
theory merely predicted what a quantity was expected to be. Mathematically the 
expectation value can be represented in modern notation as:
(C> = \cP{C)dC
where P(C)dC is the probability of finding the observable C in the interval C, C +5C.
The integration is over all values of C. Bom used expectation values in his probabilistic 
interpretation of the wave function, but no direct links between this idea and actual 
measurements had yet been developed, even though Bohr’s frequency relation was 
actually part of the formalism and there was agreement with spectroscopic observations. 
There was still much left to interpret, in particular the meat of the formalism itself. As 
Jammer points out:
This unusual state of affairs was due, of course, to the 
peculiar development of the formalism which at first was 
dominated by the correspondence principle but later 
detached from it (Jammer 1966, p. 323).
From an interpretational standpoint there were also problems with the very 
quantities and their linguistic representation in the theory. These problems were 
exacerbated by the many languages within which the theory was developed. From a 
purely mathematical standpoint, however, there was one crystal clear implication: the 
basic commutation relation p q - q p  -  h /lm  required that these quantities could not be 
solely defined by their classical meanings.
These problems were hardly an afterthought. They reared their ugly head right 
from tlie beginning reaching an early crescendo during Schrodinger’s 1926 visit to Bohr’s 
institute in Copenhagen where the clash between Schrodinger’s continuous interpretation 
and Bohi ’s discrete interpretation stimulated extensive discussions in Copenhagen long 
after Schrddinger returned to Germany (Jammer 1966). It was nearly a miniature 
preview of the great Einstein-Bohr debate that was still a decade away. Ironically
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perhaps, the person who was able to see through the dogmatic adherence of both sides to 
their opinion (for that was all it was at the time) and realize that the root of the conflict 
was the lack of a definite interpretation of the actual formalism, was Heisenberg. Once 
again Heisenberg looked to relativity for guidance. He was inspired by the thought of 
what would have happened if the Lorentz transformations in relativity had been 
combined with the descriptions of space and time prior to Einstein’s developments. 
Einstein had to completely reinterpret space and time in order to make his theory work 
and did so by turning the tables a bit: rather than describe nature by mathematics which is 
a top-down scheme of taking known mathematics and forcing it to apply to the real- 
world, assume, rather, that mathematics is the language of nature and we merely need to 
learn to interpret it.
With that in mind, Heisenberg sought the ways in which nature has its voice in 
quantum mechanics and found that it was through the observables p  and q (basically 
nature speaks to us through the things we can observe via our senses -  see chapter three 
for a full discussion -  and ultimately the interpretation of those observations involves 
mathematics at the most fundamental level). So, he simply assumed there was only the 
possibility of having Ap*A^ > h ! 2K  as the relationship between these two observables.
If that was true, could it make a consistent statement? Could experiment prove it to be 
true? These questions were retrospectively asked by Heisenberg himself (Jammer 1966). 
He reasoned that the formalism of quantum mechanics does not allow for classical 
descriptions of space and time nor does it completely preserve causality. Rather than 
develop a new conceptual framework, Heisenberg maintained the classical ideas but 
restricted their applicability to limiting cases.
In late October of 1926 Heisenberg first stated the principle in ordinary language 
in a letter to Pauli. In it he states that the basic commutation relation clearly shows that it 
is “meaningless to speak of the place of a particle with a definite velocity” (Heisenberg in 
Fierz and Weisskopf 1960, p. 42). In Februaiy of 1927 Heisenberg, after much thought, 
sent another letter to Pauli who encouraged him to elaborate. Pauli then passed on the 
elaboration to Bohr who recommended a few changes. At the end of March the paper 
was submitted to Zeitschrift ju r  Physik. It was not the first realization that p  and q cannot 
be simultaneously known -  both Dirac and Jordan made statements to that affect
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(Jammer 1966). The difference was that Heisenberg performed a mathematical 
investigation into the relationship between the distributions of p  and q. His line of 
reasoning began with the transformation theory and assumed that the dependence of q 
was described by a Gaussian error curve^^. Heisenberg’s conclusion was that the product 
of the uncertainties ôq and 8p was h/ljt. This is a “direct intuitive interpretation” of the 
basic commutation relation (quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 328). As early as 1924 his mind 
had been preoccupied by a thought experiment with a y-ray microscope. Notably, in 
1923, Wilhelm Wien (1864 -  1928) asked Heisenberg about the resolving power of such 
a microscope at Heisenberg’s oral PhD defence; Heisenberg was unable to answer the 
question. He used some of the knowledge he gained from this experience while thinking 
about uncertainty, though when actually discussing the experiment he did not account for 
the angular aperture of the objective lens (something Bohr soon corrected).
The thought experiment consisted of illuminating an electron with radiation of a 
reasonably short wavelength and then observing it under a microscope. However, the 
Compton effect immediately means that the impact of the light (quanta) used to observe 
the electron changes its (the electron’s) momentum dramatically (this is also one of the 
first descriptions of the idea that an observer has no choice but to interfere with the 
observable in order to make the observation). The electron’s momentum cannot be 
completely determined, however, since the angle of the scattered photon cannot be 
determined by the microscope (within the range provided by the wave packets entering 
the microscope). But the electron’s position, however, is now known definitely. 
Quantitatively, if an identical observation is made on an electron multiple times to locate 
its position, even if the experimental setup is identical each time, the results will not 
always be the same.
Heisenberg also applied this reasoning to a Stem-Gerlach experiment (which will 
be discussed in the next section) and found that the faster an atom crossed the deviating 
field, the less precise was the measurement of its energy: ÔE»Ôt -  h . As such he 
concluded that any two canonically conjugate quantities observed simultaneously carry 
with them some level of uncertainty. Introducing one of the most fundamental 
interpretations in all of quantum mechanics, he held that a classical notion such as a path
Eddington relied heavily on Gaussian distributions as will become apparent in subsequent chapters.
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or trajectory could be retained since “the path comes into existence only when we 
observe it” (Heisenberg 1927, p. 185). This also presents the idea that the wave and 
particle natures of particles are not simultaneously observable using the exact same 
apparatus for when a quanta (photon, electron, etc.) exists in a well-defined spatial 
location it acts like a particle whereas if it is not confined to a well-defined spatial 
location its momentum can be defined more precisely and it behaves like a wave (Liboff 
1998). A simple thought experiment that I use when first presenting this idea to my 
students, though not entirely accurate, at least gives the flavour of the problem: imagine 
you have a videotape of a ball falling to the ground next to a ruler. In order to measure 
the momentum one needs velocity which requires several measurements (several frames 
of the film) since velocity is defined as a change in position during a given time interval 
(instantaneous velocity is simply a limit here) so there is no single position. Conversely, 
if you want to see the ball at a specific point along the ruler you must pause the tape at 
the point and the ball has no velocity -  it’s frozen in place for the purposes of your 
measuring its position.
Returning for a moment to the idea that this relationship holds for any two 
canonically conjugate quantities a generalized version of the uncertainty relations can be 
written. Suppose that two observables A  and B anticommute:
= C 9^  0 (4.6)
then if the measurement of A is uncertain in some state the measurement of B  will also be 
uncertain such that:
A A .A B>||{C)| (4.7)
It will also be helpful to note the relationship between this and probability since the two 
aie inextricably linked. As Liboff explains:
If A  and B do not commute, then the eigenstate (p^  of A 
which the system goes into on measurement of A is not 
necessarily an eigenstate of B . Subsequent measurements
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of B will give any spectrum of eigenvalues of B with a 
corresponding probability distribution P{b) (Liboff 1998, p.
146).
The probability amplitude (i.e. the probability of some measurement of B  occurring) is
P{b) = |(<Pz, . This generalization of the uncertainty relations, appearing here in
more modem notation, is the result of work by Schrodinger who improved upon the 
results of H.P. Robertson (1903 -  1961) and Edward Condon (1902 -  1974) (Jammer 
1966).
A particle such as an electron, then, is represented by a wave packet in 
configuration space that is composed of the eigenfunctions of a collection of states. Its 
size is determined by the precision of the position measurement. In Heisenberg’s thought 
experiment with the microscope this precision, and thus its size, is determined by the 
wavelength of the light illuminating the electron. The packet can describe an orbit if the 
electron is bound to an atom just like a classical particle except that the packet spreads 
out with time. Each consecutive observation of the packet essentially shows a smaller 
and smaller packet. This is basically a temporal sequence of the locations of the wave 
packet (or, rather, where it was observed) and it produces the orbit. Heisenberg utilized 
these results in reaching several conclusions that have tremendous philosophical 
implications. The first is that quantum theory, despite employing statistics, is not limited 
to only statistical conclusions. He pointed to the experiments of Hans Geiger (1882 -  
1945) and Walther Bothe (1891 -  1957) as examples of this. The second is that the 
problem with causality in quantum theory is not the inability to predict the future from 
knowledge of present events, but rather the inability to actually have a fu ll and complete 
knowledge o f the present (this is the origin of the completeness debate in quantum 
mechanics). In a rather titillating hint of things to come he says:
it may be suggested that behind the statistical universe of 
perception there lies hidden a ‘real’ world ... ruled by 
causality. Such speculations seem to us -  and this we stress
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with emphasis -  useless and meaningless. For physics has 
to confine itself to the formal description of the relations 
among perceptions (Heisenberg 1927, p. 197).
In this statement he clearly eschews interpretive work such as complementarity as outside 
the scope of physics. Conversely, as Folse points out, Bohr viewed complementarity and 
the uncertainty principle as consequences of the quantum postulate where his was “the 
consequence for the conceptual framework while Heisenberg’s discoveiy was its 
formal, mathematical consequence” (Folse 1985, p. 128). The influence of Bohi* and 
Heisenberg on Eddington is less direct since Eddington reinterpreted the new quantum 
theory in his own unique way.
Interpretations of Uncertainty and Bohr’s Complementarity
The philosophical implications of uncertainty were not of immediate importance in 1927. 
Physicists were focusing on the definability and measurability of the various aspects of 
quantum mechanics. Approaches to the quandaries of the theoiy primarily involved 
practical laboratory results that could be obtained from their proper consideration. 
Heisenberg’s paper had plenty to say on these subjects apart from its statements on the 
philosophical nature of quantum mechanics. Of particular relevance to Eddington’s 
treatment of the theory is Heisenberg’s view that something is defined if it is measurable. 
So, to Heisenberg, objects that could not be measured were useless since they couldn’t be 
defined. In addition Heisenberg’s use of light as both a measuring tool and an object to 
be measured refocused the attention of physics to the importance of measurement, 
something Eddington treats in depth.
Philosophically it took some time for his conclusions about causality to be fully 
appreciated. Even in the philosophy community, upon which Heisenberg’s conclusions 
had huge effects, didn’t realize initially what had happened and, when they did, they were 
essentially taken by surprise (Jammer 1966). E.H. (Earle Hesse) Kennard (b. 1885) who 
happened to be visiting Copenhagen at the time of Heisenberg’s discovery was, apart 
from Bohr and Pauli who proof-read Heisenberg’s manuscripts, the only person who
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really understood the implications of Heisenberg’s work calling the uncertainty relations 
“the core of the new theory” (Kennard 1927 quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 333). Hermann 
Weyl’s (1885 -  1955) Theory o f Groups and Quantum Mechanics that first appeared in 
1928 was the first text on the subject that gave the uncertainty relations a central role in 
the t h e o r y . T h e  relations were criticized for a time (for instance the philosopher Karl 
Popper (1902 -  1994) remarked that Heisenberg has tried “to give a causal explanation 
why causal explanations are impossible” (Popper 1935, p. 184)), but that did not stop 
continued work on them by the likes of Kennard and Arthur E. Ruark (b. 1899), who 
focused on the experimental aspects, and Robertson and Condon whose mathematical 
work was discussed above.
As we have already seen, related to the uncertainty relations was Bohr’s idea of 
complementarity -  the fact that two mutually exclusive descriptions of the world, one 
discrete (particle) and the other continuous (wave), are not only allowed but required by 
the laws of quantum mechanics. Though Bohr’s work was partially aimed at 
Heisenberg’s principle, Folse maintains that Bohr never intended it to be limited to only 
the uncertainty principle (Folse 1985). Since he viewed both his and Heisenberg’s work 
as consequences of the quantum postulate it is natural to assume he felt his work stood 
well on its own not to mention the fact that it was Bohr himself who proposed the 
quantum postulate in the first place (to explain the stability of atoms). In this light 
complementarity appears to logically precede uncertainty and, in fact, Heisenberg began 
his work on uncertainty on the somewhat isolated island of Helgoland after an intense 
visit with Bohr (Beller 1999).
Jammer maintains that complementarity in Bohr’s mind originated in his final 
acceptance of the wave-particle duality of quanta. Experimentally there seemed to be no 
explanation for the apparently paradoxical behaviour of quanta under differing conditions 
-  why would an electron behave like a particle in one experiment and yet behave like a 
wave in another, even if it was the same exact electron in both experiments? Bohr was 
originally opposed to Einstein’s idea that light also came in packets or quanta (photons). 
But the Bothe-Geiger experiments provided overwhelming evidence in support of
Anotlier connection in the complex web of relations among physicists is that Weyl’s text was first 
translated into English by Robertson in 1931.
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Einstein. Jammer maintains that the first evidence that ti*uly supports Bohr’s move to 
acceptance of wave-particle duality appeared in the postscript of a 1925 paper of his 
where he discusses the reconciliation of the Bothe-Geiger experiments with work 
performed by himself, Hendrick Anton (Hans) Kramers (1894 -  1952), and John C.
Slater (1900 -  1976). In it he says that “one should not be surprised if the requhed 
extension of classical electrodynamics leads to a far-reaching revolution of the 
conceptions on which the description of nature has been based so far” (Bohr 1925 as 
quoted in Jammer 1966, p. 346). Beyond this the tine geimination of his ideas is difficult 
to track. But it is clear that during the time between this comment and his first 
presentation of complementarity in 1927 he struggled primarily with the logic that was 
underneath the formalism itself. For instance, both the equation for the energy of a 
photon, E = h v , and the equation relating the momentum of a photon to wave number, 
p ~ h k  , contain particle and wave elements. Simply glancing at these two equations 
should reveal that the answer must relate in some way to Planck’s constant.
Bohr found no answer to this quandary in existing logical conjectures and thus 
determined that a new logical framework was required to make sense of these results. He 
called his logical framework ‘ complementarity ’ in reference to the fact that two different 
descriptions of phenomena that are mutually exclusive are nonetheless required for a full 
description of the situation. The uncertainty relations simply provided him with a 
concrete measure of what had to be sacrificed in violating the normally rigorous 
exclusion of conceptual ideas. However, they also provided him with a mathematical 
assurance that complementarity wouldn’t lead to a logical contradiction since if one 
quantity is measured to a great degree of accuracy the other complementary one would be 
nearly immeasurable -  no physical situation can simultaneously and rigorously display 
both complementary quantities.
I have always personally had trouble with the solidity of the logical foundation 
upon which Bohr’s idea rests -  it almost seemed like a bit of a cop out to me, though I 
have never gone so far as to support a theory involving hidden variables. Bell’s Theorem 
and subsequent supporting experiments such as those performed by Alain Aspect (based 
on an idea originally put forth by Bohm) at Orsay in the early 1980s seem to offer 
unquestionable support for the notion that uncertainty is inherent in the fabric of the
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universe and that complementarity correctly interprets the wave-particle duality and so I 
am cautious in my criticism. But at the time Bohr argued that the reason it works is due 
to our inability to truly define what we mean by ‘observation’ because the observation 
itself interferes with the object under observation (see Heisenberg’s thought experiment 
with the y-ray microscope discussed previously). In essence, this presents the problem of 
truly objective observation as I discussed in the preceding chapter; our subject view may 
be behind wave-particle duality. Eddington may, in fact, have been dissatisfied with 
Bohr’s idea as well and was subsequently inspired to search for a completely objective 
way to observe the universe.
Exclusion and Spin
Paiallel to these developments in uncertainty and the new mechanics there was quite a bit 
of work being done in spectroscopic and particle beam analyses. In the early 1920s one 
of the major experimental problems that was at the forefront of physics research was 
finding a full physical explanation for the fine-structure of spectral lines. In late 1921 
Otto Stern (1888 -  1969) and Walther Gerlach (1889 -  1979) used evaporation in a 
heated oven to produce a beam of silver atoms that was directed through a nearly perfect 
(high) vacuum through collimating slits that were situated along the gradient of the 
magnetic field at the sharp edge of the pole piece of what is known as a DuBois 
electromagnet. Through a series of similar experiments they were able to show that the 
atomic beam split into two ‘beamlets’ in the presence of a magnetic field. Classically the 
resulting distribution of atoms on the collecting glass should have been Gaussian since 
classical mechanics implies a continuum of possible results including atoms that would 
have not been affected by the magnetic field at all.^ '* However, Stern and Gerlach’s result 
displayed no atoms unaffected by the magnetic field -  all the atoms appeared in one of 
two locations on the glass, a clear indication of the quantization of space. Additionally 
they were able to show that the atoms all had a magnetic moment aligned with the field 
direction. In and of itself these results were actually not unexpected. Arnold
This experiment is an excellent demonstration of the different meanings given to probability in classical 
and quantum situations (see chapter three).
72
Sommeifeld (1868 -  1951) and Alfred Lande (1888 -  1976) developed what is often 
referred to as the ‘magnetic-core hypothesis’ between 1921 and 1923 in which the 
nucleus and inner (nonoptical) electrons (often referred to collectively as the atomic core) 
possessed an angular momentum that was some multiple of h tln  along with a magnetic 
moment (the connection between the two was tenuous at that time -  see below). Thus the 
angular momentum vector of the optical electron can only assume discrete inclinations 
with respect to the axis of the core. The assignment of angular momentum to the 
electron, which was considered by many to be a point particle, was not universally 
accepted. Pauli, as I will show, did not actually use this exact concept when initially 
developing the exclusion principle. Regardless of the huth of the Sommerfeld -  Lande 
theory, the Stern-Gerlach experiment did raise some important questions. What 
mechanism produced the two beamlets found by Stern and Gerlach and was it related to 
magnetic moments or, in the ‘magnetic-core hypothesis,’ the angular momenta?
The ‘magnetic-core hypothesis’ or Sommerfeld -  Lande theoiy, developed in part 
to explain the anomalous Zeeman effect in multiplet spectral lines, had earlier that year 
provided a theoretical framework that apparently fit the Stern -  Gerlach results perfectly, 
another example of theoiy running ahead of experiment. But there was one nagging 
problem that was not answered by either the theory or the experiment and was first 
pointed out by Einstein and Paul Ehrenfest (1888 -  1933) -  just how do the atoms orient 
themselves in the field? Since the field was in a high vacuum collisions could be ruled 
out as a possible explanation. The same could be said for radiative energy exchanges 
since they require a considerably longer timespan than was observed in the alignment. 
That left only two solutions: either the atoms never assume states in which they are not 
completely quantized (i.e. they’re quantized to begin with) or states could occur during 
rapid changes that violate normal quantum rules. Einstein and Ehrenfest showed that 
either assumption leads to conceptual problems.
In a somewhat providential circumstance, Pauli completed his PhD in 1921 under 
Sommerfeld and was thus directly exposed to the early development of the Sommerfeld -  
Lande theory. In the winter of 1921/22 he was in Gottingen as an assistant to Born. It 
was there that he met Bohr who was giving a series of guest lectures on his research on 
the periodic ‘system’ (table) of elements. In the fall of that yeai" Bohr invited Pauli to
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Copenhagen to assist him in the German edition of his works. It was then that Pauli first 
undertook to explain the anomalous Zeeman effect.*^ In two papers, the first one written 
in Copenhagen and the second in Hamburg where he accepted a position in 1923, he 
attempted to generalize some of the results produced by Sommerfeld regarding the 
Zeeman effect in alkali and alkaline-earth spectra. Without any theoretical justification at 
all he directly associated magnetic moments with angular momenta and fully traced the 
splitting. This was the first instance of this association and helped explain some of the 
results of the Sommerfeld -  Lande theory. But Pauli felt his work was unfinished since 
he had been unable to explain why electron shells in atoms became filled or closed -  why 
couldn’t any number of electrons exist in a given shell? In the fall of 1924 Pauli, in fact, 
showed tliat the ‘magnetic-core’ hypothesis as proposed by Sommerfeld and Lande was 
actually inconsistent with experimental results (this is perhaps why he initially resisted 
the idea of assigning rotational quantities directly to an electron).
Based on these results, both theoretical and experimental, Pauli assumed that 
closed shells must have an overall angular momentum of zero and an overall magnetic 
moment of zero -  i.e. in Sommerfeld -  Lande theory if any of the electrons in them had 
angular momenta and magnetic moments, they all must cancel in order to preserve the 
balance of the shell. As such, Pauli concluded that, at least for alkali atoms, the 
outermost shell or valence electron must be the only part of the atom that contributes to 
its angular momentum and its energy changes in external magnetic fields. But, Pauli did 
not recognize the fact that the angular momentum here really belonged to the electron. 
Since it was assumed to be a point particle in this instance, angular momentum was a 
meaningless concept. It definitely affected the core’s angular momentum, but exactly 
how was not yet known. Here yet again the theory of relativity played a role in the 
furthering of quantum theory: Pauli was an expert on the subject since he had written an 
article on it for an encyclopaedia at the age of twenty and it was a theory he ardently 
supported and believed in. This led him to actually reject the Sommerfeld -  Lande 
‘magnetic core’ hypothesis and opened the door to spin (Jammer 1966).
In an oft quoted comment, Pauli said in 1945 while addressing the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton, “A colleague who met me strolling rather aimlessly in the beautiful streets o f Copenhagen said 
to me in a friendly manner, ‘You look very unliappy’; whereupon I answered fiercely, ‘How can one look 
happy when he is thinking about the anomalous Zeeman effect?” (Pauli 1946).
74
By this time (the fall of 1924) an acceptable description of the periodic system of 
elements had been devised largely by Bohr building on the ideas of Walther Kossel (1888 
-  1956). He had proposed a basic scheme by 1921 and subsequently developed more 
detailed schemes over the next few years. This work deviated slightly from experimental 
progress made around the same time by de Broglie and Alexandre Dauvillier (1892 -  
1979). But, in the fall of 1924, Edmund Stoner (1899 -  1968) succeeded in merging the 
experimental results with the theory, mostly provided by Bohr but including some of 
Lande’s 1922 suggestions such as the idea of assigning thiee quantum numbers to each 
sublevel (Stoner 1924).
Stoner’s article proved to be tremendously influential on Pauli in his further 
deliberations on the subject. Stoner’s scheme has been shown to be the correct scheme 
quantum mechanically, but well before that it was still considered an improvement over 
the work of Bohr (and Lande whose theory, though a solid foundation for these 
subsequent studies, did not enjoy the wide-spread popularity of Bohr’s). The primary 
difference between Stoner’s scheme and Bohi’s is that in Stoner’s there is a greater 
concentration of electrons in the outer sublevels. Six months earlier chemist J.D. Main 
Smith (dates unknown) found results consistent with Stoner’s from purely chemical 
considerations.'^ Stoner’s paper, however, connected the distribution of the electrons 
with the problem of multiplet structure. So, now the stage was set for Pauli to put 
everything together -  angular momentum, magnetic moment, multiplet structure, and 
electron shell restrictions.
Pauli added one component to Stoner’s work (and thus the work of Main Smith, 
Bohr and Lande) -  a fourth quantum number to represent the component of angular 
momentum of the atom (and not yet the electron -  really this represented how much the 
electron supposedly contributed to the atom’s overall angular momentum) that is in the 
direction of an external magnetic field applied to the atom. Pauli then realized that the 
shell structure of atoms is perfectly explained if each possible orbit or state is assigned a
Main Smith wrote a letter in response to Stoner’s publication claiming priority. Subsequent papers in 
both tlie physics and chemistry community often refer to both Stoner and Main Smith as the correct 
modifiers of Bohr’s scheme.
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set of four quantum numbers and only one electron is allowed to occupy each of these 
states.'^
There was still one unsolved problem. Bohr had asked why don’t all the electrons 
occupy the innermost shell when the atom is in the ground state? Pauli suggested that his 
solution of one electron per state (or orbit) could be interpreted as a principle. In essence 
it explained the shells and the resulting periodic system of elements because it excluded 
more than one electron from occupying a state or orbit. Pauli found a simple test for the 
principle was the case of triplet s terms for two essentially equivalent electrons (same n 
and I values) in an alkaline-earth atom. In this case both electrons would have to share 
the same exact set of quantum numbers. Pauli’s principle supposedly excluded this from 
happening so the fact that cases of these electrons do not appear in nature seemingly 
vindicates the principle. Since the exact meaning of the third quantum number was not 
established at the time Pauli could only show that the principle worked in the presence of 
strong external magnetic fields, but he was able to employ thermodynamics to show that 
at least the number of states didn’t change when transitioning to a weaker field. As such 
the principle was validated generally, if not specifically.
In that spectacular year of 1926, while the formalism of quantum mechanics and 
the philosophy of uncertainty were just coming together, Heisenberg , Dirac, and Pauli, 
among their many other accomplishments, were able to extend the essence of the 
principle to include the requirement that all state functions (including spin) of a system of 
similar' particles, assuming they are fermions (meaning they obey Fermi-Dirac statistics 
which was in the process of being developed that very year in relation to the 
transformation theories discussed above), must be antisymmetric with respect to the 
particle exchange -  i.e. the particles must be dissimilar in some respect. As such 
exclusion became a root principle by which other physical laws were generated and its 
applications are wide. In 1921 Compton had concluded “that the electron itself, spinning 
like a tiny gyroscope, is probably the ultimate magnetic particle” (Compton 1921, p. 155)
The four quantum numbers are, in modem notation: n, for the energy level, /, for the number of angular 
cycles of the wavefunction around the atom (also the number of bumps in the squared wavefunction), m, 
for the number of possible orientations of the wavefunction in space, and ms, for the spin orientation (see 
Moore 2003b, p. 163), The physical meaning of m was not well-defined when Pauli was first developing 
the exclusion principle and the spin was only associated with the electron later in 1926 by Goudsmit and 
Uhlenbeck.
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but wasn’t certain if it was a highly important or completely useless conjectuie. Spin was 
proposed in 1925 by Samuel Goudsmit (1902 -  1978) and George Uhlenbeck (1900 -  
1988) based on spectroscopic evidence as well as Pauli’s development of the exclusion 
principle. Primarily, however, they had pondered Pauli’s work and found they could only 
understand his additional quantum number (for spin angulai" momentum) if the electron 
were not a point particle but rather a small, rotating sphere. Unfortunately, in this 
scenario they found that the rotational velocity at the surface of the electron exceeded the 
speed of light several times over. But, if the electron held the rotational properties of a 
sphere yet had no size, being a point particle, one needn’t worry about this issue since 
there would be no surface for which to calculate this rotational velocity. Their paper, 
published in 1925 only on the insistence of Ehrenfest, suggested that the angular 
momentum of the atom was really the angular momentum of the valence electron that 
imposed a stress on the atomic core enabling it to assume two orientations, like the 
electron itself, rather than one (Kragh 1999 and Jammer 1966). The speed of light 
problem was mentioned briefly in a footnote.
Classical electrodynamics shows that magnetic fields arise from changing electric 
fields, thus the rotation of the electron is what produces the magnetic moment that thus 
forces the electrons to align with an external field. In retrospect, then, the principle also 
explained the Stern -  Gerlach results -  the atomic beam split because half the atoms had 
valence electrons that aligned with the field direction while the other half antialigned 
with the field direction. For instance, think of a compass needle. It always aligns itself 
with a magnetic field line with the south pole of the magnet being attracted to the north 
magnetic pole of the earth and the north pole of the magnet being attracted to the south 
magnetic pole of the e a r t h . I n  the Stern-Gerlach experiment there was no telling which 
way the valence electron was spinning and thus which direction (by the old right-hand 
rule) the magnetic moment was pointing (i.e. which end of the electron was north or 
south as it entered the magnetic field). As it turns out, statistical calculations of the 
multiplicities show that it’s about half and half.
This is a common misconception about the Earth -  the north geographic pole is actually the south 
magnetic pole so when a compass points north that end of the compass really is the north pole of the 
compass needle.
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So, from about 1921 to 1926, it was established that valence electrons account for 
the quantum properties of the atoms they are in and that they spin on an axis. Since they 
represent charge and thus have an electric field, this rotation produced a magnetic field 
whose direction was given by simply applying the right-hand rule. When subjected to an 
external magnetic field, then, they would line up their magnetic fields with the external 
field -  the north pole of the electron would be attracted to the south pole of the field and 
vice-versa. Pauli was finally convinced in late 1926 after L.H. (Llewellen Hilleth) 
Thomas (1903 -  1992) corrected an error of a factor of two in the calculation of the 
doublet separations, a result subsequently verified by Yakov (Iakov or Jakov) Frenkel 
(1894 -  1952). Pauli’s opposition stemmed from the view that rotation (spin) was a 
wholly classical phenomena and so could not be represented by a quantum number. His 
eventual acceptance of spin, however, would lead him in 1927 to develop, in 
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, a consistent theory of spin for the electron utilizing 
his now famous spin matrices. In doing so he reinterpreted spin to be a wholly quantum 
mechanical property. In modern notation, the projection of the spin angular momentum 
on the z-axis for any quanton (atom, electron, etc.) is:
1 3Sz -  sh ,(s - l)h ,...,-s ti  where a = 0 ,—,1,—,...
and, quantities containing ft are quantized, so spin indeed is a quantum mechanical 
property.
The Merger of Uncertainty and Exclusion
I have just traced, then, the early history of the uncertainty principle and the exclusion 
principle (along with the related development of the new mechanics) up to about 1928. 
Both were separate threads but often explored by the same people. As such it was natural 
for someone to attempt to find a link between the two quantum phenomena. This 
happens to be where Eddington fully enters the picture.
In 1928 Dirac had published a generalization of the Schrodinger equation that 
consisted of a set of four simultaneous first order partial differential equations (Dirac 
1928a) that is now known as the Dirac equation. In 1926-27 Oskar Klein (1894 -  1977)
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and Walter Gordon (1893 -  1939) independently attempted to construct a relativistic 
wave equation (as had Schrodinger himself privately). The Klein-Gordon equation, as it 
is now known, had two problems, however. It did not correctly predict the fine structure 
of hydrogen (it is still useful for spin-0 particles). In, what appeared to be a separate 
problem at the time, it also could not be combined with Pauli’s 1927 theory of spin. Of 
course we now know that these two problems are, in fact, two faces of the same single 
problem since fine structure is related to spin. Diiac’s follow-up to Klein-Gordon in 
1928, despite not directly introducing the idea of a spinning electron, actually contained 
the correct spin in the result (Kragh 1999). His paper contained a generalization of the 
Schrodinger equation that consisted of a set of four simultaneous first order partial 
differential equations (Dirac 1928a) that is now known collectively as the Dirac 
equation.'^
Spin turned out to be a monumental discovery on par with the de Broglie relation, 
particularly in relation to Eddington’s work since it led directly to the exclusion principle 
that was the second pillar of his theory (uncertainty being the first). I have akeady shown 
that spin was considered a fundamental part of quantum mechanics fairly soon after its 
discovery. As such any further work in the field needed to account for it. As I previously 
stated the Klein-Gordon equation, which was the first relativistic attempt at a wave 
equation, did not account for spin, but Dirac’s equation did. In fact, Pauli’s spin matrix 
development of 1927 turned out to be a nonrelativistic limit of Dirac’s equation. Since 
Dirac’s equation was a form of the wave equation, spin, which is so vital to the core of 
the exclusion principle, was merged with the core of wave mechanics that held as a basic 
tenet the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle was derived from the basic 
commutation relation that corresponded to the time-independent wave equation. Dirac’s 
relativistic wave equation was described by Bohm as
a first-order relativistic wave equation [containing] four 
complex wave functions. The extra wave functions 
correspond to additional variables, which can be related to
Dirac’s paper was communicated to the Proceedings o f  the Royal Society o f  London by none other than 4
Ralph Fowler (see chapter two). |
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the spin and charge of the electron. In this way, he is able 
to obtain conserved probabilities, as well as an accurate 
description of many of the relativistic properties of the 
electron, not treated correctly by any other theory (Bohm 
1951 [1979], p. 90).
Schrodinger’s wave equation was thus a nonrelativistic limit of Dirac’s equation. This 
link between uncertainty and exclusion is tenuous in this form, however. It would be 
better to find a direct link between the two principles and, indeed, one does exist -  a 
rather simple one, in fact.
Pauli’s spin matrices
fO (0  - i \  f l  0 ^C7„ = vl 0; ,0  - 1,
are simply a way of representing the coefficients in front of h in matrix form in the 
general equation for the components (axis projections) of spin angular momentum, 
generalized here for any direction: = sh,{s-  . S here is actually an operator
and the components satisfy the following commutation relation:
The Pauli matrices also satisfy a commutation relation:
(see Gasiorowicz 1996, p. 242). Both S and cr satisfy equations (4.6) and (4.7) and thus 
obey the uncertainty principle. Experimentally this can be confirmed by a standard 
experiment utilizing a Stern-Gerlach device (see Moore 2003b for a simple 
demonstration of such a device) and is something quantum physicists nowadays take for 
granted.
The year following these developments Heisenberg and Jordon incorporated spin 
into quantum mechanics to correctly derive hydrogen’s fine structure as well as explain 
the anomalous Zeeman effect.
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Enter Eddington, Structuralism in Tow
Eddington was actually present in these developments from the very beginning. Like 
Heisenberg he was influenced by relativity, but to a much greater extent. In fact in 
general the history of the development of quantum mechanics rests partially on the 
shoulders of relativity. Some of this development actually arose from early attempts at a 
unification of fundamental forces, something Eddington was active in from the start.
One of the eaiiiest attempts to unite gravity and electromagnetism using a field 
theoretic approach was proposed by Hermann Weyl (1885 -  1955) in 1918. Some three 
years later Weyl’s trail was picked up by Eddington who published a generalization of 
Weyl’s theoiy (Eddington 1921). As Eddington explains in the beginning of his article, 
Weyl
has shown that, on removing a rather artificial restriction in 
Riemann’s geometry, the expression for the metric includes 
terms that are identified with the four potentials of the 
electromagnetic field (Eddington 1921, p. 104).
Eddington felt, however, that Weyl’s approach was still too restrictive and worked to 
elaborate on it. In doing so he began to contemplate the structure of the universe in a 
more concrete way. This paper could be interpreted as Eddington’s first mathematical 
attempt at describing a universal structure. In Eddington’s own words:
The natural geometry of the world ... is the geometry of 
Riemann and Einstein, not WeyTs generalised geometry or 
mine. What we have sought is not the geometry of actual 
space and time, but the geometry of world-structure, which 
is the common basis of space and time and things 
(Eddington 1921, p. 121).
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This foreshadows his concept of a universal background (uranoid) upon which everything 
is built and gave him the freedom to make uncertainty inherent in the fabric of space-time 
itself (see chapter five). It establishes his view of the unity and continuous nature of the 
universe through geometry and structure and develops a link between the very large 
(gravity) and the very small (electromagnetism) that was to be a cornerstone of his 
Fundamental Theory. In a letter to Bohr in 1923, Einstein remarked “I have finally 
understood the connection between electricity and gravitation. Eddington has come 
closer to the truth than Weyl” (Einstein 1923, reprinted in French 1979).
It is to be remembered that relativity here is essentially a classical theory and 
Einstein a classical thinker who put his faith in strict causality over probability. As he 
wrote to Born in the following year “I find the idea quite intolerable that an electron 
exposed to radiation should choose o f its own free will, not only its moment to jump off 
[the atom], but also its direction” (Einstein 1924, quoted in French 1979). Einstein’s 
endorsement of Eddington’s attempt at unification appears to put Eddington in the mould 
of a classical thinker. As I will show, one of Eddington’s most unique quahties was his 
ability to transcend classical and quantum labels. Whether he was successful or not is 
immaterial; it was simply his ability to not be dogmatically trapped by a single ideology 
that is admirable.
This early attempt at unification followed on the heels of a few investigations he 
had performed into the astronomical applications of electricity (Eddington 1917 and 
1918a). However in generalizing Weyl’s theory he crept dangerously close to 
considering, for the first time, microscopic phenomena. Up to this point in Eddington’s 
career he had been entirely concerned with macroscopic phenomena, especially on 
astronomical scales. Thus, with these ideas firmly planted in his mind, already teetering 
on the edge of the microscopic world, he began investigating electrons themselves in 
astronomical situations (see for example Eddington 1923a and 1925b). Simultaneous to 
this he began studying rotational motion in primarily stellar situations (see for example 
Eddington 1923b and 1925c). In 1926 he considered a solely microscopic phenomena for 
the fh'st time by merging his two lines of thinking: electrons and rotational motion. The 
result was a letter to Nature simply titled “Spinning Electrons” (Eddington 1926). This 
followed on the heels of Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck’s initial description of spin in 1925
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and actually preceded Pauli’s 1927 theory of spin (perhaps he was inspired by Compton’s 
conjecture of 1921 or by Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck -  see above). The fact that 
Eddington’s work is not remembered speaks for itself, but it really is the first paper he 
wrote on a quantum mechanical topic.
The following year Eddington published his second paper on quantum mechanics 
(this one memorable enough to deserve mention in some histories on the subject -  see 
Jammer 1966). It was an integral part of the scientific debate on the problem of the 
completeness of the eigenfunctions in Schrodinger’s wave equations. It was a problem 
Schrodinger himself had recognized. Schrodinger employed the use of the Laplace 
transformation to find the solution of the radial equation in the standard Kepler problem 
of radial orbits. This solution, however, says nothing about the completeness of the 
eigenfunctions.
Eddington was able to show that the radial equation actually can be solved in a 
much more elementary way and that the solution was actually implicitly contained in 
several other standard treatises on the subject (Eddington 1927 and Jammer 1966). 
Eddington specifically mentions the work of Edmund Whittaker (1873 -1956) who is 
precisely the person who assembled Fundamental Theory from Eddington’s notes after 
his death. Whittaker and George Watson (1886 -  1965) had published the book Modern 
Analysis whose fouith edition appeared in 1927 and included what is now known as the 
‘Whittaker integral’ (Eddington referred to it as the ‘Whittaker function’). It was a 
generalization of various special functions (i.e. the special functions were special cases of 
this integral) and resulted from work he performed on partial differential equations that 
also produced a new solution for the wave equation and a general solution of the Laplace 
equation that included Eddington’s solution to the radial equation in the Kepler problem.
Eddington Out of the Twenties
In the beginning, then, Eddington latched onto Schrodinger’s wave mechanics rather than 
Bom’s matrix mechanics. This was a pivotal moment for Eddington. Considering the 
heavy influence relativity had on him and his strong mathematical background he was 
naturally disturbed by the fact that Dirac’s relativistic wave equation was not presented in
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tensor calculus form.^'' But he was equally influenced by wave mechanics. He 
immediately produced a sort of rebuttal to Dirac and began the process of creating a 
‘wave-tensor’ calculus that took the merger of matrix and wave mechanics to another 
level by using tensors rather than vectors that are the basic components of matrices 
(Eddington 1928). This is often considered the first paper in the development of his 
‘Fundamental’ theory or ‘fundamentalism’ as Kragh puts it (Kragh 1999) and will be 
elaborated upon in chapter five.
So by 1928 wave mechanics, matrix mechanics, the uncertainty relation, and the 
exclusion principle (via spin) had all been related and could all be found either directly 
in, or by taking some sort of limit on, Dirac’s relativistic wave equation. As I have 
already hinted, this was a watershed moment for Eddington: the paper in which Dirac 
formally proposed his equation was perhaps the single most influential moment in 
Eddington’s career as it put him on the path of his ardent ‘fundamentalism, ’ something 
that would change his life and his stature among physicists.
In fact, Charles Gallon Darwin (1887 -  1962), grandson of the evolutionist and collaborator with Ralph 
Fowler (see chapter two), was the first to officially note that Dirac’s work was not in tensor form (Darwin 
1928).
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Probability Leads to Uncertainty
Dirac’s paper took on the challenge of obtaining a “wave equation ... which shall be 
invariant under a Lorentz transformation and shall be equivalent to [the Klein-Gordon 
equation] in the limit of large quantum numbers” (Dirac 1928a). The most general form 
in which Dirac presented his equation was
e /
c
eP o + “ Ad+Pi  cr,P +  - A  \ +p^mc \ff = 0 .  (5.1)V c
Eddington was particularly bothered by the fact that this equation was not in tensor 
calculus form, though as I have noted before, Darwin was the first to notice this 
(Eddington credits Darwin with this point at the beginning of his paper). Darwin, 
however, did not take steps to rectify the apparent problem:
here we have a system invariant in fact but not in form.
Should it not be possible to give it formal invariance as 
well ... ? It is so possible, but it is not hard to show that it 
requires no less than 16 quantities to do it ... and even so 
each will have a real and imaginary part, so that we may 
say that 32 quantities are required! ... it is rather 
disconcerting to find ... that physical quantities exist which 
would b e . . .  very artificial and inconvenient to express as 
tensors (Darwin 1928, p. 657).
He had assumed that these physical quantities simply could not be expressed in tensor 
form. Eddington, on the other hand, was determined to find a way around this difficulty. 
In his follow-up to Dirac’s work Eddington presents the following modification.
He begins with a tensor containing five components that are regarded as the 
coordinates in a 5-space. By doing this he is essentially employing the methods of 
Kaluza and Klein less than a decade after their introduction of a fifth dimension in order
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to more easily incorporate the complicated terms. He calls the 5-space, f-space since he 
is working with a hypothetical tensor T. The original 4-space we are all familiar with is 
referred to as ^-space. The additional dimension accounts for a rotation of the 4-space 
itself. This latter point is an important one to keep in mind when considering just how he 
incorporated uncertainty into his theory; he has essentially treated the standard, intuitive, 
and purely observable (and classical) 4-space as a singular unit and imbued it with its 
own property (the ability to rotate). This requires the fifth dimension, though 
Eddington’s interpretation is purely mathematical. This foreshadows his use of the 
standard 4-space reference frame as a singular unit in Fundamental Theory that he 
imbues with uncertainty.
He the uses T  to transform i/A-space as T^y/^ -  y/^ which is valid for any linear
transformation of the y/s. By utilizing the second-order equation and assuming that the 
required form of the first order equation is Ty/ = 0 , he arrives at the following tensor 
calculus form of the relativistic wave equation, (5.1):
Ty/ = {(r/rgrad + (e l c)V){E^,E 2 ,E^,-iE^) + mcE^} = 0 (5.2)
(Eddington 1928). The E's are associated with various combinations of coordinates or 
matrix values that satisfy the invariant condition and are, thus, easily assignable to the 16 
quantities described above by Darwin. The only requirement is that they are mutually 
perpendicular -  no actual physical phenomena depend on the choice of what quantity to 
assign to what E  value. The advantage is that the E's present a symmetrical method 
while Dirac’s original formalism does not. The disadvantage is a common one with 
much of Eddington’s later work -  the formalism was unusual, complex, and, perhaps, a 
bit inaccessible even to clever physicists. However, he did prove that his solution was 
equivalent to Dirac’s.
The important historical aspect of this is that he employed an essentially 
geometric approach utilizing coordinate dimensions to present the Dirac equation in a 
tensor form. This also served as the seed paper for his development of E-numbers within 
the context of Fundamental Theory and his treatment of standard 4-space as an 
independent object with its own properties. But the coordinate dimensional form served 
as the basis for uniting relativity and quantum mechanics under a single framework.
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This makes sense when considering the history I have developed so far: 
Heisenberg and Pauli’s admitted reference to relativity. Coordinates are simply a 
mathematical way of defining a point-of-view. Relativity was -  and still is -  the ultimate 
declaration on points-of-view. As such it makes sense to utilize coordinates in a 
fundamental way since they are a natural aspect of relativity and since they had already 
served as a foundation for two of the most fundamental principles governing quantum 
processes.
The seeds of Eddington’s interpretation of the exclusion principle are also 
contained in this formulation. As I will show, Eddington’s form of exclusion ultimately 
made no distinction between any type of particle (regardless of spin, charge, or mass) 
since all particle properties were frame-dependent in Eddington’s interpretation. I will 
discuss this in greater depth in seven through nine. For now I will use this discussion of 
coordinates as an inti oduction to the final version of Fundamental Theory as it 
posthumously appeared in 1946.
Introducing Fundamental Theory Through Coordinates
The historical development of quantum mechanics up to Eddington’s 1928 paper 
responding to Dirac is of great importance to understanding the larger framework in 
which he worked. Many of these highlights leave an indelible impression on 
Fundamental Theory in its form, order, and philosophy. Eddington’s own development 
of the theory, however, is not necessarily to be looked at purely chronologically. 
Important eaiiy drafts will be discussed as they find relevance to the discussion at hand, 
but this is not an historical analysis. Rather it is a technical analysis of an historical 
document, particularly in relation to modern quantum field theoiy since the similarities 
are striking at time. With that said, coordinates served as the first stone on which 
Fundamental Theory was built.
In relativity coordinates serve as a way of locating objects in reference frames. In 
quantum mechanics, their role is similar, though the constraint of the uncertainty 
principle is an added limitation. In fact, one view is that quantum mechanics doesn’t (or 
shouldn’t) change relativity at all -  it simply clarifies it by putting limitations on what
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sets of coordinates can be effectively used in concert. It also makes the point that 
coordinates are simply one observable quantity among many. So, in that sense, quantum 
mechanics should be a generalization of relativity. Eddington actually took the opposite 
view -  all observables are reducible to coordinates via relativity and so, with the 
exception of the inherent nature of uncertainty, relativity should be a generalization of 
quantum mechanics. Either way the marriage of relativity and quantum mechanics 
through coordinates seems natural.
To be rigorous with the definition of coordinates, due to the Principle of 
Equivalence, which ultimately implies that there is no global inertial reference frame, the 
assumption is made that a reference frame is equal to a coordinate system or a set of 
observables since a coordinate is simply an observable. Relativity’s condition for 
observability begins with a denial of absolute motion such that all observables are 
necessarily measured relative to another observable (technically they should at least come 
in pairs, then). In quantum mechanics the condition for observability is the uncertainty 
principle meaning an object cannot be precisely located in a geometrical frame or as a 
world-line in 4-space (Eddington 1946). Regarding the view of a set of observables as a 
coordinate system, in general relativity it also can be equivalent to a manifold that is an 
m-dimensional ‘hyperplane’ in n-dimensional Euclidean space (m < n). Basically, a 
manifold is any set that can be continuously parameterised where the number of 
independent parameters is the number of dimensions and the parameters themselves are 
coordinates. Metrics are often introduced onto manifolds in order to carry information.
In current language we often relate a manifold to a quantum field, which is a collection of 
position dependent operators (often modelled as simple harmonic oscillators), where the 
field matches the manifold point-for-point.
Eddington thus sought a more general form of the uncertainty principle that would 
incorporate both observability conditions -  the relative point-of-view that requires a 
minimum of two observables (ignoring just for the moment the relation between observer 
and observed) and the quantum requirement that observations of certain pairs of 
observables have a certain limit in accuracy. Eddington’s combined principle states that 
“a coordinate ^ is obsetyable only if  it is a relative coordinate o f two entities both o f 
which have uncertainty o f position and momentum in the geometrical frame''' (Eddington
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1946, p. 1, Eddington’s emphasis). So, for instance, let’s say we wish to observe the 
position of an object. The obvious question is: its position relative to what? If you assign 
an object specific coordinate values x  and y, what you’re also doing is specifying the 
location of the origin since each coordinate is really a displacement vector (the concept of 
a vector is key to this illustration). Thus it is impossible to specify any location without 
specifying at least one other location (usually the origin). So the displacement is in fact 
the observable quantity here, not the actual coordinates of the two objects. However, 
assuming that these two objects aie measured by observables that obey a commutation 
relation in the form of equation (4.6), they will also have some uncertainty in the foim of 
equation (4.7). What I will show is that Eddington, by assuming that eveiy observable is 
frame-dependent, demonstrates that like variables (such as two position variables) obey a 
commutation relation (though he is not explicit in his derivation of this point).
From the point of view of statistics, an observable is actually a statistic based on a 
double probability distribution (one for each of the ‘end-points,’ if you will, of the 
observable). This means that an observable coordinate is not measured in reference to 
some abstract,.observer imposed mathematical origin, but rather from something that is 
physically intrinsic to the measurement (of the coordinate) itself i.e. the origin must have 
a physical nature. Since the reference here is not some mathematical origin but an actual . 
physically real secondary object (so to speak), it must obey the uncertainty principle as 
well. As such, Eddington lays down the rule that there must be two origins -  one 
physical, as just described, and one geometrical as imposed by the observer. The latter 
should be eliminated from “observationally verifiable results; being therefore aloof from 
the rough-and-tumble of observational inquisition, it has a sharpness of definition which 
contrasts with the blurring of all physical landmarks by probability scatter” (Eddington 
1946, p. 2). Essentially, given a geometrical origin applied by the observer, the physical 
origin that it corresponds to fluctuates. Eddington then applies this principle to wave 
mechanics by stating that the coordinates in wave-mechanical equations must be 
measured from a physical origin since both they and their conjugate momenta aie 
observables and not mathematical constructs. This presents a problem: what is this 
supposed origin and what sort of distribution function does it have?
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This idea can be potentially rectified with standard quantum measurement theory. 
In such a situation the observer interacts with the object under observation and thus the 
Hamiltonian operator consist of two pieces; one for the object and one for the observer 
(Bohm instead refers to the observing ‘apparatus’, see Bohm 1951). Once the 
observation begins, there is an interaction between the observer and the object and, since 
interactions are nothing more than a different type of object (see chapter three), the 
interaction must also contribute to the Hamiltonian of the entire process (Bohm 1951). It 
is possible to associate the observer (apparatus) in Bohm’s example with the physical 
origin in Eddington’s example. Then, as Bohm explains, during the instant of 
observation itself (which is interaction corresponding to the act of making the 
observation), the Hamiltonians of the observer and observable produce such negligible 
changes in the wavefunction that they can be ignored. As such the only contributing 
portion of the Hamiltonian for this situation is from the interaction (Bohm 1951). In 
Eddington’s formulation, then, the observable coordinate, which is a relative coordinate, 
corresponds to the interaction in Bohm’s example and represents the act of making an 
observation or taking a measurement.
Bohm makes the point, however, that in order to make a measurement (called an 
‘impulsive measurement’) short enough to only include the interaction’s Hamiltonian, a 
laige interaction energy is needed (Bohm 1951). Bohm shows that it is possible to 
account (or correct) for changes in the observed quantity introduced by the process of 
interaction itself. He also shows that by including the apparatus coordinates (the physical 
origin in Eddington’s language) it is possible to turn this into a completely objective 
measurement entirely fiee of human interaction (see Bohm 1951, pp. 606-607). This is 
precisely the point of Eddington’s formulation. Once again, it ap p e ls  that Bohm’s 
presentation borrows a bit from Eddington, though, in the case presented here, Bohm’s 
ideas are a standard treatment of the subject.^'
Eddington’s description of the physical origin corresponds to either an actual 
paiticle included simply for the sake of measurement, or the centroid of a set of particles.
Ironically, in this 1951 treatise {Quantum Theory), Bohm presents an argument against hidden variables 
(Bohm 1951, p. 622). Just a few years after the publication of this book Bohm’s theories had begun 
crossing the line into the realm of hidden variables. Now, Bohm’s theories, though clearly based on hidden 
variables, are often viewed as a third alternative to traditional Copenhagen versus hidden variable theories 
since they allow for unknowable quantities.
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The centroid here, though not a physical object, is nonetheless, frame-independent in that 
it’s location relative to the constituent particles is set regardless of any geometrically 
imposed coordinate system (you can’t shift a centioid around without also shifting the 
mass distribution). But, since it isn’t actually a real paiticle it can be simply treated as a 
geometrical origin as well. As such the use of the centroid provides us with a way of 
transforming between physical and geometrical coordinates. In this way Eddington has 
answered half his question: the physical origin is a centroid of a system of particles. But 
what is its spatio-temporal distribution function if it’s not a real paiticle? Statistically, 
the centroid of a large number of particles is always Gaussian regardless of the 
distributions of the individual particles (this is an important step in moving from 
microscopic to macroscopic objects and phenomena). Given this a priori knowledge of 
the geometrical distribution of coordinates (and neglecting one supposedly disposable 
constant in the Gaussian -  Eddington gives no valid reason for this), the physical origin 
then has, in three dimensions, the distribution function:
(5.3)
The standard deviation, cr, is referred to by Eddington as the ‘uncertainty constant’ and 
here is applied to the physical reference frame.
The origin of Eddington’s thinking on this matter clearly has its roots in his 
statistical astronomy work from early in his caieer. The particles in question will be 
considered to be the particles in the universe (or could be the galaxies -  or stais if 
considering something in relation to a single galaxy) and are assumed to be spherically 
symmetric. The centroid of this distribution is then essentially the centroid of the 
universe (this obviously clashes with the standard cosmological presumption that there is 
no centre to the universe which really says that the universe has no preferential axis, 
though there have been recent attempts to calculate the birefringence of the universe and 
thus produce a preferential axis) and this corresponds to the physical origin for all 
measurements. The particles will later become the standard background environment 
Eddington refers to as the ‘uranoid’ of any small system to be studied. The uranoid itself 
will be explored in coming chapters.
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Eddington does admit that the rest of his theory which is derived from this 
physical frame could very possibly be wrong since quantum theory leaves its ultimate 
frame-of-reference (master frame, perhaps) undefined and thus it is impossible to know if 
his physical frame is the physical frame for quantum mechanics. He offers this 
qualification:
The reader interested in logical rigour should bear in mind 
that the development of the theory turns partly on strict 
deduction and partly on ultimate saving of labour. The 
form er part requires proof, the latter part success 
(Eddington 1946, p. 4).
Certainly, the validity of his theory, then, would rely partly on its predictions of 
experimental results (though that in itself is not a proof of its actuality -  see Ockham’s 
Razor for clarification). He does offer an argument reductio ad absurdum showing that 
quantum theory must be based on a physical origin associated with such a centroid in 
order to validate his attempt, but the argument is simply an expansion of the ideas already 
presented, specifically as compared to Bohm’s description of measurement, and is 
somewhat circular. His physical argument in support of the transformation from 
geometrical to physical origins hinges on the standard deviation, cr, being used to ‘put the 
scale into’ the physical frame (and thus everything constructed in it).
Physical Interpretation of the Standard Deviation
To find a physical interpretation of the standard deviation, then, begin with a very large 
number of particles N  all having the same coordinate probability distribution and assume 
a large number of them exist in à volume Vq that is fixed in some geometrical (i.e. 
mathematical and non-physical) frame. Each particle has some probability p  of being in 
Vq and the expectation value (mean number in Vq in Eddington’s terminology) is tiq = pN. 
The actual number in Vg is M = Mg + y where y is some fluctuation in one coordinate axis. 
Note that y  (and x  and z as well) is not a coordinate length in this instance since the
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ai'gument of the exponent in equation 5.3 must be unitless. Since the square of the 
standard deviation would be (l -  / A^ ) by Eddington’s definition and is
unitless, y must also be unitless. In essence, since number (in particular, particle counts) 
is the root of probability and statistics, and is in some senses the simplest of 
measurements to make (aren’t all measurements really just ways of counting something?) 
it makes sense for Eddington to reduce everything to this basic idea (see my discussion of 
Russell in chapter thiee).
In any case substituting Eddington’s definitions into equation (5.3) with % and z 
set to zero yields:
/„(y ) = { 2 ? r n „ ( l - n „ (5.4) 
Assuming that N  the fluctuation y (i.e. the difference between the number of
particles actually in the volume at a given time and the expected or mean value) has the 
distribution law:
jL();) = ( 2 ; F M o ) " L - ^ (5.5) 
Both equations (5.4) and (5.5) are Gaussian distributions and thus equation (5.4) is 
actually equation (5.5) compounded with:
==(2 %%^ , (5,6)
Now define a new coordinate C ,-y  ! n  ^ such that n ~  Wq(1 + Ç). The distribution of f  is 
then:
g,(() = (2,r/ Af) 2 . (5.7)
This effectively resolves equation (5.4) into two completely independent distributions or, 
as Eddington calls them, fluctuations. He calls (5.6) the ‘ordinaiy’ fluctuation that is a 
result of the finiteness of n  ^and (5.7) the ‘extraordinary’ fluctuation that is a result of the 
finiteness of N  (Eddington 1946). The latter is a negative fluctuation meaning it is 
subtracted from the ordinary fluctuation. The ordinary fluctuation is the standard 
distribution of an expectation value (or mean) and is thus given no further clarification by 
Eddington. However, the extraordinary fluctuation must be considered in spherical space 
for the following reason: according to relativity theory the only distribution of matter that
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can be in self-equilibrium is a uniform one that fills some spherical space. This is known 
as an Einstein universe and requires a cosmological constant in its description. This 
space has a finite volume, which means that N/hq is finite. In a Euclidean space 
N  / and the extraordinary fluctuation vanishes from equation (5.4) producing
equation (5.5).^^ As such the introduction of curvature gives rise to the extraordinary 
fluctuation. Thus, in utilizing the Einstein universe as a basis for reasoning, Eddington 
seems to have attached himself to a static interpretation of the universe that appears odd 
more than fifteen years after Edwin Hubble’s (1889 -  1953) discovery that the universe is 
expanding. But, as I will show shortly, this is far from the truth. It is simply yet another 
case of Eddington straddling the line -  he applied the basic tenets of a static universe to 
an expanding one just as he took a middle-of-the-road stance on the basic interpretation 
of quantum theory. Note that it was recently proven that the large-scale geometry of the 
universe is Euclidean (de Bemardis, et. al. 2000) while, at the same time, the 
cosmological constant has returned as the preferred explanation of the source of the 
mysterious dark energy that is accelerating the universe’s expansion. If Eddington’s only 
reason for utilizing an Einstein universe was the ease with which it explained curvature, 
he may have been delighted to discover it might not have been necessary. In fact, it turns 
out that he utilizes Minkowski (flat) space-time (derived from a transformation) 
throughout Fundamental Theory and derives a cosmological constant, making his work at 
least hypothetically consistent with factual data. As such this entire line of reasoning 
might be amenable to simplification.
Returning to a discussion of the extraordinary fluctuation, the above arguments 
imply that there is a certain level of uncertainty in the number of particles contained in 
the volume. The particle density s ~ nlVo can be equivalently defined as no/V where V is 
now a fluctuating or uncertain volume and the number of particles is held constant and is 
defined as: y  = / (1 + e)^ and the uncertainty is now contained in the linear scale factor
1+Ê.
At this point it is instructive to recall that (5.6) and (5.7) are distribution functions 
with discrete values since they are based on a Bernoulli distribution (Eddington 1946).
22 This also implies thatp  is zero indicating that, in Euelidean space, objects would have a zero probability 
of occupying a specific volume.
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The distribution in the volume scale factor e is continuous so some transformation 
between continuous and discrete is required. Eddington derives this as:
( 1 = (1 + e)4 (5.8)
for equation (5.7) where the values of Ç that have what he calls ‘sensible’ probabilities 
are on the order of making them extremely small (he uses the value 1 0 ^^  for A giving 
a value on the order of 1 0 '^ ° -  1 0 ^^  is half of the number of particles, 10 ^^ , that he 
derives as inhabiting the universe as a whole). Equation (5.8) can then be approximated 
(“amply” in Eddington’s description) as Ç = 2 e . Equation (5.7) gives the standard
deviation of f  as meaning the standard deviation of £ is:
CT, = iV jv .  (5.9)
The ultimate point of the above derivation is that the extraordinary fluctuation of the 
particle density is represented as a scale fluctuation with a standard deviation given by 
(5.9). Basically, since is now taken to be an exact number, the uncertainty is 
transferred to the volume, meaning it manifests itself in an uncertainty of the scale of 
measurement. If the volume is spherical, the only uncertainty is in the scale of 
measurement of r.
In summary, if considering a point some distance r from the origin, the difference 
between its physical and geometrical coordinates consists of a fluctuation with a standard
deviation of crin all directions that is due to the uncertainty of the position of the physical
origin, and a fluctuation with a standard deviation of ap- in the radial dhection due to the 
uncertainty in the scale of measurement of r. The extraordinary fluctuation it represented 
by the latter while the ordinary fluctuation is represented by the former. As such the total 
standard deviation consists of both radial and transverse components:
(5 10)
=  cr • (5-11)
Equations (5.10) and (5.11) are referred to as the ‘local uncertainty’ of the physical 
reference frame. It is essentially the uncertainty of a local physical origin relative to a 
local geometrical origin. If the difference between the physical and geometrical origins, 
r, is small (and it stands to reason it would be almost immeasurably small since it would
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be ridiculous to have geometrical coordinates assigned to an object that was nowhere 
near it!), then both (5.10) and (5.11) are simply cr which is the original value of the 
standard deviation for the physical coordinate frame. Eddington concludes, 
“Independently of coordinate systems, the local uncertainty in a given direction defines 
an extension which might be adopted as the unit for measuring lengths in that direction 
in that locality'' (Eddington 1946, p. 6  his emphasis). This is then referred to as the <t- 
system of defining lengths, or the ‘cr-metric.’
Finally, Eddington derives the length of a line-element in the cr-metric as:
= ---- 1—. JVT + r^dd'^ +r'^ sin^ 9d(p^ (5.12)\ - [ a J a ^ ) r ^
which is the standard line-element in a spherical space with a radius of Rq = g  I (note
that in this definition Rq is a dimensionless quantity). Here he employs equations (5.10) 
and (5.11) to find the proportionality constants for (5.12). The radius of spherical space 
can then be combined with (5.9) to find the following simplified equation for the standard 
deviation:
a  = R ^ I2 - jN .  (5.13)
This gives a direct relation between the uncertainty in an observable coordinate 
measurement and the two cosmological numbers Rq and N.
Pausing for a moment to consider the significance of the preceding, rather 
lengthy, derivation, Eddington has connected the microscopic measurement problem with 
the macroscopic cosmological problem. What he is assuming is that the cosmological 
parameters are measurable quantities that, due to their enormous scale, minimize 
uncertainty in their own measurement (i.e. Eddington interpreted this as the fact that the 
uncertainty principle rarely plays a role in any large-scale measurement, blurring the 
distinction between classical and quantum uncertainty -  see below). But, what this 
provides is a way of finding the microscopic uncertainty (the standard deviation) from 
macroscopic measurements -  large-scale phenomena provide information about small- 
scale phenomena. In addition it makes the uncertainty a measurable quantity (at least for 
a given or measured value of N).
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The standard deviation, then, plays multiple roles in the formulation of the 
complete theory. First, it links the macroscopic to the microscopic. Second, it provides a 
way of measuring the uncertainty (perhaps even eliminating, for a specific N) since it is 
known to be negligible for macroscopic quantities. Third, it provides a potential unit of 
length measure in a given dhection. Fourth, it has the added effect of transferring 
uncertainty to geometrical coordinates (i.e. if r is small the physical and geometrical 
origins essentially coincide meaning that, even if the geometrical coordinates are 
supposed to be set without error by the observer, if they are equivalent to the physical 
coordinates then they equivalently have some uncertainty). And, finally, it associates the 
extraordinaiy fluctuation with the curvature of space and, since the extraordinary 
fluctuation can be reduced or eliminated in many cases, so can the curvature of space (at 
least locally -  note that this is how he approximates Minkowski space).
Notice here Eddington’s blurring of the concept of uncertainty (see chapter thiee). 
He uses the term ‘uncertainty’ in several places here but in these cases they cleaiiy imply 
a classical notion since they are simply various statistical quantities. But it is not cleai' 
that Eddington really recognizes a difference between classical and quantum notions of 
uncertainty. It appears from his continuous application of the underlying philosophical 
principle developed by Heisenberg that quantum uncertainty was simply a limiting case 
of classical uncertainty. He draws no clear distinction in his application of Heisenberg’s 
principle between microscopic and macroscopic situations. In fact he uses them to 
indisputably (in his mind) link microscopic (quantum) and macroscopic (classical) 
phenomena. In fact Eddington would rather refer to macroscopic and microscopic 
phenomena than to classical and quantum. In this way there is no cleai* distinction in 
Fundamental Theory between classical and quantum situations since macroscopic 
(classical) blends into microscopic (quantum) as multiplicities decrease (see chapter six). 
Quantum phenomena then become a limiting case of classical phenomena. The trouble 
with this is that it does not account for the fact that complementarity (or some 
comparable explanation) is required in quantum cases while it is not in classical cases, 
i.e. there is no clear and purely statistical explanation for complementarity.
Regardless, Eddington proceeds with this blumng of classical and quantum 
regimes and argues for a radical change in measurement in general. This leads to his
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requiiement of a standardised unit of length that was his best attempt at eliminating units 
entirely. Once again the derivation originates in the standard deviation.
A Standard for Length
Focusing on the third role the standard deviation plays as a potential unit for measuring 
length brings to the surface one of Eddington’s deepest troubles with mid-twentieth 
century science. With the increasingly microscopic measurements that were being 
obtained in physics, the limitations of the standard units of measurement became 
increasingly apparent. Eddington had a particular interest in finding a proper definition 
for length, calling it “the most urgent requirement of all; for when we come to examine 
what is actually measured in any kind of experiment, it is nearly always a length or a 
spatial measure -  the length of a thread of mercury in a thermometer, the shift of a bright 
spot on a galvanometer scale, the displacement of a dark line in a spectrogram, etc.” 
(Eddington 1939, p. 71). Prior to 1960 the standard measure of length was the Paris 
Metre that was, quite literally, a bar of metal in Paris that was defined to be a meter in 
length. The history of the Paris Metre dates to 1790 when Talleyrand (Charles Maurice 
de Talleyrand Perigord, 1754 -  1838) recommended reform in France and the National 
Assembly ordered the Académie to create a commission on the subject of standardizing 
measures. Two probabilists already mentioned in chapter three were on the commission: 
Laplace and the Marquis de Condorcet. Despite what appears to be the arbitrariness of 
any measurement unit, in 1791 the commission gave three possibilities for a scientific 
basis of any new measuring system: “the length of a pendulum, a quadrant of the circle of 
the equator, finally a quadrant of the earth’s meridian” (quoted in Linklater 2002, p. 122). 
An excellent and sometimes humorous look at measurement in history is Andro 
Linklater’s Measuring America (2002) where he describes how the commission chose 
from the three options. They “frivolously” chose the last option in what Linklater 
describes as an almost “capricious fashion” (Linklater 2002, p. 123)^ .^ Thus, the meter 
was defined to be one ten-millionth of a quadrant of the earth’s meridian.
2^  Linklater’s assertion has been strongly disputed by E.F. Robertson (Robertson 2004).
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The arbitrariness with which the commission chose the unit of length is, perhaps, 
not all that surprising considering two probabilists were on it. After all, how could 
someone who helped father the mathematics of inexactitude be expected to commit to a 
scientifically reasonable description for an exact measured In essence, what difference 
did it really make at the time since all measure would be inherently inexact in some 
cases? On the other hand, they did their best to maximize the certainty by which they 
measured the meridian so as to obtain as accurate a result as possible. Nonetheless this 
still left the problem of duplication. Certainly, in order to accurately duplicate the meter, 
one could simply retake the measurements performed by the French, but the arduous task 
was not simple from a logistical point of view, nor was it easy from the point of 
measurement technique. The only other option was to attempt to copy the metal bar 
directly, which is what was most often done, but the possibilities for error are obvious.
This was the state of affairs during Eddington’s entire lifetime and it is not 
difficult to see how problematic this becomes when attempting to carry out microscopic 
measurements. For instance, if the uncertainty between the original meter and some 
duplicate somewhere was a centimetre, it would be wholly unrealistic to measure 
anything at the millimetre level without introducing a great deal of uncertainty. Since 
physicists were working many, many orders of magnitude smaller than that by the 1930s, 
there obviously was a problem.^'^ In the absence of anything better, Eddington defined 
his standard of length by the standard deviation described above. Alternatively he 
described it in terms of the periods of light waves and the amplitudes of vibrations of 
crystal lattices, finding, as a consequence, that the speed of light was a constant (this was 
universally accepted from the mid-twentieth century until only recently when varying 
speed of light (VSL) theories legitimately entered the mainstream accompanied by 
supporting astronomical evidence -  see Magueijo 2004).
2“^ In 1960 an atomic standard was adopted based on the wavelength of a paiticular red-orange spectral line 
emitted by krypton-86 in a gas discharge tube. Even here, however, the reproducibility of krypton-86 
limited the accuracy. This standard was replaced in 1983 by the cuixent one, which defines one meter as 
the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum during 1/299,792,458 second. This implies that the 
speed of light is ^ o w n  exactly and that the second is well-defined. This is a quantum-mechanical 
definition of just the type that Eddington wanted.
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There is a branch of physics known as metrology that is devoted to the study and 
improvement of measuring techniques that actually predates relativity (which brought 
many of these problems to the fore). In any definition of length the most crucial part is 
the existence (or creation) of a standard that is readily available for comparison anywhere 
at any time. Regarding the Paris Metre itself as a standard, he says “Metrologists do not 
look upon a particular bar of metal, such as the Paris metre, as an ultimate standard; the 
mere fact that they feel anxiety as to its permanence shows that they have in mind a more 
ideal standard with which it might be compared” (Eddington 1939, p. 74). Eddington 
says that some physical structure that is not necessarily permanent but is unique and 
reproducible is what is required to truly define some length. He gives as an example a 
calcite crystal that has a certain number of lattice intervals -  nature requires this 
paiticular type of crystal to be the same everywhere (otherwise it’s actually something 
else enthely). Ultimately this suggests requiring some type of measure for length that is 
actually unitless -  the number of lattice intervals is simply that -  a pure number. Thus 
any structure that is easily reproducible from  some quantum specification can properly 
serve as a standard. Finally, all “such standards are equivalent, being definite numerical 
ratios to the unit of length h/mc which appears in the fundamental equations of quantum 
theory” (Eddington 1939, p. 75). The standard of time (or time-extension in Eddington’s 
terms) is similarly defined as a time-periodicity of the same structure that provides the 
standai'd for length.
The standard of length, however, prior to Eddington’s writing, comes from 
relativity. But relativity appeals to theories external to itself in order to define length. 
Eddington, here, enumerates another crucial requirement for his view of a unifying theory 
-  it must be completely self-contained such that the theory zï^c^produces its own 
standard, i.e. the standard is derivable from the theory itself. In this regard I will show 
that Eddington was unsuccessful. However, he recognized that since certain processes 
were only representable in a relativistic quantum theory, relativity and quantum 
mechanics cannot be considered separately and thus must have the same standard of 
length (Eddington 1939). Furthermore, through an examination of a changing velocity of 
light in a vacuum in relation to a hydrogen atom, he concludes that “either the ratio of the 
period of the emitted light to the time-period intrinsic in the emitting atom varies with
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time, or the ratio of the length of the emitted waves to the spatial scale of structure of the 
emitting atom varies in time” (Eddington 1939, p. 78). This makes little sense. In order 
for the former ratio to vary, the period -  and thus the frequency -  of the emitted light 
must be changing, or the intrinsic time-period in the atom must be changing. But these 
quantities aie linked -  a different intrinsic time-period should produce a correspondingly 
different frequency. In the case of the latter ratio a similar principle holds true: if the 
spatial size of the emitting object were to change the emitted wavelength should have to 
change. Modern VSL theories are certainly rigorous and may even be partial truths, but 
the state of affairs in 1946 was not neady as advanced as it is now (however, hindsight is 
always 2 0 /2 0 ): since atomic transitions were seen as the only way to emit a photon, if the 
value of the constants changed it would imply that there was no link between the photon 
and its source which is absurd.
The natural extension here then is to consider a quantum-specified standai’d, 
which is what we essentially have in place today (Eddington clearly had excellent 
foresight). However, he recognized two limitations in such a standard. The first is that 
the standard is not fully reproducible in vei*y strong electric and magnetic fields. What 
this means is that if the standard is based on the properties of a photon, say in a field-fiee 
situation, that photon most likely will have different properties while in a field since the 
field can affect the photon. In view of the fact that a photon is the carrier particle for the 
electromagnetic interaction itself, the information carried by the photon will vaiy 
depending on the nature of the interaction. In addition, subsequent to Eddington’s work, 
electromagnetism was united with the weak nuclear interaction in electroweak theoiy and 
would need to be reconciled with the W and Z bosons that are the cairier particles for the 
weak interaction. As such, a standai’d of this nature would also be artificial when 
measuring in a gravitational or strong interaction -  gravitons and quarks would then need 
to be brought into the fold. Obviously, a fully unified theory might be able to accomplish 
this, but, at least from Eddington’s point-of-view, this is a serious limitation (quantum 
field theorists and string theorists can ponder this ad infinitum should they wish). 
Eddington even points out that “at least a dozen different ‘unified theories’ of the 
gravitational and electromagnetic fields have been put forward each implying a slightly 
different definition of length” (Eddington 1939, p. 80).
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The second limitation on the standard is that it must be short. Eddington gives the 
following example to demonstrate why:
Suppose we try to measure the diameter of the earth with a 
long crystal standard stuck through it like a knitting needle 
through an orange. It is well known that the earth is 
strained out of shape by the tide-raising forces of the sun 
and moon; the long crystal will likewise be strained ... We 
cannot always remove the bodies that are causing the strain 
... Thus, in general, we have to be content with short 
standards which are proportionately less affected by strain 
(Eddington 1939, p. 82).
I briefly mentioned another example earlier in this section: imagine one wishes to 
measure something on a millimetre scale but the standard by which one is measuring is 
only accurate to the centimetre scale. Measurements in millimetres could be small 
enough that they are less than the actual uncertainty in the standard -  it’s like attempting 
to measure something on the millimetre (or smaller) scale with a wooden meter-stick (or 
yard-stick) like one might find in a fabric store (a micrometer would be far more useful in 
this situation).
Eddington points out that measuring large distances or lengths is simply 
accomplished by integrating the short distances assuming that they are unambiguous. As 
such, it could be argued that the meter is an inadequate length measure in physics, 
pai'ticularly since such a standard could undergo length contraction in even fairly simple 
situations. As Eddington points out, “the failure to define long distances observationally, 
or in mathematical language the non-integrability of displacement, is the foundation of 
Einstein’s theory of gravitation” (Eddington 1939, p. 83 my emphasis). Eddington’s 
conclusion, then, is that since the length and time intervals “are the basis of nearly all 
other physical definitions [to] avoid circular definitions it is essential that the standards of 
length and time interval should be the extensions of structures completely specified by 
pure numbers” (Eddington 1939, p. 84). The standard deviation resulting from
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uncertainty fits this profile even though equation (5.12) contains Rq -  from equation,
(5.13) we know that it is dimensionless and, thus, so is <7 (see 5.13). Eddington continues 
by specifying that the general specification of physical structures by pure numbers (e.g. 
numbers of elementary particles in states defined by quantum numbers) is developed in 
quantum mechanics meaning that the standard of length must be quantum-mechanical in 
nature. Again, crfits the bill, though the latter point needs to be proven. It can be proven 
if any single quantum-specified extension can be shown to have a fixed ratio to cr (the 
local uncertainty). This is the primary point of Fundamental Theory -  investigating ways 
in which extensions of various structures can be related to a. In essence, the entire 
treatise is a justification of the use of eras a standard for measure.
Problems in Measurement Theory
The standard deviation also plays the role of providing a value for the uncertainty in any 
measure (this is one of the standai'd definitions of it). The mere fact that there exists 
uncertainty in measurements, particularly in quantum mechanics, raises a host of issues to 
be resolved. In quantum mechanics a measurement is usually referred to as an 
observation. As eaily as 1932 Von Neumann felt the problem of observation and 
measurement was not being properly considered (Jammer 1966). His explanation rested 
on the notion that every quantum mechanical measurement process involves some aspect 
that can’t be analyzed. This aspect involves the interference of the observer in the 
measuring process. He suggested that in addition to the continuous causal propagation of 
the wave function by the usual wave equation, the function also experiences a 
d/frcontinuous, noncausal, and instantaneous change due to the intervention of the 
observer. A similar situation was proposed by Heisenberg in relation to the y-ray 
microscope thought experiment he used in his derivation of the uncertainty principle (see 
chapter four). But in Heisenberg’s case the interference of the observer was entirely 
causal (as I mentioned earlier the uncertainty principle is completely causal in nature). 
Von Neumann’s idea was based on irreversibility (the second law of thermodynamics 
reminding once again us that there is no fountain of youth) in that given some statistical
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operator U, a measurement of an observable R containing a set of orthonormal 
eigenfunctions (pi, etc. alters U as follows:
(5.14)
where P represents the probability and, thus, irreversibility of the process (Jammer 1966). 
There is a corresponding causal, continuous, and reversible change as well. Given a state
\}f -  that is expanded in the eigenfunctions of R^ ,^ measuring R reduces y/ toa
specific eigenstate y/^  whose eigenvalue is the result of the measurement. So the act of 
measuring an eigenvalue reduces the general state to a specific state not allowing the 
observer to have full knowledge of the general state X f / .  This is known alternately as the 
‘reduction of state,’ ‘reduction of the wave packet,’ or, in more modern terms, 
‘wavefunction collapse.’
The last description provides a simpler physical explanation for what von 
Neumann was postulating: given a probability distribution of possible values for some 
measurement, the act of taking the measurement collapses the wavefunction to 
correspond to the single measured value. Von Neumann’s analysis attacks the doubly 
difficult problem of proving whether statistical quantum mechanics is logically self- 
consistent or whether it could be completely and deterministically described using hidden 
variables. He concluded that statistical quantum mechanics would have to be false if any 
other explanation were introduced. Another way of looking at this is via the Schrodinger 
Cat analogy. In 1935 Schrodinger proposed the following thought experiment: imagine a 
cat locked inside a box containing a Geiger counter which itself contains a small amount 
of radioactive material that, in one hour, has an equal probability of decaying and not 
decaying (Schrodinger 1935). If it decays, the counter tube discharges and, through some 
form of relay system, triggers a hammer that smashes a bottle of hydrochloric acid, thus 
poisoning the cat. An observer can have no knowledge of anything inside the box until it 
is opened. Thus, before opening the box the cat could be said to be alive or dead. In fact 
the wavefunction for the entire system, since it’s an exponential, can easily be broken 
into superposable pieces; it’s a superposition of two states: one in which the cat is alive, 
and one in which it is dead. The reality is that prior to observation, the cat is described as
2^  The are the eigenstates o/the eigenfunctions (the ç>’s).
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both alive and dead, simultaneously. On a macroscopic level this appears contradictory, 
though it has been repeatedly verified on a quantum level. Schrodinger’s idea is similar 
(and most likely based on) Von Neumann’s idea that homogenous (ensemble) states 
cannot be eliminated from consideration simply by resolving them into a mixture of 
various substates each of which would have a set of hidden variables, where the 
homogenous state is an average of the substates, since this is contrary to the definition of 
homogenous states (Jammer 1966). Essentially he proved that it is impossible to 
construct a deterministic description of physical processes with the existing formalism of 
quantum mechanics.
Von Neumann’s conclusion has served as the foundation for many additional 
ai'guments both in favour of and opposed to hidden variables. Experiments in quantum 
non-locality originally based on the theoretical work of Bohm and John Bell (1928 -  
1990) have sparked renewed interest in hidden variable theories. Thus, for a slightly 
alternative (though still acceptable) interpretation of the measurement problem, I turn 
back to Bohm (recalling that Bohm’s 1951 work actually precedes his reseaich in hidden 
variables). Earlier in this chapter I described Bohm’s splitting of the Hamiltonian in any 
observation into three pieces -  one for the observer (or observing apparatus), one for the 
object under observation, and one for the interaction between the object and the observer. 
In this formulation Bohm was able to show that the interaction always multiplies each 
part of the wave function that corresponds to a measured value, by a random phase factor 
(Bohm 1951). All wavepackets are really a superposition of waves that inteifere 
both constructively and destructively. Introduction of this phase factor destroys the 
interference and is analogous to the wave collapsing.
Observational Uncertainty
Once again the physical problem here is the fact that an observation actually interferes 
with the object under consideration. This is often interpreted as introducing uncertainty 
into the measurement. Related to this is the fact that objects have wave-particle duality, 
behaving as one or the other based on the type of observation that is made. In addition, 
prior to measurement an object or a system (such as Schrodinger’s Cat) can exhibit wave­
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like properties that are reduced to particle like properties by the measurement process 
(see above). So the interference of the observer with the object collapses the 
wavefunction and produces an uncertainty that is related to the possible states the 
wavefunction could have assumed before the measurement. This relationship is 
demonstrated in the general equation for uncertainty (4.7). By defining a standard of 
length as a dimensionless ratio based on uncertainty itself Eddington sought to 
circumvent this problem. Conversely, Bohr proposed the idea of complementarity saying 
that two mutually exclusive interpretations were required. This is a fragmented view of 
the universe in the sense that it automatically requires a division of the universe into a 
minimum of two things -  waves and particles. This, then, ties in directly to Eddington’s 
view that the fragmentation of the universe was manifested in the various units of 
measure (meters, seconds. Coulombs, etc.). Going further still, this can be reconciled 
with Heisenberg’s original causal interpretation of the uncertainty principle: the 
uncertainty is in our knowledge of the present (are there hidden variables or not?) rather 
than the future and this, perhaps, is a result of our fragmentation of the present as 
represented in a multitude of units of measure. Eddington’s approach was rooted in his 
Quakerism which is very Eastern-like in its world-view (see chapter two) and he found 
division not in religion but in measure: “the division of the external world into a material 
world and a spiritual world is superficial... the deep line of cleavage is [actually] 
between the metrical and non-metrical aspects of the world” (Eddington 1925a, p. 204). 
He thus advocates a purely deductive theory based on pure numbers or dimensionless 
ratios of fundamental constants. He believed that there “was an entire realm of human 
experience that could not be measured or quantified -  the realm of consciousness -  and 
this was just as real" (Stanley 2004a, p. 48).
Eddington expresses his theory well in his popular books in addition to his 
technical books. As Whitworth says “he anticipates the opinions of people who trust in 
the evidence of the senses, who trust in the reliability of measuring devices, and who trust 
in standard measures” (Whitworth 2004, p. 70). In Eddington’s own words he professes 
the view that reality is basically subjective: “because this real world is undetectable we 
do not as a rule attempt to describe it. Not merely in everyday life, but in scientific 
measurements also, we describe the world of appearance” (Eddington 1918b, p. 16). In
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perhaps his clearest statement of the basis for his entire line of reasoning, he says later in 
the same treatise that “the theory of relativity offers not an ‘explanation of gravitation,’ 
but ‘an explanation of the real nature of our measures’” (Eddington 1918b, p. 36 and 
Whitworth 2004, p. 74).
In one final note on this subject, Eddington played his own devil’s advocate 
regarding objective measurement as demonstrated in the following syllogism he 
constructed (Eddington, et. al. 1937, p. 1000 and Batten 2004, p. 166):
a. It is impossible to have a priori knowledge of an objective universe.
b. The mass-ratio [of the proton to the electron] has been found by an a priori 
method.
c. Knowledge of the mass-ratio is not knowledge of an objective universe.
He obviously, as suggested by this syllogism, struggled with the dichotomy of a need for 
objective knowledge and the impossibility of gaining that knowledge a priori (see 
chapter three on probability).
Applying <7 in Physical Coordinates
Now that the foundations of Eddington’s system of physical coordinates have been 
established with a length standard given by the standard deviation of the probability 
distribution of the given coordinates, a simple application can be developed. Consider 
two particles very close together such as two protons (or neutrons) in a nucleus or two 
protons involved in a scattering experiment. Assume they have physical coordinates 4  
and respectively. Since the only physically relevant position is a coordinate difference, 
their positions can be described by - ^ s ~  reference to some geometrical origin. 
So, in this case the coordinate difference is measured relative to a geometrical origin that 
is separate from the two objects under consideration. One can also measure the 
coordinate difference directly without reference to any origin (which basically 
corresponds to placing the origin at one of the object) and this measure is given by .
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Both coordinate differences are observables that obviously have the same mean value 
(since they measure the same relative position, just in different coordinate systems). 
However, they have different probability distributions. Since is in reference to a 
geometrical origin (which is essentially a third point, versus the two points used in a 
direct measure) the probability spread is larger. Basically, using the formalism developed 
earlier in relation to the separation of the geometrical and physical origins which, for the 
sake of keeping the notation straight, will be called d  for the time being (it was r in the 
previous formulation but that is confusing for obvious reasons since I am sticking with 
Eddington’s notation for the two particles, r and j), the result is that if d  is large, we use 
; if d is small, we use .
In first considering measurements made in reference to the geometrical origin (but 
assuming, based on previous arguments, that this origin must have an uncertainty 
(probability distribution) to it since it needs to be assigned a physical meaning), a 
measurement of 4  provides a distance from some point in the probability distribution of 
particle r to some point in the probability distribution of the origin. Similarly, if 4  is 
measured, it provides a distance from some point in the probability distribution of particle 
s to some point in the probability distribution of the origin that is not necessarily the same 
point as that measured fo r r. As such, 4^ includes two random points in the probability 
distribution of the origin. Any two random points can be given a Gaussian probability 
distribution with the standard deviation of c rÆ . This is the scatter introduced when 
using a geometiical origin that is apart from either particle (corresponding to a large d) 
and is an error that should be reduced or eliminated. By taking the direct measurement 
this error can be eliminated. Mathematically this is written as:
= (5.15)
To be completely rigorous a distance between two particles in three dimensions must 
explicitly state whether it is in reference to the physical origin and is thus a direct 
measure from one particle to another, or whether it is in reference to the geometrical 
origin and would then include the extra error in (5.15). Specifically, either
'■|2 =  (4n + Vn + 4n ) ' or r.'j =  + JJu +  4[l ) ' ■
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The Range Constant of Nuclear Forces
So in considering two particles very close together in a nucleus or a scattering 
experiment, nuclear forces are of particular interest and the range of their action is 
required for detailed calculations (recalling that in the early 1940s the strong and weak 
nuclear forces were not fully developed and the electromagnetic force was still 
considered the primary force acting on a nuclear level)^^. To be rigorous in the analysis, 
the investigator must specify r ,2 or the range. Since the ideas presented here are 
unique to Eddington’s analysis, quantum theorists obviously were using r 2^ - As such 
something such as the electrical potential would be proportional to what Eddington refers 
to as the Coulomb energy, . He refers to the «on-Coulombian energy as a singular
energy corresponding to = 0  which occurs when the particles actually collide, 
entangle, or occupy the same position (see chapter six for a full discussion of the 
exclusion principle). The full electrical energy is then given as / r^ 2 + ^ 6 (7^ 2) where 6
is the Dirac delta function and e = q. In this case, then, the second term only exists when 
the two particles coincide (collide, entangle, etc.). Since r/2 = 0 , the individual 
coordinates will be zero, -  0 , which by (5.15) implies that
4 i2»^i2’?i2 -  . Thus, even though r/2 = 0 , it has a Gaussian probability distribution
with a standard deviation of G y j l . Essentially, this is, once again, the transference of the 
physical uncertainty to the geometrical coordinate system as described above. When the 
two pai'ticles coincide, even though there is technically no sepaiation between them, there 
is a probability distribution for their separation due to uncertainty (i.e. they may look like 
they’re in the same place, but they may be slightly separated).
The non-Coulombian energy term, Bô{r^2 )-> that I analyze in greater depth in 
chapter nine, then must be transformable into some form that will produce a Gaussian 
probability distr ibution. The development of quantum mechanics outlined in chapter 
four, provides the solution. Born’s formulation of a scattered wave far from the centre of
2  ^Hideki Yukawa’s (1907 -  1981) meson theoiy was just being considered in Western circles in late 1937 
and it was not until the early 1960s that real progress was made in understanding nuclear forces despite the 
ability to harness them for energy. Yukawa and his theory are discussed below.
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scattering (4.6) indicates that a Gaussian probability distribution can be obtained from the 
exponential for the time-dependent wave equation (4.5). It is convenient to then assign to
B5{ryf) the form where k = = 2 a . By (5.13) this gives
k = 2 a  = Rq I VÂ and is referred to as the ‘range constant’ of nuclear forces and is 
interpreted by Eddington simply as being the effect of the uncertainty of the reference 
frame that turns what normally would be a singularity, -  0 , into a Gaussian 
distribution of . But k is an actual experimentally available value independent of 
Eddington’s interpretation (or derivation) of it.
Historically, the first value for k, or what can be considered equivalent to k, was 
given in 1930 by George Gamow (1904-1968) in what is perhaps the earliest suggestion 
of the liquid drop model of the nucleus (Gamow 1930).22 In a bit of notational confusion, 
he refers to Eddington’s k as Rq, though it is clearly the same quantity as k and is 
completely unrelated to Eddington’s R q .  In order to maintain consistency and minimize 
confusion, I will continue to refer to it as k.
Gamow gave the following definition for k:
k = (5.16)J
where A is a constant. Gamow, however, explicitly states that k is not calculable since 
the nature of nuclear forces was not well-known (essentially A is unknown). He thus 
assumes a value gained from several previous investigations (Gamow 1930).^* The value 
he uses is k = 2 x  10~^  ^c m . Eddington uses the similar value k = 1.9x cm with the 
same justification. This begs the question of whether Gamow and Eddington were 
actually talking about the same thing. Gamow’s definition (5.16) is derived from what he 
refers to as the Debye formula for surface tension which is then given as being equivalent 
to the inside pressure (of the ‘liquid drop’ nucleus). The resulting equation for the radius 
of the nucleus includes the constant given by (5.16) as a multiplier for the number of a- 
particles in the nucleus. Thus k needs to have units of length since N  is simply a number.
22 For a full discussion of this model, see Roger H. Stuewer, “The Origin of the Liquid-Drop Model and the 
Interpretation of Nuclear Fission, Perspectives on Science 2 (1994), 76-129, especially 78-87.
2® The investigations he references include work by Bieler in 1924, Hardmeier in 1927, and Gamow himself 
in 1928. See Gamow 1930, p. 635 for details.
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In addition, since it defines the size of the nucleus, the constant governs the range of 
whatever forces hold the nucleus together. Eddington’s definition, k - 2 o  = Rq I VÂF, 
also has units of length and governs the range of the forces holding the nucleus together 
or governing a strong collision interaction. It stands to reason that Gamow and 
Eddington were both referring to the same thing (i.e. the range of nuclear forces).
Eddington, however, as is his penchant, takes this a few steps further and again 
attempts to make a link between microscopic and macroscopic phenomena by showing 
that the microscopic value, k, can be defined in terms of the cosmological (macroscopic) 
values Rq and N. This is a result of his application of crto spherical space in (5.12).
Since cr is a general quantity that is independent of scale, it can be equally well applied to 
the very large or the very small. As such it is really (7 that serves as the link between the 
microscopic and macroscopic through the following relation:
o- = |  = / ^ /2 V jv .  (5.17)
Thus, Eddington has shown that the standard deviation, if employed as a standardized 
quantity (unit of length), is a powerful tool for linking quantum mechanics and relativity.
Empirical Evidence
Finally it was left to Eddington to show that when actual values were introduced into
(5.17) it yielded consistent results. For example, anyone could come up with a strange 
enough theory such that they found the masses of the electron and proton to be equal, m,
= Mp but every student of basic science knows from empirical evidence that this is not 
true. Since the value for k has akeady been stated as being given by experiment, 
Eddington gives the equation for the mass M  of an Einstein universe:
kM  I = —7üRq 
2  “
where Kis the constant of gravitation (we know this as G). Since the universe is almost 
entkely composed of hydrogen, say M  = ^ N m ,^ , where m,, is the mass of a hydrogen
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atom and N  is the total number of all protons and electrons in the universe (hence the 
factor of 1/2). Combining this with Einstein’s equation gives:
R ç , I N ^ K m j K c ^  = 3.95 x 10“^ 'cm . (5.18)
Since the value for A: = 1.9  x 10"^^cm = Rq! 4 n  , this result can be combined with (5.18) 
in a system of two linear equations with two unknowns to give Rq = 9.14 x 10^  ^cm 
(which is 296 MPc) and A/ = 2.31 x 10^^. In contrast, currently accepted values give 
= 1.3 X10^  ^cm and (though this is a very rough estimate) A/ ~ 10^^. Obviously 
Eddington’s value for the radius of the universe is incorrect, but his value for the number 
of electrons and protons in the universe is tantalizingly close. In one final comment that 
shows he was at least aware of Yukawa’s work (see footnote 28) and the existing debate 
over its validity (see Kragh 1999, pp. 201-202), he says that since observational data 
implies that z;' = 0 , the non-Coulombian energy is definitely associated with a 
singularity (again, see chapter nine).
Thus we need not hesitate to reject the ‘meson-field’ 
hypothesis altogether. It is in any case quite unnecessary in 
genuinely relativistic quantum theory. It is not an 
alternative way of taking into account the uncertainty of the 
origin, because it gives an energy distribution
instead of Ae~''^ ‘^”^  ^ (Eddington 1946, p. 10).
In a footnote Eddington noted that it was his hope that the shape of the non-Coulombian 
potential well would be found experimentally thus validating either his or Yukawa’s 
theory. Yukawa’s theory was one of the first to suggest that forces are mediated by 
carrier (exchange) particles (see Kragh 1999, p. 201). So while Eddington interpreted k 
as arising from the spreading of the combined wave packet of the interacting nucleons 
(protons and neutrons), i.e. it roughly defined the physical Emits of the probability 
distribution, Yukawa, interpreted k as the furthest distance a carrier particle could travel. 
Discoveiy of such a particle would serve as fairly irrefutable proof of Yukawa’s theory. 
Discovery of the pion (;r-meson), as it is now known, came in 1937, though Yukawa’s
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theory was proposed several years earlier (Kragh 1999). As it turns out there are several 
mesons and other heavy particles that play similar roles. Understanding how this fully 
relates to Eddington’s theory requires an explanation of the basic mechanism governing 
Yukawa’s particles.
The Range of Fundamental Interactions
The range limit imposed on carrier particles is due to their need to transfer their 
information and return ‘home’ before they are ‘missed,’ so to speak, i.e. the carrier 
particles are, in fact, a fundamental part of the interacting particles and in order not to 
fundamentally change the character or nature of the interacting particles, the carrier 
particles have to have a round-trip time small enough that the parent particle isn’t altered 
in any way. Essentially they have to have an independent lifetime that is short enough 
that no one really notices they exist. What would a logical estimate be for such a 
lifetime? The uncertainty principle in combination with Einstein’s famous equation for 
the rest energy of a particle gives us the answer.
Recall that the time-energy version of the uncertainty principle is given as:
AE‘A t > ^ .  (5.19)
Einstein’s equation for rest energy is, of course, E  = mc^. Quantum mechanically a 
particle can only raise its energy in discrete amounts and so AE is limited to mc^. Thus:
AE»At » mc^At > ^ . (5.20)
Ultimately we’re interested in the range rather than the particle lifetime since that is what 
Eddington calculated. It makes sense then to isolate cAt which has units of length, 
where the roundtrip time (lifetime) for the carrier particle is A t , and call it the range of 
the interaction. Note that these particles must sneak in and out based on the uncertainty 
principle (i.e. there is some non-zero probability that they actually didn't sneak out which 
keeps the parent particle happy or their lifetimes are so short they may or may not have 
existed) and thus they are referred to as virtual particles since their entire existence falls
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under the restrictions imposed by uncertainty. Rearranging (5.20) and making use of 
Eddington’s notation of k for the range, we can write:
k ~ c A t ~ - ^ — . (5.21)2mc
It is thus a simple matter to calculate the range of the four fundamental interactions.
Since the photon is considered massless (see any quantum field theory text for the caveat 
to this) k is obviously infinite for the electromagnetic force, which makes sense since the 
interaction equation (Coulomb’s law) follows an inverse-square law. The graviton has 
never been observed, but since Newton’s Law of Gravitation is also an inverse-square 
law, k must be infinite here as well implying that the graviton is also massless. Now, 
since the masses of the W  and Z bosons are known from empirical evidence, the range 
can be directly calculated for the weak interaction and it turns out to be on the order of 
10 '^  cm. That leaves us to calculate the strong interaction, which is the interaction of 
primary interest in the present discussion (recalling, however, that the true nature of the 
strong interaction was unknown at that time -  it was popularly thought that the 
electiomagnetic interaction governed nuclear processes and it was even thought that 
electrons existed inside the nucleus -  see Kragh 1999).
Strong interactions at the most fundamental level occur between quarks, with the 
carrier particle being the gluon (here this interaction is often called the ‘colour’ force). 
However, since quarks and gluons are bound tightly inside nucleons (protons and 
neutrons) it turns out that the minimum emission from a nucleon is a quark-anti-quark 
pan. The positively charged pion, which is the meson Yukawa originally predicted, is 
composed of a quark-antiquark pair. It is not a stretch, then, to use the pion as the carrier 
particle for the strong force between nucleons. Note that this is only a minimum 
requirement. Thus more massive particles actually exist that carry information about the 
strong interaction between nucleons. Since the pion is the smallest possible emission 
from a nucleon, equation (5.21) implies it would have the longest range of any strong 
carrier particle between nucleons. Yukawa estimated a theoretical value of 2 x 10“^^ cm 
which is in the range of one fermi. The actual value for the pion is 0.73 x 10“^^ cm so 
Yukawa’s prediction was fairly accurate and netted him the Nobel Prize in 1949.
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Clearly Yukawa’s theoiy was correct (though incomplete), but the root of his 
reasoning was the same as Eddington’s -  the uncertainty principle. The difference 
simply was the way (and the form) in which it was applied. While Eddington used the 
position-momentum interpretation of the uncertainty principle, Yukawa’s theory 
employed the time-energy interpretation. In light of this realization it is conceivable that 
Eddington’s application is also correct, though incomplete in its lack of a heavy carrier 
pai'ticle. But in Eddington’s formalism, a heavy cairier particle would go unnoticed 
anyway since it would be completely hidden in the overlapping probability distributions 
of the interacting particles. As such, at least in extremely short range situations where 
r/2 = 0 , the two descriptions are complementary (though both aie incomplete). The
trouble comes when is closer to its maximum range of 10" cm. In this case a third 
probability distribution would need to be introduced in Eddington’s theory to represent 
the canier particle and the calculations become a bit laborious. But they might be worth 
pursuing, even for purely historical reasons, since the basic reasoning makes sense.
This comparison to Yukawa’s work serves to demonstrate every aspect of 
Eddington’s basic thoughts on uncertainty and its implications for measurement theoiy.
It is a clear application of one of the veiy first statements he made in Fundamental 
Theory on the relativity of measure (see quote p. 82). It is also a demonstration of his 
commitment to the application of basic probabilistic methods to both quantum mechanics 
and relativity, a commitment derived from the philosophical stance that a good theory of 
measurement must strive to be as objective as possible by specifying new units of 
measure and holding fast to the notion that an observer fundamentally alters the result of 
an observation simply by making it. With these basic ideas in mind it will now serve best 
to investigate some of the ancillary aspects of applying uncertainty in measurement and 
how these extensions lead to a fundamentally new interpretation of the exclusion 
principle. Beyond that I will investigate how Eddington was able to make some 
remarkably accurate predictions (and other not-so accurate ones) and how his theory 
compares to modern quantum field theory. In any case these first few pieces of the 
puzzle are now in place.
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VI
Filling in the Gaps
In the last chapter the exact point of intersection between the microscopic and 
macroscopic came when Eddington found the equation for a line element in terms of the 
standard deviation, (5.12). His assumption was that if the line element for the 
microscopic cr-metric was the same as the line element for the macroscopic universe, 
assuming both are globally flat, then one can substitute Rq for 0^1 o  in the metric. But
obviously there is local curvature to the universe and that must be accounted for 
particularly since observational analyses (based on our relative view of the universe) can, 
and often are, carried out in spherical space. On a microscopic level, the nucleus was 
considered at the time to be roughly spherical as well, so an application of the coordinate 
system transformation (physical to geometrical) needs to be applied to a spherical space.
Projecting Uncertainty into Spherical Space
Eddington’s method of accomplishing this is to project the points of a spherical space 
orthogonally onto a flat space tangent at the origin. It is vital to remember here that 
Eddington was working in four-dimensional space and not our usual three-dimensions 
that can be visualized easily. Eddington’s reason for doing this was a result of the fact 
that he found curvature and the extraordinary fluctuation to be the same. So, in essence, 
to him curvature was simply a result of natural background fluctuations and, were there 
no fluctuations, the universe would be flat (it’s the same thing as saying that if there was 
no matter in the universe it would be entirely flat).
Geometrically, then, a theoretical (mathematical) sphere (call it a hypersphere) is 
used to represent some phenomena that is more easily analyzed in a spherical situation.
In the usual flat space there is a geometrical origin, P. Consider, then, a particle at a 
point r th a t  has the coordinates y^ , and Zr Representing the extraordinary fluctuation 
by curvature does not alter these three coordinates, but it does add the coordinate that
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represents the displacement of the particle from T  to S, which is on the hypersphere. The 
origin, P, then must also be displaced to the geometrical origin of the sphere, O. 
Obviously this displacement is equal to the radius of the sphere, Rq since the flat space is 
tangential to the hypersphere. The hypersphere then has the equation:
However, the particle that has been displaced from T to 5 is actually represented by a 
probability distribution. So it’s mean values in all coordinate directions are
The standai'd deviation, then, of any one coordinate of the particle from its mean value on
the hypersphere is •
Let’s now assume there are A/particles on the hypersphere. Denote the centroid 
of these particles as O' . The standard deviation of the centroid then is
—Rq* - ^  - R q! 2-\[n  = cr. G' is simply a projection of the physical origin P' just as O 2 yjN
is a projection of the geometrical origin P. From the discussion in chapter five regaiding 
the range of nuclear forces, if both the geometrical and physical origins are represented 
by pai'ticles, they cannot be more than lO'^^cm apart. Thus P' is close enough to P that it 
can be approximated as being tangent to the hypersphere just as P  is (so it is a point both 
on the sphere and on the flat space tangential to the sphere). Since P' is on the tangent 
flat space, there is no need to represent it with a u coordinate (this coordinate 
displacement is zero, essentially, since the point lies in both spaces). As such the 
definition of the physical origin as the centroid of N  pai'ticles can be extended to spherical 
space by ignoring the u coordinate. The coordinate differences between O and O' can 
then be represented by Xq, Jq, and Zq that can also be used to describe the coordinate 
difference (and thus position) of the physical origin P ' . Any Uq that might exist is said to 
be the scale fluctuation. As such, a dhect ratio of the line between the physical origins 
and the line between the geometrical origins is given by:
G T ' (jRo-«o)
OP Rq
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(6.1)
The scale fluctuation, Mq> is simply the standard deviation, cr. As such, (6.1) can be 
rewritten as
O'P' _ R ^ - g  G ! G ^ - a
OP Rq a  I - 1  -  cTg. (6 .2 )
This essentially serves as a proof of the substitution he makes in (5.12) and implies his 
reasoning at least is mathematically correct. Physically some extended reasoning is 
required.
Physical Justifîcation for Linking Microscopic and Macroscopic
In The Nature o f the Physical World Eddington points out that it has usually been taken 
for granted that the usual theory of knowledge applied to macroscopic or large-scale 
surveys of the universe can equally be applied to microscopic situations and therein lies 
the problem. But there still must be a link between the two if the description of the 
universe is to be self-consistent. Again he appeals to general relativity where local 
irregularities that produce local curvature are simply superposed on the hypersphere that 
represents the universe. But can this appeal have any true physical meaning when using 
it to connect macroscopic to microscopic phenomena? Eddington’s solution is to find a 
situation where general relativity and quantum mechanics actually agree (which is a rare 
find indeed). Such a situation is provided by a steady distribution or an Einstein universe 
(Eddington 1946). Eddington’s interpretation of quantisation is that it is a “complication 
which arises from uniformity and symmetry” (Eddington 1946, p. 12). Slight non- 
uniformities in quantum theory were often treated in Eddington’s day (and still today in 
many situations) as perturbations. There is a subtle interplay here in the mathematics 
since quantum theory consists of dynamical integrals that produce the quantisation (most 
often describing angular momenta). When the non-uniformities are introduced they do 
not alter the integrals, though they do reduce the time that they persist. So a continual 
increase in non-uniformities in quantum theory reduces the time of persistence of the 
dynamic integrals thus reducing the quantisation. Since particles are non-uniformities in 
an empty universe (or new particles are non-uniformities in a steady distribution) the 
more particles that are present in an aggregate the less quantisation has any relevant
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effect. This is Eddington’s explanation for the lack of quantum behaviour at macroscopic 
sizes -  objects such as buildings, people, planets, etc. are huge aggregates of particles and 
thus the dynamical integrals of the individual particles act over such short periods that 
quantisation is small enough to go unnoticed.
Of course the stability of matter was not proven until 1967 by Freeman Dyson (b. 
1923) of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Andrew Lenard (b. unknown) 
of Indiana University (as legend has it, driven by the offer of a bottle of wine to anyone 
who could prove matter’s inherent stability). Dyson and Lenard’s proof was later 
simplified by Elliott Lieb (b. unknown) of Princeton University and Walter Thining (b. 
unknown) of the University of Vienna. The basis of the proofs lay in the exclusion 
principle that was first applied to the problem by Ehrenfest in 1931. Fully developed 
quantum statistics is more subtle -  and beautifully simple in its almost Bohmian physical 
features (the simplicity of the mathematics, I suppose, is relative to one’s mathematical 
acumen). It is a subject upon which much of the rest of this monograph is built, though 
from a distinctly Eddingtonian view. Ultimately it holds that all elementary particles and 
thus all atoms are absolutely identical to and therefore indistinguishable from one 
another. Quantum field theory explains this quite elegantly as the fact that particles are 
simply fluctuations in universal fields. For instance, every electron in the universe is 
simply a fluctuation in the same electron field, y/ , often called a psi-field (Zee 2003). 
(There is a subtle interplay in actual quantum field theory between the statistics of the 
field and the spin that gives rise to the various fundamental interactions.) What is 
striking is that Eddington’s development, as I will show, presages many of these points, 
as well as others, in quantum field theory.
For example, consider Eddington’s treatment of fundamental interactions. Since 
Eddington did not hold to the Yukawa interpretation of exchange or carrier particles 
acting as mediators for the transmission of forces, he was forced to find another way to 
explain how force information could be transmitted. He imagined an atom in a 
gravitational field where the non-uniformity was the gravitational field itself. In standard 
quantum mechanics the non-uniformity would treated as a perturbation that would not 
change the eigenstates of the atom but, rather, would induce transitions between them. 
The eigenstates are contained in a wave equation which, when represented in tensor form
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(see chapter five), contain . The eigenstates, however, are the same regardless of the
presence of the non-uniformity. That means that the wave equation and thus the 
coefficients are also unaffected by the perturbation. The inherent problem here is
that general relativity modifies g^y in order to represent the gravitational field.
Eddington needed a different interpretation, then, in order to properly represent the 
gravitational field in the wave equation. As such he viewed any attempt at extending 
Dirac’s wave equation to general relativity as being misguided since the principle of 
equivalence does not apply here. Building on his interpretation of quantisation at 
macroscopic levels, he assumes that the g used in extensive structures is considerably
different from the g^y used in the wave equation. The wide deviation in g^y then implies
frequent transitions between the eigenstates which makes the wave analysis useless just 
like reducing the time of persistence of the dynamic integrals can reduce the effect of 
quantisation. Thus any problem involving g^y likely involves structures extensive
enough to ignore wave-like or quantized effects (Eddington 1946). But, since Eddington 
introduced curvature via the extraordinary fluctuation rather than the presence of matter, 
he suggests a third form of relativity be conceived known as ‘intermediate’ relativity. 
Wliereas special relativity deals with flat space-time and general relativity deals with 
non-uniform curvature, intermediate relativity would deal with uniform curvature.
The Uranoid
In a letter to Schrodinger in November of 1937 Eddington says
I have sometimes thought of using the term uranoid instead 
of “universe” -  corresponding to the geoid h i . . .  geodesy.
The actual universe is irrelevant, because the experimental 
measurement is understood to be carried out in conditions 
represented by the uranoid: and the experiments will apply 
any corrections necessitated by the actual irregularities or 
disturbing conditions present (Eddington 1937).
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Once again Eddington returns to the problem of observer and environment that is so 
much a part of quantum theory. As I will show this has a remarkable effect on the so- 
called ‘intermediate’ relativity he speaks of.
He takes a decidedly non-Bohmian view in dividing the universe into two parts 
called the ‘object-system’ and the ‘environment.’ The terms object-system, object- 
particle, object-field, etc. will refer to the object under immediate study while the 
environment is everything else (including things that might not just surround the object- 
system, but could also permeate it). Eddington suggests that it could be referred to as the 
‘background’ though that term does not have the force of connotation that Eddington’s 
uranoid does. Any object-system under consideration cannot be considered apart from its 
environment. Eddington’s reasoning here is clearly based on relativity where “we do not 
recognise the concept of an atom as a thing complete in itself’ (Eddington 1946, p. 13). 
Simple object-systems include elementary particles, simple atoms, etc. while simple 
environments include specific idealizations such as uniform, electrically neutral, etc. 
Eddington gives the name ‘uranoid’ to these simple environments. So far, the uranoid I . 
have discussed in the greatest detail is a uniform probability distribution of particles or an 
Einstein universe occupying a hyperspherical space. A further clarification can be made 
if it is referred to as a ‘ zero-temperature ’ uranoid such that the particles are all nearly at 
exact rest. By limiting the environment to an effective zero-temperature radiation is 
eliminated from the consideration and only matter is present (this would obviously be 
unsuitable as a uranoid for considering the early universe). This uranoid is also 
electrically neutral so that any introduction of an electromagnetic field must accompany 
the object-system itself. This standard uranoid is the entire universe as a whole and is 
included in every problem. Eddington rationalizes this since dividing the universe into 
pieces would require calculating boundary conditions on the edges of the pieces.
Previously the (T-metric served as the connection between macroscopic and 
microscopic where a large-scale system determined the uncertainty in the physical 
reference frame that then determined the scale of the various small-scale structures in that 
frame (including microscopic structures). In the present discussion the connection 
appears to be one of mechanics where the physical interactions of the particles in the
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assemblage need to be considered. The former is a metrical effect since it involves 
measurement while the latter is a mechanical effect. But Einstein already united metrical 
and mechanical aspects of the universe by uniting geometry and mechanics in relativity 
theory. Here Eddington takes a decidedly geometric interpretation of the structure of the 
universe that implies it is, indeed, whole and continuous. Both the metrical and 
mechanical aspects are contained in the field of and it can thus either influence the
measured characteristics of the object-system through a perturbation or disturbance, or 
determine the standard of measurement used for reference in a measurement.
In a final nod to Newton, the field of g^y is usually just called the gravitational
field but sometimes is known (not so much anymore, but certainly moreso sixty years 
ago) as the inertial-gravitational field. In this context the standard uranoid provides the 
inertial part of the field whereas the gravitational part arises from some disturbance or 
perturbation that is described as a deviation from the standard uranoid. The gravitational 
part obviously does not affect individual particles that much, particularly when they are 
simply interacting with each other. However, inertial considerations can be important in 
this instance. Einstein, of course, had assumed that inertial and gravitational affects were 
identical (principle of equivalence) and, though tests of this fact continue to this day, no 
experiment has proven otherwise. But, in attempting to adjust one’s thinking to coincide 
with Eddington, it seems that he is making, here, a distinction between special and 
general relativity where special relativity plays the inertial role in these considerations 
and general relativity plays the gravitational role. As such, he is completely correct in 
assuming that inertial (special relativistic) considerations are important on the 
microscopic level but, as I will discuss in the coming chapters, he appears to abandon the 
equivalence principle as a result of this interpretation.
As for Eddington’s precise views about the existence of an aether chapters eight 
and nine discuss this in greater depth, but suffice it to say he certainly assumed that space 
had some definite structure apart from the pure vacuum. Perhaps the earliest indication 
of this appears in a 1932 letter to Sir Joseph Larmor (1857 -  1942) where he asked 
Larmor to examine some calculations he had made on an enclosed sheet of paper 
describing the radiation emitted by a rotating ring of n electrons. He asked Larmor what 
would happen if one electron were removed from the ring. The ring would then become
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discontinuous as would the emitted radiation since the “propagation of a discontinuity is 
a discontinuous process” (Eddington 1932). He introduced a vector he called the “aether 
displacement” to describe the discontinuity that linked the electron to the aether so that 
any measurement on the electron also required consideration of the aether. One can 
clearly see the basis of the uranoid concept in this. He also extended this idea to 
instantaneous states such as the present instant, “now”: the “world-wide instant ‘now’ is 
created by ourselves and has no existence apart from our geocentric outlook....” 
(Eddington 1922, p. 17). In a tie once again to uncertainty, a four-dimensional world 
view removes such instantaneous states (see the discussion of spherical space above). 
Thus, uncertainty is inherent in space-time because the reference frame cannot be 
separated from the object under observation as I’ve previously shown. He did make the 
point that the aether was not a field. In an early draft of Fundamental Theory he asserted 
that to use the term “field” in place of “aether” was “ill-advised” (Slater 1957, p. 72).
The strictly mechanical properties described both by second-rank tensors and wave 
mechanics allowed matter to look more like a field but was simply a way of describing its 
behaviour. As for the aether itself, a further discussion begins in chapter nine.
Beating Around the Bush
As the puzzle continues to be filled in, the idea of the uranoid releases again the nasty 
problem of the interconnectedness of observer, environment, and object all manifested in 
the painful act of measurement. Thus we return once again to the question of objectivity. 
Eddington is forced now to finally consider what to do about the plethora of units floating 
around in the fragmented universe. Ideally there should be one measurable unit that 
corresponds to the standard deviation, o  (see chapter five) but which unit? Is it not 
somewhat of an arbitrary choice particularly since the standard deviation as used by 
Eddington is unitlessl If it truly is arbitrary then it loses its objectivity. Eddington 
addresses this issue by adopting a system of natural units.
Eddington adopts the standard practice of setting c = 1. Now rather than adopting 
the standard f i - \  and stopping (thereby relating all the needed units), or perhaps 
adopting another semi-standard, G = 1, he puts the two together in an unusual way by
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defining ~  1. Eddington’s rationale for doing this can be demonstrated by
writing the fundamental equations for the energy tensor and momentum vector:
-  2 and = -ihd/dx^ .
SjtGT^y is a spherical curvature that can be represented by the inverse square of a length
(see (4.5) for the origin of 8;r). As such it has the same dimensions as / h f . With
Eddington’s system of natural units T^y has the same units as or p^Py. Therefore,
“An energy tensor is, both dimensionally and tensorially, the product of two momentum 
vectors” (Eddington 1946, p. 15). This, of course, is a key point in the derivation of four- 
momentum which is the relativistic union of energy and Newtonian momentum. In 
addition, Eddington’s system is designed to define a particle density (number of particles 
in a unit volume or the corresponding probability of a particle in such a volume) as a 
momentum vector, once again linking relativity and quantum mechanics.
As with the usual system of natural units it leaves a single measurement (with a 
single unit) to be taken, be it a length, mass, density, etc. Each physical quantity has, 
then, what Eddington refers to as a “dimension-index” that shows how the physical 
quantity varies with the unit of the single measurement (Eddington 1946). So, for 
example, if the single unit, called the extraneous standard, is a length, the dimension- 
index shows how various physical quantities vary with length.
Once again in statements that presage Bohm’s idea of fragmentation, Eddington 
holds that the internal structure of a system can still be entirely described by ratios of 
whole numbers, but in order to take a measurement at least one standard is necessary.
This is perhaps a nod to the impossibility of a truly objective universe.^^ He recognizes 
that the an ideal system would be the whole universe that would make an outside 
standard unnecessary. But, as Eddington says, “the analytical method of physics divides 
the universe into simple systems of various types which are studied one by one” 
(Eddington 1946, p. 15).
Bolim’s holographic universe is an attempt at a truly objective viewpoint and has gained support in 
recent decades. It remains to be seen which view is correct or even if  we can make a choice -  lots o f 
philosophical pitfalls here.
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So, working with a standard of length {k, Rq, etc. measured in cm) as was 
developed in chapter five, any standard will have an associated uncertainty since the 
extraordinary fluctuation can be represented as a fluctuation in the scale with an 
accompanying standard deviation, Since every observable is referred to in this 
reference frame, they must be measured with an extraneous standard that has a standard 
deviation, For instance, rather than assigning an extraneous standard the value of 1 
cm, we would assign it 1 ± G^cm . Using the system of natural units as defined (and
assuming we’re still working with our example where the extraneous standard is a 
length), since any physical quantity would have dimensions (length)^ it would be 
assigned a ‘scale uncertainty’ (tiansformation to length units) of I ± . This indicates
that some form of scale-free physics would be most useful.
The standard uranoid consists of two linear characteristics g  and R^ that are 
assumed, for the purposes here, to be independent. Scale-free physics would consist of a 
system that is completely unconcerned with these two characteristics. In such a system 
structures can be adjusted to any scale meaning there really is no difference between 
macroscopic and microscopic unless they are directly compared. Ultimately, many 
practical applications can be simplified to scale-free physics by letting cr approach zero or 
Rq approach infinity. Ultimately this presents three distinct branches (fragments) in 
physics: scale-free involving neither c r n o r c o s m o lo g ic a l  (“cosmical”) physics 
involving only Rq, and quantum (“quantal”) physics involving only g .  Obviously, there 
are a few areas that involve both as I have already outlined, but much (though clearly not 
all) of Eddington’s emphasis in Fundamental Theory is on developing a relativistic 
version of quantum mechanics through scale-free methods. As such he refers to quantum 
(“quantal”) physics as being scale-fixed in order to better compare it to the scale-free 
theory. Really quantal physics only includes those parts of quantum physics that involve 
quantisation and discrete eigenstates. Eddington’s formal statement on scale-free physics 
is as follows:
If we specify the characteristics of a system in terms of an
extraneous standard, and consider the series of systems
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formed by varying the standard but keeping the 
specification the same, then (for a scale-free system), if one 
system of the series in physically possible, all are possible 
(Eddington 1946, p. 17).
Wavefunctions and Observables in Eddington’s Theory
In standard quantum mechanics corresponding here to scale-fixed theory, wavefunctions 
are discrete and self-normalising in the sense that they are built on what Moore calls the 
state vector rule: “The state of a quanton [electron, photon, etc.] at a given time is 
described by using a normalized state vector \\f/) having a certain number of complex 
components” (Moore 2003b, p. 101). Every possible numerical value an observable 
might have will be associated with a normalized state vector that is called that value’s 
eigenvector. A function ÿf{q) can be built out of a generalized state vector | yr) and an
observable, q, by setting ÿ?(g, ) = y/i = 1V'’) • This function is interpreted by performing
a measurement to determine the value of q. If such a measurement is carried out the 
probability that the measurement of the quanton in state \y/) will give the value q^  is:
Pr(^f) = k ) f  = ■ (6.3)
One major problem with (6.3) is that as d q - ^ 0  (where dq is the step size) the 
probability that a measurement q will be made also decreases to zero. One way around 
this problem is to define a rescaled function as:
. (6.4)
If this rescaled function describes a quanton’s state it is referred to as the wavefunction.
If it describes an eigenvector it is called an eigenfunction. The probability that a 
measurement of the quanton will yield a value q„ is then:
Pr(^j = \ÿf{q,j\ = = \w iq n t  • (65)
The probability of being within a range of values is given by:
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^«+1
Pr(^„_i <q<  = J \y f{q f  dq . (6.6)
9(1-1
Normalization means that as d q - ^ 0
 ^= { w W )=  I W i q f  dq (6.7)
which simply means that the probability of finding a value somewhere between -oo and 
+00 is 1 (i.e. a measurement is guaranteed to yield a value -  maybe not the expected 
value, but some value of some sort). Now any measurement to determine q will collapse 
its wavefunction to an eigenfunction before a result is given (this is wavefunction 
collapse as described in the section on measurement). This is a result of the interference 
of the observer (or apparatus) in the measurement. So, to some extent, the value is 
predetermined (this point is debatable among physicists) by the nature of the interference. 
In addition, the eigenfunctions of real observables involve h making them discrete.
Another way of describing the above discrete wavefunction is as a particle density 
that “rapidly decreases outwards so that the integral over space converges” (Eddington 
1946, p. 17). Being normalized it is then said to correspond to “unit occupation.” Each 
eigenfunction is assigned an occupation factor j  that has an associated density. The 
occupation factor gives either the number of particles in the given state or the probability 
that there is a particle in that state. Sometimes the occupation factor is written as an 
operator, / ,  that reduces to an eigenvalue when there is definitely an integral number of 
particles in the given state.
Eddington draws a distinction between this relatively standai'd description of 
wavefunctions and what he refers to as pseudo-discrete wavefunctions. He associates the 
latter with the infinite plane waves commonly associated with elementary wave 
mechanics. This is not the same thing as a psi-field in quantum field theory since 
Eddington describes these infinite waves as not truly infinite -  they are large when 
compared with <7 but small when compared with Rq allowing both quantities to be ignored 
making the wavefunctions scale-free. A particle said to occupy a pseudo-discrete state 
represented by a pseudo-discrete wavefunction is said to be an ‘'''unidentified member of a 
large assemblage” (Eddington 1946, p. 17).
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Part of the problem with wavefunctions is that they contain a phase factor that 
contributes to the interference properties of two interacting waves. This means that rather 
than replace a series of distribution functions for discrete values of some parameter with a 
single continuous distribution function, we replace it with a single wave function with the 
domain of the parameter being divided into small ranges each with an associated wave 
function. The latter are the pseudo-discrete wavefunctions just described. One way to 
interpret this is by saying that if the entire occupation is concentrated in one of these 
small ranges the system is nearly exact (e.g. a system, perhaps, nearly at rest).
The observables of wavefunctions are the eigenvalues. The eigenvalues 
correspond to various characteristics that can either be scale-fixed or scale-free. For 
instance, the proper mass of an elementary particle is obviously a fixed characteristic 
(theoretically there shouldn’t be any variation in these characteristics but that is a 
debatable topic). Proper density, however, can be varied by varying the volume over 
which the density’s distribution function extends (see the previous discussion on the 
physical interpretation of the standard deviation for an example of this). In general terms 
the energy tensor (and any associated particles) is scale-free and the momentum vector 
(and any associated particles) is scale-fixed. Once again Eddington draws a link between 
the macroscopic and the microscopic by representing the energy tensor as a wavefunction 
made up of pseudo-discrete wavefunctions as described above where the pseudo-discrete 
wavefunctions represent the particles of the larger assemblage (that is represented by the 
energy tensor). Each pseudo-discrete wavefunction can be thought to represent a small 
portion of the overall energy tensor labelled tsT^y. This is a bit analogous to the
superposition of wavefunctions in the usual sense.
In summary each particle has a wavefunction that is really a probability 
distribution. All of these wavefunctions are part of a single collective wavefunction. The 
pai ticle wave functions are pseudo-discrete. We can only know the probability of each 
particle being in various states which means the occupation factors of the pseudo-discrete 
states are interpreted as probabilities of an individual particle or, alternatively, 
frequencies in the assemblage. So, for instance, even though masses are not scale-free 
quantities, a ratio of masses is equivalent to a ratio of densities where density, as
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described above, is not a fixed characteristic (and thus is scale-free). This will become 
useful in an analysis of the ratio of the masses of the proton to the electron.
It may help to pause here to digest this rather complicated discussion. Eddington 
himself offers some words that may help smooth out the rough edges a bit. In an eaiiy 
fragment described in Slater (1957), Eddington notes that in wave mechanics an 
observable is described by a product of two functions, while in relativity an observable is 
a relationship between two or more bodies (an observation point and observed object, or 
a reference point for a measurement between two observed objects). The problem is that 
in either case the observable properties really belong to the relationship. There must be 
some way to transfer the observable properties to the individual bodies themselves. In 
quantum mechanics, the self-properties of two observables together with their conjugates,
(p*(p and \j/*¥ > observationally equivalent to (p*y/. Thus, if the observation is made 
and 9  V  is measured, y/ is given directly while (p is found by noting that its complex 
conjugate is (p*. If a wave function represents the definite momentum of a particle, its 
position is entirely uncertain. In relativity these self-properties ar e represented by the 
stress-energy tensor T^y. The goal is to derive the eigenvalues for the observable that 
also gives a value for AT^y. In essence one can build the universe up from the smallest
parts by building T^y. In analyzing the problem from the quantum mechanical point-of- 
view, one sees that in essence the wavefunctions of the interacting particles are 
essentially correlated through coordinates. For example a distance between the two can 
be given by coordinate (vector) differences. A more physical example is given by 
Eddington; consider a box containing a proton and an electron. Each has a distribution 
function such that, if they are unobserved, they are equally likely to be anywhere in the 
box. At some point they will combine to form a hydrogen atom, thus emitting a photon. 
They are still equally likely to be anywhere in the box since neither has been directly 
observed. But their probability distributions and thus their coordinates are now 
correlated in a single function. As such an atomic wavefunction (e.g. for the hydrogen 
atom) is a correlation wavefunction in coordinates as opposed to a distribution wave 
function that describes a single particle’s probability distribution. This description
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parallels that first employed by Schrodinger in his first paper on wave mechanics 
(Schrodinger 1926).
In one final comment on scale-free versus scale-fixed theory, quantisation appears 
only in the scale-fixed theory and is considered by Eddington to be a wholly electrical 
phenomenon since h is simply the “electrical unit” e^lc multiplied by a factor of 137 (see 
chapter nine for a full discussion). Eddington thus describes scale-free theory as 
“mechanical” (Eddington 1946, p. 19).
A Problem with Observables
There still is a problem with observables. From a theoretical standpoint an observer is 
rarely confronted with an object or system that is wholly foreign and presents absolutely 
no prior knowledge. For instance the mass and charge of the electron are now considered 
known quantities thanks to immense amounts of experimental data. These values are 
considered to be essentially free information by Eddington. However, mass is frequently 
experimentally derived from experiments employing conservation of momentum -  
indeed, Moore (2003) has described mass as a way of gauging a particle’s reaction to 
momentum shifts since velocity is both relative and can be held approximately constant 
in elastic situations. Momentum in this instance, though, is governed by the uncertainty 
principle and thus its exact value -  and, by inference, the exact value of mass -  can be 
unknowable in such situations. Holding the velocity approximately constant in these 
situations can reduce the uncertainty but not eliminate it entirely.
A truly objective observer really can’t obtain free information, then, since if they 
were presented with an unknown particle they would have to perform experiments 
relying on the uncertainty principle to infer what the particle’s characteristics are (and 
thus infer what type of particle it is). Once again Eddington is blurring the distinction 
between classical and quantum uncertainty and is thus forced to beat around the bush a 
bit since there doesn’t seem to be any way around this paradox. Thus any free or tabular 
information such as the mass or charge of an electron is called a ‘stabilised 
characteristic.’ Stabilised characteristics are really not observables since they have exact 
tabular values with no uncertainty or probability distribution (some tables will give
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standard errors, though, which could be considered the same thing). The act of 
stabilising the characteristics of a paiticle or system has the effect of reducing its degrees 
of freedom since any characteristic that is stabilised is no longer a variable. A note of 
caution, however: stabilising the components of a vector or tensor forces the 
abandonment of tensor transformation properties. However, stabilisation can be applied 
to invariant conditions that must be satisfied by the tensor as a whole, e.g. impose the 
condition on a second rank tensor that it is antisymmetrical, that it is the outer product of 
two vectors, or that it is the outer square of two vectors. Such conditions are invariant for 
tensor transformations. In addition they reduce the number of independent variables 
needed to specify the tensor, tlius reducing the number of dimensions in the probability 
distribution.
Introducing Fields
In taking the above a step further Eddington veiy nearly reproposes Yukawa’s meson- 
field theory, which he had previously dismissed, when discussing a particle’s interaction 
with the environment. Particles (object-particles in Eddington-speak) disturb the 
distribution of surrounding particles through fundamental interactions (as I have 
previously mentioned, Eddington studies the only two interactions known with certainty 
at that time: electromagnetism and gravity). As such the surrounding environment cannot 
have the simple specification of the standard uranoid. Eddington treats the disturbed 
environment as the sum of a uniform environment such as the standard uranoid and a 
disturbance. As such the universe, for Eddington, consisted of particles, disturbances, 
and the standard uranoid.^® In relativity theory the disturbance is considered part of the 
environment (it’s an actual curvature of space-time) and is called, then, a field theory. In 
wave mechanics the disturbance is part of the particle (object-particle) itself as 
represented in its wave-nature. As such, Eddington refers to the disturbance in this
I say ‘disturbances’ while, in actuality, Eddington uses the singular, ‘disturbance’ -  as if  he intended 
there to be only a single disturbance in the universe. I have mulled tliis over in my mind and I have 
concluded that he, in fact, meant the plural. However, if  he had meant the singular it would imply that all 
localized disturbances -  interactions -  are really different manifestations of some overall ‘disturbance field’ 
so-to-speak. Since he does not elaborate on this latter point I suspect he is using it much like one might use 
‘trouble’ in places of ‘troubles. ’
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instance as the “object-field” and prefers to work entirely with this representation of 
disturbances, leaving the standard uranoid as the background.
It is worth contrasting these ideas with those considered current. In the words of
Zee:
We thus interpret physics contained in [a] ... simple field 
theory as follows: In region 1 in space-time there exists a 
source that sends out a “disturbance in the field,” which is 
later absorbed by a sink in region 2 in space-time (Zee 
2003, p. 24).
In current jargon experimentalists refer to the disturbance in the field as a particle. This 
goes back to Yukawa’s original idea that the meson mediated the force between two 
nucleons that was analogous to the photon in electromagnetic fields (non-quantum fields, 
of course, being a nineteenth century construct). There are two universal fields, then: 
gravity and electromagnetism. There are also limited range fields associated with the 
strong and weak interactions. In any case. Zee describes the field as a sort of mattress (as 
on a bed). Lumps in the mattress are particles and standing on the mattress induces a 
disturbance that causes the lumps to move toward one another (it’s worth trying this at 
home if for no other reason than an excuse to jump on the bed). The disturbance, then, 
produces an attractive interaction between the particles (represented here by lumps)^^
(Zee 2003). The lumps here are the source and sink described by Zee and the attractive 
interaction is the exchange or carrier particle.
Before 1959 quantum field theory generally considered space-time to be 
continuous on the microscopic level. The idea of ‘quantizing the field’ had not yet been 
born. But at a conference in Kiev that year, Soviet physicist Lev Landau (1908 -  1968) 
proposed replacing the conventional theory with one based on observables and “equally
The astute reader will note that like charges repel. In calculating the photon propagation terms one finds 
that it is necessary to perform an integration by parts that flips one of the signs in the equation for the path 
integral (really in the equation for the action). As with nearly every sign-flip in physics, this indicates a 
change in direction -  the photons cease to propagate toward another charge and instead propagate away 
from it. The mechanism that drives this ultimately turns out to be spin. See Zee 2003, pp. 31-35 for a 
fuller discussion.
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elementary compound particles” (Kragh 1999, p. 337). Landau’s suggestion was driven 
by the inability to extend the field-like properties of quantum electrodynamics to the 
strong and weak interactions. Present quantum field theory includes a mix of pre- and 
post-1959 (Landau) interpretations -  continuous or continuous-like fields that are 
quantized (there is still some philosophical debate about whether the fields are truly 
continuous -  advocates for both sides can be vociferous). Eddington clearly held the pre- 
Landau interpretation of a continuous space-time.
Another problem that presented itself early in the development of quantum field 
theory is the fact that particles interact with their own fields. Alternatively one could say 
they interact with the psi-field (of which they are a part), for instance, immediately 
surrounding themselves regardless of the presence of other particles. Quantum field 
theories, then, must account for such self-interaction. The problem goes back to the first 
attempts to formulate a quantum theory of the electromagnetic field. Both Dirac and 
Jordan independently developed the first theories of quantum electrodynamics (QED) in 
1927. Two year later Pauli and Heisenberg developed a version of QED that was 
relativistically invariant and quantized radiation as well as matter waves (Kragh 1999). 
The trouble was that the self-energy of the electron, which is the energy associated with 
the electron due to its own electromagnetic field, was infinite. As QED developed in the 
late 1930s more infinities crept out of the woodwork. The meson-field theories born 
largely out of Yukawa’s work turned out to have their own diverging results. The 
problems were not resolved until well after Eddington’s death.
But Eddington’s formulation of object-fields partially addresses these issues, 
though obviously not necessarily in an accurate way. For instance, he defines two types 
of object-fields: extraneous and complementary. An extraneous field is a field external to 
the object under study, perhaps introduced intentionally for the sake of studying certain 
behaviour. The complementary field accounts for the readjustment of the environment 
due to the object’s presence -  essentially it’s a self-energy-type field, though it is handled 
in a slightly different manner. As an example, if the object has some charge the 
complementary electromagnetic field represents the induced charge in the particle’s 
surroundings (i.e. the presence of charge of one type must induce the presence of an 
opposite charge in the surroundings if one does not already exist since charge is
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conserved^^). Conversely, it could also represent any substitutions made in the equations 
in order to neglect induction effects in the environment. The latter representation is 
simply a mathematical difference between the disturbed and undisturbed environments 
measured either through energy tensors or momentum vectors. In this sense it follows on 
Eddington’s idea of ideally measuring locations via coordinate differences directly 
between objects (i.e. with the origin essentially at one of the particles)^^ Since the 
difference is measured through tensors or vectors it follows that the field has the same 
variables (energy, momentum, etc.) as a distribution of particles. Eddington 
acknowledges the description of a field in terms of potentials (something any second- 
semester physics students should be familiar with) but only employs this version when 
grouping the disturbance with the environment as in relativity (Eddington 1946). '^*
Particles, then, would carry two bits of information. For instance, they would 
have both a particle energy tensor that is associated with their fundamental properties as 
well as a complementary energy tensor that is associated with the energy they have as a 
result of their disturbance of the surrounding environment (i.e. their interaction with their 
own disturbance in the field). Eddington’s use of the term ‘environment’ here indicates 
the strange way in which he divided up the universe. It acts as a middle layer, in a way, 
between the object-fields (particles) and the standard uranoid (zero-temperature Einstein 
universe). True fields in Eddington’s sense, particularly quantum ones, can be associated 
with any of his three parts of the universe since fields are merely associated with the 
average characteristics of an ensemble of particles rather than with the characteristics of 
the individual particles themselves. Complementary fields (or self-energy fields in 
modern terms) are, of course, object-fields. Eddington felt that they had been ignored by
There really is only one fundamental conservation law in this sense: the conservation of four-momentum. 
The conservation of momentum and energy are explicitly contained within this single law while the 
conseivation of charge is implicitly contained within the conservation of energy. Since mass is the 
magnitude of the four-momentum vector in some sense conservation o f mass is the most fundamental.
This was developed at the beginning of chapter five. It very loosely resembles the Green’s function 
portion of a path integral in the sense that, for example, a Green’s function G(xiX2) does not depend on xi 
and X2 separately but rather on tlie difference between them, x\ -  %2- 
In an historical ‘missed-it-by-//?a^-much’ event, in 1948, just four years after Eddington’s death, Hendrik 
Casimir (1909 -  2000) proposed disturbing the vacuum such that there would be a shift in its energy 
density. While tlie energy density itself is not observable, its shift should be since the method o f disturbing 
the vacuum is controllable. This shift leads to a small force (since experimentally discovered) known as 
the Casimir force. In this case the disturbance was grouped with the environment -  in fact it was in the 
environment. Had Eddington lived a bit longer he likely would have made extensive use of the Casimir 
effect.
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quantum physics (Eddington 1946, p. 23). Though QED was dealing with a plague of 
self-energy issues in the late 1930s these issues were directly linked to unwanted 
infinities which was not something Eddington had encountered in his self-energy fields.
Working with Fields
In beginning his work with fields Eddington considers the treatment of gravitational 
fields in quantum theory where the movement (or even complete removal) of paiticles 
doesn’t alter g^y. The field in this case is then referred to as a rigid field. As such
eigenstates can then be specified while the occupation can be assigned later. Since the 
occupation is flexible it allows physical change to be represented as the transitions 
between eigenstates with the field remaining unchanged. The method is only an 
approximation, however, with the condition that “the field must be stationary for small 
changes of the occupation factors of the eigenstates” (Eddington 1946, p. 24). Of interest 
is the fact that Eddington makes a distinction between quantum particles and ‘relativity’ 
particles. The former are the usual paiticles treated in standard physics while the latter 
aie singularities. Singularities are not discussed much in Fundamental Theory, 
particularly in the early chapters, for a variety of reasons including the prevailing notion 
at that time that they were simply ugly infinities that needed to be eliminated. But 
perhaps the clearest reason is simply that it didn’t fit the theme of Eddington’s theory. 
Quite simply, rigid fields serve as the foundation for further development of his theory 
and singularities arise from a non-rigid field (since any movement or removal obviously 
changes
As described above, the field acquires its own characteristics including its own 
energy separate from the particle energy. In modern interpretations there are several 
ways of looking at this (without getting overly philosophical) -  either the particle is 
simply a fluctuation in the field and so is a subset of the whole field energy, or the 
particle’s energy is produced separate from any one individual field and is produced by 
interacting fields. The trouble with all of this comes when considering the graviton. All 
fields and particles “live” in space-time but the graviton is the quantization of space-time. 
The graviton had not been formally postulated by the time Eddington had died, though
135
quantizing space-time is an idea that had been bantered about (though very informally) 
since the beginning of quantum theory.
Eddington separates out the particle energies by discrete eigenstates where each 
state is assigned an occupation factor. Changes in the system are manifested by changes 
to the occupation states that are represented as generalized coordinates or momenta. The 
total energy of the system is then a function of the occupation factors, ■
FP is not necessarily a linear function. The energy of a particle in a given state is given 
as:
E ^ = d H y d l .  (6 .8 )
Eddington’s rationale for this is that any change in the energy of the system must be 
wholly accounted for by the particles if the field is to be rigid -  i.e. the field’s energy 
does not change. Presumably this makes the calculations simpler since the field assumes 
a role analogous to the uranoid by remaining stable through various system transitions. 
The collective energy of all the particles is then given by:
= S A  • (6.9)
The field energy is then the difference Vfi = i f  -  EP. If the total energy of the system is a 
homogenous function of the nth degree then:
É ^ ^ n H \  W ^ = { \ - n ) H \  (6.10)
In this analysis Eddington has outlined the treatment of energy. A similar process 
can be performed for other characteristics that are additive such as energy-density, 
momentum, pressure, angular momentum, and even, presumably mass, though the 
interpretation of the latter could be tricky. Such a process, however, assumes the system 
is an unidentified member of a large assemblage and that the majority of other systems in 
the assemblage are in some initial state.
When this process is applied to a scale-free system, however, a complication 
arises in that the eigenstates are no longer discrete meaning they no longer are specified 
by quantum numbers. As such Eddington develops a generalized characteristic {a -  
l,2,...,n) where any such characteristic will always have the same physical dimensions 
with an associated extraneous standard. For instance could be a set of coordinates in 
some n-dimensional ‘representation space’ (Eddington 1946). Points in this space don’t
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necessarily correspond to possible states (so it’s not simply the location of particles in 
some assemblage as described above). What actually is specified is some relation 
between the characteristics Again, this simply builds on the idea developed earlier 
that it is really relational coordinates (or properties) that have physical meaning -  i.e. you 
always have to have some reference object. The actual number of possible states, k, will 
be less that than the number of dimensions in representation space, n; in essence the 
possible states for a A:-dimensional locus in the representation space that is referred to as 
the phase space of the system. The number of dimensions k  is referred to here as the 
‘multiplicity factor’ (Eddington 1946). I will have more to say regarding multiplicity 
factors in the next section. For now it will serve as a useful tool in adopting the previous 
formalism to scale-free systems.
Phase space is, of course, a term culled from classical mechanics where each 
dimension of the space corresponds to an independent state vaiiable of a system 
(position, velocity, momentum, etc.). It is a purely mathematical concept that simply 
provides a tool for better analyzing a system. In the present discussion it serves as a tool 
for making scale transformations such that transforms some ^-dimensional
element of a volume dr  into a new element of volume X'^dT. The discrete occupation 
factors are now replaced by a continuous occupation factor that is a function of the 
coordinates. As such equations (6.8), (6.9), and (6.10) can be rewritten by replacing 
summations with integrations and ordinary differentiation with respect to j,. with 
Hamiltonian differentiation with respect to j(X) -  i.e. differentiation with respect to a 
function rather than a variable. Equation (6.10) becomes:
E \  (6.11)
V I J
where I is the dimension-index of fP. As described above, the scale-free condition makes 
i f  a homogenous function, in this case of degree -l/k, of the pseudo-discrete occupation 
factors. If / = 1 then (6.11) becomes:
W°=-()k + l ) E \  H'^^-kE\  (6.12)
As an example, the energy tensor is a scale-free characteristic and thus the 
simplest kind of scale-free particle will only have the energy tensor as a characteristic.
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The components of the energy tensor are then the For such particles, the total energy 
EP is the energy tensor:
W^y = ~{k  + \)E^y , T^y = -kE^y  . (Ô. l 3)
where k (the multiplicity factor) is the number of independent components of The 
value of k can be reduced by introducing stabilized characteristics thus altering the 
numerical division of (6.13). Through a redefinition of the energy tensor he is able, once 
again, to make a direct link between the quantum (discrete) world and the relativistic 
(continuous) world: a relativity particle is formally a quantum particle with a multiplicity 
of -1. In order to understand this result a bit better a deeper look at multiplicity is 
required.
Multiplicity
Multiplicity is most often defined in relation to Einstein solids and monotomic ideal 
gases though it can be applied to virtually anything where the multiplicity of a macrostate 
is the number of possible microstates for that macrostate. Eddington’s use is fairly 
standard in that k in both cases is the number of possible states (microstates) in some 
larger system or space (macrostate). Multiplicity can be described as being a function of 
both the total energy of the state (system) and the number of particles (units) in the state 
(system).^^ An Einstein solid, for example, can be modelled as a system of 2>N 
independent oscillators where N  is the number of atoms^^. Since the factor 3 is due to the 
dimensionality of the space (degrees of freedom) this could be altered in Eddington’s 
theory since he does make alterations to the total number of dimensions in space-time. 
But, for the time being I will continue to assume a three-dimensional space-time.
The total energy in an Einstein solid, U, is an integer multiple of some basic 
energy unit e. The total number of energy units in the solid are defined as q = U f e . In 
Eddington’s theory, rather than dealing with a solid, one would simply deal with a large 
assemblage of particles. In any case, the multiplicity of an Einstein solid’s macrostate, in
For an indepth discussion of multiplicity and how it can be fully derived in numerous situations see 
Schroeder (1999).
This is similar to Zee’s description o f quantum fields (Zee 2003).
138
modem notation (dropping Eddington’s use of k for reasons that will shortly become 
obvious), is given by:
(Moore 2003c, p. 66). In Eddington’s theory the factor of 3 would obviously be different 
as would the exact value ofg. But the basic idea holds: multiplicity is the number of 
possible states in a system.
There is an additional macroscopic step that can be taken with Einstein solids. If 
two such solids are in contact there is a total energy to the system made up of the energies 
of the two solids. The total energy of the system can be partitioned by multiples of the 
basic energy unit in a number of ways that are not necessarily confined by the solids 
themselves. The total multiplicity of the system, then, is the product of the multiplicities 
of the two solids. In adapting this to Eddington’s theory, one could macropartition some 
larger system like the universe into smaller macroscopic systems in order to find the 
multiplicity of some larger system. Since we’re dealing with exponentials at the 
fundamental level here this makes sense. As long as the total energy U remains fixed the 
combined system of two solids (or subsystems) can (and will) randomly shift between 
different microstates. This is actually known as the ‘fundamental assumption’ of 
statistical mechanics and is formally stated as: “All of a system’s accessible microstates 
are equally likely in the long run” (Moore 2003c, p. 68). The term ‘accessible’ basically 
means that the microstates must shift such that U remains constant. This is the same idea 
as Eddington’s description of the electron and proton in a box: at some point they will 
join to form hydrogen thus conelating their wavefunctions but both still have a non-zero 
probability of being anywhere in the box.
Some implications of (6.14) that can easily be tiansferred to Eddington’s theory 
without knowing q or the multiple of N  include the fact that laiger systems will have huge 
multiplicities -  in fact ridiculously huge multiplicities (see Moore 2003c, p. 78) -  as well 
as the fact that the shape of the macropartition distribution becomes less and less 
Gaussian as the system gets larger to the point where the probability distribution is 
essentially an infinitesimally nairow spike. Moore concludes for Einstein solids that 1.) 
if the system is not in the most probable macropartition to begin with it will fairly rapidly
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move toward that macropartition and 2.) it will stay at that macropartition regardless of 
random exchanges in microstates between the solids. This is simply a statistical way of 
pointing out that systems tend to move toward equilibrium, which is just the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. As such there’s no reason this can’t be applied to a situation such 
as Eddington’s -  in fact it’s fundamentally required. In standard statistical mechanics 
this is simply interpreted as the fact that random and/or quantum processes even out on a 
macroscopic level (hence the reason Newtonian mechanics works fine as a predictive tool 
for macroscopic objects).
One final definition that theoretically could be extended to Eddington’s theory 
(though more research would be needed to determine the appropriateness of the use of 
Boltzmann’s constant) is the following relationship between entropy and multiplicity for 
a macrostate, where is Boltzmann’s constant (not to be confused with Eddington’s 
notation for multiplicity, k):
S^kg ln Ç l .  (6.15)
Again, since the fact that the entropy of an isolated system never decreases is merely a 
restatement of the second law, it follows logically that this can be applied to Eddington’s 
situation. In a frequently misleading interpretation, entropy is often deemed a measure of 
disorder in a system. In reality, the basic meaning of entropy is multiplicity and not 
disorder as is commonly held (Moore 2003c). In Eddington’s theory multiplicity is 
interpreted in three different ways: the number of degrees of freedom of the system, the 
number of phase-space dimensions, and the number of components in the energy tensor. 
All tlnee interpretations are equivalent.
Probability in Statistical Mechanics
Obviously the mere name ‘statistical mechanics’ implies that probability has a formal 
role in any such development. But probability actually has a direct measurable 
relationship with multiplicity in a way consistent with Eddington’s philosophy of whole- 
number ratios. It is a direct application of equation (6.15) and leads to what is known as 
the Boltzmann factor.
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Consider, then, a small system with two quantum states having energies Eq and E  ^
where E^>E q. If, for instance, the lower energy corresponded to the vacuum energy and 
the higher energy coiTesponded to the ground state of some particle, in a highly 
simplified (and incomplete) way this situation could be interpreted to be the probability 
that a particle exists at all in some region. Fundamental statistical mechanics states that 
the ratio of the probabilities is equal to the ratio of the system’s multiplicities in each 
case:
Pr(£i) ^  a,_
Pr(£„) a .
From (6.15) we get:
_ (S,-So )lko _  àS/k, /g J
P r(E J
In reality the change in entropy here is for a reservoir that supplies the small system with 
a theoretically inexhaustible supply of energy. But the combined system of the reservoir 
and the small system together must conserve energy if it is isolated. Thus whatever 
energy is lost by the reservoir must be gained by the small system, AU = {E^~ Eq) .
Since l /T  = dS/dU , for the reservoir AS ~ AU /T  as long as T  remains approximately 
constant. This is the well-known definition for change in entropy that is given in most 
standard introductory physics texts. The assumption that T will remain approximately 
constant is fitting for Eddington’s theory since he assumes in most cases an unchanging 
environment (and/or uranoid). Equation (6.17) can then be written as:
_  ^àU/kgT _  -{Ei-EoVk^T _  £—EilkjjTAU/k  i ) l g  ______  (6 181
where the minus-sign is a result of determining the values for the reservoh* rather than the 
small system. This relationship must hold true for all pairs of small-system quantum 
states meaning that the probability that a small system in contact with a reservoir will be 
in a quantum state with energy E  is:
Pr(£) = L-®"'*’'.  (6,19)
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The proportionality constant 1/Z must be the same for all the quantum states of the small 
system. The value of this constant follows from the knowledge that the total probability 
of the system being in some quantum state must be 1. Thus:
1 = % Pf(E ,) = . (6.20)
all all ^  ^  all
Leading to the following value for Z:
Z = . (6 .2 1 )
all
Equation (6.19) then becomes:
Pr(E) = (6.22)
all
where is known as the Boltzmann factor (Moore 2003c).
Interpreting this in terms of Eddington’s theory, the argument is very similar to 
the reasoning that follows from equations (6.9) and (6.10), though from a probabilistic 
standpoint. The denominator (the assemblage) in (6.22) is an averaged sum over the field 
that acts as the reservoir in this case and the numerator acts as the particle (system). This 
is a bit like Zee’s source and sink description of fields. The equation obeys Eddington’s 
two rules: 1.) the system under consideration is an unidentified member of a large 
assemblage and 2.) most of the other systems in the assemblage remain in their initial 
state. The multiplicity tells us the number of possible microstates (vacuum fluctuations, 
particle masses, etc.) in a given macrostate (environment, uranoid, etc.) and (6.22) tells us 
the probability that a system will be in one of these microstates (a quantum state) with a 
given energy relative the macrostate’s energy. In terms of observables like momentum, 
these probabilities must account for the differences in physical and geometrical 
coordinates. In fact, the probability of a physical momentum is actually the combined 
probability of the geometrical momentum of the particle and an opposite (recoil) 
momentum of the physical origin. As such “the distribution of geometrical momenta is 
turned into a distribution of physical momenta by weighing the ranges dp'' with a 
statistical weight function (Eddington 1946, p. 76). We’ve basically pulled the field and 
particle energies apart probabilistically, though this is a simplification. True QFT gets 
much more sophisticated than this (as does true quantum mechanics), but the gist here is
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to understand that Eddington’s thinking, despite the unusual notation and nomenclature, 
is remarkably modern in many ways.
One final note on the use of multiplicities is the consideration of quantum 
particles that have (reverting to Eddington’s notation for multiplicity) multiplicities of 
and The relation between their masses is:
= (6,23)m2
The application of this to protons and electrons will be presented in chapter eight but it is 
worth mentioning here since a relation could be drawn between (6.23) and (6.14) (and 
extended to include (6 .2 2 )) such that multiplicities, and thus probabilities, can be used to 
determine mass ratios.
Coordinates in Rigid Fields
The above arguments make it clear that the field energy is fairly large from an ordinary 
point of view, but Eddington points out that, for instance, gravitational fields can be 
obtained by a transformation of coordinates and that this is how such large field strengths 
are reached when working with rigid fields. A set of ‘rigid coordinates’ is then 
introduced that must satisfy the condition that the field remains stationary for small 
changes of the occupation factors. The relation between Galilean coordinates (unprimed) 
and rigid coordinates (primed) are:
x' = x ,  y '  = y ,  z '  = z ,  = (6.24)
Since have Galilean values,
&44 = • (6.25)
The spatial coordinates here remain unchanged so the number of particles per unit 
coordinate remain unchanged. As such the only energy-momentum coordinate that 
changes is the temporal one,
”  In four-momentum this is the energy component so Eddington is talking about a system change without a 
change in Newtonian momentum.
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Eddington gives this as the reason the momentum vector in wave mechanics is a 
CO variant expression -  -ihdfdx^  [sic] (rigid representation) while in relativity it is a
contravariant expression = mdx^lds [sic] (non-rigid representation). He also gives
this as the reason that the velocity of a particle in wave mechanics is really the group 
velocity of the waves rather than the wave velocity. Creating a gravitational field 
through a coordinate transformation, then, satisfies (6.13) (Eddington 1946).
The minus sign here is less problematic than it appears since it is accounted for in 
the i as in normal quantum mechanics. But an unrecognized problem takes its place -  the 
constants measured by experimentalists are not, in fact, the ‘true’ values but are distorted 
by our non-objective view. The ‘true’ values can only be obtained by a coordinate 
transformation such as the one just described.
Energy Issues
Since k introduces a minus sign the particle energy always has the opposite sign of the 
total energy. Eddington is clearly advocating in favour of Dirac’s hole theory that 
suggests there is a ‘sea’ of negative energy states that are almost entirely filled (see fuller 
discussion in chapters seven through nine). Eddington’s application of this to gravitation 
means that by inserting a particle with a mass m at some point P the energy in the region 
containing P is increased by the amount m (employing natural units, of course). Gravity, 
though, is treated as a potential well and particles in its presence have a small amount of 
negative energy. So the introduction of the particle introduces a small gravitational 
potential that supplies a negative amount of energy from all the particles in this 
environment. It is conceivable that the addition of the energy m from the addition of the 
pai'ticle is actually more than counteracted by the negative energy arising from all the 
surrounding particles due to the new gravitational potential -  i.e. adding a particle seems 
to decrease the net energy. Thus to increase the net energy one would have to add a 
particle with a negative mass. In a classical sense this poses a serious problem but from 
the point of view of wave mechanics, the positive and negative energies are merely 
superposed uniform distributions (Eddington 1946). There may also be a link here to the 
somewhat artificial separation of energy and momentum in non-relativistic situations
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where in four-momentum the sign convention is opposite for energy and momentum (if 
one is positive, the other is negative).
How is a particle of negative mass (energy) intioduced? Given a particle with 
mass m it must have an associated field energy of -2m  so that the total rest energy is -m  
thus satisfying the need for a particle with a negative energy (mass). Now put this 
particle in motion such that it gains some kinetic energy. Since the field is rigid the 
kinetic energy is only added to the particle’s energy. What happens if we simply flip the 
signs here? The kinetic energy is now -~m v^  and the total rest energy is now m. The
whole energy, including both rest and kinetic portions, is m ~~m v^ . To avoid what 
Eddington refers to as a dynamical paradox (how can something have a negative amount 
of kinetic energy?) this needs to be rewritten as m + |m (iv)^. So the particle in a rigid 
field has a velocity i times the classical velocity and thus a momentum i times the 
classical momentum. This is Eddington’s explanation for the presence of i in quantum 
theoiy, basically through an argument involving particle self-energies and the separation 
of field and particle energies. A physical explanation can be found in the Ahronov-Bohm 
effect where a quantum wave-like particle is split into two partial waves that then pass on 
either side of a region of a magnetic field. The recombination must involve a phase shift 
and introduces the need for complex algebra. But this effect was not discovered until 
nearly a decade after Eddington’s death.
This all presents one significant problem that should be evident by now 
considering everything I ’ve introduced about Eddington’s theory so far* -  how is any of 
this measurable, particularly since the measured quantities aie really relative values 
between a particle and some reference particle (see .discussion of measurement theory 
above)? Really any measurement made determines chaiacteristics that belong both to the 
particle under consideration and some reference particle jointly. So consider an object- 
particle (the one under observation) and a reference particle that will be called the 
‘comparison particle’ (Eddington 1946). Their momentum vectors are and
respectively. The so-called ‘mutual’ energy tensor that describes the two as a single 
system is of the form:
= lC{p„P'v + P'^Pv) ■ (6-26)
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The self-energy tensors for each take the form:
/?; . (6.27)
Here C, A, and A' are dimensionless constants. For particles nearly at rest the three 
energy tensors reduce to densities where the densities of the two particles sum to the 
mutual density:
p„, = Cmm', p  = Am^, p ' = A'm'^
=> Am^ -f A'rnf^ = Cmm'. (6.28)
Values for the constants will be explored in chapter nine while comparison particles will
be discussed in chapter seven. The important point here is to recognize the relationship
between the measured quantities (representing mutual quantities) and actual desired
quantities (representing the object particle related to a comparison particle). Basically
Eddington is making the point that one of the reasons measured values are never exact
and always contain some amount of uncertainty is because they have not been properly
corrected to account fo r  the field.
Adding spin to the mix can make the problems more difficult since spin is not 
only a measurable quantity but it is also a purely quantum quantity in the sense that it has 
no real classical analogue (it’s not really just angular motion in the classical sense). The 
Riemann tensor in (3+l)-dimensional space-time has 256 independent components from 
16 indices (the “energy tensor is both dimensionally and tensorially the product of two 
momentum vectors” -  see Eddington 1946, p. 15), though this number can be reduced to 
20. The complete energy tensor has 136 independent components when including spin 
and only 10 without it. Eddington calls a particle that carries only a complete energy 
tensor a standard carrier. If a particle carries an additional ‘permutation variate’ it will 
have 137 dimensions in phase space. This additional variate adds energy to the system 
via the idea of interchange, which will be identified with the Coulomb energy (see 
chapter seven). As such it adds a degree of freedom to the system. There is also a non- 
Coulomb energy that is an adjustment of any initial energy in the system that allows it to 
be reduced from four particles to two.
Scale as a Variable
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Since Eddington has equated the uncertainty of the scale with curvature through the 
extiaordinary fluctuation, by dealing directly with the scale uncertainty curvature is 
automatically considered. As such all equations can be treated in a flat space so that local 
curvature is simply overlaid via the scale uncertainty. The scale is now treated as a 
separate observable with a probability distribution that is specified by the momenta and 
coordinates. The vaiiables in probability distributions occur in conjugate pairs so the 
scale must have a conjugate. The conjugate of scale is called the ‘phase’ (Eddington 
1946). If scale reduces to an eigenvalue it is considered a momentum while the phase 
would be considered a coordinate. This phase coordinate is now considered the fifth 
dimension normal to space-time. This makes the scale and phase invariant for rotations 
and transformations (including Lorentz). Incidentally the gravitational potential between 
two particles in (n + 3 + l)-dimensional space follows a dependence assuming that
r <^R where R is the scale associated with any extra coordinates. This gives rise to the 
possibility of ‘large’ (at least on a particle physics scale) extra dimensions (Zee 2003). 
The graviton, in this situation, is actually a fluctuation throughout all dimensions rather 
than just the (3+1) we’re familiar with. This makes the graviton special since it is the 
only particle we know of that exists in more than four dimensions.
The scale uncertainty, as stated before, is primarily a fluctuation in the extraneous 
standard that is reflected in the measured characteristics of the system. This fact 
compares rather well with the Casimir Effect (see footnote 37) where the shift in the 
energy density could be interpreted as a fluctuation in the extraneous standard. In the 
Casimir Effect the measured characteristics all come from the shift in the energy density 
since the energy density itself is unmeasurable. As I will show, in chapter seven, the 
extraneous standard (among other quantities) is represented by a ‘comparison particle,’ a 
description not unlike the modern particle physics representations of nearly everything, 
including forces, as particles (this is rather ironic since Eddington disavowed Yukawa’s 
meson-field theory -  see chapter five). The scale and phase dimension are equivalent to 
this use of comparison particles and is introduced first in my presentation in order to 
maintain the cohesive field-theoretic argument to this point.
Curvature as represented in the extraordinary fluctuation makes its measurable 
appearance through something known as the scale momentum that must be given a
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Gaussian probability distribution with a standard deviation of cr^. In many cases this is a
stabilised characteristic. If it is destabilised it opens a new series of investigations to us. 
As an example, consider a scale momentum that is an angular momentum. The phase > 
coordinate in this case is an angle since scale and phase are conjugate. For angular 
coordinates with a uniform probability distribution between 0  and 2k  there is an infinite 
uncertainty, i.e. as the uncertainty in the angular momentum decreases, the angle “tends 
towai'd a uniform distribution over the range 2it' (Eddington 1946, p. 47). Or, another 
way of looking at it is by assuming that an exact scale is extended to a slightly fluctuating 
scale “by spreading the distribution uniformly over a thickness 2 ;rin an extra phase 
dimension” (Eddington 1946, p. 47). Eddington calls this the ‘widening factor.’
What we have then is two equivalent ways of representing curvature. The first is 
the familiar way of having a stabilised scale in spherical space. The second is as a 
fluctuating scale in flat space. The widening factor is used in a comparison of the two 
approaches. For example, consider a spherical space with volume V  = 2k ^RI . This can 
be reconsidered as a volume ~ k R^ in three-dimensional space with a thickness of 2k  
in an extra phase dimension. A flat (Euclidean) sphere has a volume = ^ k Rq . 
Comparing these two gives V^=jV^  but since in (Eddington’s) natural units the inverse 
of a volume is a mass, this gives:
= (6.29)
This is an example of the comparison of masses and multiplicities given by equation 
(6.23) where Vg is stabilised (exact) and V4 is destabilised, thus giving it an extra degree 
of freedom (multiplicity). This is, in fact, just Eddington-speak for saying that adding 
extra dimensions adds degrees of freedom (1 :1) and the multiplicity is just a measure of 
the degrees of freedom of a system which is perfectly consistent with our standard 
treatment.
Fundamental Theory Redux
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Before moving on to discussions of the exclusion principle and calculations of the 
fundamental constants in Fundamental Theory, 1 will pause for a moment to summarize 
what we have learned so far in Eddington’s theoiy. Despite its often abstruse formalism, 
the basic ideas are fairly simple. Eddington builds quite simply on the idea that 
eveiything -  all particles -  can be represented by Gaussian probability distributions. 
Relativity then requires that no particular point anywhere in the universe is special so the 
only relevant measurement is between particles (probability distributions). Since at least 
one of the particles involved in a measurement must be considered the reference body (at 
least in terms of placement of a coordinate origin), there are actually two locations of this 
point: the particle, which is subject to the uncertainty principle, has a probability 
distribution associated with its location, while the observer then places a geometrical 
coordinate origin as near as possible to the mean for this distribution. The geometrical 
origin, though, being limited by the ability of the observer (among other problems) has its 
own probability distribution. There is a small difference between the location of the 
physical origin and the location of the geometrical origin. There is also a standard 
deviation to the physical origin’s probability distribution and this is used to furnish a 
measuring standard in the hope of developing a truly objective theory. This standard 
deviation becomes a standard unit for measuring length. There is also an uncertainty in 
the scale of measurement called the scale uncertainty that is due to the inaccuracies of 
standard measurement techniques. It is associated, once again, with the idea that no 
observation can be truly objective and, despite the use of natural units, at least one unit 
must be specified -  called an extraneous standard -  and will contain this scale uncertainty 
(since the extraneous standard is a scale). Specifying values of observables then becomes 
known as stabilisation. It is possible to define a scale-free form of physics by not 
referring to either the extraneous standard (standard deviation) or the radius of spherical 
space (i.e. working somewhere in between).
Fields are introduced then since no particle exists purely in and of itself (at the 
very least it has its own self-energy producing fields) -  i.e. particles cannot be considered 
apart from their environment (particles are the fields or field sources, as it were). In 
order to simplify calculations situations must be arranged such that the fields stay 
relatively unchanged for any transitions in them and, thus, the concept of a rigid field is
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created. It becomes necessary, then, to separate the field and particle energies so one can 
be sure the calculations are being performed on the particles alone. It also becomes 
necessary to define a set of rigid coordinates to apply to the rigid field. In performing 
these two operations (separating the energies and supplying the coordinates) the true 
depth of the interaction of the field and particle energies must be considered along with 
any energy contributed to the system from any reference particle.
All of this introduces the idea of scale being a measurable quantity meaning in 
wave mechanics it must have a conjugate which Eddington calls the phase. In 
considering tliese issues in relation to tensor quantities one finds that there is an 
additional degree of freedom in electrical problems. As such there are also both 
Coulomb and non-Coulomb energies associated with such systems, the latter arising from 
the reduction of a system to a two-particle system (including comparison particles which 
will be discussed in the next chapter).
With fields and particle-field interactions taken care of, the next logical step is to 
address that thorny issue of measurement again from the point of view of reference 
bodies. This will lead directly to the exclusion principle.
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VII
Uniqueness
It is somewhat ironic that one of the primaiy purposes of quantum field theory is to 
explain individual paiticles making QFT the particle physicist’s primary mode of 
analysis. As such a discussion of fields frequently appears to break down into a 
discussion of paiticles once again, but with a different formalism than that we’re used to 
from quantum mechanics. This new formalism is the result of QFT. The same thought 
process is evident in Fundamental Theory where the discussion of fields breaks down 
into a discussion of particles. In truth, Eddington simply seeks to eliminate surrounding 
fields by including them in the environment or background -  to some extent they are a 
nuisance, but they cannot be ignored since a particle can’t be completely removed from 
its surroundings.
Having considered primarily how particles can be measured individually in 
chapter five and how they then individually interact with fields in the previous chapter, it 
is now time to consider in greater depth how particles interact with each other and how 
they can best be measured. Ultimately this leads directly to the exclusion principle and 
Eddington’s somewhat unusual (and rather modern) interpretation of it.
Carrying Information: A How-to Guide
In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of the ‘standard carrier.’ To reiterate, 
Eddington’s view of particles was that they were nothing more than conceptual carriers 
of a set of variâtes. The standard carrier is the simplest type of carrier in scale-free theoiy 
and, again as I ’ve stated before, carries a complete energy tensor including spin and 
nothing more. As such they have 136 independent components and are referred to as 
particles. What we’re really describing here is a mathematical form -  a blank sheet as I 
described in chapter three -  on which various characteristics and properties can be 
superimposed. Basically one starts with a complete energy tensor whose components are 
empty. How the components aie filled determines what type of paiticle it becomes. This
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definition does not simply apply to elementary particles (why should it?) but also to 
composite particles such as atoms and, perhaps, even molecules (in fact the definition 
could be extended to organisms, theoretically, but the components would be so 
phenomenally complex it would likely be impossible to write them down!). Eddington, 
though, recognizing the difficulty with more complex combinations, refers to anything 
beyond simple combinations as systems and does not extend the definition to include 
these.
Eddington’s conception of the standard carrier as an empty mathematical tool able 
to be filled in any number of ways in order to describe various phenomena, indicates his 
belief that there likely were more particles than were known in the early 1940s (and we 
know this has been proven true), but that, theoretically, there are many more particles 
than are even known today. As he describes:
We shall freely invent particles to carry the sets of variâtes 
that our form of analysis groups together. The provision of 
a carrier is not so much a necessity of thought as a 
necessity of language (Eddington 1946, p. 31).
Eddington finds that the necessity of language may indicate that it is
desirable to distinguish the ‘mathematical fictions’ from the 
‘actual particles’; but it is difficult to find any logical basis 
for such a distinction [since] ‘[d]iscovering’ a particle 
means observing certain effects which are accepted as 
proof of its existence; but it seems to be a matter of fashion 
or convention that one sort of effect rather than another is 
accepted as critical for this purpose (Eddington 1946, p.
31).
He gives the discovery of the companion of the star Sirius as an example of the last point. 
The companion’s existence had been inferred fairly early from the elliptic motion of the
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star itself, but it was not ‘confmned’ until it was actually seen visually in 1862, But, he 
asks, why is the visual confirmation better than the gravitational? The visual observation 
is mediated by radiation or, more clearly, the electromagnetic interaction. The 
gravitational obsei*vation is mediated by the gravitational interaction. Both obseiwation 
systems have their own intricate levels of analysis between the actual fundamental 
interaction itself and the processing of the result by the brain. Certainly, if the visual 
observation is made without the use of CCD cameras (i.e. with the naked eye), then there 
is less of this analysis, but still, what makes gravitational evidence better than 
electromagnetic? As Eddington explains, experimental tests, regardless of their type, are 
concerned not with the conceptual carrier itself (the fundamental particle of the 
interaction) but rather with the infoiination it carries. Thus, trusting the photon’s 
information over the graviton’s appears completely arbitrary (although we have never 
observed gravitons while we observe photons every day). This foreshadows Eddington’s 
interpretation of the exclusion principle where he doesn’t distinguish between particles of 
any type -  a particle is a particle is a particle. This is also the reasoning behind the 
choice of a standard carrier. By substituting different values in the complete energy 
tensor the carrier can manifest itself as different particles. It’s as if  each particle in the 
universe is simply a different set of clothes for a single mathematical function.
A subset of the standaid cairier is the ‘vector carrier’ which is a particle specified 
not by a complete energy tensor but rather by a complete momentum vector (including 
angular momentum and thus spin). As such it only has 10 independent components and 
is referred to as a Vjo particle. Vector carriers can be derived frona standard earners by 
making a standard carrier the outer square of a complete vector. This is a stabilising 
characteristic meaning it reduces the degrees of freedom (multiplicity), k, (from 136 to 
1 0 ) and is somewhat subjective (see the discussion on stabilisation in chapter six). 
However, Eddington makes the point that such particles are in fact observable in nature 
(any spin-0 particle could theoretically be represented this way). He concludes that 
and ViQ particles are what might be called ‘actual particles’ while the Vg and V4 spinless 
particles don’t have the possibility of including spin, which is a very real effect. Thus 
these paiticles must be simplified mathematical fictions.
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Relatively Speaking
In chapters five and six I introduced the idea that measurements only really make sense 
when there is a reference body present for comparison (e.g. I could say that a particle has 
15 acks -  well, what’s an ack and what (and where) is the ack?). In most experiments a 
measurement is taken and then compared to a reference object that in all likelihood was 
itself derived from another reference object, and so on, all the way back to the original 
definition of the particular unit of measurement under investigation (which is likely 
arbitrary to begin with; see again chapter five). This is a rather long chain of connections 
and each link in this chain will include its own probability distribution. As such, the 
longer the chain, the greater the standard error in the final measurement. The ideal 
situation, then, would be to make a direct comparison between the object under 
investigation and the standard of measurement for a particular unit or quantity (e.g. the 
Paris Metre). Since this is impractical an idealised experiment would be one in which the 
standards of measurement were embodied in a particle that the object under investigation 
could directly interact with. In fact this is, to some extent, precisely what spectroscopy 
has always done and is similar to Heisenberg’s thought experiment with the y-ray 
microscope. Granted, wavelengths, spectral line widths, frequencies, and other features 
are often represented by comparison to a length, inverse time, etc. that is not part of the 
problem, but ratio comparisons are always possible since the method of measurement is 
thiough a photon for which the same quantities can be determined. So, for instance, a 
more accurate length measurement might really be a dimensionless ratio of the length of 
the object under investigation and the wavelength of the photon detecting the object. 
Spectroscopy may not always perform this mathematical method, but a comparison is 
often made with the wavelength (frequency, etc.) of the light involved in the experiment 
thus partially eliminating the propagation of error.
The idea, then, of having some standard that actually interacts with particles as 
they do with one another is given form in the idea of ‘comparison particles.’ A 
comparison particle is simply a carrier that includes the standard of measurement and 
interacts directly with the object under investigation. Specifically, the comparison 
particle carries the extraneous standard and is thus outside the object-system. However,
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in order to make a truly objective measurement the comparison particle needs to be 
included in the object-system and thus the object-system is expanded to include it. 
Eddington refers to this extended object-system somewhat optimistically as the ‘perfect 
object-system’ in that it is self-contained; the standard for measuring the system is 
actually within the system itself.
Once inside the object-system, the comparison particle is set to cany only a single 
variate, specifically the scale variate, meaning that all other possible variâtes are 
stabilised (recall that scale is now a measurable variable on par with momentum and 
energy). Eddington is careful to point out that the stabilised characteristics of the 
comparison paiticle must be chosen so that they do not affect the measurement of the 
desired quantity at all. But, this means that the only inexact (non-stabilised) quantity in 
the comparison particle is then the scale used for comparison, which appears paradoxical. 
However, his point is that the stabilised characteristics are imposed by the observer (and 
are thus subjective) while the scale, though inexact, is measurable. Again, this is similar 
to the example I gave above regarding spectroscopy. Via the use of natural units 
extraneous standards have fixed relations to the fundamental scale uncertainty of the 
physical reference frame (which is embodied in the comparison particle anyway). By 
embodying the scale in a particle (a comparison particle representing the scale) we also 
embody the scale uncertainty.
There is another important property of comparison particles that will soon become 
useful. If the comparison particle is outside of the object-system then it is a mean 
(average) particle meaning its attributes are based on the collective distribution of all the 
particles in the uranoid (essentially they are average quantities). Since we know that the 
lai'ger an assemblage of particles we have, the smaller the effect of the uncertainty 
principle or probability in general (i.e. large data sets are always better since they 
minimize error), then the uncertainty or fluctuation in an external comparison particle 
must be fairly small. In fact it is .
However, if the comparison particle is inside the object-system its attributes are 
no longer averages of a laige assemblage; it is an individual and thus has an uncertainty
or scale fluctuation on the order of 4 n  times G  ^ by (5.13) and the fact that Rq~ g  IG^.
This seems to indicate comparison particles would have a ridiculously large uncertainty
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in any of their characteristics. According to Eddington this problem is apparently 
overcome by replacing the continuous probability distribution of the scale (internal to the 
system) with distribution that is over what he calls ‘eigenscales’ (Eddington 1946, p. 45). 
A discrete eigenscale is simply a convention by which the scale for each resulting 
(measured) eigenstate is exact. The scale uncertainty is manifested as an uncertainty in 
the state of the system as a whole unless it is stabilised to exist in a particular eigenstate.
By that token, measuring the mass of a comparison particle will not serve as a 
standard for measuring other masses that are not in the object-system, but when it is 
employed as a standard within the object-system its measured mass is assumed to be the 
same as the measurement that would be obtained if it were to trade places and be treated 
as the object-particle itself, rather than the comparison particle -  i.e. the measurements 
for a pai ticle are assumed to be the same regardless of whether it is treated as an object- 
pai ticle in one instance and a comparison particle in a different instance. As such the 
comparison particle is, like everything else, just some modification on the standard 
carrier meaning that it begins life as an unspecialised element of the uranoid’s energy 
tensor.
Eddington assumes that all particles are essentially identical in their most basic 
form and relativity simply makes them appear different. As such in any object-system 
there really only needs to be a single comparison particle regardless of how many object- 
particles there are. This is how Eddington analyses atoms, then, by considering one of 
the elementaiy particles in the atom to be the comparison particle while the other (or 
others) is the object-particle(s). In fact, much of this is simply complicated jargon -  
Eddington-speak, if you will -  and all he is really saying is that the most effective 
measurements, particularly in atomic situations, are ratios between like characteristics of 
the constituting particles. For example, rather than measuring a mass for the electron or 
the proton by comparing it to some standard kilogram, why not simply compare the 
election and proton to each other? Could such a measurement be as instructive? 
Certainly; imagine comparing these masses to each other as in a hydrogen atom. Now, 
how would we know whether the lighter mass, for example, had any comparison to 
anything outside of the atom if we’re not measuring it in reference to anything outside the 
atom? If we’re simply measuring a ratio, who’s to say (assuming, for a moment, we are
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ignorant of the periodic system) there isn’t some other potential two-particle atom with 
the same exact ratio but different individual masses? The logical thing to do in this case 
is to then compare the ratios of the masses of the two atoms under consideration. If this 
ratio is unity they have the same total mass meaning the constituent particles must be the 
same. When working with particles that appear to be isolated (e.g. observing a lone 
electron in interstellar space) the comparison particle could be the photon (or other canier 
or exchange particle) used to make the observation. Rather than measuring in terms of 
mass, natural units and Einstein’s brilliance allows us to equivalently measure in terms of 
energies making the fact that the photon, gluon, and graviton are massless, of little 
concern; a ratio of energies would be taken rather than a ratio of masses with the resulting 
energy for the isolated particle being resolved into a rest mass. It is a rather elegant 
system of measurement, in my humble opinion, that will be explored further in chapter 
eight.
Interchange and Fermi-Dirac Statistics
I will present here Eddington’s interpretation of interchange. There are subtleties 
inherent in the concept that I do not discuss until the next section, specifically the notion 
of permutation invariance. Since Eddington blurred the distinction between quantum and 
classical applications of statistics it is best to look at his theory on interchange as a whole 
before looking at recent work in permutation invariance that was not influential to 
Eddington. Its subsequent analysis it does bring Eddington’s ideas into a new light. But 
first, Eddington’s version of interchange is presented.
By measuring all positions (and thus velocities) as being relative, observable 
coordinates and momenta must involve two physical entities. In the standard method of 
experimental science, measurements actually involve/oMr quantities -  two involving the 
objects and two involving the comparison. For example, a length measurement involves 
the two end-points of the physical distance between two points as well as the two end­
points of the comparison distance on the yard-stick (tape-measure, ruler, etc.) used to take 
the measurement. Eddington early on made the point that true observables are relative 
measurements such as this. So when measuring the mass of the proton, say, as a ratio to
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the mass of the electron the observed quantity is really the ratio here. In order to make 
sense of this number a comparison ratio must be provided (much like I described in the 
previous section regarding measuring quantities for the hydrogen atom). The true 
measurable, to be distinguished from an observable, is the combination of the two ratios. 
A measurable, then, is a characteristic that arises from a set of four entities each of which 
must, of course, have a probability distribution. The overall error then grows larger as 
the system gets more complex which seems to contradict the notion that errors grow 
smaller the larger an assemblage becomes since they average out. Eddington attempts to 
sidestep this problem by taking one or more of the four entities out of the overall object- 
system, which I have previously shown reduces their variance, and makes it Gaussian, 
which, if it is not negligible, can be accounted for with simple corrections.
His goal here is to reduce systems to a maximum of two probability distributions. 
My example with the two hydrogen atoms is another way of stating this. By measuring 
the ratio of the masses of the two particles in both atoms, one deals with only two entities 
(not four since it’s a ratio), each of which has a probability distribution. So by 
performing a ratio operation rather than a direct comparison measurement, a maximum of 
two probability distributions is all that one encounters. When comparing to another 
hydrogen atom, the atoms are treated as single entities each having a probability 
distribution, or, the values for the mass ratios each follow some probability distribution 
and it is really these that one is initially comparing. Either way you still have only two 
probability distributions. The danger is the possibility of losing important correlations by 
averaging too soon (analogous to a rounding error caused by excessive rounding in 
successive calculations).
Looking at the hydrogen problem yet another way, imagine a hydrogen atom 
initially under consideration that includes the two entities and A2 representing the 
proton and the electron respectively. A comparison hydrogen atom would have two 
entities A[ and A^  for its proton and electron respectively. A true measurable {not
observable) could be written as [A^ A^ AgA^ ] where each particle from the first atom is 
compared to a similar particle in the second atom (electron to electron, proton to proton). 
One can perform the following transformation
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[ AjA l Aî ] (7 1)
where the first proton is now compared to the second electron and first electron is 
compared to the second proton. This process is called ‘interchange’ and, again, builds on 
the assumption that all particles aie ultimately the same in their basic form.
The idea of interchange arises from Fermi-Dirac statistics (that describe 
fermions). In Relativity Theory o f Protons and Electrons (the prelude to Fundamental 
Theory) Eddington makes the argument that there is no real difference between the 
Coulomb (electromagnetic) interaction and Fermi-Dirac statistics (presumably he would 
have had to modify this statement to include the colour (strong) force between quarks in 
the same category if he had known of its existence). Both describe an interaction 
meaning they assign to the fermions a probability distribution for position, momentum, 
and spin that are different than those for non-interacting particles. In Fermi-Dirac 
statistics symmetrical wave functions have zero probability thus preventing two electrons 
from sharing the same set of quantum numbers. Conversely the Coulomb force modifies 
the wave functions such that they satisfy a modified wave equation that is also 
asymmetrical (it contains an extra term called the Coulomb energy). This these two 
mechanisms explain the same interaction. Eddington concluded that it
cannot be seriously maintained that the Coulomb force, 
which prevents two slow moving electrons from 
approaching one another, is an altogether distinct 
phenomenon from the exclusion principle (contained in 
Fermi-Dirac statistics) which achieves the same result by 
forbidding them to occupy the same phase cell (Eddington 
1936, p. 282).
He does not mention how to reconcile this with fast moving electrons which can collide, 
thus overcoming the Coulomb force, yet still obey Fermi-Dirac statistics. The discovery 
of bosonic charge clearly refutes Eddington’s claim. In another example, which is a 
demonstration of quantum non-locality (the non-existence of any objective local theory) 
and was first experimentally proven in 1982 by Alain Aspect, colliding electrons
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exchange portions of their wavefunctions such that after the collision, regardless of their 
separation distance, they cannot be considered as individual particles but rather as a 
system. As such, for example, if one is spin up then the other must be spin down in order 
for them to obey the exclusion principle. This actually implies that these particles are 
observationally distinguishable since they are forced to have at least one quantum 
property that is different. Particles in large ensembles cannot be truly considered to be 
individuals based on Aspect’s experiment (which was an idealization of Bohm’s 
modification (found in his book Quantum Theory) of the famous Einstein-Podolsky- 
Rosen (EPR) thought experiment) since they share common properties. This fits 
Eddington’s requirement that particles, unless directly under observation, must be 
unidentified members of a large assemblage -  they’re ultimately indistinguishable.
The philosophical implications and arguments resulting from Aspect’s experiment 
run the gamut from those that believe the experiment (or rather experiments -  there were 
multiple runs) indicate a flat-out denial of any possibility of hidden variables in physics 
(this seems to at least be true locally) to those that have found the peculiar behaviour of 
the entangled electrons at great distances (seemingly at odd with special relativity) to be 
disconcerting enough to possibly believe in hidden variables (string theory with its 11 
dimensions may ultimately resolve this problem in favour of the indeterminate subjective 
view that denies the existence of hidden variables). Since these experiments and even 
Bell’s inequalities occurred long after Eddington was gone, he was thus unaware 
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were wrong (especially in 1936, just one year after their 
paper was published).,
In any case there is now sufficient evidence to support the fact that the Coulomb 
force and Fermi-Dirac statistics were not necessarily the same thing since the Coulomb 
force could be overcome while Fermi-Dirac statistics could not. But in 1936 the situation 
was considerably different and, though he does not explicitly say as much, Eddington 
must have assumed that the relativistic situations that could overcome the Coulomb force 
must also have overcome Fermi-Dirac statistics in the process since he considered the 
two equivalent. What happened to the neutron which had ‘won’ its independence, so to 
speak (from the electron-proton composite view) by Eddington’s death? Since charge 
was a relativistic phenomenon our perception of Coulomb repulsion (i.e. the inverse
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square law every elementary physics student is familiar with) was purely relativistic and 
the exclusion principle itself was the true origin of the force. In his own words:
This separation of the interaction of electrons into two 
effects strongly resembles the separation of gravitation and 
inertia in Newtonian mechanics. The latter taught that a 
body tends to move uniformly in a straight line by its 
inertia, but is pulled into a different path by the 
gravitational field. Similarly today quantum physics 
teaches that electrons tend to take up the probability 
distribution corresponding to Fermi-Dirac statistics, but are 
forced into a different distribution by their electrical 
repulsions. There is need for the same kind of treatment 
that has proved so successful in the unification of 
gravitation and inertia (Eddington 1936, p. 282).
Since Fermi-Dirac statistics aiose, in Eddington’s view, from the indistinguishability of 
the fermions involved in a given process, then the Coulomb force, if it is indeed simply 
another manifestation of the same fundamental interaction, must also arise from the 
indistinguishability of the fermions involved in that same process. As I have mentioned 
before one reason fermions are indistinguishable is that they are all fluctuations in the 
same universal field -  so they aie not sepaiate objects, necessarily, rather they are like 
different wrinkles on the same sheet. Eddington goes on to show that this 
indistinguishability produces the extra Coulomb energy term in the wave equation.
The fundamental idea enumerated above then indicates that, since all fermions 
(protons, electrons, etc.) are indistinguishable from one another, they can be interchanged 
and any equations applied to the system must be invariant for the interchange of 
indistinguishable particles. Since invariance in this sense (as Eddington applies it) refers 
to Lorentz transformations, it is a purely relativistic phenomenon -  interchange is simply 
a new type of relativity transformation viewed as a rotation of the system (e.g. a 
transition could change a mass value). Interchange involves the transfer of probabilities
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from one object to another and can be carried out gradually via a ‘permutation 
coordinate’ that has a conjugate momentum known as the ‘interchange energy’ which is 
really the Coulomb energy term in the wave equation (Eddington 1936). Here Eddington 
pauses in a somewhat uncharacteristic display of frustration at his colleagues. He 
laments:
Now that interchange energy is regularly used in practical 
problems, it is difficult to see why the author’s theory of 
the Coulomb energy of electric charges is still looked upon 
as a dubious excrescence on wave mechanics. In the 
equations in current use the identity of interchange energy 
and Coulomb energy is accepted (Eddington 1936, p. 283).
He then directly quotes from Dirac’s Quantum Mechanics:
The interchange energy is given as {y^^|l + (c7r,cr^)},
whose eigenvalue is the Coulomb energy The unitary 
matrix factor depends on the circumstances of the problem 
to be treated, and does not affect the identification (Dirac,
1935, 2"^  ^ edition, p. 228 as quoted in Eddington 1936, p.
283). 
Permutation Invariance and the Indistinguishability Postulate
All of this is very suggestive of modern quantum field theory and one of the major 
hallmarks of both QFT and Eddington’s theory is summed up by Zee who says it “should 
be recognized as a triumph of quantum field theory that it is able to explain absolute 
identity and indistinguishability easily and naturally” (Zee 2003, p. 117). Eddington’s 
theory obviously has numerous holes but it at least shares this fact with QFT.
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However the problem of indistinguishability is not nearly as simple as Zee implies 
and has been studied in great depth by a number of current philosophers of physics who 
have concluded that particles formerly thought to be indistinguishable might actually not 
be in their entirety. The subject strikes deep at the heart of quantum statistics and 
ultimately begins with the notion of permutation invariance (PI). The basic idea “is that 
dynamical laws depend only on the distribution of states, not on which ‘individual’ 
possesses which state” (Huggett 1999, p. 326). If permutations are considered invariant it 
means that they are undetectable by any measurement whereas transformations ar e 
usually covariant meaning they are only indistinguishable to observers that are likewise 
transformed. The origin of PI is in a paper by Messiah and Greenberg where they 
explained that “dynamical states represented by vectors which differ only by a 
permutation of identical particles cannot be distinguished by any observation at any time” 
(Messiah and Greenberg 1964, p. 248). A basic definition and lemma for PI is given by 
van Fraassen:
P  is symmetric on set S of events if and only if, for all 
members E^, E„(n=  1, 2, 3, ...), the probability of the
sequence [E^ , ..., E J  is invariant under permutation of 
indexes; i.e., P([Ei, ..., E J) = E([E,;, ..., E J )  for any 
permutation r of {1 , ...,«} .
Lemma: If P and P" are symmetric on S, so is their mixture 
cP + (1 -  c)P" with 0 ^  c ^  1 
(van Fraassen 1991, p. 62).
This is essentially known as De Finetti’s theorem. Van Fraassen gives a more concise 
definition as follows:
Given a sequence of exchangeable random variables fit) , 
we can represent their individual distributions P([/(0 < r]) 
as all produced by integration on a set of distributions
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deriving from probability measures for which these 
variables are independent (that is, measures p  such that 
P i W )  < r ] n  ([/(O < q]) = p iifii) < r]) pilfii) < q])) (van 
Fraassen 1991, pp. 64-65).
In equation (7.1) Eddington essentially permutes the indices of the variables involved. In 
this case the variables are four particles -  two electrons and two protons (an extra for 
each for comparison). Clearly Eddington intends for electrons and protons to be 
interchangeable with one another and this arises from his Principle of the Blank Sheet -  
all particles are variations on a single mathematical form known as the standard carrier. 
Does this imply indistinguishability? Not necessarily. All atoms exhibit PI in relation to 
exchanges of their electrons (i.e. if two electrons in a sodium atom swapped places no 
one would know the difference) but can be individuated by other properties such as 
momentum. So the sodium atoms of my example might be identical (in one sense) but 
not necessarily indistinguishable. This is an important distinction: indistinguishable 
particles are all particles in the same quantum state. Identical particles might be all free 
electrons moving at 215c but with some other differing property (i.e. they must have 
different quantum states even if every other attribute appears to be the same).
There is now another distinction that needs to be made. There are actually three 
types of quantum statistics: Bose-Einstein (BE), Fermi-Dirac (FD), and parastatistics (for 
particles that are neither BE or FD). In Bose’s original work the identity of particles was 
ignored; each possible assignment of occupation numbers to the different energy levels 
was equiprobable. Fermi-Dirac statistics, on the other hand, does not assign equal 
probabilities to all occupation numbers with the most glaring example being spin states -  
if an electron with a given spin state exists in an orbital there is zero probability that 
another electron will exist in that orbital with the same spin state. By contrast, Maxwell- 
Boltzmann (MB) statistics are used in classical situations and make a full distinction 
between all particles in an ensemble (see van Fraassen 1991, p. 378 for a comparison of 
MB with BE).
Let us apply all three statistics, MB, BE, and FD, to a specific example, that of 
two dice. If the exclusion principle holds, then on a given roll the dice cannot have the
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same value in FD. This reduces the possible outcomes from 36 to 30 and the maximum 
possible value becomes 11. For MB the exclusion principle does not hold so as van 
Fraassen puts it, a gambler (who would perhaps unknowingly use MB) would assign a 
probability of 1/18 to a roll of 11. But assuming exclusion applies to both BE and FD but 
in different ways, FD gives the probability of 1/15 to a roll of 11 while BE gives the same 
roll a probability of 1/21. What’s the difference between FD and BE? FD favours 
combinations of distinct numbers while BE favours doubles. So, for example, the 
probability in FD of a roll of 12 is 0 while in MB it is 1/36 and in BE it is 1/21. Thus in 
the case of a roll of 11, BE < MB < FD, while in the case of a roll of 12, FD < MB < BE.
It should be clear from this description and Eddington’s definition of interchange 
that Eddington reduced FD to BE. For example, since Eddington insisted that particles 
come in pairs (a particle and its comparison since all measurements must be relative), his 
statistics favour doubles in a sense similar to BE. This is actually consistent since pairs 
of fermions actually obey BE and single isolated particles were irrelevant (or, better, 
uninteresting) to Eddington. There is also a way to bridge the gap between quantum and 
classical statistics here. As van Fraassen says, BE is the “natural probability function, for 
a perfectly simple and natural combination of ignorance and chance” (van Fraassen 1991, 
p. 417) and in the case of maximal ignorance agrees with MB. The case of maximal 
ignorance conesponds to a uniform statistical distribution and represents the sole point of 
contact between quantum and classical models.
To put a more intuitive spin on this idea we might say that bosons tend to 
aggregate in the same cells (we’ll see this is at the heait of Eddington’s version of the 
exclusion principle) while fermions tend to aggregate in different cells. Distinguishable 
(classical) particles show no tendency either way (van Fraassen 1991). However, a word 
of caution is in order. There are other possible aggregations for the various particle types 
and the preceding is simply meant as a mental aide in understanding the most basic 
difference between FD and BE.
We can clearly see from this intuitive example, however incomplete, that 
fermions clearly exhibit individual identity. In addition bosons clearly exhibit some 
sense of identity in pairs, though not as individuals per se. So is there really such a thing 
as indistinguishability? Again we must be certain to mark the difference between
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indistinguishability and identity. In the discussion of the various types of statistics 
particle attributes were generally limited to the usual quantum numbers. Clearly, 
however, spatial location should be included in any consideration of indistinguishability, 
i.e. it is obvious that a blue car parked in your driveway is distinguishable from a blue car 
driving simultaneously by your house because they are spatially separate. In regard to 
permutation invariance, a strong version of PI would exclude properties of spatial 
location (making it easier to say particles are indistinguishable) while a weak version 
would include them (French and Redhead 1988). Since relativity reminds us that time is 
just another dimension, what can we say about temporally separated particles? Your car 
in your driveway now versus two hours from now seems to clearly be the same car. But 
if time and space are of the same basic structure why is one case different from the other? 
The answer requires knowledge of where an object obtains its attributes. The statistics I 
introduced above don’t exactly answer that question but they do acknowledge a 
difference for different types of particles. But even in the case of BE where particles 
seemingly appear to have little or no individuality it is still clear that they are different 
particles, i.e. how can we speak of multiple particles if they don’t have some sense of 
individuality? We might as well be speaking of just a single particle. This is an 
argument that has been used in some PI discussions regarding fermionic states. To better 
understand this, let us return briefly to quantum statistics and consider a two-particle 
system. Following French and Redhead, suppose there are four possible states:
(1) Both particles are in the state la^ >
(2) Both particles are in the state la'>
(3) Particle 1 is in state la^ > and particle 2 in state fa®>
(4) Particle 1 is in state la®> and particle 2 in state laV
The exclusion principle corresponds to the fact that the first two arrangements are not 
allowed for fermions. For quantum particles, if they are individuals then it is clear that 
(3) and (4) are not identical. But these states aren’t really the ones we use to discuss 
quantum statistics. The relevant states for quantum statistics really are:
166
(5) la'>® la‘>
(6) la’> ® la '>
(7) (1/V2)(la'>® la‘> + la'>® la'>)
(8) (1/V2)(la'> ® la‘> - la’> ® la'>)
These four states are mutually orthogonal and span the same subspace as the first four 
states but they are chosen so that (5), (6 ), and (7) are symmetric under an exchange of 
particles labels, i.e. they satisfy PI. (5) and (6 ) are really the same states as (1) and (2). 
The difference is really between (3) and (4) and (7) and (8 ). Of these four states all are 
symmeti'ic except (8 ). So bosons are restricted to the three possible symmetric states 
while fermions are restricted to the antisymmetric states of which there is only one -  (8 )! 
Huggett likens this to the imposition of something akin to a boundary condition (Huggett 
1999). As French and Redhead say, states without the correct symmetry are “eliminated 
because they are not accessible to the joint quantum system, not because there are no 
such states!” (French and Redhead 1988, p. 237). Recall here that we are speaking of a 
joint quantum system meaning two fermions or two bosons.
But what do these states represent? Well, at some point if we wish to avoid 
mindless mental exercises there ought to be something practical at the end and in 
quantum mechanics that is usually an observable. I can now introduce the 
Indistinguishability Postulate (IP) in quantum mechanics:
(9) <P(^IQIP0> = <0IQ10>, VQ, V0
where \(f)> is an arbitrary N-particle state and Q is a possible observable (French and 
Redhead 1988). What (9) does is restrict the possible states for the N-particle system. In
fact it limits it to only the fermion or boson possibilities. However, it could be
inteipreted as a restriction on the number of possible observables for the N-paiticle 
system. This has the effect of reducing the accessibility of the states rather than their 
existence. But how does that affect the individuality of the given particles?
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Take (8), for instance. In this case the particles are not in separate states. Rather 
they both exist partially in both states la*^ > and la®>. This is the situation entangled 
paiticles encounter. They do not have an identity unto themselves because they are in 
fact a mixture of two states. For example, imagine a can of white paint and a can of 
black paint. Let us say they interact such that in the end we still have two cans of paint, 
but each can has an equal amount of both black and white paint. This is a superposition 
of states. But, if Q is our measured observable standard interpretations of quantum 
mechanics refer to Q, and Qg as expectation values in accordance with statistical 
probabilities and not as values actually possessed by the corresponding particles. 
However, French and Redhead have clearly shown that PI can be violated in such a 
situation (French and Redhead 1988). If these particles -  or, rather, the observables 
corresponding to the measurement of these particles -  are not invariant to permutations 
meaning that we can tell if they are suddenly switched, then even though they consist of a 
mixture of states, they can be discerned as individuals. The simplest way to do this 
harkens back to Eddington as we’ll see: spatio-temporal separation. If nothing else, these 
particles are spatio-temporally different.
Fermi-Dirac Statistics and the Coulomb Force in Fundamental Theory
Let’s return, then, to Eddington’s claim that the Coulomb force and the exclusion 
principle, which results from Fermi-Dirac statistics, indicates that there must be some 
relation between spin and electrical charge. I present two arguments here. The first is 
related to the above discussion of permutation invariance and indistinguishability while 
the second is more heuristic.
Eddington essentially is claiming that in an atom the reason there is a limit to the 
number of electrons in an orbital (i.e. exclusion) is because Coulomb repulsion forces the 
additional electrons into another orbital. Obviously this implies that the repulsion 
between electrons with like spin is greater than the repulsion of electrons with <iwlike 
spin since two electrons can exist in the same orbital if they have different spin states. 
Clearly this also implies there ought to be an additional term in Coulomb’s law (and 
Eddington, in fact, has added this term). Since electrons are fermions they would obey
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FD and tend to congregate in their own cells making them fairly easily distinguishable on 
an individual basis. But, in addition, they tend to aggregate in groups of two since that is 
the maximum number of electrons possible in a given orbital (or suborbital). In that 
sense they appear to obey BE at least in pairs. Recall that in cases where the exclusion 
principle applies, BE < MB < FD, while in cases where the principle does not apply, FD 
< MB < BE. In the case of the atom, then, starting with an orbital, FD has the highest 
probability and the orbital is thus filled with two fermions, the limit provided by the 
exclusion principle. The orbital (or suborbital) gets filled in pairs and thus, exclusion 
being fulfilled, BE now gives the highest probability (this explains why pairs of fermions 
behave like bosons). However, none of this provides a clear mathematical interpretation 
of the existing version of Coulomb’s law. So, at least from a statistical standpoint linking 
Coulomb repulsion to FD would require an additional term in the force law equation 
which Eddington has supplied in order to account for the relative stiength in excluding 
and non-excluding situations. So now a more heuristic argument is made.
We already know what spin is, but what exactly is charge! We return once again 
to the fundamental description of the universe as particles and their interactions where the 
interactions are actually mediated by more particles. The electromagnetic interaction is, 
of course, mediated by the photon. Obviously, then, there must be some exchange of 
photons when charges are in close proximity (in fact the electromagnetic interaction, as 
I ’ve shown, is infinite in range as evidenced by the fact that we can observe quasars on 
the edge of the universe). The photons are exchanged in a different manner depending on 
whether the charges are alike or not. One of the most common ways of describing 
particles is through a mathematical term known as a propagator. A propagator describes 
how a particle moves and through some fairly complex math can also describe how 
particles are created an annihilated. Charge can thus be described as being a measure of 
how photons propagate.^^ Note that the same analogy cannot necessarily be made for the
A major question any serious believer in probabilistic methods should ask at this point is, why are the 
proton and electron charges exactly equal? Wliy doesn’t the uncertainty principle dictate minor differences 
between the two? The answer is fairly complicated but boils down to the fact that the renormalization of 
the charge is directly related to the photon and can be derived from something known as gauge invariance. 
Ultimately since the photon has to propagate between positive and negative charges, tliey must have the 
same value; any fluctuation would tlirow the photon off couise. It’s a bit like imagining the photon is a dart 
and the charges are dart boards: moving a board might cause the dart to miss it entirely! This can be 
explained macroscopically by the fact that atoms must be electiically neutral to an amazing degree of
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relationship between the graviton and mass since the graviton propagator can be written 
in flat space-time in which case it contains no mass terms, whereas the renormalized 
photon propagator does contain charge (or, rather, charge-related) terms.
So we now know that charge is a measure of how the photon propagates, but how 
is it related to spin? Charge is not a wholly fermionic phenomenon since, for instance, a 
pair of electrons has a charge of -2e  but obeys BE. What, then, is the difference between 
a pair of (coupled) electrons and a single electron? Quite simply, the spin. A pair of 
coupled electrons (e.g. a Cooper pair) must obey the exclusion principle and thus, with 
one spin-up and the other spin-down, they will have a total spin of zero. We can rule out 
a direct relation then between charge, in general, and FD since it is possible to have 
pai ticles with charge that obey BE. The problem is that we also can find particles 
without charge that obey FD (e.g. n (the standard neutron). A®, , A°, and S® are all
neutral baryons and neutrinos are neutral leptons). It seems that Eddington’s correlation 
between Coulomb repulsion and exclusion as formulated in FD is simply incorrect, 
though in deference to him, many of these particles were not known then (though the 
neutron wa^). In addition, Pauli proposed his famous spin-statistics theorem in 1940 that 
linked spin values to statistics (half-integer spin to FD and integer spin to BE; Pauli 
1940).
Eddington could have been onto something here, however, since there is a 
correlation between the weak interaction and particles obeying FD. The weak interaction 
essentially transmutes quarks and leptons (e.g. electrons, neutrinos, muons, and taus) 
from one form to another (essentially this is parity violation) and these are the most basic 
fermionic particles. In essence the weak interaction allows particles to exchange 
characteristics. This raises the question of indistinguishability once again. However, if 
this is merely a permutation of observables between particles I have shown above that in 
some senses these particles are nonetheless still distinguishable. In any case, the weak 
interaction is the mechanism by which particles can permute various indices. In fact, 
neutrinos only interact via the weak interaction. It turns out that all half-integer spin 
particles interact via the weak interaction and the weak interaction only occurs between
accuracy if  standard cosmology is to work. If not, electrostatic forces between large objects would literally 
tear the universe apart.
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particles with half-integer spin. All half-integer spin particles must have antisymmetric 
wavefunctions meaning they obey FD. As such it stands to reason that there is a link 
between the exclusion principle (or FD) and the weak interaction. At phenomenally high 
energies (e.g. at levels found in the early universe) the electromagnetic and weak 
interactions were simply different manifestations of the same interaction and so through 
electro weak unification there might be some way to reconcile Eddington’s proposal. One 
final note, however, is that indistinguishability in Eddington’s theory does not result from 
quantum effects but rather from relativity where all particle variables are frame- 
dependent and interchangeable. Again this reminds us that Eddington really blurs the 
lines between quantum and classical effects.
Fundamentals of Eddingtonian Interchange
Imagine, then, a proton and an electron along with their corresponding comparison 
particles. When brought together into a single system this is a measurable. But due to 
their common origin in the standard carrier of protons and electrons (Eddington’s 
reasoning for this is vastly different than convention as I ’ll show) there is only a need for 
a single comparison particle in the combined system since both are represented by V,36 
(there is no need to duplicate the extraneous standard). As such, when a proton and an 
electron are combined there are now a total of three particles rather than four in the 
measurable.(just one comparison particle is needed). However, some fourth object must 
remain in order to preserve (7.1). As such the permutation variate is introduced to carry 
the extra information required by (7.1). The permutation variate in Eddington’s theoiy 
adds an interchange energy to the system that is the Coulomb energy. This transforms 
the standard carrier into a ^137 by adding an extra degree of freedom (the multiplicity 
increases by one). Basically Eddington accounts for the electromagnetic interaction here 
simply through the concept of interchange -  protons and electrons are bound together via 
interchange which, ultimately, is simply some combined form of FD and BE (I will 
discuss this in great depth later).
In bringing two particles together into a single system their two separate scale 
momenta are replaced by a join scale momentum and a permutation momentum and their
171
two phase coordinates are replaced by a joint phase coordinate and a permutation 
coordinate. The permutation coordinate is defined to be an angle for several reasons 
(basically he works up to everything here from relativity as I mentioned previously).
First, it incorporates natural units without any difficulty. Second, a transformation 
through 2 k  restores the original measurable and limits the range of uncertainty to 2 n  (this 
is actually a permutation and exhibits PI). This limit to the uncertainty is the widening 
factor discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the treatment of scale as a variable. 
A change in configuration via (7.1) can either happen as a result of actual spatial motion 
or simply by an increase in the permutation coordinate by K, Eddington uses the term 
‘interchange’ solely in regard to the latter which, in the ‘old’ quantum theory (before the 
advent of wave and matrix mechanics), would be considered to be a quantum jump. In 
the basic original form of wave mechanics the jump is represented as a continuous flow 
of probability from one state to another. The discretisation appears as previously 
described in the eigenvalues for given eigenstates. Eddington pictures this jump as a 
circulation in an extra spatial dimension normal to (3 + 1) space-time (this circulation is 
just the permutation coordinate I just described). Ultimately, as I have described before, 
he is working in a (4 + 1) space-time. Mathematically the extra interchange (Coulomb) 
term results from the inability of the probability distribution to satisfy the continuity 
equation if only spatial transitions are accounted for. The interchange term then is added 
in order to preserve continuity. Since quantisation requires that there are no eigenstates 
with zero angular momentum in a plane of degeneracy (which the interchange rotation is 
in), interchange is unavoidable (Eddington 1946). The link between Eddington’s 
interchange and PI is the indistinguishability of particles in large ensembles. As I have 
mentioned before, however, recent has pointed to weaknesses in PI. If Eddington’s 
interchange is simply an alternate formulation of PI then it is subject to the same 
criticisms.
Interchange in Fundamental Theory is ultimately relativistic in character since it 
relies on the indistinguishability of particles that is due to the frame dependence of all 
characteristics. Since relativity implies that there is no absolute frame of reference and, 
thus, motion is a completely relative term, any particle can be brought to rest (or similarly 
accelerated) simply through a transformation. Since energy is related to velocity as well
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as mass, it makes sense that it might be possible to change the mass of a particle through 
a relativistic transformation (this is not the same thing as changing the mass through a 
weak interaction). In fact the known masses of particles are really their rest masses 
since, as a particle is accelerated, its mass is converted to energy. As such, as far as 
masses are concerned, relativistic transformations can theoretically make protons and 
electrons indistinguishable. Though this is jumping ahead just a bit, Eddington assumes 
the same is true of spin and charge. For spin, despite the point-like nature of fundamental 
particles, he assumes a frame rotating with spin-up could be transformed into a frame 
rotating with spin-down just as a frame embedded in the Earth could be tiansformed into 
a frame with opposite spin (this is pretty simple to imagine in a classical sense -  who 
says ‘north’ is ‘up?’ -  there’s really nothing special about either north or south). The 
only difference quantum mechanically is that it essentially takes two complete rotations 
to return to the original state. But this does not affect the relativistic view Eddington 
imposes -  two rotations are the same regardless what direction you’re viewing it from.
So spin and mass are both frame-dependent quantities. However, one must remember 
that any transformation that changes spin-up into spin-down, also changes the original 
spin-down into spin-up, i.e. the interchange must occur in pairs. In the case of spin this is 
true because as soon as an axis of rotation is intioduced into anything it immediately 
creates a duality in that there are two possible ways to rotate aiound that axis.
Charge is a trickier matter, however, since there is no simple intuitive way of 
thinking about it in frame-dependent terms. As I ’ve shown charge is essentially a 
measure of how the photon propagates. But, obviously it propagates differently 
depending on the sign of the charges involved -  if they’re alike then the photons produce 
repulsion, while if they’re different the photons produce attraction. Ultimately in the 
equation for the effective action of the photon (in general the massive vector meson), 
which contains the propagator, there exists a source (current) term, J^{x) that can be 
modified to accommodate both positive (p) and negative (n) charges as -  Jj^ .
When the charges are alike the effective action is positive producing repulsion; when the 
charges are not alike the effective action is negative producing attraction. Thus, if charge 
is to be considered frame-dependent, then a rotation of the frame of J^(x)  must change
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its sign, i.e. J^{~x) = - J ^ ix )  must be true. However, a simple derivation, following 
Lorentz’ own reasoning, can show that = V*j + — . Since the conservation of
charge requires that ^  + V* j  = 0 then d = 0 meaning charge can neither be createdot
nor destroyed (Zee 2003). Thus any change in reference that flips a sign, say, from 
positive to negative must flip some other sign from negative to positive in order to 
maintain charge conservation. This is the same situation we have just seen occurs with 
spin (your right hand is your mirror image’s left hand and your left hand is your mirror 
image’s right hand).
Eddington confronts this with the idea that particles are simply carriers of 
variâtes. Charge, mass, and spin are all simply the contents of the carriers themselves.
As such a particle y,o as defined by Eddington could carry the information for either an 
electron or a proton. This is born out of the idea that interacting particles (at least to 
Eddington) cannot be considered as individuals. In some sense this is similar to the weak 
interaction’s ability to transfer characteristics from one particle to another thus 
reinforcing the notion that particles are simply ‘empty’ structures that can be filled in 
various ways in order to appear different.
The one topic I have not touched much on yet that requires discussion is how 
particles behave in atoms -  can the proton and the electron in a hydrogen atom 
interchange attributes and, if so, is the result still the same hydrogen atom? Could we tell 
such an interchange had occurred? Eddington would say the answer is yes and would 
cite PI (if he had been aware of it). French and Redhead, van Fraassen, and Huggett 
would say the answer is no because PI is not strong enough to completely make the two 
particles indistinguishable.
External v. Internal
There is an alternate way of looking at atoms. Rather than treating them as a collection 
of particles, one can redivide the system into what Eddington referred to as ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ particles. This is not uniquely Eddingtonian; it is common practice among
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nuclear scientists and others, though it is not referred to in the same jargon. For example 
two-particle systems are often represented by examining the centre of mass on one hand 
and the internal energy interactions on the other hand (Gasiorowicz 1996). So 
Eddington’s external particle is the hydrogen atom as a whole represented by its centre of 
mass, while the internal particle is a representation of the internal energy of the atom or 
the interactions between the electron and proton. The usual notation for the masses of 
these two ‘particles’ is
M  = m + p  = mm'/  {m + m') (7.2)
where M  is the mass of the external particle (the hydrogen atom as a single unit) and fx is 
the mass of the internal particle refened to in modern texts as the ‘reduced mass’ 
(Gasiorowicz 1996). In typical Eddington form he develops new jargon for these 
paiticles: ‘extracules’ and ‘intracules.’
By analysing the system in this manner interchange becomes quite simplified 
since, if one only considers the extracule, interchange is irrelevant since it is an internal 
property. Eddington verifies this by considering the coordinates of the extracule in the 
usual mass-of-mass manner, but then treating the coordinates of the intracule in his usual 
manner by taking a difference between the particles making up the intracule. So the 
coordinate ‘position’ for the intracule is really a coordinate difference of the two 
pai'ticipating particles, which follows Eddington’s reasoning that only relative 
coordinates have meaning. He uses similar reasoning to show that the total volume of the 
bi-particle (extracule/intracule system) is the same as the standard hydrogen atom, thus 
certifying his approach (and as I ’ve noted this is all fairly standard practice today, though 
without the unusual jargon). However, the Hamiltonians in each system do not quite 
match. This is because when the system is transformed from a proton-electron system to 
an extracule-intracule system the zero-level for the energy is adjusted to account for the 
additional density of the distribution -  essentially the datum is shifted. This 
transformation is referred to by Eddington as “freeing the intracule” (Eddington 1946, p. 
53y
The Hamiltonian is then written in the fonn (for the energy)
£  = + ^  (7.3)
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where /i, is the rest mass and is call the mass-constant of the particle. He makes the 
point that the two agree in a purely inertial field. However “the particle possesses 
potential energy in a gravitational or electrical field, and this constitutes the difference 
Ml “  M2 ” (Eddington 1946, p. 53). What happened to equivalence? Has Eddington 
abandoned it entirely? He clearly has a point that there does exist a potential in the 
presence of a gravitational field that is not there in an inertial situation, but the 
equivalence of gravitational and inertial frames is one of the great breakthroughs Einstein 
made with relativity! Clearly something is amiss. It seems unfathomable that such an 
aident supporter of Einstein’s theory would abandon one of its key results. In addition, 
Eddington makes one more rather subtle error that is made by many modem physics text 
authors (and this could perhaps simply be Eddington using the colloquial terminology as 
most authors still do): he attributes the potential energy to the particles themselves. In 
reality potential energy is associated only with interactions (thus it could be said that 
exchange particles contain potential energy). Potential energy is entirely absent in 
situations where a particle is completely isolated. In the case of the hydrogen atom there 
is, of course, potential energy associated with the interactions inside the atom, but this is 
considered to be a contribution to the internal energy of the atom if the atom is treated as 
a single object.^^ This seems to be a fatal flaw in reasoning, but, for the sake of 
completeness, let us continue to follow Eddington’s course.
Eddington associates the mass-constant with the given mass values in tables of 
physical constants. When /x, = Ihe particle is referred to as ‘free’ and when = 0 it 
is referred to as ‘bound’ (Eddington 1946). Intracules are considered to be bound 
particles in classical theory since they are made up of other particles bound to each other 
(as such nucleons could be analysed using the external/internal particle model). In scale- 
fixed or quantal theory intracules are to be treated as free particles. Eddington argues that 
Dirac’s wave equation for the hydrogen atom is actually an equation for a free intracule. 
As such there must be some way to connect situations in which the intracule is free to
Since potential energy is associated only with interactions and it is not present in purely inertial 
situations, equivalence implies that potential energy is a relative quantity. In fact this is indeed true since a 
conversion of potential to kinetic energy simply requires a Lorentz transformation -  shifting a particle to its 
rest frame eliminates kinetic energy but since four-momentum must be conserved it must be transferred to 
another form, namely potential. In the case of an isolated particle this would require the emission of a 
photon that would carry away the potential energy.
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those in which it is bound. Obviously in passing from the bound state to the free state the 
intracule gains amount of energy meaning relativistically that the datum for
zero energy has been shifted. Since in relativity energy determines the gravitational field 
and thus the metric this shift is important since it appears to naively create energy. Once 
again Eddington appears to demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the principle 
of equivalence. On the other hand, philosophically, Eddington could have been pointing 
out a fundamental flaw in the understanding of equivalence at that time. Equivalence is 
much easier to understand in this particular context when it is known that the interactions 
contain the potential energy and that the interactions themselves are particles. In that
sense the difference between gravitational and inertial situations is simply the presence of
an additional particle, the graviton. Simple relativistic transformations can shift the 
kinetic and potential energies aiound in such a situation. Since the exchange particle 
description of interactions was first proposed by Yukawa, as I have discussed in depth 
before, and was not really even discussed in Europe until much later, the acceptance of 
these ideas came about long after Eddington had died. As such, fr om his point of view 
there did appear to be a fundamental philosophical problem with equivalence.
Continuing with his line of reasoning, however, the double wavefunction of the 
^136 particle will have to be broken into separate wavefunctions for the extracule and the 
intracule. The energy given by the Hamiltonian (7,3) is then resolved into
=jtx + y /^ M  (7.4)
where Mq is the proper mass of the external particle (in this case the hydrogen atom). As 
Eddington explains, due to the change in datum, the rest energy of the standard particle 
(standard cairier is now
m o + l^ = m ^o = P ^ o -  (7.5)
The factor p  accounts for the ratio of degrees of freedom that arises from making the 
transition to the extracule/intracule representation. Basically what is happening here is 
that interchange introduces an extra energy term as I’ve shown previously. The extra 
energy term is equivalent to the Coulomb energy. Up until this point I have offered no 
explanation for this. The reasoning becomes self-evident, however, when one considers 
that the extr a term is eliminated by the shift to the extracule/intracule representation.
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What’s different here? The proton and electron in the hydrogen atom are now considered 
together as an intracule and the electromagnetic interaction occurring between them 
becomes internal energy for a single particle. So the interchange energy must be the 
Coulomb energy since it is the Coulomb energy that is eliminated (or rather transformed 
into internal energy) in the transition to the new representation.
Particles represented by (7.5) are then referred to as ‘hydrocules’ (Eddington 
1946). This becomes the second system for representing energy. The first system that I 
will label A includes a standard particle uranoid with bound intracules while the second 
system that I will label B includes a hydrocule uranoid with free intracules. So in the first 
system the standard reference system for the universe (see discussion in chapter five) is 
as we have seen up to this point and is particularly useful when working with large 
systems of particles (or even galaxies if they are treated as particles). Since this is not 
always useful in microscopic situations it pays to have a second standard reference 
system and the hydrocule is it.
The change in standard reference for the move to the microscopic has a few 
consequences. The first is that in moving from a standard particle to a hydrocule of 
the mass is converted to energy (the interchange energy represented by the extra degree 
of freedom). In macroscopic situations a change in density of a large number of particles 
disrupts gravitational equilibrium. In relativity only the density of a steady distribution of 
pai ticles at rest (the density of a pressureless Einstein universe) is compatible with the 
gravitational constant G. As such the hydrocule, if used extensively in converting back 
and forth between microscopic and macroscopic situations would require an adjustment. 
Since it is the density that requires matching to G one could simply redistribute the 
particles over a smaller volume in order to maintain the density. Conversely G (and, as a 
result of the system of natural units, h) could be varied (this is a result both Milne and 
Dirac found explicitly in their own cosmologies). Eddington finds a third way by 
coupling with a change from A to J5 a change in the extraneous standard. Essentially the 
measured densities are multiplied by p. The particle density, s, of both the standard 
uranoid and the hydrocule uranoid are kept the same thus requiring dividing the mass- 
density by p. But, by changing the standard as well the mass-density is restored to its
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original value keeping the uranoid compatible with G. As such h remains unchanged. In 
summaiy, s, G, and h do not change in moving from A to B.
The above is logically consistent with Eddington’s previous statements: the 
extraneous standard is furnished by the uranoid itself (see chapters five and six) and thus 
any change in uranoid will be accompanied by a change in standard making the entire 
transformation relativistic. The result for lengths and times is that in moving from A to B
they are multiplied by . However this can only be applied to quantities that are 
directly measured. Scale-free particles can only carry a density since they must be free of 
unit-dependence (and density can be developed as a dimensionless ratio with the proper 
system of natural units). Scale-free particles are not carriers of mass and any masses 
attributed to them are not directly measurable. Technically, then, m^, M, and p  ai'e really 
densities that have been converted into masses when passing into scale-fixed theoiy. 
Ultimately we find that the rest masses and of the hydrocule and standard
particle (carrier) in A are converted to tuq and ji respectively. As an example 
consider the hydrogen atom at rest both externally and internally as the standard particle. 
Results for system A, which is the standard system we are normally familiar with, have 
already been determined in chapters five and six. In system R, however, the rest mass is 
made up of the mass of the extracule tHq and the mass of the intracule jx. The 
corresponding energies become
= mo + y ^ /2 m o , E. = fx + p^/2/X. (7.6)
Compare this to (7.4) and we find an additional term present in the extracule’s energy. In 
(7.6) both external classical motion p ' and the motion of the transition from A to B ,p ,  
aie accounted for.
Interpreting the Energy Transfer
What has happened here is that energy in the form of fX is added to the system in order to 
free the intracule. In the process the rest mass of the atom changes to mQ+ p  though its 
mass (or mass constant as Eddington calls it) Mq for classical motion (by a change of
179
space-time axes) does not change. The added energy must be potential since it does not 
alter the position of the atom and is not put into motion if the atom is put into motion (i.e. 
relative to the atom itself -  it moves with the atom).
As I have already discussed extensively Eddington has interpreted this added 
energy as electrical (the interchange energy is really the Coulomb energy). In addition I 
have pointed out faults in this line of reasoning, though such faults were aimed primarily 
at the link between Coulomb energy and the exclusion principle. Building on that idea I 
have suggested that it is really the energy associated with the weak interaction that can be 
related to the exclusion principle. However, Eddington was unaware of the weak 
interaction’s existence while he was working and he attributed this relationship to the 
electromagnetic energy instead, which makes sense for charged particles given the 
knowledge of the day.
I have already shown that by adding the permutation variate and thus the 
interchange energy a 7,36 particle (standard carrier) becomes a 7 ,3? particle thus adding a 
phase space dimension (multiplicity). I have also shown that the rest masses of these are 
related by m' - m ^ / P . Since I have just shown that the latter is the mass of the 
hydrocule we can conclude that a 7 ,3? is a hydrocule. Both particles are hydrogen atoms. 
The difference is related to the observation taking place. In dealing with the standard 
carrier an observation (that, of course, must interact with the atom itself) is made to 
determine (within the uncertainty limitation) the location of the electron and proton 
relative to each other. In dealing with the hydrocule an observation is made that seeks to 
determine exactly which particle is at which location. The latter is a deeper 
understanding of the given situation and thus atomic, nuclear, or quantum physicists 
would be inclined to use the hydrocule while physicists dealing with large-scale 
phenomena will be inclined to use the standard uranoid as first developed. Once again 
Eddington has developed a system of moving from macroscopic to microscopic. One 
other interpretation that he adds is to view the standard particle as the 7,36 of system A  
and the hydrocule as the 7,36 of system B. Or, in atomic physics (B), the hydrocule 
consists of an extracule and a bound intracule while the standard particle consists of an 
extracule and a free intracule (both equivalently consist of an electron and a proton).
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One of the limitations in Eddington’s interpretation comes from the fact that 
experimental nuclear physics was unable to really probe the contents of the atom in a 
manner he would have found sufficient until well after his death. Certainly the nucleus 
had been artificially broken apart in 1919 by Rutherford and Chadwick’s discovery of the 
neutron came in 1932. However, when Chadwick made his momentous discovery it was 
still thought that the neutron was actually a proton-electron composite. The neutron was 
not recognized as elementary by anyone but a few until 1933 when Heisenberg proposed 
that exchange forces occurred between protons and neutrons in the nucleus (which was 
treated quantum-mechanically). Even then Heisenberg’s theory still held that the neutron 
was an electron-proton composite. At the 1933 Solvay Congress the debate about the 
elementary nature of the neutron was prominent. By October 1934 most everyone was 
convinced of its elementary status by new data showing that the neutr on was actually 
more massive than an electron and proton together and that it was unstable spontaneously 
decaying into a proton and an electron. At this point electrons ceased to be considered 
nuclear particles. Note that Eddington’s first crack at a fundamental theory was 
Relativity Theory o f Protons and Electrons that was published a mere two years later 
(1936) with much of the sourcework performed earlier. Clearly nuclear physics was not 
well understood phenomenologically then. Linear accelerators and cyclotrons did not 
make a large-scale appearance until the late 1930s and then mostly in the United States. 
Lise Meitner (1878 -  1968) and Otto Frisch (1904 -  1979) first realized that a uranium 
nucleus could split when capturing a slow moving neuti'on only in 1938 and their fission 
hypothesis was first reported in early 1939. The basis for a true understanding of atomic 
energy was laid later that year when Bohr and John Wheeler (b. 1911) completed a 
semiempirical study that appeared as a paper in Physical Review on September 1, 1939, 
the same day World War II began (Kragh 1999). Needless to say work on atomic energy 
and in physics in general focused less on general understanding than on wartime 
applications for many years. Since Eddington died in 1944, nearly a year before 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he never witnessed the atom and nucleus truly probed to a level 
that would have met his satisfaction.
As such Eddington was forced to conclude that system A corresponded to 
observed quantities since most observations of hydrogen were as a gas consisting of
181
countless atoms and thus were macroscopic. Since linear accelerators and cyclotrons 
were so new no one was really experimentally studying single atoms yet, at least not to 
the level required. Experimental physics was firmly system A  and system B  was wholly 
theoretical. In order to make any proper experimental investigation of system B the 
associated quantities would need to be transformed into system A for comparison to 
observables and other data. Or, conversely, data observed under A would have to be 
transformed to B and compared with predicted theoretical values. He gives specific 
conversion factors for g, ft, and 3  (Faraday’s constant). He also derives an exact 
procedure (anchorage as he calls it) for obtaining theoretical values from experimental 
measurements. Secondary methods (anchors) exist, of course, and he outlines three 
including the spectroscopic determination of the proton-electron mass ratio, the 
deflection determination of ejm^c , and the direct determination of hie. Eddington is 
blunt in basically saying that, since theory and measurement obviously have to agree, if a 
theory does not match measurement something must be done io force it to match. In his 
own words:
We have to accept the convention that any quantity that has 
been extensively used in the systém atisation of 
observational knowledge has acquired thereby the status of 
a vested interest. It if [sic] does not arise naturally in the 
theory we have to go out of our way to introduce it in order 
to avoid talking a different language from everyone else.
Unless an internal inconsistency is detected the established 
procedure of reduction of the measurements -  which is the 
definition of quantity -  must be accepted without 
amendment (Eddington 1946, pp. 57-58).
Eddington’s derivation of the Coulomb energy is far more extensive than is 
presented here and continues well beyond the subject of this monograph that is interested 
primarily in uncertainty and exclusion in his theory. He gives several early arguments for 
it in the various chapters leading to the exclusion discussion but does not fully investigate
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it until he develops a wave equation for the intiacule much later. But he does make the 
point that the addition of the Coulomb energy changes the multiplicity to 137 that is 
roughly the fine structure constant (he argues, as I ’ll show in chapter eight, that it is 
exactly 137). More specifically he points out that the derivation of the fine-structure 
constant produces the k in 7,37 rather than k + \ m  7 ,3^ . Utilizing the mechanics of a large 
ensemble of particles in relativity theoiy Eddington derives the expansion energy for a 
wave packet as being 3^^/4 (T^m. This is twice the value for the mean kinetic energy of 
the particle and thus the particle’s total energy consists entirely of this and mass energy 
since, if it is isolated or non-interacting, there is no potential energy term. In order to 
stop (or slow) the expansion, a negative potential must be introduced. The result 
produces an equation describing a spinless 7g particle. The macroscopic form of this 
process involves an assemblage of particles attempting to disperse and a negative 
potential energy must be introduced to prevent (or at least inhibit) the dispersal. As such 
Eddington has introduced a method of argument seemingly supportive of steady-state 
cosmologies. Since he calculates the rate of expansion he obviously does not believe in a 
static universe, but his methods introduce the possibility. The expansion energy, then, is 
countered by a negative potential energy. But he argues throughout Fundamental 
Theory, particularly in direct response to Dirac, that negative potential energy is simply a 
result of shifting the datum. As such the negative potential energies, as described in 
chapter five, are really positive energies opposing the expansion energy. The additional 
energy must be ‘created’ somehow, seemingly in violation of energy conservation, and it 
is through interchange that this occurs. Thus the additional potential opposing expansion 
of the wavepacket or the universe in general is the Coulomb energy. Relating this extra 
energy to spin, since spin is really a frame-dependent quantity (at least in his mind -  he 
makes it clear that he believed that the idea that it had to pass through two full rotations 
to return to its original state was a spurious notion), if angular momentum is to be 
conserved there must be a recoil spin inside the atom. It is the study of this recoil spin 
that leads to the derivation of the fine structure constant that is also equal to the 
multiplicity produced by the extia energy. As such conservation of momentum produces 
a recoil spin that produces the extra Coulomb energy term represented as interchange 
energy that was due to the ability of particles to exchange characteristics. In addition.
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this provides a direct relation between spin and the Coulomb energy, which is the basis of 
his reasoning for equating the Coulomb force with the exclusion principle.
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VIII
Exclusion
Having discussed some of the conditions required for uniqueness including how this 
relates to the concept of interchange and the ability to represent composite particles in 
alternate ways, the robust development of these ideas will ultimately lead us down the 
path to the exclusion principle.
Observations Involving Time
As has been repeated numerous times, the process of measurement disturbs a system. 
However, the interference is not always intentional. It is possible that a system may 
spontaneously release information that is eventually detected by one or more of our five 
senses. In fact anything we naturally sense in our day-to-day lives is this type of 
‘measurement.’ It does not eliminate the fact, however, that there is a selective bias in 
the measurement since the system under measurement is still interacting with its 
environment that happens to include ourselves. This seems to rule out purely objective 
theories (Eddington 1946).
We can therefore not properly speak of ‘undisturbed states’ since there is no such 
thing. As such there should be a standaid measure of the amount of interaction caused by 
observation in general, which is to say “the system is subjected to a conventional amount 
of probing” (Eddington 1946, p. 70). The only characteristics available for analysis from 
such a system aie those revealed by this probing. Any sporadic information that pops 
into the picture cannot be included in the analysis since we’re not then describing the 
normal state we set out to describe. In essence, we put limitations on measurements, i.e. 
we idealize experiments in order to filter out the noise of everyday experience. However, 
this means that the ‘normal state’ is not always the same since we are free to define it in 
any way we please. However, in doing this, new systems and particles will be defined. 
For example the standard hydrogen atom becomes the hydiocule when attempting to 
study its structure.
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There is nothing, however, that is stopping us from introducing a standardised 
amount of interference just as we have introduced the standard background as the 
uranoid. Once again this is developed to help account for the transition from 
macroscopic to microscopic. Normally the generalised coordinates and momenta are 
enough to define a system where the number of these pairs that are produced is the 
multiplicity. But some level of standard interference really must be introduced to 
properly handle any measurement of such quantities. One of the problems here is that 
observables do not generally commute (e.g. coordinates and momenta). As such they are 
treated as a join-observable -  they only make sense when observed in tandem. The joint- 
observable has a probability distribution that can describe either the coordinates or 
momenta. Since the uncertainty principle puts a lower bound on the joint knowledge of 
these two measurements, one way to define the level of interference (probing) here is to 
use this lower bound as the minimum fixed value for the observation. In this situation the 
system is described as being ‘fully observed.’
What happens after an observation concludes and the system is no longer being 
disturbed (interfered with)? If the initial observation was made at time at some later 
time the combined uncertainty is greater than it was at Essentially the
uncertainty increases with T. This is really just the backwards interpretation of 
wavefunction collapse -  a large amount of uncertainty exists prior to an observation.
Once the observation is performed the uncertainty disappears since the wavefunction 
collapses to a single eigenvalue in a single eigenstate. Eddington qualitatively describes 
this in reverse -  the wave packet is expanding as was described in the previous section. 
So, an observation reverses the process of expansion on a wave packet. In essence the 
observation furnishes the extra (negative) potential energy that inhibits and eventually 
reverses wave packet expansion. Eddington defines the time, T, as measured from the 
instant of cessation of the full observation, as a ‘coefficient of under-observation’ for the 
system (Eddington 1946). In essence any time an observation concludes the system is 
said to be under-specified. The only way to fully specify a system is to always observe it. 
The only way over-observation could occur is if measurement of the variables of some 
system continued after that system had completely vanished which is unlikely.
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So the standard probing that corresponds to the zero-temperature uranoid that is 
the standard environment is a full observation. If the system is then observed from birth 
to death, so-to-speak, any interference is automatically always a part of that system. For 
instance, if one observes a particle for a tenth of its lifetime, nine-tenths of its lifetime 
exhibits different behaviour since it is not being observed during that time. However, if it 
is observed for its entire lifetime then any interference is always present and is 
automatically included in the full description of the particle. Practically speaking it is 
possible to do this with pair creation since the particle lifetimes are short. There are other 
instances of short-lived particles in nuclear situations that also could be fully observed.
Sometimes it is necessary to examine a particle in a different environment. In 
order to account for the change in environment from one uranoid to another during a 
single observation, the disturbance produced by the uranoid is supplied with the attributes 
of an object-field with the appropriate variables, usually potentials. A change in uranoid 
then simply requires a change in the values of the variables. Thus there is an 
environmental field carrier developed here by Eddington that is very similar to the 
standard carrier. Its purpose is to carry the information associated with the environment 
and it can change form depending on the situation. A similar* field can be developed for 
the standard probing and is called the ‘field of under-observation’ (Eddington 1946). 
However Eddington does not mathematically develop this theory beyond a single case as 
he believed it had no practical application (with one exception).
The exception Eddington discusses is the abrupt cessation to some standard 
probing. The time T is the only variable required to specify this situation and it is equal 
to the time interval between the moment the probing ceases and the moment being 
considered. If it is an observed time interval (e.g. if you stop observing something and 
then wish to consider what that something might be doing 5 minutes later, the 5 minutes 
is an observable time interval) then it is subject to uncertainty in its measurement simply 
due to the inability to develop wholly accurate measurement devices (and, by ôE*ôt ~ h , 
it directly follows an uncertainty relation) and has an associated probability distribution. 
However, there is nothing that prevents T from being stabilised either.
What does it mean, though, to have a probability distribution over time? Since in 
natural units times and lengths can be considered equivalent there is nothing that
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specifically prevents us from representing a given time by a probability distribution 
simply from this basic fact. But, in addition, there is a practical limit to the exactness of 
clocks. Normally a distribution function f { x ,y ,z , t )  gives a distribution over only x, y,
and za ta. given time t. If the distribution is to include Tthen it should be represented as 
f{ x ,y ,z ,T ,t)  however there is no homology (to use Eddington’s own terminology) 
between T and the spatial coordinates. In order to induce homology between these a 
physical origin for the time must be defined in a similar way as the physical origin for the 
spatial coordinates, i.e. “as the centroid of a large number of events uncorrelated in their 
time distribution” (Eddington 1946, p. 71). Eddington immediately discards this 
description as leading to mathematical terms with no corresponding physical explanation. 
As was developed in equation (6.24), the multiplicity provides a sign change for the time 
meaning that the relativistic homology occurs between space and imaginary time and 
thus a negative standard deviation is impossible.
Eddington resolves this apparent paradox by taking the scale and its 
accompanying phase dimension as the fourth dimension. Since the particles in the 
uranoid have uncorrelated phases (they must be non-interacting) one can simply write the 
physical origin as including Gaussian uncertainty in its phase coordinates as well as its 
spatial coordinates. The scale fluctuation as developed in chapter five (see equation 
(5.10) for example) is combined negatively. Therefore the scale and phase have a time­
like relationship to the spatial measurements. By this line of reasoning Eddington argues 
that using time as the fourth coordinate in Dirac wavefunctions is incorrect. However, 
since the Dirac equation is Lorentz invariant he claims that invariance in phase 
coordinates is analogous to Lorentz invariance and the phase is a time analogue in any 
analogy between classical (time) and quantum (phase) mechanics (Eddington 1946).
Structuralism v. Prediction
Modern physics can generally be categorized as having two purposes -  describing the 
structure of the universe as well as its constituents and making useful predictions 
regarding the objects within the universe. Obviously if a theory is to make a prediction
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then observation of the system under investigation has to cease before the moment of 
prediction (and subsequently restart) for the prediction to have any meaning (i.e. if you’re 
holding a ball, predicting it will fall when you let it go requires actually letting it go).
This relates directly to the cessation of observation that leads to T. On the other hand a 
theory can equally well describe the structure of various objects including the universe 
itself and such investigations include the determinations of fundamental constants, energy 
levels, etc. In these situations the system is either considered to be fully observable or T 
is stabilised. Either way Tis not really involved in the process.
In predictive problems there is often an associated decay of some structure 
(including mathematical) and so such problems are sometimes described as problems of 
decay rather than prediction. Decay is a misleading term, though, as it is now most often 
associated with radioactive processes and the release of energy. This is not entirely what 
he describes despite his use of the term. For example, given an initial occupation for a 
set of eigenstates, one might wish to determine any changes to the system during a 
subsequent transition period given by T. The variables in this problem are the occupation 
factors, but there is no requirement that the system decay per se, though clearly 
Eddington reasons that the wavepacket will expand and not contract since it is at its full 
contraction (wavefunction collapse) while being observed.
The vast majority of Fundamental Theory is devoted to structuralism and 
prediction is only brought in near the end, well outside of the primary subjects considered 
in this monograph. As such T is never involved in any of these considerations and all 
systems are considered to be fully observed. However, it is presented here as a 
philosophical point in order to emphasize once again the problem with a purely objective 
theory since considerations focusing on r  are as close as Eddington comes to something 
truly objective since during the time interval T the observer is completely absent from the 
process. Even though the observer is present both before and after this interval, a ratio 
comparison between measurements made on either end of the interval still provides a 
reasonably good objective approximation for any changes that occurred during the 
interval.
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In discussing structuralism, then, changes cannot be taken into account through 
predictions. In wave mechanics physical changes are represented by the changes in the 
occupation factors of steady states. Wavefunctions thus have to represent steady states 
with the occupation factor being the only variable that changes with time. If unsteady 
states are introduced physical changes are represented either by continuous motion or by 
discrete transitions, which are mutually exclusive. In order to only vary the occupation 
factor with time only two types of motion are allowed: steady circulation of probability 
within a given state and non-spatial transitions of probabilities between states where the 
states themselves can be steady or unsteady. Lorentz transformations introduce motion 
that does not fall under either of these categories. The time-like variable in the 
wavefunction is then the phase.
Developing the Proper Mass
Given that we now have a framework for working with wavefunctions in both 
structuralist as well as predictive situations we can bring the two together in the 
prediction of proper mass values. Equation (5.6) represents the physical distribution 
function while equation (5.7) represents the geometrical distribution function. A 
geometrical distribution function can be converted into a distribution of a correlated 
physical coordinate where x = + ^ , by:
/%($) = J  g(^o + l) /(^ o )^ o  • (8.1)
Fourier integrals can be written for h, g, an d /as  H, G, and F. Through separability a 
direct relation between H  and G can be obtained:
;/(g )  = g-^'^^G(^) (8 .2 )
where the factor  ^ = 2nF{-q) is a result of the physical origin having a Gaussian 
distribution function as described in chapter five. In most cases momenta are of primary 
interest and distributions of physical momenta are converted into distributions of 
geometrical momenta (or vice versa). But, when dealing with coordinates, it helps to 
work with wavefunctions instead of probability distributions. As such two real
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distribution functions representing x  and^p are replaced by a single complex wavefunction 
that has two reciprocal forms (from Fourier transforms) that are mathematically derivable 
from one another. These Fourier transforms aie analogous to similar transforms that can 
be derived from H, G, and F directly. In fact they are the square roots of the original 
reciprocal transforms and contain the term p /fi .  As such, since the originals contained a 
q term in place of the p/% term, we find that q = Ip l f i  where the factor of 2  results from 
the squaring of the exponential that contains these terms. Equation (8.2) directly converts 
a distribution of geometrical momenta given by G(2 p/A) into a distribution of physical 
momenta given by H (2  p / / i ) .
Given a wavepacket represented by a Gaussian distribution of momenta, with 
standard deviation s\
G(p) = [nn^l2s^ f   ^ (8.3)
equation (8 .2 ) can be rewritten in general form as:
}f(p) = C .G (p)F(-p) (8.4)
where C is a constant. This means that the probability of a physical momentum p  is 
actually the combination of the probability of a geometrical momentum p  of the object 
under consideration and an opposite momentum -p  of the physical origin. The recoil of 
the physical origin has already been discussed. However, at the time we had not yet 
considered the physical origin as a two-particle system (say a hydrogen atom represented 
as an external and an internal particle) with two momenta represented by a single external 
momentum P and a single internal momentum Ü5 (where W is analogous to ^ - both are 
relative measures). Since the two-particle system could alternately be resolved into its 
constituents (say the proton and the electron, for instance) each of these has their own 
momenta p  and p ' . The relationship between the distribution functions for the momenta 
of the two individual paiticles and the momenta of the external/internal particle 
representation is:
7ir(F)Jf(QT) = G (p )F (y ) . (8.5)
If K(P) is represented by a Dirac delta function such that for all states with a non-zero 
probability F = 0  (which results from the recoil momentum of the physical origin, i.e. 
conservation of total momentum or the probability of p  without recoil is zero, hence the
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Dirac delta function representation) and it can be shown that p  = = CT, then (8.5)
reduces to (8.4). The result is completely independent of the masses assigned to the 
pai ticle and the physical origin since we’re working with standard carriers. Ultimately by 
representing K(P) as a Dirac delta function the requirement of Gaussian distributions is 
relaxed and (8.4) can then be used at will to convert momenta between physical and 
geometrical systems. Changing F(-p) to w(p), a  to s, and defining W = h / l a , (8.4) can 
be rewritten as
H{p)dp = C*G{p)w{p)dp (8 .6 )
where
w(p) = (2nm^ . (8.7)
Equation (8.7) represents the ‘weight function’ w whereby a distribution of geometrical 
momenta is converted to a distribution of physical momenta by weighing the ranges dp 
with w. The idea of the weight function is to reduce the frequency of large momenta and 
Eddington gives the exact value for W as being roughly lOOm^c .^ He says that omitting w 
or, equivalently, setting cr= 0, introduces unwanted infinities (Eddington 1946). This is 
identical to Heisenberg’s ‘weight function’ but with slightly different notation.
So far I have only introduced the zero-temperature uranoid. What would happen, 
then, Eddington asks, if we considered an infinite-temperature uranoid where the particles 
are not at rest but rather have unlimited uniform probability distributions. The 
corresponding distribution of physical momenta is given by the weight function (in three 
dimensions), wdp^dp2 dp^. The mean values are given as:
Pi ~  p I = p I  4 (7^.  (8.8)
If the momenta are suitably large, say relativistic, the correct energy is given by
+ p I + p I+  p I (employing natural units, of course). The mass term drops out if 
particles do not have a proper mass (e.g. a photon). By (8 .8) the energy is then:
F  = . (8.9)
In fact regardless of whether or not the particles are photons, in an infinite temperature 
uranoid the particles would have a physically impossible infinite kinetic energy and thus 
velocity. As such their entire mass would be converted purely into energy. Eddington
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proves this result by applying his results for the standai'd deviation in macroscopic 
situations to the pressure-density equations for a steady uniform distribution of matter as 
given in the then-widely accepted text on relativity and thermodynamics by Richai'd C. 
Tolman (1881 -  1948, Tolman 1934).
In this way he shows that proper mass is a concealed form of energy (nothing new 
here) but says any fundamental theory should show how this conversion takes place. 
Lowering the temperature of the uranoid then should reverse the process and produce a 
proper mass m for particles (this is somewhat akin to what actually happened during the 
cooling of the universe, though the actual process is far more complicated). The proper 
mass here, however, is considered an invariant (and since it is the magnitude of four- 
momentum and four-momentum is conserved this is true) that is independent of the 
motion of the paiticle since motion is relative anyway. Thus it is the temperature of the 
standard environment that is to be considered here, not even the particle’s actual 
environment. The trouble with Eddington’s argument is that he is basing it partially on 
his belief that inertial and gravitational fields aie different -  i.e. on the falsity of 
equivalence -  whereas equivalence has been experimentally proven many times to 
phenomenal accuracy. Regardless, he continues to derive various relations between 
quantities in a zero-temperature uranoid and an infinite-temperature uranoid. In these 
derivations he makes use of the fact that K(P) is a Dirac delta function that eliminates 
three degrees of freedom leaving the multiplicity at 3 (particles considered here are 
particles). As such “the probability distribution of momentum is uniquely determined by 
the probability distribution of coordinates and vice versa” (Eddington 1946, p. 79). The 
scale uncertainty can be accounted for directly in this process or replaced by curvature. 
Since wave mechanics is not well-suited to handle curvature the scale uncertainty ought 
to be accounted for directly. But, in doing so, m has a probability distribution that results 
from the uncertainty in the standard of mass used to measure it which is embodied in a 
comparison particle. If the scale uncertainty is included directly this adds a degree of 
freedom (extra variable or multiplicity) and the particle is a V .^ Equation (6.29) has 
already provided a conversion for the mass values of V3 and V4 particles. However, if 
rotational motion is to be considered the particles must really be Viq with a mass
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In the derivations of the various physical constants in the zero-temperature and 
infinite-temperature uranoids he arrives at the following equation for mass
m = 2C7 = 7 /(7  = 27>/ïv/i?o (8.10)
where he has employed equation (5.13). He then derives the following for 7
y = nyjM/ii = \ 3 6 n / ^  (8.11)
where M  and /i represent the masses of the external and internal particles in the hydrocule 
representation. The Vjo must then be the external representation of the hydrocule with the 
mass:
M  = (8.12)10 4 R,
But, since M = , the proper mass is given by:
- 0 = 1 ^ .  (8.13)
There is one step left in developing the proper mass. Since the move is being made from 
a theoretical to an observational system the factor P must be included (see equation 
(7.5)). Equations (8.12) and (8.13) become:
m  = (8.14)° 4 10 4 cA,
where c has been reinserted in order to return any restrictions originally placed on the
units. Eddington refers to (8.14) as the “central formula of unified theory” (Eddington
1946, p. 81). Equation (8.14) can be rearranged to solve for Rq, which then includes the
term h /M c . Since tt/e and e/Mc are well known to great accuracy from experiment
(the latter is Faraday’s constant), h/Mc is also well-determined. One can then divide
through by 4 n  to get a more accurate value for (T.
(X =  ^  = 9,53657 X 10'“* cm . (8.15)2VÎV 10 4 m
The value obtained by applying (5.17) using the observed values used in (5.18) gives 
9.5x10-''* cm.
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Exclusion from Uncertainty
Equation (8.14) can be derived in an entirely different way by utilizing the principle of 
exclusion the earliest version of which prevents more than one particle from occupying a 
given eigenstate in an atom. In the hydrocule model of the hydrogen atom, however, 
there is only one internal pai ticle (the intracule) and thus this version of the exclusion 
principle is trivial (in fact it is trivial for the normal hydrogen atom as well since there is 
only one electron). Eddington thus states an alternative version of the exclusion principle 
as follows:
If the 6 -space obtained by taking x, y, z, Pi, Pz, P 3 as 
coordinates is divided into cells of volume (h = 2 n:fi), 
then in a steady state the maximum number of particles per 
cell is two electrons and two protons (Eddington 1946, p.
82).
A similar description can be given for extracules and intracules using relative coordinates 
and internal momenta for the intracules:
In a steady state the maximum number of particles is two 
extracules per cell of xp-space and two intracules per cell 
of (^QJ-space (Eddington 1946, p. 82).
What exactly does this mean? Using the generalised coordinates and momenta as 
coordinates of a single space is simply using phase space in the classical sense (hence 
Eddington’s introduction earlier of the phase dimension -  c.f. Goldstein 1980). The 
maximum number of particles is then determined by the uncertainty principle! Let me 
reiterate this fascinating conclusion -  Eddington has defined the exclusion principle in 
terms o f the uncertainty principle] For example, in a single dimension the uncertainty 
principle is given by Ap^*Ax > h l2 n  which can be rewritten as 2nAp^*Ax > h . Similar
relations can be written for y and z. The factor of 2 (ignoring k  for a moment) means that
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two sets of generalised coordinates and momenta can be defined for a given direction. 
Thus two identical particles can occupy the given space within the bounds of uncertainty. 
In three dimensions this simply means that two identical particles can occupy the volume 
Iv’ again within the bounds of uncertainty. Basically he lays claim to the fact that 
uncertainty prevents perfect exclusion since there’s really no way of knowing for certain 
whether two particles share the same exact location (recall that to Eddington this was in 
configuration space and that quantum and classical descriptions were not as distinct as we 
usually treat them). Uncertainty then permits two identical particles to occupy the same 
volume in space, which does not necessarily mean that they will be in the exact same 
spot. This is analogous to the two particles in a box problem discussed previously (with 
the two particles being the proton and the electron). Initially both particles have an equal 
probability of being anywhere in the box. Regardless of whether or not they interact, 
their probability functions will always give them an equal probability of being anywhere 
in the box. If they are observed then the wavefunction collapses to a given location, but 
since the above argument applies right at the Planck scale any observation is inaccurate to 
within the given uncertainty thus allowing them to coexist, i.e. even after observation, the 
observation includes uncertainty meaning the wavefunction really didn’t collapse 1 0 0 %, 
it just shrank considerably. The probability for them to be anywhere in the volume (and 
thus not occupying the same spot) is minimal, but not zero. This is a profound result that 
brings up the thorny issue of completeness in quantum theory.
The exclusion principle as it is traditionally understood postulates quite simply a 
zero probability that two particles will share the same exact quantum numbers (which 
precludes them from existing at the exact same spot). This seems to imply an exact 
measurement in the sense that, even if their locations and momenta cannot be known 
exactly, it is known exactly that they are not in the same spot (or sharing the same 
quantum numbers). But the uncertainty principle implies that there are really no such 
things as exact measurements, per se. Ultimately it implies that we cannot have full 
knowledge of the state of a system, yet it can.be argued that the exclusion principle 
provides full knowledge. There appears to be a contradiction here.
The contradiction can be rationalized away by considering that exclusion is still 
governed by probability even though it presents a null result. Thus, even though
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exclusion appears to provide an exact knowledge of a given state, it only gives a 
probability for that state that happens to be zero (and zero is no less real than 50%, for 
example). Eddington obviously had trouble with this, however, given that he alters the 
exclusion principle to explicitly account for uncertainty. But as a consequence there is 
nothing the prevents any particle, regardless of spin, from obeying this new version of 
exclusion. In Eddington’s theory even photons would obey exclusion.
Electrical and Mechanical Exclusion
Since the intracule was defined as a particle it contains the extra degree of freedom 
given by the Coulomb energy and is thus electrical in nature while the extracule, being 
quite simply an electrically neutral hydrogen atom, is mechanical in nature (and by this I 
mean these particles are observed either mechanically or electrically). As such the 
second definition of the exclusion principle given by Eddington actually provides two 
separate versions -  one for extracules and one for intracules -  and in the process creates a 
mechanical exclusion principle (applying to extracules) and an electrical exclusion 
principle (applying to intracules). He uses this process, then, to replace gravitating (non­
excluding) particles with excluding (non-gravitating) particles. As such he makes 
exclusion a wave-mechanical substitute for gravitation, or more correctly, he replaces the 
curvature of space with the mechanical exclusion principle noting that the electrical form 
corresponds to the version of the principle verified by experiment (he specifically 
mentions the super-dense matter in white dwarf stars). On the other hand, the concept is 
very narrow since exclusion assumes a steady state. Based on what we have developed 
so far, then, exclusion is thus also the same thing as the extraneous standard.
Mechanical exclusion as applied to extracules begins with the consideration of n 
extracules per-unit volume in three-dimensional space. If their mass-constant (total 
mass) is jji^  then the total kinetic energy of an extracule is given by the classical form:
£ = p 7 2 M o . (p I = p I + p I + p I)-  (8-16)
In the zero-temperature uranoid this energy is obviously a minimum, though not 
necessarily zero due to the uncertainty principle in energy and time. The momenta pi, pz, 
and P 3 are distributed so that the total energy is at a minimum with a density of no more
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than two particles per cell (one is a comparison particle since all measurements are 
relative). Drawing on the description of spherical space given in chapter five, a volume 
of radius r must be equal to half of the n extracules per unit phase space volume, i.e. 
Eddington’s exclusion rule has two extracules and two intracules per so the volumes in 
spherical space and phase space are related by:
(8.17)
with the radius of the spherical volume equivalent to the momentum, p  = p  due to the 
application of Eddington’s system of natural units. Substituting (8.17) into (8.16) then 
gives the energy E as:
£  =  - ^  =  f — Y —  (8,18)
that Eddington calls the ‘top energy’ corresponding to a total for that volume. The total 
number of extracules in the universe, being half the total particles in the universe, is 
given by:
\ N  = In^R ln  or, solving for n, n ~  j N  j l n ^ R l . (8.19)
Defining the term p, = and using (8.19), (8.18) becomes:
(8.20)4  2 f t
This can be further simplified to:
= (8.21)
where by (8 .8 ) the weight constant, 07 = h / l o  = Ii4 n / I tcRq .
How is the above interpreted? Returning to a discussion of multiplicity, if i f  is 
some characteristic (e.g. energy) dependent on the occupation factor of a large number of 
particles with a particle density, s, if one particle is removed, the amount of i f  removed 
is d iflds. If the assemblage is entirely in a single pseudo-discrete state, this amount is 
dH^/ds = -H ^ /k ^ s  and is known as the H  of the ‘top particle’ (Eddington 1946, p. 28). 
The average i f  per particle in a unit volume is i f  Is and is called the H  of the mean 
(average) particle. The H  of the top particle. I), in terms of the H  of the mean particle,
77, is - H /k .  Since proper masses have the same ratio as proper densities this
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general form can be used for mass relations, SDÎ = -m /k  . If (8.20) defines the ‘top 
energy’ (energy of the top particle), (8.9) and (8.21) combine to give the mean (average) 
energy as E = ^ E . Now, if the particles are in a zero-temperature uranoid, the top
energy is just the rest mass of the top particle. The top energy is essentially the energy 
that the particle is boosted to due to the complete occupation of all the lower energy 
states, so it is associated with exclusion. So the rest mass is associated with exclusion 
since its value is given according to the occupation of all the lower energy states.
Masses, of course, have gravitational fields and, in one interpretation of the uranoid 
scenario, the particles in a uranoid give an individual object particle its rest energy by 
determining the scale fluctuation that gives curvature to space. Both these interpretations 
of interactions must be equivalent and thus both exclusion and gravity (curvature) boost 
particle energy in the same way. Eddington, thus, interprets these as being equivalent 
thus concluding that exclusion acts as the wave-mechanical form of gravity (exclusion is 
derivable from gravity and vice versa).
The one major flaw that appears to jump out here is that, given Eddington’s 
description, a naïve interpretation would assume that every pair of electrons, for instance, 
in the universe would have a different energy level. This doesn’t make sense since we 
know that, as long as they are non-interacting, two electrons can share the same energy 
levels (quantum numbers) -  e.g. it’s easy to have two hydrogen atoms containing 
electrons in the same exact orbital as long as the electrons themselves don’t interact. Ah, 
but Eddington has solved this problem earlier by making scale a variable on par with 
mass, energy, etc. His rationale for this comes out of the fact that gravity is the curvature 
of space-time itself and has energy, so a scale of measurement in space-time ought to 
have an associated energy since it is a ‘chunk’ so-to-speak of this curvature. Basically, 
coordinate locations contribute to the energy level just as mass, motion, and other 
characteristics do. So all the electrons could seemingly have the exact same energy 
levels, yet, since they are not in the same locations, they actually have différent energy 
levels based solely on their coordinates. It doesn’t mean they can’t all have the same 
kinetic energy or even the same set of traditional quantum numbers. It simply means that 
they all have different locations. So just as gravity (curvature) provides an energy boost
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to particles, so does exclusion, and both can be interpreted in the same manner -  as a 
change in location.
From the standpoint of the original formulation of the exclusion principle as 
applied to atoms, this makes sense from Eddington’s point of view. In an atom, only two 
electrons are allowed in any given energy level -  one with spin up and one with spin 
down. Once this level is filled, electrons start filling in the next level, and so on. 
Eddington viewed each change in energy level as being the same thing as a change in 
location. So after the lowest orbital was filled, filling the next orbital amounted to simply 
putting the new particles in a different location (which indeed is true). This idea of 
location as being the central point behind exclusion comes from Eddington’s reliance on 
relativity to make sense of his viewpoint as an observer: moving locations was simply a 
relativistic transformation. When viewed in this light, since relativity implies that no 
viewpoint has special meaning and we can’t really be absolutely certain of anything (at 
least anything objective), it is no surprise that he found a natural philosophical link 
between it and uncertainty and used this as his basis for the reasoning in Fundamental 
Theotj.
Dirac’s Negative Energy Sea
Relativity plays such a tremendous role in his interpretation of physics it leads to some 
unusual insights as I ’ve shown. One that I have briefly pointed out was that negative 
energies were simply a result of a shift in the datum, especially when one considers the 
relation between energy and motion in kinetics and the fact that potential energies 
associated with interactions are really tied to exchange particles and can be interpreted in 
the same way. Theoretically one could always adjust the frame such that the datum 
moved, then, so that all previously negative energies were positive -  or vice-versa. So 
Eddington considers the highest level of the top energy E  as the zero level meaning that 
all the other levels are below this. Thus the particles of a zero-temperature uranoid fill 
the series of negative energy states below the zero level just as Dirac described in 1929, 
interpreting the negative energy results of his own equation (Kragh 1999). Once again 
we see the fact that Dirac’s equation, though not initially satisfactory to Eddington due to
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its non-tensor form, was continually on his mind throughout the development of 
Fundamental Theory.
Eddington further rationalizes that these particles filling the negative energy sea 
aie really normal particles distributed in such a way that they do not interfere or interact 
with the ‘positive-energy’ particles governed by the normal laws of quantum mechanics. 
Since the particles are extracules there is a symmetry between positive and negative 
charge and the problem of infinite negative charge, as postulated by Dirac, does not aiise 
since there are a finite number of particles in the universe. As such Eddington proposes 
that there ought to be negatrons (anti-protons) as well as positrons, and, of course, we 
know he was correct in this prediction. In fact, Eddington’s theoiy, if extended to include 
any newly discovered particles, which would all obey his exclusion principle regardless 
of spin (since his version does not rely on spin in its formulation), every paiticle ought to 
have a corresponding anti-particle. Quantum field theory predicts exactly that and many 
of these have been found (n.b. neutral particles are their own anti-particle).
The formation of the observable particles in the universe is brought about through 
the excitation of top particles to a higher energy (i.e. above the zero level). The net 
addition to the uranoid is a particle with an energy E above the zero level and a 
corresponding hole an energy E  below the zero level. The particle-hole combination is 
called a ‘bi-particle’ and carries the excitation energy. This relates directly to the 
discussion of mutual and self-energy conditions in the section on energy issues in chapter 
six. Expanding on this idea Eddington says that an introduction of a particle with a 
comparison hole (which is just a particle with a negative mass in the equations -  again 
just a relativistic transformation) produces no net change in particle density since every 
new particle is balanced with a new hole. The bi-particle is a and the excitation 
energy it carries produces the normal particle (electron or proton) as a Viq and the hole as 
a VI- If one wants an observable anriparticle a hole is ‘excited’ to a lower energy state 
where the net addition to the universe is a bi-particle (thus keeping the particle density 
the same) with a hole at a lower level and a comparison particle filling the original hole. 
Since the same equations are used with a simple sign reversal the masses of antiparticles 
must be the same as their corresponding normal matter partners. Top level particles in 
this formulation of exclusion can be used as comparison particles by changing their
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energies. Thus E  is identified with previous descriptions using Here we see that 
matter can be created, in essence, from nothing (in essence, this is Eddington’s 
description of pair creation). I will discuss this further in chapter nine.
Eddington’s comparison of exclusion and gravitation does not end there. He 
takes the zero level as being a threshold and defines studies of particles below this level, 
the Dirac sea, ‘sub-threshold’ theory and studies of particles above this level ‘super­
threshold’ theory. Since E = ^ E , there are slightly differing values for the various 
constants in sub-threshold theory in terms of the known (super-threshold) values, namely 
G, = f  G and h\ -  .
Gravitation from Exclusion
In comparing two uranoids that have the same microscopic constants but a different top 
quantum number, 3 , we find that both E  and Pi are constant and p^=  p J 3 .  In addition 
(8 .2 0 ) takes the form:
2 f t £  = S 7 fi,/« » )'•  (8 .2 2 )
A quantum particle, then, is defined as being an addition to a rigid environment. If it is a 
top particle that can be added or removed without changing the completely filled energy 
levels underneath then this definition is fulfilled in the exclusion representation.
Replacing normal gravitating particles by excluding particles thus replaces the 
gravitational field of those particles with an ‘exclusion field’ that is automatically rigid 
(Eddington 1946). When N  is very small there actually are two forms of exclusion (not 
to be confused with the electrical and mechanical version) -  lateral and vertical. Thusfar 
I have only introduced vertical exclusion where particles gain or lose energy. If, for 
example, the uranoid consists solely of two particles that mutually exclude each other 
from being in state E = 0, then either particle can be considered the top particle (this is 
built from the idea of interchange). This is not a rigid environment, however, since 
removal of either particle would allow the other to occupy the E = 0 state. If the energy 
of each particle is E = Pq+ and since these energies in uranoids are actually
independent of quantum number, (8 .2 2 ) becomes:
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E^ = 5 ^ { n j R , f = i N { n j R „ f  (8.23)
which is valid in super-threshold theory since it contains the cosmological values N  and 
Rq. Since , (8.23) becomes:
This is precisely the same as (8.13) which was derived from standard relativity equations 
given by Tolman. Eddington has thus derived the same exact formula for proper mass 
from both the exclusion principle (albeit his version) and relativity.
The Planoid
Several equations have thus been developed over the past few chapters that connect the 
cosmological numbers N  and Rq with the microscopic constants of physics. A 
simplification can now be made in order to study objects and systems on a much smaller 
level (very small compared to Rf). Since curvature can be represented by the scale 
fluctuation, object-systems and their environments can be considered in flat space. The 
standard environment is then a uniform distribution of particles in flat space. In order to 
represent infinite plane wave functions the distributions can be considered to be infinite 
themselves (meaning they continue indefinitely) but the environment of the object-system 
can now be limited to a sphere of radius R^ containing Ni particles with these values 
chosen to give the correct value for a. This form of standard environment is called the 
‘planoid’ by Eddington (Eddington 1946). It is not a mathematical transformation but a 
separate distribution. When the scale and phase dimension are then used in place of 
curvature, as we’ve developed, the process of projecting spherical space onto flat space 
as developed in chapter six is now useful. Neither the uranoid nor the planoid are 
representative of the actual universe, but in treating object-systems locally the remote 
environment of the universe can be neglected just as we neglect the affects of the 
Andromeda galaxy when calculating gravitational interactions between the Sun and 
Earth. Local phenomena include the integrated effect of the universe in .
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Distinguishing between the curvature of space-time and the shape of the 
environment, the planoid is, like the uranoid, spherical. It is still Euclidean meaning 
space-time is still flat, but we simply consider a spherical volume of it (in fact space-time 
on a large-scale is flat and not curved as was thought for most of the twentieth century 
and yet we deal with spherical objects on a regular basis). Boundary conditions are 
accounted for in the extraordinary fluctuation that replaces curvature. As such we can 
now consider a zero-temperature planoid of radius i?i with A, particles. It is also 
assumed that the same units of mass and length are used in both the uranoid and the 
planoid so that the quantum-specified standards are the same in each meaning that cr must 
be the same in both. From the standard deviation of a given coordinate (and coordinate 
of the centroid) in the planoid, the (7 must have the following relation (thus relating 
planoid and uranoid values):
p2 p2
= (8.25)5Ai 4N
Using the new constants for the planoid the proper mass is:
(826)4
Rather, the proper mass in the uranoid given by (8.13) can be rewritten as:
6
tfln = (8.27)
Generally 7/j and R, are fixed by the ratio in (8.26), but for some applications it is 
necessary to fix each separately and this process creates the ‘special planoid’ that I will 
introduce presently.
Interchange for Extracules
Averaging over the volume of the planoid with r being the distance from its centre and 
introducing the mass-constant p  = mo/136 for an intracule, (8.26) can be written as:
= (Ps = i^/n)> (8.28)
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where is the mass of a V3 extracule. Physically if the V2 particle has half-quantum of 
angular momentum about the .sth planoid extracule then p, in (8.28) is the corresponding 
linear momentum. If these particles are the extracules of the planoid then (8.28) is a 
single particle in an assemblage of similar particles allowing rigid-field theory to be used. 
If a Vj, particle makes a transition to a state of momentum p^, Py, and p^ then its energy is
given as E^=m^ + (^pl + Py + . Substituting (8.28) into this gives:
^ 3  = (p? + R2 + p I + Pz)/'^P  ■ (8.29)
This is interpreted as eliminating the initial energy in the form of rest mass thus making 
the entire energy due to the transition of a system with ~N^ + 3 degrees of freedom. All
degrees of freedom except for the last three are covered by the standard planoid and so 
the final three are the only observables.
Here Eddington gets a bit lost in speculation. The initial or rest mass m3 is really 
energy as demonstrated by (8.29) and he describes it as arising from the 1/3 extracule 
having a half-quantum angular momentum about every other extracule in the assemblage 
of the planoid. But the particles are all at rest so the momentum must be extra-spatial and 
the half-quantum value represents interchange circulation (Eddington 1946). His 
complicated explanation for this phenomenon boils down to the idea that since only the 
three momenta p^, Py, and p^ are observable the mass is m3 and the particle is a V .^ 
Everything else is accounted for in the standard planoid, but the interchange circulation 
essentially is a fancy way of saying that the extracules can randomly interchange with 
each other. This is yet another way of accounting for curvature: the resultant energy 
produced by the constant interchange of the object-particle under consideration with the 
other particles in the planoid. In the exclusion interpretation, particles force each other to 
be individuals at differing energy levels while in this interpretation these same particles 
constantly interchange with each other producing the same total energy that the exclusion 
interpretation does. Eddington puts off a more detailed explanation of each until 
developing his E-number theory in the latter half of Fundamental Theory. At this point 
the topic begins to stray from the fundamental foundational issues of interest here and 
thus I will not discuss them. However, an analysis of Eddington’s E-number theory is in 
the works.
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Modifications to the Planoid
The special planoid mentioned above is a cross between the planoid and the uranoid that 
employs the convention N i= N  and R, = Rq but retains the sub-threshold constant hi. 
Particles are no longer V3 particles, rather they are V4. From (8.25) we have:
a f  = R ^ l5 N ,= R ^ /5 N  = ^<j^. (8.30)
Combining (8.30) with (8 .8 ) the new weight constant is:
2C7i
h
2(7 C7. (8.31)5 / 5
In the case of the special planoid the standards for lengths and masses (energies) are no 
longer their usual values since they depend directly on (7 and W respectively. Equations 
(8.30) and (8.31) provide a direct transformation for each. The length transformation can 
be eliminated (changed to a 1:1 ratio) if (8.30) is applied to R^  assuming the same number 
of particles is contained in the uranoid and planoid.
The special planoid is used in the analysis of the exclusion principle, Dirac’s 
negative energy states, and the derivation of the proper mass from exclusion theory, 
among other things. Eddington’s primary argument in favour of the special planoid is 
that it introduces the factor -f rather than the -  in the standard uranoid. The usefulness 
of this is evident in the selection of top particles that give the same change of density as 
the stabilisation of scale that then transforms a V4 particle into a Vj particle. This, he 
claims, results from transforming from a flat planoid to a curved uranoid with a 
stabilisation of scale (thus reducing the multiplicity from 4 to 3). Unfortunately, at this 
point, it feels a bit like Eddington is simply playing with numbers, adjusting formulae in 
order to produce the desired result. His physical justification breaks down to pure 
mathematical manipulation. His motivation likely lies in his desire to maintain a 
multiplicity of 4 that would keep the scale free from stabilisation since his version of 
exclusion considers only the three spatial momenta as classifying state characteristics 
(thus a multiplicity of 3) and his solution for the mass in extracule interchange produces 
an m3. The special planoid allows him to accept these results while at the same time
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keeping his scale unfixed. It is a process all too familiar with Eddington -  results arrived 
at from two different vantage points are tantalizingly close and thus a fudge factor (or, in 
many cases, an entire fudge theory) is introduced to connect the two. He clearly does this 
numerous times to convert between 136 and 137 since the former is a natural number that 
arises in many dimensional considerations while 137 is the approximation of the fine- 
structure constant. I would conclude from this that Eddington did not believe in 
coincidences nor did he believe in artificially difficult processes (although he seems 
strongly in favour of artificially simple ones).
Some Remaining Energy Issues
The electron-proton and extracule-intracule two-particle problems have both been 
analyzed so far. In both situations all the interactions considered (which in Eddington’s 
case is only gravity and electromagnetism) were attractive. But how could the developed 
version of this theory be applied to particles of like charge? If the system consists solely 
of two like char ges, they become the source of an extended electric field that presumably 
induces opposite charges somewhere else in the environment. In terms of generally 
neutral systems of the type thusfar considered, they technically form an incomplete half 
of a four-particle system. For proton-electron systems the Coulomb of interchange 
energy has been calculated but it would be difficult to calculate this for a proton-proton 
system (or electron-electron system -  for simplicity we will simply consider a proton- 
proton system here). One can deduce the result, however, from the proton-electron 
results.
A charged particle is said to have no Coulomb energy in a neutral environment 
since Coulomb energy is really interchange energy and there would be nothing for the 
particle to interchange with. The mutual energy is then purely mechanical by definition. 
Obviously equal distributions of positively and negatively charged particles produce 
neutral matter so for all values of r the proton-proton electrical energy should be equal 
and opposite to the proton-electron energy. This is easily verified using the well-known 
classical equation for Coulomb (electrical) potential energy. Since the proton-electron 
energy is proportional to -e ^ fr  the proton-proton system will be proportional to e ^Ir .
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When placed in a neutral environment a charge of - l e  is induced in the environment. If 
the system is treated as isolated a term must be introduced into the Hamiltonian in order 
to represent the ‘ignored’ induced charges and Eddington equates this term with the 
Debye-Hückel energy that frequently appears in astrophysical (plasma), high-energy 
(Yukawa potential), and solid-state (Thomas-Fermi potential) situations (see footnote 
Liboff 1998, p. 804). In treating an object-system in the standard uranoid it is simply the 
non-Coulombian energy.
As I have shown Eddington made the assumption that charge was a frame- 
dependant quantity and so the classical concept of charge is referred to as relativity 
charge. These charges induce opposite charges in the environment. However, quantum 
charges, which are not considered frame-dependent quantities, are simply superimposed 
on a rigid environment. This is the analysis used in the present formulation.
Consider, then, a single proton as an object-system that is superimposed on an 
undisturbed uranoid containing \ N  protons and \ N  electrons. If V is the volume of the
uranoid and each particle has a probability dVIV of being in some volume element dV  the 
mutual energy of the proton and the uranoid is:
J_
y
and:
- \ E d V  = - a  (8.32)
^ \ E d V  = a  + B lV  (8.33)
for a proton-proton where B is a constant. The total mutual energy for the proton object- 
particle and the uranoid is then B/V  = -Q  = where the last part of the
equality results from the consideration of the interchange of extracules and the 4/3 
conversion factor for moving from a planoid to normal measure. Since the volume is 
V = -f/rRo the constant R is:
B = - ( j ) '  4ne^ R^/A = - ( j ) '  . (8.34)
Equation (8.33) can be rewriting in terms of a Dirac delta function multiplying B.
Consider then that this proton exists in a large assemblage of indistinguishable 
protons and one of these other protons is referenced as the origin (and remember that this
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is Eddington’s definition of indistinguishability). Due to their indistinguishable nature 
there is a probability that any of them could be that origin. Various coordinate 
transformations along with (8.34) provide the equation for the energy distribution in a 
uranoid if the origin is randomly placed in one of the indistinguishable protons:
where dVIV is the probability distribution of the carrier, -  O ' is the amount of
energy carried, B = - 2 0 y / N  , and O ' = (l -  2 /V ) 0 . The caiiiers are quantum protons
meaning that they are superimposed on the neutral background environment and have a 
uniform distribution. Ultimately, then, the energy of a quantum proton in the field of 
another proton that is taken as an indistinguishable origin in an assemblage of protons in 
a uranoid contains the energy BR(r') as well as the normal Coulomb energy. One final 
coordinate transformation is required to restore the original frame and, given the singular 
point r ' = 0 that corresponds to a Gaussian probability distribution in a relative 
coordinate frame we have:
= (8.35)
Combining (8.35) and (8.34) the final result for the non-Coulomb portion of the energy
is:
i  _2
B 5(r') = - | —  — . (8.36)\ 3 7 t J  (7
Equation (8.33) can be rewritten as simply:
E  = eV r + B ôir') = e^jr -  ( — Y . (8.37)\ 3 n )  a
Integrating (8.37) with respect to r yields the modified form of Coulomb’s law that I 
argued was necessary from a statistical argument for the identification of exclusion with 
Coulomb repulsion.
The explanation for (8.37) is that when a system of two like charges is treated as a 
superposition on an undisturbed environment the energy has to be adjusted to compensate 
for not including the induced charges. So the additional term takes the place of the 
induced charges to some degree. The Dirac delta function appears to account for the fact
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that this term is zero when there is no separation. This is because the two protons are 
then physically touching and can now be considered to be a single +2e charge that then 
induces a -2e  charge in the usual way as in a proton-electron system.
The result for (8.36) is modified in some situations by adding a multiplicity 
factor. Basically the question becomes, where in this process are quantum protons 
substituted for classical protons? This point is where the non-Coulomb energy term is 
added. Eddington reasons that this point is the point at which the mass of the hydrocule 
is Wo meaning that the adjustment can be made directly in the special planoid where this 
is the mass of top particles. Comparison particles in this situation come in two types: 
those that include the extra energy term and those that don’t. Remember that this 
additional energy term simply allows the normal four-particle system of two proton- 
electron pairs to be simplified to a two-particle system of a single proton-proton pair. 
The adjustment of the mass energy is determined by manipulating (6.28) something that 
will be studied further in the next chapter. Ultimately, however, Eddington finds the 
standar d deviation from the Rydberg constant and combines this to find the multiplicity 
for the non-Coulomb energy term, k  = 1.9208 x 10"'^ cm . This is on the order of the 
range nuclear forces which is precisely what should be found by any good quantum field 
theory (see the end of chapter five).
We are now ready to apply Eddington’s theory to several other situations where 
we will find many curious numerical results that led to its labelling as 
‘cosmonumerology.’ In reality, no mystical notions were ever put forward in the theory. 
It simply was of a form that derived numerous physical constants. Eddington’s 
philosophical reasoning for this is discussed in chapter three but it still leaves as 
unanswered the question of whether or not the theory was subconsciously (not likely 
consciously) designed to be this way.
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IX
Numerical Considerations and Applications
The striking numerical coincidences (or planned results, depending on interpretation) in 
Fundamental Theory begin early with Eddington’s calculation of the range of nuclear 
forces and the recession of the galaxies. The results continue to be peppered throughout 
the work as the theory becomes more developed and opens new avenues for 
consideration. Some results are definitely striking and some definitely appear artificial. 
Others clearly are pure coincidences.
Nuclear Forces and Galactic Recession
The eaiiiest numerical results produced in Fundamental Theory appear very early in his 
consideration of the range of nuclear forces and the recession of the galaxies. I showed 
in chapter five how, simply through an application of probabilistic methods, Eddington 
arrived at the following equations in terms of Rq and N\
i?„/Af = Gm,,/;rc" = 3 .95x10““ cm and R„/Vjv = *  = 1.921 x lO ‘‘= cm . (9.1) 
The latter, as I ’ve shown, is in clear agreement with values calculated by Yukawa and 
others. This is potentially a striking result as it links the range of nuclear forces with 
cosmological parameters. Eddington’s arrival at it arises simply through the basic 
foundations of the theory: the uncertainty in the physical origin, fluctuations in the scale, 
and the application to spherical space. In addition, as a bedrock of his thinking, 
Eddington adopts a truly relativistic viewpoint where coordinates and other 
characteristics are quantities that are solely relative to other physical quantities and not to 
random, observer-based quantities. Essentially he establishes early on the concept of 
comparison particles.
The equations in (9.1) provide a system for uniquely determining N  and Rq and 
thus, Rq can be applied to the speed of recession of the galaxies (as derived by George
Lemaitre (1894 -  1966)), Vq = c j . The result of applying (9.1) then gives Vq =
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572.4 km/slMPc. At the time Eddington was reasonably close to the experimentally 
determined value of Vq = 560 km/slMPc given by Hubble and Humason (Eddington 
1946). This parameter, now known as the dimensionless Hubble parameter, is actually a 
function of the Hubble constant, Hq\
h -  Ho/100km/s • M Pc . (9.2)
This is, of course, not to be confused with Planck’s constant. The notation used here is 
standard in current texts. Its value now ranges from 50 to 100 with a best estimate being 
around 72 (see any modern cosmology text such as Peacock 1999). The first part of (9.1) 
is also (5.18). It appears from this that Eddington’s results would have to depend on the 
values for the parameters in (5.18) and since G, m^, and c are not appreciably different 
than they were in the 1940s, the new value for N  would need to produce the proper value 
for R q. Logically (9.1) would have to be a pair of internally consistent simultaneous 
equations -  i.e. changing N  would have to change Rq since if their definitions are identical 
in both parts of (9.1) simple mathematics requires the relationship to hold. Just for the 
sake of argument let’s verify this with current values.
Current values for N  are most frequently given as being on the order of 10®° -  
10®^ , though there are estimates that range as high as 10'^° -  10'®°. Using these values 
with the second part of (9.1), values for Vq would range from a high of 282 to a low on 
the order of 1 0"'®, which certainly encompasses the currently accepted values for h.
Using the ‘best estimate’ value of 72 for h (or Vq in Eddington’s notation) and knowing 
that the range of nuclear forces, k, has not changed, we find N  to be on the order of 10®', 
which is well within the more conservatively accepted range of 10®° -  10®^ . Using these 
values for Rq and A in (5.18) produces a value of 4.863 X lO'^'^cw -  still tantalizingly 
close to the known value of 3.95 x 10“^ ®cw . So, even when adjusted to include currently 
accepted values of h the relationship still holds -  (9.1) appears to be more than a simple 
coincidence. The radius of the universe and the number of protons and electrons (and 
neutrons) in the universe appear to combine to give a relation between macroscopic 
cosmological quantities and microscopic nuclear quantities. On the other hand, since the 
universe is expanding and thus Rq is changing, this implies N  is continually growing 
which implies continuous matter creation, a hallmark of steady state theories. However,
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he solves the matter creation problem simply by changing the datum thus shuffling the 
Dirac sea a bit as I’ve described -  the conservation laws still hold.
The Proton-Electron Mass Ratio
One of the most studied results in Fundamental Theory was his derivation of the mass 
ratio of the proton to the electron. This particular discussion arises out of the discussion 
of external and internal paiticles. Working from equation (7.2) the total particle energy 
for the atom is E = mg + l ^ p  where p ^ m ^ / k -  mo/136. In the external/internal 
treatment the rest energy of the internal particle is not p  (the mass of the internal particle) 
but, rather, zero which is a highly useful result. The energy, E, then can be decomposed 
into its constituent pieces labelled:
E  ^= mo, Ei = p'^l2p  (9.3)
where the subscript e is for the external particle and the subscript i is for the internal 
particle. Rather than a single energy tensor now applying to the atom as a whole, the 
external and internal particles now have their own energy tensors that reduce their 
multiplicities from 136 to 10 (the standard carrier now is broken into two Vjo’s which 
are now carriers of vectors rather than tensors -  the vector quantity here is the 
momentum). The change in multiplicity does not affect the transition energy thus leaving
El unchanged. The energy of the external particle is now E  ^= Mj where Mj = — mo.
For the internal particle p  = -^mQ. If this given definition is accepted as a potential 
solution for the hydrogen atom the ratio of the mass of the external particle to that of the 
internal particle is:
= — = 1849.6. (9.4)
'  10
If the masses of the proton and electron are, respectively, m  ^and m,, (7.2) gives 
m + m  ^= Mj and m^m^ -  M ^p . The proton and electron masses then become the roots
of the quadratic equation -  mMj + M^p = 0  where m is the generic variable that gives 
both mp and m^ . However, given = -^m^ and p ^ - ^ m ^ ,  this becomes:
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f  136 ^ /136 V  1 ^m - m  ——/«o +  Wq  m» = lOm^ -  136mmo + = 0 . (9.5)V 10  7  1 10  7 U 3 6  J " “
Solving this equation gives the following slightly different result:
m„772 = —  = 1847.6 . (9.6)
All Eddington is really doing here is showing that the ratio provided by the 
external/internal particle method (9.4) is roughly the same as that provided by taking the 
proton and electron (9.6), which simply means the external/internal particle 
representation looks physically about the same. There is nothing terribly unusual about 
anything Eddington has done here. Similar results can be derived from the treatments 
given in any standard physics text. Part of the reason for this is that the “reduced mass p  
differs from the electron mass by very little in the hydrogen atom” (Gasiorowicz 1996, p. 
280). Since the mass of the hydrogen atom as a whole differs very little from the mass of 
a proton (since the electron is so small in comparison) it stands to reason the ratio of the 
mass of the atom (external particle) to the reduced mass (internal particle) should be 
roughly the same as the mass ratio of the proton and the electron. It is curious, then, that 
historians and physicists have jumped on this particular result as being 
cosmonumerological. The reasoning he employed leading to (9.5), particularly in regard 
to the various particle multiplicities, is unusual, but since it is purely mathematical it is 
not physically disprovable, per se. The result is unremarkable. As such all Eddington 
has done is devise a new way of mathematically describing the hydrogen atom that 
experimentally yields the correct results. Certainly by Ockham’s Razor one could 
eliminate Eddington’s theory when compared to others simply by its complicated nature. 
But there have been other theories far more complicated, bold, and completely incorrect, 
that did not receive as much bad press (though this is a purely anecdotal observation).
However, Eddington does take this a step further, as is his trademark. He 
interprets (9.4) as being the more experimentally direct value where (9.6) is the listed 
value. Masses given by (9.5) are then referred to as the ‘standard masses’ of the proton 
and the electron. When splitting his theory into electrical and mechanical components 
via the transition from to ^137 particles he finds a different ratio. The first strictly 
Eddingtonian step taken here is in his definition of the Rydberg constant:
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i f  1 y  pc
iKfl (9.7)2 U 3 7
A 1935 edition of Pauling and Wilson’s Introduction to Quantum Mechanics contains the 
following expression:
2 . . 4
R = (9-8)h c
(Pauling and Wilson 1935, p. 41). When comparing this to (9.7) there are two items to 
notice here. First, he substitutes the exact value of 1/137 in for the fine-structure constant 
though it is known from experiment to be closer to 1/137.037. Second, in performing the 
algebra to transform (9.8) to (9.7) (maintaining, for the sake of aigument, Eddington’s 
value for the fine-structure constant) one ends up with an extra e  ^in the numerator:
Eddington specifically excluded this term, saying that the derivation in Fundamental 
Theory leads directly to (9.7) “there being no occasion to introduce e  ^except as an 
abbreviation for /ic/137 ” (Eddington 1946, p. 58). With that single sentence, appearing 
in parentheses in the text, he manages to gloss over a not-so-trivial point.
In an early diaft of Fundamental Theory Eddington does little to clear up this 
vague statement, but does describe why it is necessary:
By accepting [9.7] as the formula for the experimentally 
determined Rydberg constant, we tie the resulting value of 
mjm^ to a system that is certainly not B [see discussion of 
systems A  and B in chapter seven, beginning p. 160]. The 
transformation from B to the observational system 
conesponds to the recognition in classical theory of an e.m. 
aether as part of the environment of every object-system 
(Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p. 139).
Focusing first on the reasoning behind his definition of the Rydberg constant, we find 
that he seeks to tie the ratio mjm^ to an experimentally determinable quantity. I am about
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to demonstrate that this version of that ratio distinguishes the standard masses as given in 
(9.6) from what are known as the ‘current masses.’ The intent is admirable but given that 
he begins the derivation with (9.7) he has left a gaping hole in the proof -  how exactly 
can be eliminated. There is nothing else in any early draft that further elucidates this 
move.
Continuing, then, under the assumption that (9.7) is correct, the empirical 
Rydberg constant, 9t, is measured according to his assumptions in system A  which is the 
standai'd particle uranoid with bound intracules. The formula, however, is obtained from 
the theory of free intracules that corresponds to system B, a hydrocule uranoid with free 
intracules. How does Eddington, then, define an observational system exactly?
We can now give a formal definition of the ‘observational 
system ’ ... masses of neutral particles are molarly 
[macroscopically or relativistically] controlled, and 
quantum masses or energies optically controlled. We 
therefore define the observational system to be that in 
which these two conditions are satisfied simultaneously 
(Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p. 139).
The empirical Rydberg constant, then, must account for the conversion factors used in 
transforming between systems A and B. It is given as:
=  —  2 ^  ^ ^ M .  (9.10)27th137 J
where p  = P a * I have already given several instances where P is used in
converting between systems A and B. Recall that its value is 137/136 and it represents 
the addition of an extra degree of freedom in the intracule to account for the Coulomb 
energy contained within it. It is not purely an invention of Eddington’s (c.f. Bond 1934) 
but is employed far more liberally by him than anyone else. In (9.10) p^  ^is the ‘current 
mass’ of the intracule (Eddington 1946). He gives this as the observed reduced mass
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value. Unlike intracules, extracules transform their masses as measured densities: 
Mjg = PMiji. Equation (9.1) then becomes:
m
The quadiatic (9.5) becomes:
=p- M,
J  A V, A /s
136 •/I"  = 1838.34. (9.11)
lOm^ — 136mmo + = 0 (9.12)
Solving this yields:
m
77' = - ^  = 1836.34. (9.13)
Masses determined in this way are referred to as ‘current masses’ for the proton and 
electron and are distinguished from the standard masses derived above. Again, the 
difference between the values is a result of which system one is investigating -  the 
observational system or the nearly objective theoretical system. Once again he is taking 
into account the problem of interference from the observer and the difference here is that 
(9.11) and (9.13) account for the transition between systems A  and B  (which amounts to 
considering the observational system to be subjective and the theoretical system nearly 
objective) while (9.4) and (9.6) do not.
Eddington actually proceeds to correct (9.11) which is the ‘corrected’ observed 
value. Following on the preceding quote from Slater he determines that the masses of 
extracules are molarly controlled while the masses of intracules are spectroscopically 
(optically) controlled. The Faraday constant for hydrogen Z - e !  m,^c can be found by 
measuring the charge that results from the electrolysis of a known mass of water. Given 
that h -  \31e^lc  = 1373^m^c. Substituting this into (9.10) gives:
jU^  = 4 ; r . l3 7 % " m ; .  (9.14)
A correction must be made to this since the definition of the Faraday constant assumes 
that e is molarly defined. Eddington finds that the value in quantum theory is slightly 
different and, as such, when converting from a quantum system B to a molar system B'
lengths and times are multiplied by . Or one could instead convert from a quantum 
system A to a molar system B' using p ~ . Note that the origin of all the exponents for p
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is simple dimensional analysis and the corrections it provides are very small. Hence even 
without this correction factor Eddington’s theory would still be surprisingly close to 
observed values.
Similar conversion factors are found for e, h, and 3 . Using accepted 
observational data from 1942 for these constants, Eddington makes the proper corrections 
to aiTive at an observed value of 1838.56 ± 0.51 for the extracule/intracule mass ratio. 
Converting this to a proton/electron mass ratio gives 1836.56 ± 0.51 which is 
considerably closer to the value given in (9.13) further supporting Eddington’s use of the 
extracule/intracule model in place of the proton/electron model. Using the ratios of the 
Rydberg constants for deuterium and hydrogen and the ratio of the atomic weights, both 
of which can be determined experimentally from mass-spectroscopic methods, a ratio of 
1836.14 ± 0.22 is obtained. Numerous other alternative methods for determining the 
various ratios of these physical constants are explored by Eddington, all with the same 
theme: begin with a set of measurements and move through corrections to see how close 
the data comes to (9.13).
A Brief Note on the Aether
The quote on page 197 justifying the Rydberg constant opens yet another Pandora’s Box, 
however: he clearly advocates for an aether. He actually prefaces the above quote with 
the following:
Although separation of mechanical and electrical energies 
is important ... for analytical treatment, they are not 
separated in anything that the observer handles -  or 
supposes he handles. The elementary particles, protons and 
electrons, carry bo th electrical and m echan ical 
characteristics; the aether is a carrier of electrical and 
gravitational waves (Eddington as quoted in Slater 1957, p.
139X
218
It is almost unfathomable that so strong a supporter of relativity would also support an 
idea whose debunking actually led to the development of relativity. This quote is not an 
anomaly, either. In a 1932 letter to Larmor (see chapter six, p. 112) he introduces an 
‘aether displacement’ to represent a link between an electron and its environment. I have 
previously ai'gued that the uranoid was his manifestation of the aether (Durham 2003b). 
However, further investigations have led me to change my view on this. The uranoid is a 
standai'dized environment and can be made up of not just space-time itself but also other 
particles in a large assemblage, as I ’ve akeady shown. Eddington’s use of the aether 
most likely stems from the fact that he recognized space-time as quantisable (essentially 
foreshadowing the graviton). Since light travels on geodesics in space-time and 
gravitational waves are propagated through the ‘fabric’ of space-time, it is well-known 
that space-time has some sort of structure to it. Eddington recognized this structural 
aspect and applied the term ‘aether’ to it. His definition of the aether, then, was not 
necessarily the same as the classical definition. However, as I have previously stated (see 
p. 112), he did not feel this aether was necessarily a field. He obviously struggled with 
exactly what it was, physically, though it can be easily described as the ‘fabric’ of space­
time. But just what is the fabric of space-time? I will leave that for quantum gravity to 
answer.^® Suffice it to say, Eddington’s use of the term ‘aether’ was not in keeping with 
its classical use, but, nonetheless, demonstrated a belief in a structural vacuum.'^*
The Fine-Structure Constant
Unlike most other physical constants given in Fundamental Theory the fine-stiucture 
constant is not derived from any fkst principles, rather, it is assumed to be a first 
principle which seems to violate, again, the deductive, non-arbitrary spirit of the theory.
It could even be said to be a stabilised quantity given as 1/137. In fact, Eddington would
Steven French has pointed me to a PliD thesis currently being written by Dean Rickies at the University 
of Leeds as being an excellent source for a discussion of this topic.
The aether concept is still debated and it has been clear for several decades that (from quantum field 
theory) the vacuum has an energy of its own and particles can spontaneously pop into existence (and 
subsequently annihilate one another) in vacuum. The aether is, in fact, still discussed in the literature (see 
Wilczek 1999).
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say it is fixed by the theory -  its value is not derivable, per se, but the given value is the 
only one that works within the theory. This seems to be a rather odd conclusion and one 
cannot help but speculate that he was driven to force this to be true by the oddly 
coincidental closeness of 136 and 137. In deference to Eddington, I have already 
mentioned that the ratio 137/136 was not his own discovery (see Bond 1934 - p i s  called 
the Bond factor). Nonetheless, as I will show, finding a need for a multiplicity of 137 in 
many situations results in his definition of the fine-structure constant as 1/137.
Eddington’s own explanation for the value of the fine-structure constant derives 
from the addition of the interchange energy that I outlined in chapter seven. The internal 
wavefunctions of the hydrogen atom imply half-integer spin in any plane of rotation. But 
viewing this relativistically in the sense that there are no preferred frames of reference, 
the implied (or rather applied) frame of reference introduces chirality into the problem -  
either particle could have right-handed or left-handed spin. The atom does not naturally 
possess any such preference since a relativistic transformation can easily flip right-to-left 
and vice versa. The only requirement is that the two particles remain in the same 
orientation relative to each other. This is just another way to explain Eddington’s view 
that spin is a frame-dependant quantity.
Spin, then, is formally added in order to remain consistent within our own 
analytical system. In essence we’re constrained by our own subjective perspective that 
forces chirality into our observations. Since in the hydrogen atom, regardless of how it is 
viewed (extracule/intracule or proton/electron) the particles each contribute half-integer 
spin. If these spins are in the same direction the entire atom contains integer spin. If they 
are in the opposite direction the entire atom contains zero spin, though Eddington does 
not mention the zero spin situation. Since there is an interchange circulation -  a 
circulation due to the constant interchanging of indistinguishable particles in the planoid 
-  the interchange energy can be interpreted as being provided by the spin. Interchange is 
really a quantum number, then, and since Eddington equates it with the Coulomb energy, 
then the Coulomb energy must also be the same quantum number. The interchange 
circulation arises for the same reason -  our limited viewpoint -  and that is the real reason 
it can be related to spin. So interchange angular momentum is a full quantum, % (or zero) 
rather than a half-integer quantity. If this system is analyzed in rigid coordinates, the
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rigid coordinate time is k'  ^ times the Galilean time. In working with interchange energy, 
which is just Coulomb energy, the multiplicity is taken to be 137. The interchange 
angular momentum provides a linear momentum to the intracule of filr that appears in an 
extra-spatial dimension that is normal to r. If this extra-spatial dimension is actually the 
time dimension in normal (3 + 1) space-time then the linear momentum reduces to the 
Galilean coordinate representation h/kr = ^ /137 r. Given that the classical electron
radius is given by m c^ , we can write E  = mc^ = . Dividing through by c
gives me = e^/crQ. Using Eddington’s system of natural units this has the same units as 
Ti/kr = ^ /137 r. Setting them equal to each other and rearranging with the knowledge 
that I%c = a  is the fine-structure constant, we find:
1 e"= —  = (%. (9.15)137 he
Eddington’s theory thus requires the fine-structure constant be the inverse of 137 due to 
the correction factor introduced in moving from rigid to Galilean coordinates in an 
intracule. The inverse of the fine-structure constant then appears as the multiplicity of an 
intracule (V137) rather than a coincidental /:+  1 relation to a standard carrier (V’ljg), In this 
way he also directly relates it to electrical situations since it represents the mechanical 
degrees of freedom plus an extra degree of freedom from the Coulomb (interchange) 
energy contained within the intracule representation. In modern interpretations, the fine- 
structure constant is the coupling constant for electromagnetism meaning it measures the 
strength of the electromagnetic interaction. So Eddington is at least consistent in that he 
essentially finds the same thing -  it is produced because the energy of the bound electron 
and proton in the intracule that produces an extra degree of freedom leading directly to 
the fine structure constant happens to be the Coulomb energy.
Non-Coulombian Energy
I ended the previous chapter with a discussion of the non-Coulomb energy term that 
appears when like charges interact. A deeper analysis leads to some additional numerical 
results. One method that I introduced for adding protons and electrons to the universe
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involved taking the hydrocule mass as a comparison particle. As such protons and 
electrons are then individually added to the environment together with their comparison 
holes. Comparison particles will then consist of an equal number of two different types: 
those that have the additional non-Coulomb energy and those that don’t. Eddington 
associates those with the additional energy with protons and those without it with 
electrons. When a proton is introduced its comparison hole eliminates a comparison 
particle that has the additional energy term whereas the electron’s comparison hole 
eliminates a comparison particle without the extra energy term. The comparison hole is 
simply the regular hole created by exciting the proton to an energy level above the datum. 
The additional energy term actually adds a corrective element to the energy of a proton,
nip assuming its rest energy is mg: [mpjmQ^B8{r' ) . Again the non-Coulombian energy is
given as an adjustment to the initial energy that simplifies a four-particle system to a two- 
particle system. It appears on the same footing as a particle’s rest mass, which is an 
adjustment that simplifies 2l \ N  -particle system to a one particle system. Basically it
accounts for the larger mass of the proton (or the difference between the masses of the 
proton and the electron). Another way of looking at this is to say that since there is 
technically only one mathematical form for comparison particles regardless of whether or 
not the original particle is an electron or a proton. Since these comparison particles, if 
they are internal, must contain only a single variate (the scale uncertainty) then the 
difference in the mass of the proton has to be accounted for somewhere. As such the 
excess mass supplied by the proton is converted to this non-Coulomb energy term in the 
comparison particle. But then why does this non-Coulomb energy have anything to do 
with charge at all? There is no clear explanation for this in the texts, in any of the early 
drafts, or in Relativity Theory o f Protons and Electrons (1936).
Nonetheless (8.36) can have the factor added to it to give:
f  16 tn
This is then the corrected non-Coulomb energy of two protons. Since we know that 
/: = 2 ct = 7?g / ,  if we define:
222
g'
Mq a
(9.16) can be rewritten as:
£ „ = - A ê- '’/*“ (9.17)
where the subscript nc indicates that this is the non-Coulomb energy term. Using the 
Rydberg constant and previously described methods to determine the values for k and a  
the value for A is found to be 52.0Im^c  ^and A is called the nucleai-energy constant. Both 
k, interpreted here as the range of nuclear forces, and A, which is understood to be an 
optically (spectroscopically) controlled energy, are found experimentally in proton- 
proton scattering experiments. The observed value given by Eddington is 52.26m^c^. 
Notice that this teim is negative indicating that it is an attractive energy. When combined 
with the normal Coulomb repulsion term one finds regions where the total energy and 
resultant force are attractive and repulsive. Naturally one could determine a ratio of the 
values of the Coulomb to non-Coulomb energy and Eddington gives its value as 15.20.
Despite his claim that the extra energy teim is only associated with proton 
comparison pai'ticles due to their larger mass, he applies the preceding argument to the 
scattering of electrons since this extra energy term also arises when there are like charges. 
Substituting the mass of the electron into (9.16) in place of the mass of the proton gives 
the ratio of Coulomb to non-Coulomb energy as very nearly unity with the same said for 
the related forces. As such the non-Coulomb energy is negligible for the electron. It is 
perhaps here that he rationalizes using the non-Coulomb energy term in both a mass 
situation and a charge situation. It actually does arise in any situation involving like 
charges, but because it can be equated with a rest mass it is negligible in the case of the 
comparatively tiny electron.
In a nutshell, Eddington is attempting to adjust the standard Coulomb interaction 
to account for anomalies experienced in scattering experiments. Of course, what he is 
presaging here without knowing it is the strong interaction. Why strong and not weak? 
He assumed that the standard Coulomb repulsion might possibly be overcome at high 
enough energies and some other interaction or energy would have to take over and 
produce the observed scattering. Electron-electron scattering was more predictable since
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electrons are fundamental particles, but because protons, unbeknownst to anyone in the 
early 40s, are made up of quarks and gluons, proton-proton scattering experiments 
contain anomalies not found in electron-electron scattering. So, in essence, he was trying 
to explain away effects we now usually attribute to the strong interaction (though the 
weak interaction also plays a role).
As I will discuss below, particles can be created and annihilated in the vacuum in 
Eddington’s theory just as in quantum field theory. This is as to be expected since 
Dirac’s equation essentially predicted antimatter as early as 1928, though the realization 
that the antielectron (positron) was the correct solution to these problems did not come 
until 1931 when Dirac formally introduced it as a new kind of particle (Kragh 1999). 
Eddington simply reinterprets Dirac’s negative energy sea. The direct link between this 
and an increasing N  is not explicitly discussed, however.
Newton’s Gravitational Constant
The preceding discussion of proton-proton scattering provides a way to determine 
Ro/yfN  . By measuring k one obtains Rq/^In  directly. Measuring A  then provides cr
which gives Rq/2-Jn  directly. It also possible to determine R ^/N  and Rq from 
observation. Later in Fundamental Theory Eddington gives a derivation of the value for 
N  that gives N = |  • 136 • 2^^. The principle formulae for these various quantities are 
then:
^ _ G m ^  (9.18)
N  nc
= (9.19)4 n  10 v20j  Incmf^
jV = j"136 2z*. C9.20)
Combining (9.18) and (9.19) with the fine-structure constant and Faraday’s constant 
gives:
G 136-137 (  9 y  nPl  
3 ' V  10 U o J  VÂ" (9.21)
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This then can be solved for G, which gives a value of 6.6665 x 10“^  which he claims is 
accurate to one part in five-thousand. Conversely, using an experimentally determined 
value for G will provide an alternative derivation for N  that does not require the far more 
complex derivation that is a result of Eddington’s E-number theory that is not discussed 
here. The physical interpretation of this is that the number of par ticles in the universe is 
determined by a ratio of locally measurable constants. Since he assumes that his later 
value of N  given by (9.20) is correct he then assumes that his value of G must be the 
correct one.
The force constant, then, which is the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces 
(interactions) between a proton and an election is given by:
where m l/lO  and was substituted into (9.21). This, of course, is known to be
an enormous number and is often calculated in introductory physics courses as an 
example of just how weak gravity is.
One further result Eddington immediately jumps to that could have been derived 
much earlier (see chapter five) is the relationship between limiting speed of recession of 
the galaxies and the range of nuclear forces. The recession velocity, which was
introduced before, is Vq -  c / . Since R^ = k-\fN we can write IcVq = c /V ÏN  “so 
that the recession-constant can be derived from the range-constant of nuclear forces, or 
vice-versa, with no other observational data except the velocity of light” (Eddington 
1946, p. 105). One more time the microscopic and macroscopic are linked but the point 
can now be better emphasized that macroscopic (molar) interactions ar e governed by 
gravity while microscopic (quantal) interactions are governed by electricity. In order to 
build the universe up from the very small to the very large there must be some transition 
region where the two interactions can be linked. This transition region is given by 
Eddington as being the scale-free theory that makes up the majority of the statistical 
portion of Fundamental Theory.
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Degenerate Matter
The final application of Eddington’s statistical theory that has yet to be discussed is the 
application of his work with exclusion to degenerate matter such as that contained within 
white-dwarf stars. The densities of such stars are tremendous. At such densities the 
electrons and protons (or nuclei) are in a constant state of collision. Separating carriers of 
electrical energy, Vi^j, from those of mechanical energy, is vastly different than 
anything as yet encountered, which has been mostly isolated two-particle systems 
separated into extracules and intracules.
Both mechanical and electrical systems include waves as a fundamental physical 
representation. In mechanical systems, waves include such forms as sound waves, waves 
on a string, etc. In electrical systems, waves include changes of electric polarisation 
(with the resulting currents) and various magnetic effects. For the most part the electrical 
and mechanical aspects are independent. However, if the amplitudes of the various 
waves are not infinitesimal, cross-terms arise that create an energy equilibrium between 
the two forms. Consider, for instance, a system at non-zero temperature. Since the 
temperature is non-zero there must be a field of radiation that can be determined by 
Planck’s law. This field induces electrical waves in the material. But, there is a slow 
transfer of energy from the field to the material that can induce mechanical waves in the 
system (by adding kinetic energy).
Now comes the Eddingtonian part. If the system is dropped to zero-temperature 
the waves do not vanish since uncertainty predicts that there isn’t necessarily perfect 
uniformity at zero-temperature, i.e. uncertainty really says that exactly zero-temperature 
uranoids (no motion) are impossible. As such there are residual fluctuations resulting 
purely from the uncertainty principle. This idea is not so far fetched, actually. As Zee 
tells us straight off, “In quantum mechanics the uncertainty principle tells us that the 
energy can fluctuate wildly over a small interval of time” (Zee 2003, p. 3) and since 
relativity tells us energy and mass can be converted into each other, the wildly fluctuating 
energy can turn into mass. These fluctuations exist in the vacuum and particles pop into 
and out of existence from the vacuum itself. Ignoring, for a moment, the cosmic 
microwave background radiation (which, at 2.9 K, is pretty close to zero anyway), the
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vacuum is basically a zero-temperature system. As I’ve described before, Eddington 
explained the possibility of the production of particles (and even antiparticles) as 
excitations in the Dirac sea, which is simply a group of particles below a subjective 
datum. Where do these particles receive the energy necessary to excite them into 
existence? The answer is, quite simply, the random zero-temperature fluctuations 
produced by uncertainty. Eddington’s study of degenerate matter is actually an attempt 
to determine the energy and pressure of the residual waves or fluctuations. This is the 
same reason given by quantum field theory in the union of special relativity and quantum 
mechanics.
Microscopically the polarisation provides a distribution function of electrical 
coordinates while macroscopically displacements produced as a result of sound waves 
provide a distribution function of mechanical coordinates. The electrical coordinates are 
provided by doublets and thus the state of the material is described by probability 
distributions of electrical coordinates of unidentified doublets in a large assemblage and 
the mechanical coordinates of an unidentified neutral particle. In order for this 
description to work the system must be in statistical equilibrium so that the fluctuations 
are of a completely random nature.
Now calling on the methods developed for transforming two-particle systems 
where a proton and electron, for instance, are replaced by an extracule and an intracule, 
we can assume that the material actually consists of a superposition of positively and 
negatively charged matter and thus, rather than consider the mechanical and electrical 
waves sepaiately, we can bind them together and rather consider two different wave 
types: displacement of positively charged matter and displacement of negatively charged 
matter. Electrical waves can be described by these two wave types in opposite phase 
while mechanical wave can be described by these two wave types in the same phase. 
Microscopically the state of a material is described by a probability distribution of the 
displacement of an unidentified positively charged particle and a probability distribution 
of the displacement of a negatively charged particle. Now as the mechanical and 
electrical waves are laigely independent, these two new wave types actually have intense 
interaction since they represent charged particles. In terms of the wave descriptions, 
whenever an electron and proton collide, energy is transferred from one to the other
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meaning energy can be transferred from one wave type to the other. The entire energy 
can be said to have passed from one wave type (system) to the other when each particle 
in one type has had at least one collision and thus the relaxation time is roughly the time 
between collisions. But in degenerate matter, the protons and electrons are in a constant 
state of collision and so neither wave type can be said to exist separately even for a brief 
moment, though at low (really mid) densities there comes a transition point where they 
can be treated separately using formulae similar to the two-particle transformation.
The electrical coordinates are given by and the mechanical coordinates are 
given by and, since we’re using the second set of wave types (displacement of
positive and negative charges) each particle has both electrical and mechanical 
coordinates. These coordinates have the conjugate momenta and . Wavefunctions
(in the quantum sense) are then obtained in electrical and mechanical space and thus the 
exclusion principle is then applied: there are no more than two particles per cell of 
ÇCT -space and not more than two particles per cell of XP-space. The latter substitutes 
for gravitation and inertia and is concealed in the rest masses of the extracules. As such 
the former is the only form of exclusion that is necessarily dealt with. The doublets 
mentioned above turn out to be intracules and we can reanalyze the matter as being 
extracules and intracules -  again a tie to the two-particle transformation. Also, the only 
matter considered here is hydrogen since a far more complex transformation is required 
for other elements since we’re no longer working in the two-particle paradigm.
The average energy per intracule is E - \ E  where E  is given by (8.18). This 
introduces another definition of scale uncertainty as a particle density for the intracules.
In astronomical situations the pressure is often also required but can be calculated 
independently of the energy. The average contribution of each intracule to the
normalisation volume Vq is A7^  ^= p llv ^ fx . The total number of particles in the volume
is then aV^ and thus the total pressure is P - a  p f / p .  The spherical form of the
momentum distribution is given as pf  (see the section on spherical space in
chapter five). By (8.17) the total pressure is then:
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P = K<7'^ K  =  —
V
h i C9.23)
This is what is known as the degeneracy pressure of white-dwarf matter and is interpreted 
as the pressure at zero-temperature. Modern notation for K  (Carroll and Ostlie 1996, p. 
588)i&
(9.24)5 m,
which is entirely consistent with (9.23) assuming the electron mass and reduced mass are 
nearly identical and noting that Eddington uses h rather than %. Eddington has thus 
derived the coiTect formula for total degeneracy pressure from the basic tenets of 
Fundamental Theory, another remarkable or perhaps remarkably coincidental result, 
though it should be noted that the basic form of (9.23) was fkst given by Eddington’s old 
mentor Fowler in 1926 (Fowler 1926). But it is not the result that is remarkable, since it 
is the standard equation used for nearly eighty year s. Rather, it is the fact that the 
sometimes exceedingly complex arguments in Fundamental Theory were able to produce 
it. This still does not indicate that Fundamental Theory has any legitimacy as a theory as, 
once again, it could be eliminated by Ockham’s Razor, but certainly lends additional 
credit to the methods since they have turned out to be, at the very least, consistent.
The wavefunctions of steady states are standing waves where the reduce to
eigenvalues which puts this analysis squarely in scale-free physics. A scale 
transformation between the two uranoidal systems, 5  —> A , must be applied for large 
values of , but in doing so this allows
E = m + p^/2m  (9.25)
to be used as the Hamiltonian energy for standing waves (where is not small). This 
then also serves as the energy provided by the zero-temperature fluctuations that cause 
pair creation in the vacuum to occur. This is not a field theoretic approach in that it is 
single-dimensional whereas modern quantum field theory assumes, obviously, a field 
theoretic approach that includes a canonical momentum density (Zee 2003). It is thus a 
gross simplification of the actual physical process and ultimately not conect in its
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application. However, (9.25) can be used to represent a particle in a potential where the 
potential is given by the first term, m, using natural units and the mass-energy relation. 
Free particles are represented as having standing waveforms and the interaction that 
results from the presence of the potential will not necessarily change this. So Eddington 
is partially correct, but his apphcation is far too simplified to correctly account for true 
physical processes.
Motivation
That concludes a detailed study of Eddington’s statistical theory contained in the first part 
of Fundamental Theory (Chapters I-VI which are a merely an expansion of Relativity 
Theory o f Protons and Electrons published a decade earlier). I will summarize and 
analyze it in the context of modem quantum field theory in the next chapter but I wish to 
conclude with a remark on the apparent motivation for Eddington’s entire quest. I say 
‘apparent’ since it is semi-speculative, there being no direct evidence to support the idea 
in any of Eddington’s writings.
Eddington’s career was spent largely as an astronomer. This begs the question: 
where was he introduced to quantum mechanics? Reading Fundamental Theory it 
presents itself as an early quantum field theory and tends to get bogged down in 
formalism much of the time. Why would an astronomer take on a purely physics project 
seemingly so far removed from his field of study? The answers to these questions, 
particularly the latter, are likely obvious to us in hindsight, but were not necessarily so 
obvious to Eddington. Primarily the motivation appears to lie in the discovery of super- 
dense astronomical objects. Since he was influenced directly by Fowler who studied 
degenerate matter in white dwarfs as early as 1926, and having been one of the early 
pioneers of the theory of stellar stmcture, in extreme astronomical conditions he found 
quantum mechanics and relativity colliding head-on: quantum mechanically degenerate 
objects that had tremendous gravitational fields. In order to further study stellar structure 
he found it necessary to find a way to bring the two seemingly incompatible theories 
together in a single unified theory. Ultimately, then, it was his interest in stellar structure 
that gave him the motivation for developing Fundamental Theory in the first place in
230
order to explain internal stellar processes particularly in stellar oddities such as white- 
dwarfs.
Despite acknowledging the potentiality of an unlimited number of types of 
particles created simply by plugging in different values to the standard carrier, he appears 
oddly stuck in the two-particle paradigm despite the discovery of numerous particles by 
his death in 1944. This is a result of the fact that his theory only admitted two types of 
particles -  electrical and mechanical. Any normal particles (elections, protons, neutrons, 
positrons, etc.) could theoretically be included in either of these two types depending on 
the situation (neutral particles likely would only appear as mechanical particles). So he 
was not necessaiily stuck in the electron-proton paradigm, which would have been 
absurd, but rather in an electrical -  mechanical paradigm that was not shattered for 
certain until after his death, with the introduction of the weak and strong interactions. 
Nonetheless, most likely without ever knowing it, he developed an early quantum field 
theory that is largely outmoded and incorrect in many places, but is remarkably predictive 
of what was to come. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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X
Clarity of Perception
Having reviewed Eddington’s statistical theory in great detail it is now prudent to both 
summarize it and to ask how correct, relevant, and foresighted it was. This must be 
described in the context of both his motivation and methods. We return, then, to 1916 
with Eddington poring over large data sets at the Greenwich Observatory. This was in 
line with the observatory’s chief mission of improving observations in general, both 
through improvements to equipment as well as improvements in methods of analysis.
We have already seen in his obituary of Schwarzschild that this work led him to consider 
the general structure of the universe from a stellar point-of-view. In addition the methods 
of analysis used in this case were statistical. Statistical methods include methods of 
probability and, in fact, statistical mechanics (better known as thermodynamics) was the 
forefather of the quantum revolution. So the stage was partially set when, early on, he 
applied statistical methods to general astronomical applications. The stage was 
completely set once general relativity had made its appearance in Britain when a copy of 
Einstein’s paper was smuggled to Eddington via de Sitter (French 1979)"^ .^ This 
circumstance led to Eddington becoming the foremost expert on relativity in the English- 
speaking scientific community. The collision of these two historical events in 
Eddington’s life -  his assigned research involving statistical methods as Greenwich and 
his being on the receiving end of a smuggled paper by Einstein -  led to the broad 
formation of Eddington’s scientific outlook in part presented in Fundamental Theory.
Tracing the Roots
Precisely when the two collided in Eddington’s own mind is debatable. It did not occur 
immediately upon his receipt of Einstein’s paper. Clearly it could not have occurred 
prior to his receiving this paper from de Sitter since he had no knowledge of general
Germany and Britain were, of course, at war at the time thus requiring the use of the “smuggler” (de 
Sitter).
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relativity at this point. The most obvious confluence of the two methods was the eclipse 
expedition of 1919. In attempting to experimentally prove a (theoretical) prediction of , 
general relativity he was required to employ statistical methods of data reduction. In 
addition there had to be the recognition that the results were only accurate to a point.
This limit in accuracy begs the question of whether it is a limit imposed by the 
experimental and/or data reduction methods, or whether it is inherent in nature.
This did not turn Eddington directly onto the path leading to Fundamental 
Theory. He was still a career astronomer at the time and upon his return to Cambridge, 
was immersed almost wholly in astronomy. But it was also around this time that 
astronomy began to move away from the realm of solely positional and dynamical 
methods to include studies of the actual structure of astronomical objects. Eddington 
followed the trend, turning his interests to stellar structure. The motivation, again, is 
explicitly stated in his comment in Schwarzschild’s obituary which I will repeat here for 
purposes of clarity: the “task of determining accurate data for a large number of stars 
inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems of the structure of the stellar- 
universe” (Eddington 1916b). It was in 1919 that Fowler returned to Cambridge from the 
war. Three years later, in collaboration with Darwin, Milne, and others, he began work 
on his seminal studies of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics that included 
applying these methods to problems of stellar structure. Eddington had already been 
Plumian Professor for nearly a decade and, since Fowler worked at the Cavendish 
Laboratory (under his father-in-law Lord Rutherford), they were in close proximity along 
Madingley Road. In 1926 (yet another brilliant discovery in that amazing year) Fowler 
published his most seminal paper linking gaseous degenerate states (a short time later 
discovered to obey Fermi-Dirac statistics) to white dwarf stars that were not yet well 
understood (Fowler 1926). Somewhat simultaneously Eddington and Chandrasekhar 
were publicly arguing over just how far stellar collapse could go (this is the discovery of 
the famous Chandrasekhar limit for white dwarfs).'^^
The problem that presented itself as a result of the observation of the very strange 
companion star to Sirius A that is now known as Sirius B. Sirius B’s existence was
In the philosophy of science literature some recent discussions of Eddington’s obsei*vations have been 
made, cf. Deborah G. Mayo’s Error and the Growth o f  Experimental Knowledge, University of Chicago 
Press, 1996.
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predicted in 1844 by Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel (1784 -  1846) and first observed by 
Alvan Clark (1804 -  1887) in 1862 (Canoll and Ostlie, 1996). But it wasn’t until 1915 
when Walter Adams (1876 -  1956) working at Mt. Wilson Observatory discovered that 
Sirius B’s temperature was huge (modern values are around 27,000 K). But using the 
Stefan-Boltzmann law this predicts a size smaller than the Earth! So it had a tremendous 
luminosity but a very small surface area. No hithertp known laws of physics could 
seemingly explain how something so small could produce so much energy until Fowler 
proposed that white dwarfs were, in fact, in a degenerate state and thus obeyed quantum 
statistics which were just then being developed. Specifically, in that same year (1926) 
Dirac proposed his groundbreaking idea that wavefunction symmetry was related to the 
statistics developed just a year before by Bose, Einstein, and Fermi. Einstein had 
proposed that quantum gases and molecular gases were completely analogous to one 
another after having pondered Bose’s derivation of Planck’s radiation law that was based 
purely on the statistics of photons. Since Eddington was in the throes of arguing about 
white dwarfs, Fowler’s paper could not have escaped his attention. In addition Dirac, 
Chandrasekhar, Darwin, and Milne were all at Cambridge around this time along with 
Fowler and Eddington and contact between them could scarcely have been avoided.^ 
Thus, by the end of 1926 quantum mechanics had entered the realm of astronomy.
Being stellar objects, white dwarfs were also ripe for relativistic examinations and 
their gravitational aspects had been well-studied, particularly the orbital mechanics of 
Sirius A and B. In addition the new debate over the Chandrasekhar limit brought the 
relation between mass and pressure to the fore. A link was thus developed between mass 
and quantum statistics in degenerate matter and, since mass is at the heart of general 
relativity, a natural link between general relativity and quantum mechanics was found in 
white dwarf stars. This is where Eddington’s statistical background in astronomy, that 
had led him to study stellar structure and introduced him to quantum statistics, collided 
head-on with his extensive knowledge of general relativity: there had to be some link 
between the two, some theory that independently recovered both in non-degenerate 
situations. One major key to this interpretation, however, is that Eddington equated the 
microscopic quantum (or ‘quantal’ as he says) world with electricity and the macroscopic
This truly marked the pinnacle of the golden years o f Cambridge physics and astrophysics.
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(‘molar’) world with gravity. What he’s really doing is following up on his 1921 
generalization of Weyl’s unifying theory of gravity and electromagnetism employing 
extra-dimensional methods similar to those employed by Kaluza and Klein in their earlier 
attempts at such a unification. Ultimately, Eddington really saw quantum mechanics as 
an extension of electromagnetic theory. This, then, is the earliest seedling of 
Fundamental Theory: the unification of electromagnetism and gravity, finally appearing 
to bear some fruit in the study of white dwarf stars.
Unique Extensions of Perception
In employing Kaluza-Klein methods Eddington added a fifth dimension in a rather 
unique way that philosophically calls into question our ability to objectively measure it: 
he assumes that one can take normal 4-Z) space and rotate it. In order to rotate, it must 
have a dimension within which to move. This is the added dimension. In doing this, 
however, the added dimension is then subject to uncertainty. In addition this assumes 
that there would be some way to objectively observe this rotation in the extra dimension. 
The philosophical nature of this assumption is not addressed, but endowing regular 4-D 
space with the ability to rotate gives Eddington the relativistic method by which different 
particle types can be interchanged. Also, since the fifth dimension, like other 
dimensions, must have some coordinate structure and, since relativity implies all 
observables can be reduced to coordinates, relativity ought to be a generalization of 
quantum mechanics. Uncertainty plays no adverse role in this since it is completely 
causal and only limits knowledge of the present.
So, since a set of observables is simply a coordinate system, 4-D space is a 
‘hyperplane’ in 5-D Euclidean space (see chapter five). This is the origin, then, of the 4/5 
ratio that appears in Equation 8.25 developed to transition between a planoid and a 
uranoid. There is also a direct link here to his interpretation of multiplicity. Multiplicity 
is the number of dimensions in the space under consideration, a definition I’ve already 
shown is consistent with current interpretations. Since a coordinate system can represent 
a manifold and a manifold is a continuously parameterisable set where the number of 
independent parameters is the number of dimensions, the multiplicity describes the
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number of dimensions in the manifold. In phase space this number is either 136 or 137, 
but in regular space this can either be 4 in normal 4-D space or 5 in the 5-D space that 
includes the rotation dimension. So the transition between the planoid and the uranoid 
involves a change in multiplicity and the addition or subtraction of the rotation of the 
entire frame. In this way the 4/5 ratio is macroscopically much like the 136/137 ratio (or 
its inverse) in microscopic theory.
Eddington also makes the very valid point that when we speak of relative 
quantities we must ask the question, relative to what? Eddington introduced comparison 
particles in order to answer this question. Generally this means that every measurement 
requhes a minimum of two observables (two endpoints, two like particles, etc.). This is 
why there must be a fifth dimension: the rotation of a 4-D space must be a rotation 
relative to something and that something is the extra dimension. Again, the 
generalization of this requires every measurable quantity to be a relative measurement 
between two things (in length measurements this means there must be two locations or 
endpoints). This is a very valid observation since our specification of any measurement 
quantity and origin location is purely arbitrary. For instance, in length measurements, 
Eddington felt it made more sense to place the origin at another particle since measuring 
relative distances is often more useful than measuring distances relative to some arbitrary 
origin. In a direct measurement, the units themselves may be arbitrary, but the physical 
distance is not. Measurements are all then just relationships between objects. In 
mathematics, relations such as this are treated as ratios, hence Eddington’s prodigious use 
of ratios in Fundamental Theory. To further simplify things Eddington uses relativity to 
reduce all units to length measurements and reinterprets physical scenarios so that any 
uncertainty appears in measurements involving lengths (as opposed to densities, etc. -  see 
Equation 5.8 and the discussion preceding it for an example). The idea of using a ratio as 
a unitless measure of length then suggests that anything that can be reproduced from 
some quantum specification can serve as a standard since quantum specifications are 
ratios to the fundamental unit of length htmc that appears in various fundamental 
quantum mechanical equations.
It is clear from this discussion that relativity played an important role in his 
interpretation of physical phenomena beyond the standard view I discussed in the
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previous section. Eddington took any phenomena that involved motion or coordinates to 
be interpretable in a relativistic sense, including spin and charge. I will discuss chaige, 
which may not seem to be obvious in this sense, a bit later. Focusing on spin, however, 
Eddington inserts a co-rotating frame in the electron in order to Lorentz boost that frame 
to rest. Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck had already found in 1925 that if the electron had some 
finite size, the rotational velocity at the surface would exceed the speed of light several 
times over. Presumably this spelled the end of co-rotating frames for point particles. But 
there is nothing that requires there to be a surface to attach the frame to. Even if the 
particle is a dimensionless point there is nothing that prevents one from inserting a co- 
rotating frame into the picture. So if spin is simply rotation then Eddington’s 
interpretation is rather unremarkable. However, spin-1/2 particles have the unusual 
property that they must be rotated through two complete rotations before returning to 
their original state. This is counterintuitive in a classical sense since anything rotating 
through one complete rotation of 2jt is returned to its original state. For the non-classical 
quantum spin case this would mean that given two reference frames A(x,y,z) and 
A A  ^  ' where 91 is the usual rotation matrix. There obviously would need
to be some mechanism by which this could be reconciled, i.e. perhaps a transformation of 
the rotation matrix that would turn A into -A  upon a single complete rotation of 2rt. The 
solution cannot be a new rotation matrix, it simply must be a relativistically transformed 
version of the original rotation matrix, otherwise the operation would not make sense. 
Essentially, at 2n the rotation matrix must become minus the identity matrix while at 4jt it 
returns to the identity matrix. In short for any rotation through (4«-2)jc where n is any 
integer (not the number of rotations) the sign must flip. It turns out that finding a scheme 
by which this happens under a simple transformation is not trivial. The problem gets 
even more difficult when one considers that this only works for particles with a half­
integer multiple of spin. No solution is readily obvious but, on the other hand, there is no 
proof to the contrary. So Eddington’s assumption that spin could be treated this way (i.e. 
Lorentz boosted to rest) may not be incorrect, but it has yet to be proven to be correct. 
Once again, this calls on the nature of permutation invariance (PI) for a thorough 
understanding and is something I discussed at length in chapter six. The main thing to
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remind yourself of is the fact that Eddington blurred the distinction between classical and 
quantum phenomena thus making this a slightly more complex situation.
The relativistic nature of charge is an even thornier issue. Unlike spin, charge 
seemingly has no relation whatsoever to coordinates! However, as I tell my introductory 
physics students, signs in physics inevitably indicate nothing more than direction. In the 
most basic interpretation, charge is simply an indication of the direction of the electric 
field lines. On a deeper level I mentioned earlier that charge is a measure of how the 
photon propagates. The current density term in the path integral can be written to 
account for positive and negative values and, since the current density can be related to a 
spatial Lagrangian, the positive and negative values can be related directly to spatial 
directions. But there is nothing here that explains why this is true -  i.e. why can we write 
the current density this way? The deepest level of truth lies in electroweak unification 
and the ability of the weak interaction to exchange charge (really the weak interaction 
exchanges quarks with quarks and leptons with leptons). But the full relativistic 
application in Eddington’s sense, where a simple transformation can change charge is an 
seems plausible as I discussed in chapter seven but remains unproven.
But the essence of both of these situations (spin and charge as relativistic 
quantities) is a haunting possibility. Though Eddington’s own reasoning was naïve, 
rather than a cursory dismissal, a deeper exploration of these ideas only brings to light 
more questions rather than a resounding denial of their truth.
Perceiving Measure
Again, relating Eddington’s concepts directly to the Standard Model, the perception of 
everything as relative was combined with the realization that objects cannot be 
considered apart from their environments -  the universe is nothing but particles and their 
interactions, and studying particles without any interactions (n.b. there are self­
interaction schemes) would be rather boring anyway. Thus in determining a quantum- 
specified standard one must recognize, as Eddington did, that there are two major 
limitations, both of which I discussed in chapter five. The first is that the standard is not 
fully reproducible in strong fields since the standard would be based on some particle
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(quanta) that could be altered by a strong field (even neutrinos could theoretically be 
altered by an extremely strong weak-field). Clearly Eddington assumes any such 
standard would be based on the photon since it sets an upward bound for velocity. But, 
the photon is the carrier particle of the electiomagnetic interaction itself, which creates a 
problem when one encounters neutral particles such as the neutrino as well as in photon- 
photon interactions. Since electromagnetism is actually united with the weak interaction 
in electroweak theory thefe ought to be some relation here to W and Z bosons. But why 
should the standard be necessarily based on electroweak theory? Gravitons and gluons 
also move at the speed of light (and, though unlikely in present theories, so might 
neutrinos which are not even carrier particles!). Eddington’s mathematical solution falls 
again on the shoulders of the standard carrier that is a single rigid form that can be altered 
depending on the particle desired. Out of this he constructs the standard deviation model 
that that provides a standard based on aggregate number alone and no other property.
The standard deviation model has the advantage that it is independent of scale and thus 
can be equally well applied to both very large and very small scales. Though other 
values and quantities can be altered through relativistic transformations and actual 
physical interactions, pure number is somewhat unalterable (I say ‘somewhat’ since, for 
example. Hawking radiation predicts that not all spontaneous pair creations end in pair 
annihilations).
The other problem with the quantum-specified standaid is that it needs to be 
suitably short. Eddington’s point is an excellent one. Certainly we have compensated for 
the meter by subdividing it so that we use lengths such as Angstroms, for example, on 
very small scales (where Angstroms are 10' °^ m). But Eddington envisioned a base 
standai'd that was ultimately unitless and very tiny"^ .^ Logically, for quantum-specified 
standards one might start with the Planck length, the theoretical lower limit to size (or, 
rather, knowledge of size). But this could become quite cumbersome with normal, 
eveiyday values and is not as forceful as Eddington’s argument in favour of a standard 
impervious to potential field interactions.
One might question how something could be considered ‘tiny’ if  it is unitless. Eddington’s point was 
simply that it would take an extraordinarily large number o f these things to make anything macroscopic. i
j
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The idea of using a system of pure numbers as a measurement standard (and as 
the basis of the derivations of physical constants normally found only by experiment) 
smacks to some physicists and historians as cosmonumerology. On the other hand, 
Eddington had a point. Pure number is one of the only unalterable aspects of the universe 
-  two is two regardless of where you are in the universe (even if you can’t see ‘two’ -  
double stars, for example). Certainly there are the post-Eddingtonians who continue this 
line of reasoning, most notably Clive Kilmister and Ted Bastin who, along with John 
Amson, Frederick Parker-Rhodes, and Pierre Noyes founded the Alternative Natural 
Philosophy Association (ANPA) in the 1970s. They have been rather successful in many 
of their predictions and they do readily admit Eddington was incorrect in some areas of 
his’work. But their basic philosophical premise is the same and, unfortunately, they tend 
to be marginalized in some circles. The perception of pure number as a root foundation 
in measuring (and ordering) the universe makes logical sense from its unalterable 
perspective and is the primary point of Fundamental Theory. The entire research 
program is built around finding ways in which various structures relate to this 
measurement standard. Since Eddington uses g  as his standard measure, the entire 
treatise is a justification of that choice, something I mentioned in chapter five. So if 
Fundamental Theory could be boiled down to a single theme it would be the use of a 
standard for measurement that is either unitless or based on a single unit, i.e. one standard 
unit like length for every quantity in the universe which is what Eddington initially did 
before eliminating it entirely through ratios. The latter point he justified by the fact that 
all measurements are really comparing two things (endpoints, objects, etc.) so it didn’t 
really matter what the single measurement unit was as long as everything could initially 
be expressed in it (that way seemingly unrelated characteristics could be directly 
compared). It could later be eliminated entirely in the ratio of comparison (it’s a bit 
analogous to the idea that one can only measure a difference in potential energy -  and 
thus total energy -  rather than measure it at a singular point).
As I mentioned earlier Eddington viewed the universe as being fragmented by the 
various units of measure and felt that a single unit of measure for everything was more 
elegant. By making everything relativistically transformable any unit could be translated 
into a length that would then be completely eliminated by a ratio. In his 1951 book
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Quantum Theory Bohm supplied three Hamiltonians for any observation (observer, 
object, interaction). I discussed this in chapter five but would add to this, in regard to the 
present discussion, the observation that this endows the interaction with particle-like 
characteristics. Certainly since Yukawa proposed his meson hypothesis in the late ‘30’s 
it is not an unusual action taken by Bohm, but further solidified the growing vision that 
interactions really were paiticles themselves (or were mediated by them). This being the 
case it solidifies Eddington’s argument that a standard based on only one of these 
exchange paiticles was fraught with problems. Bohm’s Hamiltonian for the actual 
interaction between observer and observed could be equally well applied to any exchange 
pai'ticle since visual observation is not the only type of observation. In fact, since 
Hamiltonians can be applied to any particle the Hamiltonian is a bit like Eddington’s 
standard carrier -  a mathematical form that holds information about a particle. Eddington 
ai'gued the observational point as well by asking why one should take visual observations 
as having a gieater value than other observations (gravitational, etc.). W hat’s the 
difference? Since any gravitational interaction in interstellar space is too small an effect 
for us to notice we do not regard this as hard evidence of anything. Since strong and 
weak interactions have very limited ranges they generally do not appeal to our senses 
either. That leaves electromagnetism as the only interaction that appeals to our senses, at 
least astronomically (certainly in gravitational interactions with the Earth there is a case 
to be made that we have sensory reactions, but this is an isolated case, at least at present 
while human space travel remains limited). But why, for instance, should 
electromagnetic data not collected directly by our senses (e.g. from CCD cameras, 
voltmeters, etc.) be more acceptable than gravitational data? Perhaps it is due to the fact 
that humanity’s primary quantifier, number, is best recognized visually which means 
everything gets reduced to sensory data in the end.
That being the case we are limited to the use of the photon as a basis for a 
quantum-mechanical measurement standard. But Eddington’s point about the photon’s 
reaction to strong fields is a valid one -  the standard is technically not fully reproducible 
in this case. Hence the case can be made for unitless ratios, particularly when combining 
this argument with the argument that all measurements are really comparisons between 
two objects. In the case of length it is a comparison between two endpoints, i.e. all
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coordinates are relative and all measurements ought to run between two objects without 
reference to an arbitrary origin. Another way of looking at this is to realize that 
measurements only make sense when made between two objects (at least most of the 
time). For instance, it is usually pointless to measure the distance from some star to some 
piece of empty space thousands of light-years away.
There are two major problems with this, however, that harken, again, back to 
basic physics. As I warn my students, reference frames should not be placed on or in any 
object that one wishes to study directly since that frame runs the rather high risk of being 
non-inertial. Since the endpoints of a length measure could be argued to be part of that 
measure, an origin placed in either endpoint could be interpreted as including the 
endpoints thus making the frame non-inertial. This is even more obvious when 
measuring a distance between two objects if that distance is in any way affected by one of 
the two objects (this can be ignored, then, in most cases, but two gravitationally strong 
sources near each other will affect the nature of the length measure between them). In 
addition, upon occasion one actually does care about points in empty space. The simplest 
example of this is in centre-of-mass problems where the centre-of-mass may be a point in 
empty space. A more specific and applicable example of this is the Genesis spacecraft 
that recently returned to Earth with samples of the solar wind: it orbited the Sun at the 
Sun-Earth Lagrangian point which is an empty point in space (if anything were actually 
there it would ultimately be pure coincidence or intentional as in the case of the 
spacecraft itself).
Relative Measure and Flatness
As I’ve just demonstrated Eddington’s perception of the universe was not terribly 
heterodoxical: a natural background energy field exists (the essence of the universe) and 
natural fluctuations in it caused by the combination of uncertainty and special relativity 
produce the particles that make up the mass found in the universe. Mass produces 
curvature meaning that curvature is simply a result of the natural background 
fluctuations. So a universe devoid of fluctuations (mass) would be flat. In a modern 
interpretation one could say that since mass is the measure of how gravitons propagate
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then so is curvature. This is very nearly the truth, though his interpretation does not 
account for the evolution of the universe from the Big Bang on, but the Big Bang was a 
relatively recent and not wholly accepted concept at the time Eddington was working. In 
fact it did not see wide-spread acceptance until the mid-1960s. Lemaitre had proposed 
the first model resembling a big bang in 1931 after Hubble’s discovery a year before that 
the universe was expanding. Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker (1912 -  present) suggested a 
more refined model in 1938 that began from nuclear principles. Gamow and other 
nuclear physicists built upon this model but, though the Big Bang model gained 
momentum through the early 1940s, the wai distracted most physicists from thinking 
about such matters. By the time the war was over Eddington was gone (Kragh 1999).
So considering the Big Bang was so new at the time, Eddington still came 
remarkably close to the truth in describing the fundamental nature of the universe as a 
‘blank sheet’ of energy where random background fluctuations give rise to matter that 
produces local curvature while on a large-scale the universe remains flat (again, see de 
Bernardis, et. al. 2000). In tying this to the standard of measure, the transformation of 
relative coordinates was really the only difference between curved and flat space (see 
Equation 6.1). So even curvature itself was a frame dependent quantity! This makes 
sense in Eddington’s context since mass gives rise to curvature and mass is frame 
dependent (i.e. if you Lorentz boost an object to such a degree that its mass is fully 
converted to energy -  which is, of course, impossible -  you would eliminate curvature 
altogether). As more and more fluctuations give rise to more and more particles the 
relevant effects of quantization are reduced thus explaining the lack of quantum effects 
on a large scale. In a slightly different argument he suggests that as it appeal's in 
large-scale structures differs from that which is used in the wave equation. Since there is 
such a wide deviation in the two instances of g^y this implies frequent transitions between 
eigenstates making wave analysis useless much like reducing the persistence time of 
dynamic integrals reduces quantization effects. But, since curvature is introduced via 
fluctuations rather than purely through matter (essentially he reinterprets matter as 
fluctuations) g^y this suggests a third form of relativity intermediate to special and general 
where the curvature is uniform. Again, he has some very valid points about transitioning 
between macroscopic and microscopic situations and his statistical approach helps him in
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this regard. Recognizing that an energy tensor is both tensorially and dimensionally a 
product of two momentum vectors he designs his system so that particle densities, which 
are statistical quantities, are defined as momentum vectors. As such particle densities are 
conjugate to spatial dimensions making them subject to uncertainty. Again, this makes 
sense when one considers that either the volume is held constant while the particles move 
in and out of it thus making the density uncertain, or the density is held constant causing 
the volume to fluctuate. Essentially, density is conjugate to volume. Eddington 
accomplishes this with his system of natural units. In terms of SI units this does not 
appear to work unless one considers total number rather than density and then considers 
the volume in spherical coordinates as pseudo-one-dimensional represented by an angle. 
In condensed matter physics it is well known that number and phase angle are conjugate 
to one another. More generally Heisenberg showed that momentum density was 
conjugate to the phase fie ld  (Zee 2003). Phase angles can be used in complex spaces to 
create circles. A phase fie ld  then should be able to create a sphere in complex space. 
Eddington also introduces a phase coordinate as an extra dimension whose conjugate is 
the scale uncertainty that is manifested as an extraneous momentum in an extra 
dimension. When these are reduced to eigenvalues the scale uncertainty becomes a 
momentum and the phase coordinate becomes a coordinate.
Now since all measurement standards are based on units of length in Fundamental 
Theory they must be transformed from their original units into units of length. This 
tiansformation has an associated uncertainty associated with it as described in chapter 
six. The dimensionality constant y associated with this transformation is directly 
associated with the physical dimensions of the space, which in the particle density case is 
either 4 or 5 depending on the method of investigation. This seems obvious but these 
numbers also provide multiplicity values that give the dimensions in phase space and as I 
just showed this is conjugate to the scale uncertainty that is manifested as a momentum. 
The relation to wave mechanics is then brought to bear by describing discrete 
wavefunctions as particle densities that rapidly decrease outwards forcing the integral 
over space to converge, further solidifying the momentum-particle density relation.
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An Exercise in Natural Unit Manipulation
Upon stepping back to look objectively at this, however, one still is left with the nagging 
question, how in the world could a particle density be physically related in any way to a 
momentum vector? Perhaps surprisingly (perhaps not) this is not as strange as it sounds. 
In the case of photons one can simply integrate the Poynting vector to show that 
momentum can be defined in terms of the photon number (see Peacock 1999, p. 181 or 
van Fraassen 1991, pp. 438-442). This becomes a density when the analysis refers to a 
specific volume in space. Let’s examine this case in greater detail but in a more heuristic 
way. For electromagnetic waves momentum density, P, is simply the momentum per unit 
volume of an electromagnetic wave. Finding the momentum for photons is fairly simple. 
It can be derived from the well-known relativistic formula -  p^c^ + . Solving
this for the momentum, p, we find p  = E /c . This holds true for individual photons so the 
same must be true for electromagnetic radiation as a whole and thus the momentum 
density of electromagnetic radiation is its energy density divided by the speed of light.
Let us say a volume of space has a photon density, n, and contains a single amalgamated 
electromagnetic field related to these photons (so the volume is filled with 
electromagnetic radiation in the form of photons). Though massless, photons aie 
particles in keeping with the Standard Model and thus a photon density can be interpreted 
as a particle density.
The total number of photons in the volume is N  ~ n V . Each photon has some 
amount of energy, u, that it contributes to the total energy of the volume, E. We define 
this to be E = {u ) N  = {u)nV  where <u> is the average individual particle energy for the
volume. Define the energy density for the volume as f/ = E /V  = (u)n . The magnitude 
of the momentum density can then be defined in terms of the energy density as:
P  =  -  =  - -  =  — . ( 10. 1)V V c c
This defines the momentum density for a field of electromagnetic radiation. Since the 
final result requires a relation between momentum vectors and photon densities, though, 
we need to modify (10.1) in order to find the momentum in a vector format. Since the
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electric field of an electromagnetic wave oscillates rapidly it is useful to calculate average 
values. Thus, for the oscillating total electric field in this volume we can write (using 
brackets to indicate averages and assuming, momentarily, that it oscillates in one 
direction):
(p) = (P )y  = = C»k (10.2)c c
where C is a constant with SI units of kg ■ js  which is simply units of momentum 
multiplied by units of volume. This also assumes that the average photon energy <u> 
and the volume V do not change. So, at this point I have shown that a momentum vector 
is linearly proportional to particle (photon) density. The goal is to show that the 
proportionality constant, C, is both unitless and unit-valued (1) valued since this would
show that p = rtk or, in scalar form, p - n .
Employing the usual system of natural units (not Eddington’s) such that c = l  and 
/z = 1 we can show that kg ^  s as follows:
fl. From c = 1 we find that 1^  = 3 x 10* m .
b. From A = 1 we find that 1^ ' = 1.054 x 10"^ "^  kg-m^.
c. Dividing a. into b. we find that 1 = 3.513 x lO '^^^ • m which implies that 
m-‘ = 3.513x10-^'kg.
d. The combination of a. and c. implies that 1kg = 8.540 x 10 °^ s .
Expressing (10.2) in scalar form for the moment we write p  = Cn. Obviously the units on 
both sides must cancel, but do they cancel in natural units such that C = 1 ? The SI units
for the relation p  = Cn are kg • m is -  (kg •m'  ^js)-  (l/m ^). These units cannot be shuffled
around without changing the basic nature of the quantities involved (i.e. without changing 
n to N  or something similar). Using the values derived in the steps above for natural units
we can, however, change everything to units of s'. Given that C = p r f ^, which solely in
terms of the natural unit relations derived above is
(l .054 X10 ’^ ) = (2.847 X10"*^ .y) • (3.704 x 10"^®),  we find that C appears to have units
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of /  which does not meet our criterion for unitlessness. However, crunching the 
numbers does show that its value is indeed 1 ! Thus C = l / .  Is the requirement that this 
be unitless necessary? What does the simple fact that C’s value is 1 tell us? It tells us 
that when represented in natural units the numerical value for particle (photon) density 
and the magnitude of the momentum aie always identical] Now, technically I still 
haven’t shown the relationship between p  and n in vector form. Since n is not a vector 
quantity we assume that it must be multiplied by some vector quantity in order to extend 
the relationship with p  beyond simple magnitude discussions. We might first try to 
define a unit vector (not an operator) that caiTies the correct units of / .  This is 
essentially a redefinition of C as a unit vector. In any case, in vector notation we might 
write p = w(l) where (1) is a unit vector with units of / .  In this context the unit vector
serves two purposes: to change the units of n and convert it to a vector representation. 
But, recovering the relationship p - n  out of this turns out to be impossible without 
turning (1) into a function of some sort. It appeal's that an operator is required in this 
situation. Since n is the magnitude of p, which is simply p p or /?, we would have to 
show that the fourth-order derivative of p is equal to p’s magnitude:
V- d{x“f
d (V.p) = p (10.3)
where the divergence is required to eliminate the vector nature. In order to tidy (10.3) up 
a bit let us define
and choose 5 = 4. (10.3) can then be rewritten in the more compact form:
H"p = p  (10.5)
The simplest solution to this is p = k . Since p automatically has natural units of
seconds and k has units of inverse seconds, the third derivative of the divergence of p 
(which we have defined as only being in a single direction) leads to e~^  ^jk^  which has 
units of inverse cubic seconds. Setting k = 1 preserves the original form and yet brings 
the units in line with the units of particle density. The initial divergence converts the 
vector p to a scalar and the regular derivatives simply add derivative permutations to the
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function. Should the divergence or the ordinary derivatives come first? That depends on 
when the momentum needs to (or can) be converted to a scalar. In the case considered 
here it doesn’t matter since the end result is the same. That ultimately means the constant 
in (10.2) is really an operator of the form (10.4) and thus the combination of (10.2) and
(10.5) gives:
S‘‘p = n . (10.6)
Recall, however, that the present derivation was for photons and we arbitrarily set k = 1 
in order to preserve form. In addition we defined the constant C, which represents the 
average individual photon energy divided by c, to be an operator, although this is hardly 
unusual in quantum mechanics since momentum itself is an operator. In fact this implies 
that the momentum operator is really just an integer multiple (to some extent, 
disregarding units at the moment) of some other operator. Whether this relationship,
(10.6), would hold for other particles, in particular massive ones, is questionable, but the 
point is that Eddington was not necessarily wrong in his assumption that particle density 
and momentum are equivalent since it at least holds in one specific (and very important) 
case. Incidentally, when one considers relative measure and compares ratios of p  to 
ratios of n one need not worry about units and the stated ratios will always be equal (e.g. 
a ratio pilp\ for two fields is always equal to the ratio %/»! for the particles producing 
those fields).
So, in conclusion, intriguingly, Eddington may have been correct. He obviously 
recognized that there was some natural relationship between the numerical values of 
momentum and particle density in natural units. Once again he clearly perceives an 
underlying relationship that is not readily obvious and that could have profound 
implications including the fact that the particle density in some sense could be conjugate 
to spatial dimensions. This is made even more intriguing by the known fact that 
momentum density is conjugate to phase field and pure number is conjugate to phase 
angle; if a relationship exists between phase angles and phase fields one ought to exist for 
momentum densities and pure number thus suggesting one exists for momentum and 
number density. Finally, since curvature is introduced by the fluctuations observed as 
particles then the greater the particle density, the greater the curvature, meaning the
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momentum of the field is correlated to curvature (assuming the particles have mass -  this 
obviously doesn’t work for photons).
From Natural Units to No Units
Eddington established both a scale-free and a scale-fixed theory as I have described. 
Eddington’s system of natural units brought everything down to a single unit (length). In 
order to establish the equivalence of scale-free (mechanical) and scale-fixed (electrical) 
systems, ratios can be used thus eliminating units entirely and holding to the 
philosophical idea that the most meaningful measurements are comparisons (ratios). This 
also has the effect of reducing the importance of quantisation which only appears in 
scale-fixed theory. In essence Eddington was simplifying eveiything by putting it into 
his ‘native language’ of relativity (scale-free theory).
Now, since units are no longer an issue and since relative measurements are made 
through tensors or vectors, the field has the same variables as a distribution of particles 
which is essentially what I argued above in equations (10.2) -  (10.5). Eddington 
therefore argued that since true fields were equivalent to the average characteristics of an 
ensemble of particles field theory was reducible to statistical studies o f datasets for large 
numbers o f particles.
This is a profound conclusion and barkens, once again, back to Eddington’s 
statement (which I will repeat for a third time) that the “task of determining accurate data 
for a large number of stars inevitably leads the mind to consider the great problems of the 
structure of the stellar universe” (Eddington 1916b). The stars were the first objects to be 
considered particles in Eddington’s statistical studies of the universe, and as an 
understanding of the nature of galaxies matured in the wake of Hubble’s discovery of the 
nature of M31, galaxies became the particles. In Eddington’s cosmology fields acquired 
their own characteristics since these characteristics simply arose from the statistics of the 
distribution. Changes in the fields came about through changes to the occupation states 
of the individual particles in the distribution where the occupation states appeared as 
generalized coordinates or momenta. Eddington later converted these discrete occupation
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factors to a continuous occupation factor that is a function of the coordinates. This 
satisfies Eddington’s criteria that the particles be unidentified members of an assemblage.
Generalized characteristics of the particle assemblage are normally additive.
Since Eddington works within a rigid-field framework, he is assuming the overall 
characteristics of the field do not change, meaning the average characteristics of the 
particle assemblage do not change which is reminiscent of basic conservation laws. 
Essentially the rigid-field condition is his conservation law.
Multiplicity and the Assemblage
The rigid-field can be used as an inexhaustible reservoir, then, since its average 
characteristics remain the same. Since all measurements must be relative measures 
between two values, the rigid-field acts as a convenient reference point in measurement. 
For instance, equation (6.22) gives the probability that some particle in a quantum state 
with energy E  is in contact with the reservoir or, in this case, rigid-field: Another 
interpretation of (6.22) was given in chapter six stating that it is the probability that a 
system will be in a microstate (quantum state) with an energy E  relative to the 
macrostate’s (rigid-field’s) energy. The total number of possible microstates we know is 
the multiplicity. As such, the multiplicity tells us the number of possible quantum states 
of energy E  that a particle could be in while (6.22) gives the probability for each state.
So, for instance, say the multiplicity is 137; then there are 137 possible microstates. Each 
of these 137 quantum states is not necessarily equally possible, however, and thus (6.22) 
is employed to determine just how likely each of these 137 states is. This is less than the 
actual number of dimensions in phase space since some aspects of the system are 
presumably stabilised (i.e. assumed values from prior data). In fact, as given in (6.11), 
the multiplicity k is the dimension index (number of dimensions) of an individual 
particle’s energy, i.e. the number of possible states it can have (corresponding to the 
number of independent components of the energy tensor), while there is a separate 
dimension index, /, for the total energy that is often set to 1 as in (6.12) and (6.13). Since 
the total energy is set to 1 positive values for k imply negative values of-(k+1) for the 
rigid-field’s possible energy states in order to balance positive and negative (recalling
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Eddington’s assertion that a given datum for positive and negative measurements is 
completely arbitrary). The reason the total energy is set to 1 is because the universe is 
assumed to only have a single macrostate and thus a single possible overall state that 
fluctuates internally.
Using the rigid-field as an inexhaustible reservoir as developed in general 
statistical mechanics situations (see (6.17)) allows energy to explain away Dirac’s sea of 
negative energy states. These states are really just the states that make up the rigid-field. 
Rigid fields are the primary domain of quantum mechanics and the coordinates 
describing states in rigid fields are slightly different than those in non-rigid domains as 
given in (6.24). Eddington uses this transformation to explain the covariant nature of 
momentum in wave mechanics. Even the word ‘covariant’ suggests rigidity since it 
implies that quantities change together. Out of this argument he then derives the origin of 
i in quantum theory. A closer examination of his argument, however, shows that the true 
nature of his reasoning is embedded in relational considerations. As he separates out the 
particle and field energies he inserts a datum to explain an extra minus sign (present in 
the covai'iant momentum expression in quantum theory). The extra minus sign is 
contained in i and thus the relational consideration explains its existence. Now relational 
considerations are merely relative considerations based on one’s choice of reference 
origin. Such a choice is governed by special relativity meaning the presence o fi in 
quantum theory is really a relativistic phenomenon.
Profound Results
Certainly the meeting of relativity and statistical methods in Eddington’s mind, brought 
to an apex with the developments related to white dwarfs in the 1920s, played the most 
critical role in developing the foundation of Fundamental Theory. However, the 
adherence to fairly strict interpretations of relativity and statistics present unique 
conclusions. To reiterate two of the most important points I have just made, Eddington 
showed that field theory is reducible to the statistics of a large assemblage of particles 
and all measurable quantities are frame-dependent and can be altered simply by a change
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in reference. Starting with his ‘blank sheet’ hypothesis, this leads to a remarkably 
modem conclusion.
From a structuralist standpoint, Eddington is quite clear on his interpretation of 
the nature of particles: they are simply conceptual objects that carry information in the 
form of variables. This is the root of the concept of a standard carrier where there is a 
single mathematical form that manifests itself differently depending upon which variables 
are filled. Since Eddington also held that all measurable quantities (mass, charge, spin, 
etc.) are frame-dependent, a transformation can easily shift a standard carrier from one 
particle into another. From a physical standpoint, the universe consists of this ‘blank 
sheet’ of energy that is initially undisturbed. The uncertainty principle combined with 
special relativity, as is well known, can disturb this vacuum energy and create particles 
and anti-particles -  particles literally pop into and out of existence in the vacuum. Since 
all particles are different manifestations of the standard carrier and a Lorentz boost can 
theoretically transform one into another by changing the values in the standard carrier’s 
matrix of characteristics, all particles in the universe are ultimately indistinguishable 
p-om one another. This is the current accepted view of many field theorists (Zee 2003) 
though for different reasons including the fact that the exchange of massive bosons is 
really responsible for transferring characteristics from one particle to another. 
Philosophers of physics, as we have seen, have recently shied away from this blanket 
statement demonstrating through permutation invariance that particles can actually 
distinguishable in cases where they previously were thought not (cf. French and Redhead 
1988). But, the idea was discussed as early as the late 1920’s with Dirac’s work. 
Eddington simply took a holistic view by assuming that there was a single, continuous, 
uniform energy field that, due to the uncertainty principle, is endowed with various 
particle characteristics mathematically represented by altering the standard carrier. 
Cassirer, as I discussed previously, has suggested that particles are simply intersection 
points in certain relations which is a similar point of view. Another way to look at this is 
to define particles as being the intersection points of interacting fields, though I do not 
personally find that description elegant. If a unified theory is ever found, theoretically all 
four fundamental interactions and their fundamental fields would be manifestly identical. 
Thus I find Eddington’s original description to be simpler -  all particles are fluctuations
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in a single field and the fluctuations arise from uncertainty (the fact that zero fluctuations 
has a near-zero probability of occurrence). Taking this a step further, the fields 
associated with the four fundamental interactions are merely different manifestations of a 
single unified field. In the interest of pure simplicity the four manifestations of this 
single field are associated with the type of fluctuation (particle) that is created by 
uncertainty (as the weak field in neutrinos, for example, or as all four in a proton). So, 
the unified field manifests itself in different ways depending on how it is disturbed by the 
uncertainty principle. Since Eddington was ultimately a statistician at heart he 
transformed field properties into the properties of a large assemblage of particles. In 
deference to his relativistic sensibilities, however, he also adopted the view that 
eveiything in the universe is simply energy. All of existence is reduced to random 
fluctuations in the uniform background or energy field. Eddington’s conception here is 
far from heterodoxical.
The line of reasoning pertaining to the exchange of characteristics between 
particles leads us tantalizingly close to the weak interaction again. Since I have shown in 
chapter seven that the frame-dependence of charge only works with a global change in 
reference frame that would always flip pairs of charges (thus conserving overall charge) 
this might be used to explain why exclusion works in pairs in Fundamental Theory -  flip 
one particle or the other, but relativity says you can never really tell which one flipped. 
Eddington’s explanation is rooted in comparison particles, but by his own reasoning, this 
can be explained by recalling that exclusion’s job is really to make indistinguishable 
particles distinguishable. In Fundamental Theory it is the job of interchange to mediate 
the exchange of information such that exclusion works. In fact it allows properties to be 
transferred from one particle to another, essentially substituting a quantity in one standard 
carrier for a quantity in another standard carrier. The weak interaction by contrast 
exchanges quarks with quarks and leptons with leptons thus allowing particles to change 
identity.
Another remarkable conclusion Eddington reached via this line of reasoning was 
his version of the exclusion principle which, as I described in chapter eight, is defined in 
terms o f the uncertainty principle. The root of this lies in the above discussion of the 
statistics of laige data sets and the indistinguishability of all particles. Exclusion’s job is
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to make indistinguishable particles distinguishable. Since Eddington works in a phase 
space of coordinates and momenta, common even in classical physics, he opens the door 
to uncertainty since it is defined in terms of commuting physical properties and 
coordinates and momenta are the most common commuting pair in quantum problems. 
Thus, since one could easily choose a cell of phase space having a volume i f  Eddington 
simply rearranges the uncertainty principle to find the maximum number of particles in 
this volume. Since uncertainty ultimately prevents complete knowledge of particle 
properties Eddington is implying that it prevents perfect exclusion (meaning two particles 
at the same exact spot in space or sharing the same exact energy levels) since it prevents 
complete knowledge of a particle’s exact location. So rather than at a point, particles are 
limited in a certain volume. As I discussed in chapter eight this also implies that 
wavefunction collapse is never 100%. This problem has been discussed in depth by a 
number of physicists and philosophers and is often referred to as the GRW interpretation 
of wavefunction collapse after the authors of one of the original and most seminal papers 
in this area (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986). Yet it could be argued that exclusion 
provides full knowledge (or nearly full knowledge) which would appear to be a 
contradiction. Of course we know full well that neither exclusion nor anything else, for 
that matter, provides full knowledge of the state of a system. That was precisely 
Heisenberg’s point -  our limitation is in our knowledge of the present, not our ability to 
predict the future. Nonetheless, Eddington’s result is remarkable in that it strongly 
suggests a relation between uncertainty and exclusion that has been hitherto unexplored.
Trouble in Paradise
However, the strict adherence to the relativistic worldview appears to have one major 
exception in Eddington’s formulation. One of relativity’s greatest triumphs is the 
equivalence of gravitational and inertial situations (e.g. one cannot distinguish between 
an inertial frame and a frame in free-fall in a gravitational field). This triumph of 
reasoning is actually what led to the development of general relativity from special 
relativity and was really built on the equivalence of inertial and gravitationally measured
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masses that was developed by Galileo! Eddington, however, clearly distinguishes 
between the two situations in a way that appears to violate this principle.
The problem is that Eddington attributes the potential energy to the object (or 
appeal's to, based on the wording in Fundamental Theory), Potential energy is really 
associated with an interaction. If an interaction is not present then there is no potential 
energy. So, for instance, consider two isolated particles each with some amount of 
kinetic energy. In order for these particles to dump some of their kinetic energy they 
have to interact with something, say each other. During the interaction some kinetic 
energy is taken from each by the interaction (which in the Standaid Model is just another 
particle). The interaction then gains potential energy. The potential energy does not exist 
without the interaction. The interaction could then impart some kinetic energy back to 
the particles, often in the form of an exchange of some sort (e.g. particle A  loses 10 J of 
energy, particle B  gains 10 J of energy).
The fact that the interaction is represented by an exchange particle can also help 
explain the equivalence principle. One could imagine that, in the case of the two 
particles just described, the interaction’s potential energy is really, on a fundamental 
level, the kinetic energy of the exchange pai ticle (since most exchange particles aie 
massless, this is a bit more complicated than I’m describing, but is an illustrative 
analogy). So, one could imagine that a given particle with some kinetic energy interacts 
with some other particle by exchanging a massless boson. The amount of kinetic energy 
it loses goes into the boson which has to gain kinetic energy in order to move. Once this 
exchange particle comes in contact with the second particle it hands over this kinetic 
energy to the new particle. In fact, this is the basis of Feynman diagrams and is very 
easily understood via the photoelectric effect. In the photoelectric effect a surface of 
some material is interacting electromagnetically with something else (the Sun, a lamp, a 
laser, etc.). The photons, which are the exchange particles for the electromagnetic 
interaction, have a certain amount of energy which can be interpreted as kinetic (though, 
note that all massless particles including three of the four types of fundamental exchange 
bosons move at the speed of light, so this is not understood in the classical sense but 
rather through relativistic means). The amount of energy associated with the photon’s 
motion has to be equal to the minimum energy required to dislodge an electron -  there’s a
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fundamental equivalence there not to mention a clear indication of a transfer of 
momentum.
So returning once again to the equivalence principle itself, a gravitational 
potential simply adds an extra particle to the mix (the graviton) ferrying kinetic energy 
from one object to another. Since all massive particles can be brought to rest through a 
Lorentz boost, one could attempt to bring the graviton to rest. Doing so would stop any 
gravitational information from being transferred between the objects and seemingly 
eliminate gravity. Thus it appears gravity is associated with the motion of gravitons. So 
a reference frame attached to a graviton, for instance, which can be thought of as freely 
falling in some sense, can be brought to rest by a Lorentz boost. Thus it is impossible to 
tell the difference between an inertial frame and one that is freely falling in a 
gravitational field. The presence of the gravitational potential has no affect on the 
internal constitution of a system in this sense and simply accelerates it in reference to 
some other frame of reference.
There is another problem in Fundamental Theory that is perhaps not quite as 
serious when understood in its historical context. In order to stop wave packet dispersal 
and in order to fully explain energy relativistically he introduces negative energy states 
that can seemingly give rise to matter spontaneously. Historically there are two points to 
be made here. The first is that, as I have already pointed out, the Big Bang scenario was 
not fully accepted until after Eddington’s death and thus the 1930s (post-Hubble) marked 
the first shot-in-the-dark, so to speak, for modem cosmology. Prior to Hubble’s 
discovery the universe was generally thought to be static. Once it was found to be 
expanding the logical conclusion was that, if time were run backward, the universe would 
begin with a singularity. That leads to the second historical point; singularities were 
viewed as headaches to be eliminated in the 1930s and 1940s. Singularities are nothing 
more than infinities present in an equation and even today infinities in theories are 
usually considered a pox.'*  ^ The fact that the universe had historically been viewed as 
static and the fact that singularities were not viewed in a positive light at the time both 
contributed to the acceptance of continuous matter creation as a possibility for quite some
As a modem example the presence of infinities in the original theory o f weak interactions was what led 
Glashow, Weinberg, and Salam to develop electroweak unification as a way to eliminate those infinities.
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time. Recall that the steady-state theory of Hoyle, Bondi, and Gold did not appear until 
well after Eddington’s death. Thus, at the time this aspect of Eddington’s theory was not 
very heterodoxical and in hindsight was no more or less so than theories developed by 
Milne and Dirac, neither of whom share the same historical treatment as Eddington.
Overlooked Subtleties
In ti'uth Eddington’s ‘steady state’ theory, as one might call it, is far more subtle than 
that. From a structuralist point of view changes cannot necessarily be taken into account 
via predictions such as those offered by probabilistic methods. In wave mechanics 
changes are represented by changes to the occupation factors of steady states meaning 
wavefunctions must represent steady states where the occupation factor is the only 
variable that changes with time. Eddington took this to be a principle upon which a full 
theory could be developed. As such he utilized relativity and uncertainty in union to 
change occupation factors, either by a change in the reference datum for energy or in a 
random fluctuation designed to create or annihilate particles.
With the occupation factor interpretation of energy states as a foundation, as all 
lower energy states become occupied, each particle has what Eddington called a ‘top 
energy’ (see chapter eight) that happens to be the energy a particle is boosted to due to 
the occupation of all the lower energy states. So clearly there is a link between the 
occupation factor and the exclusion principle. Since exclusion limits the number of 
pai'ticles in a volume, if the volume is completely filled as dictated by exclusion, then the 
occupation of that energy level is complete. Eddington also associated the rest mass of a 
particle with exclusion since its value results from the occupation of lower energy states. 
So, in simplified terms, the way to build the universe is to start with random fluctuations 
in the background field. Uncertainty not only creates these fluctuations but also limits 
how many can exist in a given volume forcing any new fluctuations to be spatially 
separate. Fluctuations in the scale of measurement give space curvature and endow 
individual particles with their rest energies. Since both descriptions must be equivalent 
Eddington concluded that exclusion was a wave-mechanical form of gravity. In order to 
validate this link Eddington derived the same formula for proper mass from both the
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exclusion principle and relativity. If this is true and if exclusion is the weak interaction in 
disguise then the W and Z bosons would have to have mass (and indeed they do!). Of 
course we now know this is more subtle than described here. The origin of mass lies in 
spontaneous symmetry breaking and the Anderson-Higgs mechanism but Eddington’s 
idea is fairly similar (though without the reliance on symmetry principles). Mass can be 
interpreted as the measure of how a graviton propagates just as charge is the measure of 
how a photon propagates. Nonetheless, uncertainty is at the deepest level of the heart of 
spontaneous symmetry breaking and so in a way Eddington was correct in assuming it 
played some role in the origin of mass (and thus curvature).
Returning momentarily to Eddington’s problem with the equivalence principle, 
there is a somewhat new interpretation of the origin of mass that was put forth in 2000 by 
Albrecht Giese that says the inertial behaviour of the mass of extended objects can be 
traced to the time of transmission for exchange particles in an interaction and his 
reasoning has valid points to it (Giese 2000). Unfortunately he does not explain the 
origin of mass for point particles. But his notion is intriguing and, on the surface, also 
appears to question the equivalence principle. Tests to show the equivalence between 
gravitational and inertial frames have overwhelmingly proven the two are equivalent to a 
phenomenal degree of accuracy. But Eddington has a curious addition in his theory that 
may be the root of this seeming difference.
In Fundamental Theory coordinate locations are endowed with energy just as 
mass, motion, and other characteristics are -  different locations indicate different energy 
levels. Based on Eddington’s interpretation of the exclusion principle and occupation 
factors given above this makes complete sense. Consider a particle with a constant 
velocity moving in space. In the above interpretation, if the coordinate location is 
constantly changing the energy associated with it (the coordinate location) must be 
changing. Since energy must be conserved, the mass must be changing (since the 
velocity isn’t) which makes no sense! But, bring in a gravitational potential and another 
source (or sink) of energy has been added such that rather than the energy of the 
coordinate locations being exchanged with the mass energy, it can be exchanged with the 
gravitational energy (potential). As such, gravity would be interpreted as a mass- 
stabilization energy term. Since all massive particles have (albeit miniscule) gravitational
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potential wells associated with them, there is a gravitational self-energy term that 
stabilizes the mass -  so mass stabilizes itself Unfortunately Eddington seems to forget, 
despite his liberal use of it elsewhere, that relativity tells us that coordinate systems are 
entirely relative so the coordinate location energy must really be an energy associated 
with the fact that a certain particle, for instance, is not in the same location (regardless of 
coordinate system) as another particle. In addition this does not adequately explain how 
massless particles remain massless.
Nonetheless, both gravity and exclusion provide an energy ‘boost’ to particles by 
changing their location that is manifested in wave mechanics as a changed in occupation. 
Either way it simply amounts to a change in location which is ultimately a relativistic 
phenomenon and might even suggest that gravity and electromagnetism were different 
manifestations of the same phenomenon to Eddington. In this way Fundamental Theory 
is truly a unified theory. Regardless, there is such a thing, then, as ‘exclusion energy’ in 
Fundamental Theory. Continuing with my line of reasoning regarding the relation 
between the weak interaction and exclusion this again makes sense -  the ‘exclusion 
energy’ is simply the energy of the weak interaction.
Another remarkable subtly in Eddington’s theory is the nature of the particles 
filling the negative energy sea. Since the fact that their energy is negative is simply due 
to a choice of datum, they have mass as any other particle does. Also, since exclusion, 
particularly when combined with the fact that most of the negative energy states are 
filled, forces extended objects into being and ostensibly, due to repulsive interactions, 
forces them apai't, it could be interpreted as the mechanism driving expansion in 
Eddington’s theory. The negative energy sea, then, has a very real total mass and energy 
and this could be interpreted in this context as being the mysterious dark energy of the 
universe especially considering Eddington explicitly includes the cosmological constant 
in his theory. Of course, with today’s knowledge we know this is not the case (even 
though we do not know precisely what dark energy and dark matter are). But, the picture 
I am painting here of Fundamental Theory is that, despite being filled with numerous 
problems, it is internally self-consistent and in keeping with experimental evidence. In 
fact it is remarkably prescient of subsequent discoveries many of which I have already 
pointed out. Yet another example related to the present discussion is that it predicts that
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every particle must hawQ a corresponding anti-particle, something we know quantum field 
theory predicts (and something that is troublesome for its lack of experimental 
confiimation -  where’s all the anti-matter?).
Subtly W eak Suggestions
As a large portion of the past few chapters has indicated Eddington found that exclusion 
and interchange were complementary concepts. In his exclusion interpretation of the 
universe that I have just analyzed particles force each other to be individuals at varying 
energy levels. Using interchange as an interpretive model instead, these same particles 
are constantly interchanging with one another producing the same total energy as the 
exclusion interpretation. We already know that the weak interaction is responsible for the 
interchange of particle characteristics for quarks and leptons so, in a way, this once again 
validates my assertion that exclusion and the weak interaction are intimately related. His 
discussion of the non-Coulomb repulsion terms adds yet more fuel to this argument as 
this repulsion amounts to an additional force. Since the weak and strong interactions 
were not only not well understood but thought to be one and the same at that time, 
Eddington is essentially advocating for their existence or the existence of something 
similar. Basically he acknowledges that electromagnetism and gravity cannot be the only 
two interactions in the universe. There must be at least one more.
The one major flaw in the suggestion that the weak interaction and the exclusion 
principle are the same phenomenon is that mesons participate in weak interactions but do 
not obey exclusion. On the other hand, if one realizes that the weak interaction is not 
really manifesting itself between mesons but rather between the quarks and anti-quarks 
within the interacting mesons themselves, the problem is partially solved. Why then 
would baryons, which are also compound particles composed of quarks, obey exclusion 
while mesons do not? Spin is the obvious (and universally accepted) answer, but I 
believe the truth is more subtle. The question really should be (if one is assuming that 
exclusion and the weak interaction are so closely related), if the weak interaction is there 
and its occurrence suggests exclusion, where is the exclusion phenomenon? What makes 
mesons different from baryons? Well, first, baryons have three quark-like particles while
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mesons have two. Second, while all three particles in a baryon are quarks, in a meson 
one is an anti-quark. So in terms of matter (as opposed to anti-matter), there is three 
times as much in a baryon. Perhaps the meson’s internal weak interactions cancel each 
other out such that there is no residual weak field outside the meson. Adding a third 
quark-like particle would break the 1:1 symmetry forcing the residual weak interaction 
energy to search for a ‘new partner’ as-it-were. As such it is reasonable to assume that 
the new pentaquark discovered last year would obey the exclusion principle since its 
weak interactions are unbalanced.'^^
Numerological Results and Extra Energy Terms
As chapter nine demonstrated Fundamental Theory was also remarkable in the number of 
physical constants derivable from it. There is still a great debate over the derivability of 
physical constants, especially as certain new theories and experimental evidence suggest 
these constants are of greater importance and more mysterious than first thought. 
Eddington’s method went further by exploring the relations between physical constants 
and it established relationships between constants seemingly at opposite ends of the size 
spectrum. Some of Eddington’s conclusions appear to be more than pure coincidence, 
however. (9.1), for instance, is still remarkably close to accepted values despite major 
changes in value for the dimensionless Hubble parameter since the 1940s.
Perhaps the most studied numerical result of Fundamental Theory, the mass ratio 
of the proton to the electron, has been offered up by critics as an example of his 
‘ cosmonumerology ’ but, as I demonstrated in chapter nine, he simply utilizes a 
mathematical trick or two to arrive at the result. In addition, at least one of these 
mathematical devices, the derivation based on external and internal masses (atomic and 
reduced masses) makes sense when performed for hydrogen since in this case the reduced 
hydrogen mass differs very little from the electron mass and the atomic hydrogen mass 
differs very little from the proton mass. Analyzed in this light it is not an unexpected
Subsequent to the writing of this treatise but before it was submitted I completed a phenomenological 
proof that exclusion is not equivalent to any of the four fundamental interactions (forces). I have inserted it 
as an appendix but have left my previous writing intact since it raises important philosophical issues and 
demonstrates the difficulty this problem presents.
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result. It is entirely possible that the poor reception of it was due to the obscure language 
of Fundamental Theory.
Another very studied result of Fundamental Theory is the value for the fine- 
structure constant. Eddington held that its inverse was exactly equal to 137 due to the 
correction factor required when moving from rigid to Galilean coordinates. Essentially it 
is the inverse of the multiplicity of an intracule. Ignoring the specific value for a 
moment, how does this compare to modem interpretations of the nature of the fine- 
structure constant? The fine-structure constant is nothing more than the coupling 
constant for electromagnetic interactions and appears at vertices in Feynman diagrams for 
such processes. It is essentially a measure of the strength of the electromagnetic 
interaction and can be expanded in a series expansion. In a way Eddington was close to 
this description since he viewed the fine-structure constant as being related to the degrees 
of freedom of the intracule and the intracule’s motion is constrained by its internal 
electromagnetic interaction (the internal binding energy of the intracule).
The non-Coulombian energy term that arises in these situations is essentially an 
accounting of the extra rest mass given by the proton over the electron. Eddington 
recognized that if all particles in the universe are ultimately indistinguishable something 
must account for the difference between the rest masses of the proton and electron. This 
was a very clever insight and, though incorrect, indicates that Eddington was able to see 
the inherent problem in the idea of indistinguishability. Of course, we now can attribute 
the excess mass of the proton to the fact that it is actually a composite particle made of 
thiee quarks. Quantum field theory can now explain the meaning and origins of such 
characteristics thus explaining indistinguishability. Again, less important than 
Eddington’s method was the mere fact that he recognized the underlying problem. In 
addition, his solution, though incorrect, is self-consistent since it explains why the non- 
Coulombian energy term is only associated with the proton. His work actually presages 
the discovery of internal structure in the proton. His methods outlined in equations (9.16) 
and (9.17) are actually based on scattering experiments. Anomalies had arisen in such 
experiments, some of which have since been shown to be a result of the three-quark 
structure of the proton, and Eddington was simply attempting to account for them. For 
instance he develops this extra energy term using a Dirac delta function such that it
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appears when the separation distance is zero (and he suggests that this implies the 
existence of a singularity, the only real mention of singularities in Fundamental Theory). 
Since the internal structure of the proton is primarily governed by the strong interaction 
he was also suggesting the existence of another internal interaction. In fact, in a way, the 
non-Coulombian energy in Eddington’s theory is directly related to the strong interaction 
since it is this that binds the quarks together providing the extra mass. The determination 
of the various mass terms is then the primary goal of Eddington’s statistical theory and, 
indeed, he calls (8.14) the “central formula of unified theory” (Eddington 1946, p. 81). In 
any case, the problem of the excess mass combined with the anomalies in the scattering 
experiments clearly indicated the existence of some unknown process and Eddington’s 
attempt at an explanation is certainly as admirable as any at that time.
Philosophical Implications
The major philosophical theme behind Fundamental Theory is the search for a truly 
objective theory of physics. Eddington struggles mightily with this throughout, 
vacillating between truly attempting to develop one and realizing it is most likely 
impossible. The most obvious manifestation of this objectivity requirement is a 
measurement standard since, at the moment, all measurement standards are inherently 
subjective. Eddington concluded that for a standard to be truly objective it must be 
derivable fiom the theory itself and not imposed by an observer. Subsequent objective 
physical theories have appealed to hidden variables as one solution to this problem, a 
solution that immediately calls into questions the completeness of quantum mechanics as 
a description of nature. These questions were nothing new to Eddington since they go 
back to the work of von Neumann and others in the 1930s (though it should be noted 
Eddington would have had to have read von Neumann in Geiman since his works were 
not ti anslated into English until the 1940s). But Eddington does not appeal to a hidden 
variable scheme in locating a solution to this problem but rather attempts to develop an 
objective theory that is consistent with accepted quantum mechanics principles such as 
uncertainty and complementarity. For this very reason Fundamental Theory should be 
viewed with less derision than hidden variable theories which continue to be disproved.
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Ill fact Eddington relied on the fundamental philosophical tenets of the founders of 
quantum theory employing such basic principles as the interference of observer and 
observed, something not as clearly defined in all hidden variable theories.
Eddington did, of course, introduce novel ideas, but they were nonetheless based 
on fundamental principles. In the case of the search for objectivity it is well understood 
that uncertainty plays a role in our inability to develop a truly objective theory. 
Eddington, however, took this a step further and placed an uncertainty in the fabric of 
space-time that was a result of the inability to separate the reference frame from the 
object under investigation. So, in a way, he applied this fundamental principle in reverse: 
rather than uncertainty being the root cause of subjectivity, it is our subjective viewpoint 
that actually leads to uncertainty in the fabric of space-time. In addition it is our 
subjectivity that introduces chirality into physics (rather than spontaneous symmetry 
breaking as it is now understood). He then took the unusual step of trying to determine 
the evolution of a system after any observation had ended. Uncertainty, in this case, 
increases the further from the end of the observation one gets. Since an observation can 
be modelled as a collapse of the wavefunction, this is essentially the reverse: the 
wavefunction spreads out and the number of possible eigenvalues increases. Again, 
Eddington is not introducing anything terribly novel but rather is simply working 
backwards from a point of knowledge to see how one might arrive at that piece of 
knowledge. In doing this he introduces a time coordinate that measures the time 
difference between the end of the observation and the moment in question. Statistically 
this must be added to the distribution function. The full description of this process gets 
bogged down in pedantic labelling and transformations between ordinary and ‘imaginary’ 
time since a distribution function is taken at a point in time but would include in it a 
change in time. Eddington may have unnecessarily complicated this process since one 
can resolve this by a simple comparison of distribution functions for the end of 
observation and the moment in question. Theoretically one could then create a third 
distribution function for the comparison of the first two and one would then have the 
answer.
Eddington never delves into greater depth with this problem clearly emphasizing 
the inherent difficulty in objective theories. The vast majority of Fundamental Theory is
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devoted to studies of actual observations where the observer clearly interferes and the 
wavefunction is collapsed. Any hope for a truly objective theory in this instance is in 
vain and perhaps this was Eddington’s way of acknowledging the limitations of normal 
theories. Nonetheless, he is striving for a working and applicable theory rather than one 
that is untestable or speculative and thus he sticks to building a theory around 
experimental results, though one should notice on studying his methods more closely that 
he attempts to greatly simplify things (as many physicists do). But we know that 
experimental results are fai* from simple in their verification. For instance, he assumes in 
equations such as (8.19) that all protons and electrons are bound. This is likely just his 
way of representing the fact that the majority of the mass in the universe is made up of 
hydrogen, but it is a major simplification for experimental purposes particulaily when 
one considers that if N  is really a count of hydrogen only, how could it have any 
particular usefulness in general equations used for free particles, larger atoms, and the 
like?
In addition to building a theoiy around experimental evidence he also builds a 
theory around the notion that everything can be reduced to mathematics. He clearly takes 
the stance that the nature of mathematics is such that it is inherent and in some way prior 
to the physical universe. In a way this is his route to objectivity. Since mathematics are 
inherent in the fabric of nature and, in fact, are independent of nature itself, a purely 
mathematical theory should be a purely objective theory. So in his view, a perfect theory 
would be purely mathematical and would yield numerical results consistent with 
experiment. Part of this desire for a purely objective theory based solely on mathematics 
is a result of his dissatisfaction with the rather arbitraiy nature of our choice of just what 
type of observational evidence is acceptable as solid proof. Visual evidence is nearly 
always accepted as solid proof yet visual evidence is simply electromagnetic in nature 
(notice the strong influence of observational astronomy in Eddington’s thinking here).
He asks why gravitational evidence is not equally acceptable as solid proof. As I 
mentioned earlier the difference here is that in most cases we do not have direct sensory 
experience of gravitational evidence. Regardless, the choice of a certain type of 
evidentiary proof as the most acceptable is somewhat arbitrary. A purely mathematical 
theory would blur the distinction, providing numerical results for both types. On the
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other hand, in his attempt to link microscopic and macroscopic phenomena he indicates 
that electromagnetic evidence is the realm of the microscopic while gravitational 
evidence is the realm of the macroscopic and both are transmitted to us via light since 
most gravitational solutions are observed via light since we don’t physically experience 
them. His most forceful example of this is the companion to Sirius that was inferred by 
gravitational effects but not ‘proven’ until it was discovered optically. Since Eddington 
had proven in 1919 that light reacted to gravitational fields he did not necessarily 
recognize the purely electromagnetic nature of light, though it is also fair to say photons 
were not recognized as the exchange particles for electromagnetism only, on par with 
gravitons, W and Z bosons, and gluons until after Eddington’s death. It was obviously 
known that they were related to electromagnetism but the eclipse expeditions implied that 
there might be more to them than that.
Eddington in Context
In critiquing Fundamental Theory too many historians oddly seem to have forgotten 
some of the basic interpretations of quantum mechanics including those developed at the 
onset of the theory’s development. One important conclusion that was first reached by 
Heisenberg was that quantum theory was not limited to statistical conclusions -  it could 
make precise and accurate predictions of physical phenomena. This then relates to the 
second important conclusion that the inability to make certain valid predictions arose 
from the inability to know everything about the present. Famously this is the question of 
whether or not quantum theory is complete. But it also implies that uncertainty is causal. 
Since the universe is then completely causal Eddington tries to avoid the incomplete 
knowledge problem by developing a system that provides all fundamental constants in a 
derived manner. Eddington’s methods were certainly a bit abstract and he is often overly 
pedantic, but his philosophical reasoning was sound and he did not deny any major 
foundational principle of physics (with the possible exception of the equivalence 
principle). It is rather curious, then, that he should receive the treatment he does in 
historical literature. Further, my analysis shows that much of his work was remarkably 
similar to modern quantum field theory and, though outdated and incorrect, leads to new
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questions such as the nature of exclusion and the relationship between particle density 
and field momentum. It is my hope that this monograph will serve as a partial 
vindication of Eddington’s cosmonumerological reputation and a stimulation of further 
research.
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Appendix A
The Zoo Puzzle
The Zoo Puzzle first appeared as ‘The Looking-glass Zoo’ in Hubert Phillips’ 1937 book 
Question Time: An Omnibus o f Problems for a Brainy Day published by J.M. Dent & 
Sons (London). Phillips often wrote under the pseudonym Caliban and Eddington 
himself submitted this puzzle to Phillips. Notice the reference to Lewis Carroll (as 
Charles Dodgson). There are numerous solutions. I present (verbatim) the solution that 
appears in the terrific collection on rec-puzzles.org. This is an excellent introduction to 
Eddington’s work in combinatorics and relates to some of his work in group theory.
The Zoo Puzzle as posed by Eddington in Phillips (1937)
/  took some nephews and nieces to the Zoo, and we halted at a cage marked
Tovus Slithius, male and female.
Beregovus Mimsius, male and female.
Rathus Momus, male and female.
Jabberwockius Vulgaris, male and female.
The eight animals were asleep in a row, and the children began to guess which was 
which. "That one at the end is Mr Tove. " "No, no! I fs  Mrs Jabberwock, " and so on. I  
suggested that they should each write down the names in order from left to right, and 
offered a prize to the one who got most names right.
As the four species were easily distinguished, no mistake would arise in pairing the 
animals; naturally a child who identified one animal as Mr Tove identified the other 
animal o f the same species as Mrs Tove.
The keeper, who consented to judge the lists, scrutinised them carefully. "Here's a queer 
thing. I  take two o f the lists, say, John's and Mary's. The animal which John supposes to
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be the animal which Mary supposes to be Mr Tove is the animal which Mary supposes to 
be the animal which John supposes to be Mrs Tove. It is just the same fo r  every pair o f 
lists, and for all four species.
"Curiouser and curiouser! Each boy supposes Mr Tove to be the animal which he 
supposes to be Mr Tove; but each girl supposes Mr Tove to be the animal which she 
supposes to be Mrs Tove. And similarly for the other animals. I  mean, fo r  instance, that 
the animal Mary calls Mr Tove is really Mrs Rathe, but the animal she calls Mrs Rathe is 
really Mrs Tove. "
"It seems a little involved, " I  said, "but I  suppose it is a remarkable coincidence. " "Very 
remarkable, " replied Mr Dodgson (whom I  had supposed to be the keeper) "and it could 
not have happened if  you had brought any more children. "
How many nephews and nieces were there? Was the winner a boy or a girl? And how 
many names did the winner get right?
The Answer (rec-puzzles.org)
Given that there is at least one boy and one girl (John and Mary are mentioned) then the 
answer is that there were 3 nephews and 2 nieces, the winner was a boy who got 4 right.
Detailed Solution (rec-puzzles.org)
Number the animals 1 through 8, such that the females are even and the males are odd, 
with members o f the same species consecutive; i.e. 1 is Mr. Tove, 2 Mrs. Tove, etc.
Then each childs (sic) guesses can be represented by a permutation. I  use the standard 
notation o f a permutation as a set o f orbits. For example: (1 3 5)(6 8) means 1 -> 3 ,3  -> 
5, 5 -> 1, 6 -> 8, 8 -> 6 and 2,4,7 are unchanged.
I. Let P be any childs (sic) guesses. Then P(mate(i)) = mate(P(i)).
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2. I fQ  is another childs (sic) guesses, then [P,Q] = T, where [P,Q] is the 
commutator (sic) o f P and Q (P  composed with Q composed with P 
inverse composed with Q inverse) and T is the special permutation (1 2) (3 
4) (5 6) (7 8) that Just swaps each animal with its spouse.
3. I fP  represents a boy, then P*P - 1 ( 1  use "^for composition, and I  fo r the 
identity permutation: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
4. I fP  represents a girl, then P*P = T.
(1) and (4) together mean that all girl's guesses must be o f the form: (A B  CD ) (E F  G 
H) where A  and C are mates, as are B &D, E & F G & H.
So without loss o f generality let Mary = (I 3 2 4) (5 7 6 8) Without to (sic) much effort we 
see that the only possibilities for other girls "compatible" with Mary (I use compatible to 
mean the relation expressed in (2)) are:
g l ; (1 5 2 6) (3 8 4 7)
92: (1 6 2 5) (3 7 4 8)
g3: (1 7 2 8) (3 5 4 6)
g4 : (1 8 2 7) (3 6 4 5)
Note that g l is incompatible with g2 and g3 is incompatible with g4. Thus no 4 o f Mary 
and g 1-4 are mutually compatible. Thus there are at most three girls: Mary, g I and g3 
(without loss o f generality) By (1) and (3), each boy must be represented as a product o f 
transpostions (sic) and!or singletons: e.g. (I 3) (2 4) (5) (6) (7) (8) or (1) (2) (3 4) (5 8) 
(6 7).
Let J represent John's guesses and consider J (I). I f  J(l)  = 1, then J(2) = 2 (by [I]) using
[2] and Mary J(3) = 4, J(4) = 3, and g l & J  =>  J(5) -  6, J(6) = 5, & g3 & J  => J(8) -  
7 J(7) = 8 i.e. J  -  (1)(2)(3 4)(5 6)(7 8). But the [J,Mary] <> T. In fact, we can see thatJ  
must have no fixed points, J(i) <> ifor all i, since there is nothing special about i = 1.
I fJ ( l)  = 2, then we get from Mary that J(3) = 3. contradiction.
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I fJ ( l)  = 3, then J(2) = 4, J(3) -  1, J(4) ~ 2 (from Mary) ->  J(5) = 7, J(6) -  8, J(7) -  5, 
7(8) = 6 = >  y = (7 3)(2 7)(6 8) (/rom g7)
But then J  is incompatible with g3.
A similar analysis shows that J(l) cannot be 4,5,6,7 or 8; i.e. no J  can be compatible with 
all three girls. So without loss o f generality, throw away g3.
We h ave  Mary - ( 1 3 2 4 )  ( 5 7 6 8 )  
g l  = ( 1 5 2 6 )  ( 3 8 4 7 )
The following are the only possible boy guesses which are compatible with both o f these:
Bl ; ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3  4 ) ( 5  6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 )
B2; (1 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7  8)
B3; (1 3 ) ( 2  4 ) ( 5  7 ) ( 6  8)
B4; (1 4 ) ( 2  3 ) ( 5  8 ) ( 6  7)
B5; (1 5 ) ( 2  6 ) ( 3  8 ) ( 4  7)
B6; (1 6 ) ( 2  5 ) ( 3  7 ) ( 4  8)
Note that B1 & B2 are incombatible (sic), as are B3 & B4, B5 & B6, so at most three o f 
them are mutually compatible. In fact, Mary, g l, BI, B3 and B5 are all mutually 
compatible (as are all the other possibilities you can get by choosing either B l or B2, B3 
or B4, B5 or B6. So i f  there are 2 girls there can be 3 boys, but no more, and we have 
already eliminated the case o f 3 girls and I boy.
The only other possibility to consider is whether there can be 4 or more boys and I girl. 
Suppose there are Mary and 4 boys. Each boy must map 1 to a different digit or they 
would not be mutually compatible. For example i fb l  and b2 both map I  to 3, then they 
both map 3 to I (since a boy's map consists o f transpositions), so both bl^'b2 and b2*bl
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map 1 to 1. Furthermore, b l and b2 cannot map 1 onto spouses. For example, i f  b l( l)  
a and b is the spouse o f a, then bl(2) = b. Jfb2(l) = b, then b2(2) = a. Then bl*b2(l) ■ 
bl(b) = 2 and b2*bl(I ) = b2(a) = 2 (again using the fact that boys are all 
transpositions{s\c)). Thus the four boys must be:
B l; ( 1 ) ( 2 ) . . . or (1 2)
B2 ; (1 3 ) . . . or (1 4)
B3 ; (1 5)  . . . or (1 6)
B4; ( 1 7 )  . . . or (1 8)
Consider B4. The only permutation o f the form (1 7)... which is compatible with Mary ( (1 
3 2 4 ) (5 7 6 8 ) ) i s :
(1 7 ) ( 2  8 ) ( 3  5 ) ( 4  6)
The only (1 8)... possibility is:
(1 8 ) ( 2  7 ) ( 3  6 ) { 4  5)
Suppose B4 = (1 7)(2 8)(3 5)(4 6)
lfB 3  starts (1 5), it must be (1 5)(2 6)(3 8)(4 7) to be compatible with B4. This is 
compatible with Mary also.
Assuming this and B2 starts with (1 3) we get B2 =: (1 3)(2 4)(5 8)(6 7) in order to be 
compatible with B4. But then B2*B3 and B3*B2 moth map 1 to 8. I.e. no B2 is mutually 
compatible with B3 & B4.
Similarly ifB2 starts with (14)  it must be (I 4)(2 3)(5 7)(6 8) to work with B4, but this 
doesn't work with B3.
112
Likewise B3 starting with (16) leads to no possible B2 and the identical reasoning 
eliminates B4 = (1 8)...
So no B4 is possible! i.e. at most 3 boys are mutually compatiblw (sic) with Mary, so 2
girls & 3 boys is optimal. Thus:
M ary = (1 3 2 4) (5 7 6 8)
Sue = (1 5 2 6) (3 8 4 7)
John = (1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3  4 ) ( 5 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 )
Bob == (1 3 ) ( 2  4) (5 7 ) ( 6 8)
Ji m = (1 5 ) ( 2  6) (3 8 ) ( 4 7)
is one optimal solution, with the winner being John (4 right: 1 2 7  & 8).
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Appendix B
The Burying Ground at St. Giles 
A Most Unusual Cemetery
Certainly Britain has its famed cemeteries, burial grounds, and catacombs with 
Westminster Abbey topping the list. But there exists a curious little cemetery in 
Cambridge that, for its small size, has what seems to be a disproportionate number of 
“Cambridge’s greatest talents” (Goldie 2000). To quote from Mark Goldie’s A 
Cambridge Necropolis,
There you will find the graves of the physicist who split the 
atom, the biochem ist who discovered vitam ins, the 
astronomer who discovered Neptune, the anthropologist 
who explored the roots of religion, the architect who 
designed more of the university’s buildings than did any 
other, a son and granddaughter of Charles Darwin who 
made their own marks as a scientific instrument-maker and 
a poet, and two of the most important philosophers of the 
twentieth century.
Here lie two Nobel Prize-winners, seven members of the 
Order of Merit, eight masters of colleges, fifteen knights of 
the realm, and thirty-nine people who appear in the 
Dictionary o f National Biography (Goldie 2000, p. 3).
Remarkably these graves lie on only one-and-a-half acres currently known as Ascension 
Cemetery and formerly known as the St. Giles Burial Ground. There are nearly 2500 
people buried there in 1500 plots and they represent numerous religions (as well as none).
I had the good fortune to visit there during the workshop Arthur Eddington: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives that took place in March of 2004. Eddington himself is 
buried at Ascension as are several people who play peripheral roles in this monograph. I
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have already included photographs of several headstones but wish to include photographs 
of a few others representing people who had some connection to Eddington, astronomy, 
physics, philosophy, etc. I also include the full list given by Goldie (2000) but refer 
readers to that work for maps, directions, and biographical sketches.
The Photographs
Figure B l. Ascension Cemetery with St. Giles Chapel in 
the background and the Eddington family plot at bottom 
Right.
Figure B2. St. Giles Chapel, now privately 
owned.
Figure B3. A trio of Cambridge luminaries, from left to right: Nobel laureate physicist Sir John Cockcroft 
(1897 -  1967), former Cambridge Observatory director and discoverer of Neptune John Couch Adams 
(1819 -  1892), and mathematician and historian W.W. (Walter William) Rouse Ball (1850 -  1925).
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The List
This is the list of luminaries given by Goldie (2000). It is always difficult to define 
greatness so perhaps it is better to say that the following people are recognizably public 
figures in their fields or in the Cambridge University community. Nonetheless, it attests 
to the phenomenal influence of Cambridge in British Society.
Adams, John Couch (1819 -  1892), see Figure B3 above.
Anderson, Sir Hugh (1865 -  1928), physiologist. Master of Caius.
Appleton, Rev. Richard (1849 -  1909), Master of Selwyn.
Ball, Sir Robert, FRS (1840 -  1913), see Figure 3 (in Chapter II).
Benson, Arthur (1866 -  1925), Master of Magdelene.
Bethune-Baker, James, FBA (1861 -  1951), theologian.
Brink, Charles, FBA (1906 -  1994), classicist.
Brogan, Sir Denis, FBA (1900 -  1974), historian, political scientist.
Brooke, Zachary, FBA (1883 -  1946), historian.
Bushnell, Geoffrey, FBA (1903 -  1978), archaeologist.
Clark, Sir William, KCB (1876 -  1952), civil servant.
Cockcroft, Sir John, CM, FRS (1897 -  1967), see Figure B3 above.
Cornford, Frances (1886 -  1960), poet.
Darwin, Sir Francis, FRS (1848 -  1925), botanist, biographer.
Darwin, Sir Horace, FRS (1851 -  1928), scientific instrument maker.
Darwin, Ida (1854 -  1946), mental health pioneer.
Eddington, Sir Arthur, CM, FRS (1882 -  1944), the subject of this book!
Frazer, Sir James, OM, FBA, FRS (1854 -  1941), anthropologist.
Gwatkin, Henry (1844 -  1916), historian, theologian, conchologist.
Hopkins, Sir Frederick, OM, FRS (1861 -  1947), biochemist, Nobel laureate. 
Hopkinson, Bertram, FRS (1874 -  1918), engineer.
Hutchinson, Arthur, FRS (1866 -  1937), mineralogist.
Jackson, Henry, OM (1839 -  1921), classicist.
Jebb, Sir Richard, OM, FBA, MP (1841 -  1905), classicist.
Kenny, Courtney Stanhope, FBA, MP (1847 -  1930), legal scholar.
Lamb, Sir Horace, FRS (1849 -  1934), see Figure 1 (in Chapter II).
Lubbock, Hugh Roger (1951-1981), cell biologist.
MacAlister, Sir Donald (1854 -  1934), Vice-Chancellor of Glasgow.
McCarthy, Sir Desmond (1877 -  1952), literary and drama critic.
McLean, Norman, FBA (1865 -  1947), orientalist. Master of Christ’s.
Marshall, Alfred, FBA (1842 -  1924), economist.
Mayor, John (1825 -  1910), antiquarian.
Moore, G.E., OM, FBA (1873 -  1958), philosopher.
Newall, Hugh, FRS (1857 -  1944), astrophysicist.
Newton, Alfred, FRS (1829 -  1907), ornithologist.
Ramsey, Frank (1903 -  1930), philosopher and mathematician.
Roberts, David (1911 -  1982), architect.
Rouse Ball, Walter William (1858 -  1925), see Figure B3 above.
Sandys, Sir John (1844 -  1922), classicist and orator.
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Scott, Charlotte (1853 -  1921), pioneer female student.
Selwyn, Rt. Rev. John (1844 -  1898), Bishop, Master of Selwyn. 
Skeat, Walter (1835 -  1912), philologist, Anglo-Saxonist.
Spufford, Bridget (1967 -  1989), namesake of Bridget’s hostel.
Stern, Peter, FBA (1920 -  1991), Germanist.
Taylor, Hemy, FRS (1842 -  1927), mathematician, Braille expert. 
VeiTall, Arthur (1851 -  1912), classicist and literary scholar.
Wisdom, John (1904 -  1993), philosopher (how great a name is thatl). 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889 -  1951), see Figure 6 (in Chapter IV). 
Wood, Charles (1866 -  1926), composer.
Wright, William (1831 -  1914), Shakespearean and biblical scholar.
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Appendix C
A Dialogue Concerning the Nature of Exclusion and its Relation to Force
I present the following argument that the exclusion principle is not equivalent to any of 
the four known fundamental interactions via a dialogue. The dialogue in scientific 
writing has been a lost art for many years. I present it in this form since that is the form it 
took in my head as I was working out the details. I find I often play ‘devil’s advocate’ to 
myself in my own ‘internal’ dialogues concerning my research. I give the role of the 
scientist to Peter Higgs of the University of Edinburgh who first formulated the idea of 
the Higgs mechanism as the source of mass in the Standard Model of particle physics 
(Higgs 1963). My reasons for this choice should be apparent by the end. The ‘advocate,’ 
as it were, remains ... the ‘advocate.’
HIGGS: You will agree, will you not that the four fundamental interactions are gravity, 
electromagnetism, the weak interaction, and the strong interaction?
ADVOCATE: Indeed, that is clearly understood.
HIGGS: Would you also agree that exclusion would be repulsive if it were an 
interaction?
ADVOCATE: Yes, that does appear to be its nature -  exclusion, repulsion -  minor 
semantics, really.
HIGGS: Well then, since gravity and the strong interaction are attractive we can 
immediately rule them out (thus blowing a hole in Eddington’s Fundamental Theory). 
ADVOCATE: Yes, well Eddington wasn’t really a numerologist anyway -  none of this 
prognostication like that fellow Nostradamus. I like prognosticators.
HIGGS: No numbers necessary here, at least until the end. Anyway, that leaves us with 
the weak and electromagnetic interactions.
ADVOCATE: Which are really one-and-the-same according to those GWS fellows. 
HIGGS: You mean Sheldon, Steven, and Abdus? Yes, well at normal energies those two 
interactions at least look different.
ADVOCATE: Indeed, but I think at least one of them can be eliminated.
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HIGGS: Yes, well I was getting to that. I suppose you were thinking of our rather 
elusive friend the neutrino.
ADVOCATE: Yes, he is a bit of a bother; about the only thing that regularly visits our 
toasty little haven ‘beneath’ and heaven knows we like our privacy (or at least its 
occupants do).
HIGGS: Precisely. That is because neutrinos only paiticipate in the weak interaction! 
But, being leptons, they do obey the exclusion principle!
ADVOCATE: Putting the final nail into Eddington’s coffin I suppose.
HIGGS: I ’m ignoring your puns, by the way.
ADVOCATE: Yes, most people do, but it’s not the puns that get them ...
HIGGS: Yes, well, as I was saying at the most fundamental level, all quai'ks and leptons 
interact weakly and obey the exclusion principle. It seems that the weak interaction is the 
only universally common attribute of particles with half-integer spin.
ADVOCATE: Lest you move too hastily in your assumptions, recall that both exclusion 
and the weak interaction have antisymmetric properties.
HIGGS: Oh, yes, nearly forgot that. Indeed the weak interaction Lagrangian is chiral 
while excluding wavefunctions are antisymmetric. But, if we build composite particles 
out of quarks and antiquaiks we find one family of composite quark particles -  mesons -  
participate in weak interactions but do not exclude! That should do it, eh?
ADVOCATE: If you say so. Personally I find it logically unsatisfying since someone is 
bound to argue that the nature of mesons is a bit different since they contain one quark 
and one antiquark whereas other composite particles generally contain three such 
fundamental particles (or five in the case of the newly discovered pentaquarks). In 
addition one might argue that composite particles really don’t count since we’re 
interested in the most fundamental nature of exclusion (i.e. mesons may not exclude as a 
whole but their constituents surely do and it is these constituents that ultimately interact 
weakly with each other).
HIGGS: Ah, good point.
ADVOCATE: I have them occasionally.
HIGGS: So perhaps the nature of the bosonic exchange is different inside a meson.
Well, if that is the case then let us look at it another way. Exclusion is clearly related to
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spin which can be related to charge via magnetic moment, but neutrinos exclude yet have 
no charge (as do neutrons but based on our current line of reasoning their constituents are 
what we care about).
ADVOCATE: Tut-tut. Think outside the box, man. What is charge anyway but a 
measure of how a photon propagates? It is reasonable to assume that spin simply tells 
photons what to do i f  they are present but their presence is, by no means, required. Don’t 
get bogged down in classical descriptions. Recall that the Wigner (spin conservation) 
rule says that for any transition, be it radiative or radiationless, transitions between terms 
that have the same multiplicity are ‘spin-allowed’ while those between terms that have 
different multiplicity are ‘spin-forbidden.’ Exclusion depends solely on the spin quantum 
number.
HIGGS: Hmmm ... I guess we’ll have to think some more about the weak interaction. 
Approaching this, then, from the standpoint of the Standard Model, the weak interaction 
exchanges W and Z bosons.
ADVOCATE: So exclusion would have to be equivalent in energy to these bosons. 
HIGGS: But the W boson exchanges electrical charge. Since exclusion does not affect 
charge the only boson left is the Z that transfers nothing but momentum (all its quantum 
numbers are zero since it represents a neutral current interaction and is its own 
antipai ticle). This should immediately close the door on this line of reasoning since spin 
is a quantum number.
ADVOCATE: A truly sharp mind would ask the following question: what if we suppose 
that the Z carries quantum numbers (not its own, since it has none) from one identical 
particle to another? Essentially two identical particles interacting weakly would 
constantly exchange Z bosons meaning they would be constantly exchanging the same 
information. This would mean, for instance, that an electron pair with opposite spin 
could coexist in the same orbital because they cannot exchange a Z boson since they do 
not have identical quantum numbers. Z bosons only propagate between particles with 
identical quantum numbers. Momentum is conserved in the transfer since each of the 
two interacting particles emits (and then receives) a Z at the same time as the other. This 
appears to be a realistic model for exclusion as a neutral current interaction.
HIGGS: Interesting, but it must be subjected to a test.
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ADVOCATE: You scientists and your tests. Can’t anything be accepted on mere faith 
anymore? I ’m clearly in the wrong business these days.
HIGGS: Imagine that an electron was attempting to reach the lowest orbital in a 
hydrogen atom and that it had quantum numbers that were identical to the electron 
aheady occupying that orbital. If this invading electron had enough energy to overcome 
electromagnetic repulsion it still could not get any closer than the second lowest orbital 
due to quantisation and exclusion (recall it has the same spin as the electron that is 
already there). As such the Z boson, if it represented exclusion, would have to transmit 
an equivalent amount of energy in the given distance between the two orbitals. But in 
very simple atoms the distance between orbitals can be on the order of 10' °^ m while the Z 
can only have a range of up to 10'^  ^m which is the maximum range of the weak 
interaction. To put it another way, if exclusion is represented by the Z boson then atoms 
would be considerably smaller than they are. For exclusion to be represented by any 
boson at all that boson would have to be less massive than the Z as given by (5.21). 
ADVOCATE: What in the Devil’s name is (5.21)? Is that some Biblical reference again? 
Please say otherwise. I never win any arguments with Him.
HIGGS: Never mind.
ADVOCATE: Well, look here my dear fellow, your argument rules out your very own 
mechanism as well since the Higgs particle is theoretically more massive than the Z. One 
should always strive to maximize the applicability of one’s own theories.
HIGGS: Ha! You really understand scientists do you? Vanity is often cured by a 
good puzzle. So, there. I ’ve proved it! Exclusion is not represented by any of the known 
fundamental interactions or forces, if you will!
ADVOCATE: But, as Margenau has argued, it clearly displays quasi-force behaviour in 
some theoretical situations. Since charge is a measure of how photons propagate and 
mass is a measure of how gravitons propagate, one would expect spin to be a measure of 
how some third type of boson propagates. But we have ruled out gluons, Higgs particles, 
and even W and Z bosons despite the very attractive similarities between exclusion and 
the weak interaction (antisymmetric nature, rules for identical particles, etc.).
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HIGGS: It simply means that the nature of the exclusion principle may be on par with 
the nature of the conservation laws that are immut&le rules of design in the universe 
with no satisfactory explanation outside of symmetry.
ADVOCATE: Yes, well, regardless, it is clearly a more complex phenomenon than one 
might expect.
HIGGS: Again you underestimate us scientists. That’s a reason to celebrate -  it’s 
another puzzle to solve!
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